

CONSCIOUSNESS AND REALITY

Studies in Memory of Toshihiko Izutsu

EDITED BY

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BRILL
LEIDEN · BOSTON · KÖLN
2000

ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY THEOLOGY AND SCIENCE

Texts and Studies

EDITED BY

H. DAIBER and D. PINGREE

VOLUME XXXVIII



CONSCIOUSNESS AND REALITY

This book is printed on acid-free paper

This book is published under the auspices of:

Unesco, Paris.

Kcio University, Tokyo.

This book is published with the Grant-in-Aid for Publication of Scientific Research
Result of the Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture, Japan.

Publication of this volume has also been assisted by a grant from the Daido Life
Foundation, Osaka.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Consciousness and reality : studies in memory of Toshihiko Izutsu / edited by
Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī...[et al.].

p. cm. — (Islamic philosophy, theology and science, ISSN 0169-8729 ;
v. 38)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 9004115862

I. Philosophy, Islamic. 2. Sufism. 3. Izutsu, Toshihiko, 1914-1993

I. Āshtiyānī, Jalāl al-Dīn. II. Izutsu, Toshihiko, 1914- III. Series.

B741.C57 1999

181'.07—dc21

99-046290

CIP

Die Deutsche Bibliothek – CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

Consciousness and reality : studies in memory of Toshihiko Izutsu /

Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī... - Leiden ; Boston ; Köln : Brill, 1999

(Islamic philosophy, theology and science ; Vol. 38)

ISBN 90-04-11586-2

Copyright © 1998 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers

First published 1998 by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo

ISSN 0169-8729

ISBN 90 04 11586 2

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PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

Contents

Foreword (<i>Shinya Makino</i>)	ix
Preface (<i>Seyyed Hossein Nasr</i>)	xi

I. Perspective on History and Global Society

1. Islamic Resurgence
Wilfred Cantwell Smith 3
2. Al-Wāqidī, the Orientalists and Apologetics
Charles J. Adams 17
3. The Quranic Commentaries of Mullā Ṣadrā
Seyyed Hossein Nasr 45
4. The Meaning and Experience of Happiness in Islām
Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas 59
5. *Danishnamah-i Maysari*, the Oldest Medical Compendium
in Persian Verse
Mehdi Mohaghegh 79

II. Religion and Aesthetical Order

1. Why Decline of Buddhism Took Place in India?
Hajime Nakamura 89
2. The Paradise Garden Paradigm
Nader Ardalan 97
3. The Pīr-Murīd Relationship in the Thought of ‘Ayn al-
Quḍāt Hamadānī
Forough Jahanbakhsh 129
4. Refiguring Postmodern Times
Mark C. Taylor 149

5. In the Gardens—A Psychological Memoir
James Hillman 175
6. Legacy of the Prophetic Experience in Judaism
Hiroshi Ichikawa 183
7. Avatars japonais de l'ascension d'Alexandre
Hideichi Matsubara 201

III. Structured Analysis and Methodological Possibilities

1. Ibn 'Arabi's Conception of God's Universal Mercy:
The Chapter on Zakariyya' in the Fusus al-Hikam
Ronald L. Nettler 213
2. The Unique Arabic Manuscript of Aristotle's *Ar̥s Rhetorica* and its two Editions published to date by
'Abdurrahmān Badawī and by M[alcolm] C. Lyons
Estiphan Panoussi 233
3. On the Originality of "Izutsu" Oriental Philosophy
Shinya Makino 251
4. Le Soufisme entre Louis Massignon et Henry Corbin
Christian Jambet 259
5. La Révélation coranique et la Gnose islamique
Mikio Kamiya 273
6. Hallāj in the *Sawānih* of Ahmad Ghazālī
Nasrollah Pourjavady 285

IV. Being and Knowing

1. An Essay on "Creatio ex Nihilo"
Masao Matsumoto 297
2. The Structure of Consciousness in Śaṅkara's Philosophy
Yoshitsugu Sawai 323
3. On Sufi Psychology: A Debate between the Soul and the Spirit
William C. Chittick 341
4. Unity of Ontology and Epistemology in Qaiṣarī's Philosophy
Akiro Matsumoto 367
5. 'Azīz-i Nasafī and the Essence-Existence Debate
Hermann Landolt 387
6. La Voie de Hallāj et la voie d'Ibn 'Arabi
Mokdad Arfa Mensia 397

7. Suhrawardi, Philosopher or Mystic?	
Golden Triangle of his Worldview	
<i>Shiva Kaviani</i>	423
Curriculum Vitae of Toshihiko Izutsu	439
Bibliography of Toshihiko Izutsu's Writings	441
Appendix: Catalogue of Lithographed Books of Iran in the Library of	
Toshihiko Izutsu (Compiled by Takashi Iwami)	451
Editors	470
Contributors	471

Foreword

The present volume of collected papers is the product of an international academic project which aims at successive development of the late Dr. Izutsu's philosophic inquiries into the structural relationship between consciousness and reality. Dr. Izutsu had been in pursuit of this inquiry for a long time through the fields of Islamic studies, as well as philosophy of language and comparative philosophy. Both overseas and Japanese scholars who had enjoyed academic relations with the late professor Izutsu joined this project and submitted papers with subjects related to Dr. Izutsu's theme for the present volume. Together they have produced this international academic collaboration which has great importance for future actualization of "real dialogue" among various cultural traditions.

As I shall state in my paper which is submitted below, professor Izutsu's outstanding ability allowed him to master more than twenty foreign languages, and after that he investigated various cultures of the world and elucidated especially the substance of the religious and philosophical systems of many peoples by making free use of these languages. In the present day when learning tends to be increasingly specialized, it is certainly surprising that the sphere of his research activities is so extensive that it contains within it the principal cultures of the world.

The sphere of professor Izutsu's research activities is so extensive as to be unimaginable, stretching, for example, from Ancient Greek philosophy and the philosophy of the Western Middle Ages to Islamic mysticism of Arabia and Persia, Jewish philosophy, Indian philoso-

phy, Chinese thought of Confucianism and Taoism, to the philosophy of Zen. However, the true genius of his research activities does not consist only in the extensiveness of his work. Instead, whatever of these diverse domains he may have chosen as his object of investigation, he pursued at all times the problem under the basic theme of the relationship between philosophical thinking and mysticism, which arises from an awareness of the problem of contemplative experience lying concealed in the depths of philosophical thinking. And this theme did neither occur accidentally, nor was it discovered as the result of mere theoretical research. It was uncovered through the contemplative experience of Zen training, which he had practiced since the days of his youth, and at the same time through many years' efforts of his strict philosophical thinking.

And it should not perhaps be ignored that in the heart of the whole matter there lies a unique philosophical stance of his own, the Oriental "metaphysics of language" as a hidden methodology.

MAKINO Shinya

Preface

I first met Toshihiko Izutsu during a cold winter day in 1962 in Montreal where I had come from Harvard University to lecture at McGill University on the philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā. During that visit I attended one of his classes in which he was lecturing on the semantic theories of European existentialist philosophers, the subject of semantics having been always dear to his heart. After hearing my lecture on Mullā Ṣadrā, however, he stated that henceforth he would change his field of research to later Islamic philosophy, a decision which became actualized in his later life. As a result of this common interest, we soon became close friends and I was to meet him in cities as far apart as Madrid and Kamakura. But with his increase of interest in Islamic philosophy, it was Persia that began to attract him more and more. His collaboration with Professor Mehdi Mohaghegh, who began to visit McGill regularly from the late 1960s onward, led to Izutsu travelling to Tehran often, where he met many of Persia's famous scholars such as Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī.

When I founded the Iranian Academy of Philosophy, I invited him to join its teaching staff on a permanent basis, an invitation which he accepted. He thereby spent much of the year from 1975 to 1978 in Tehran, a period of four years during which he interacted with numerous scholars including Henry Corbin as well as students of Islamic thought, not only Persian but also Japanese, European and American, the latter including now well-established scholars such as William Chittick and James Morris. With the tumultuous events of 1978 in Persia marking the beginning of the Islamic Revolution, he left the Academy to return to Japan where he spent the last part of

his life.

Toshihiko Izutsu is the greatest scholar of Islamic thought produced by Japan and a seminal figure in the realm of comparative philosophy. Combining a Buddhist sensibility and traditional Japanese discipline with an unbelievable gift for learning languages and an exceptional philosophical acumen including both analytical and synthetic powers, Izutsu was able to cross cultural and intellectual frontiers with ease and to penetrate into different universes of meaning with great insight. He was a master of not only the main languages of three civilizations, the Far Eastern, Western, and Islamic, but also of their intellectual heritage. He wrote with authority not only on Lao-Tze but also Ibn 'Arabī and Mullā Ṣadrā not to speak of European philosophers.

As far as Islamic studies are concerned, the significance of the work of Izutsu lies precisely in that here we observe a mind molded by Zen Buddhism, Neo-Confucianism and Shintoism, the constituent elements of Japanese classical culture, encountering the world of the Quranic revelation and the Islamic thought which followed upon its advent. Since the 19th century, European orientalism has produced a vast body of works on Islamic thought which is the product of minds molded by Judaism, Christianity and the Graeco-Roman heritage as well as the secularizing currents of modern times. The works of Izutsu in the domain of Islamic studies with their own intellectual "flavor" reveal in fact how significant is the worldview with which a scholar undertakes the study of another intellectual universe and how shallow the claims of supposed "objectivity" preached by so many Western scholars (there being of course honorable exceptions) by which they usually mean, whether they are aware of it or not, the anti-metaphysical and secularized "reason" and rationalism of the Age of Enlightenment.

Izutsu is the first major figure in modern times to present serious studies of Islamic thought from not only a non-Islamic but also non-Western perspective. We say modern times because in centuries gone by there have also been Hindu, Buddhist and even Confucian studies of Sufism and Islamic philosophy to which in fact little attention has been paid in contemporary scholarship. In any case the

significance of Izutsu is not only in the field of comparative philosophy in general. It is more specifically in creating the first serious encounter between the more inward and central intellectual and spiritual currents of Islamic and Far Eastern thought in the context of modern scholarship.

Izutsu had the exceptional gift, rare in contemporary academic circles, of relating philosophical ideas to the written text going back to the original meaning of lecture as reading. It was this combining of philosophical insight and analysis with careful attention to the text, its language, sentences, words and even letters, that made Izutsu such a fine teacher in the manner of the outstanding traditional scholars of various civilizations for whom a traditional text always served as the basis and foundation from which ideas flowed and also took flight. In this domain he possessed an art lost to a large extent in modern university education where philosophical ideas are taught usually divorced from a careful analysis of the traditional texts on the basis of traditional commentaries. That is why his students found him so compelling as a teacher. He created a bond with his serious students much more similar to the link between a traditional master and his disciples than that between a professor in a modern university and those attending his classes.

Izutsu was a prolific scholar and produced a large number of important books and essays despite his many travels from Japan to Europe, America and the Islamic world. His early works on the language of the Quran and Islamic theology have not yet been surpassed in European languages. His writings on Taoism and Buddhism have been recognized for their high quality among scholars of the field. His studies of later Islamic philosophy and such figures as Sabziwārī were ground breaking when they appeared and quite astonishing considering that he turned to this subject only in the 1960s. His treatment of some of the most difficult Sufi doctrines such as the recreation of the world at every instant are among the most penetrating in European languages. But most of all his writings on comparative philosophy and especially this monumental opus *A Comparative Study of the Key Philosophical Concepts of Sufism and Taoism*, are unmatched for their masterly command of the original

languages involved and keen analysis of the morphological similarities and dissimilarities between the ideas involved in the texts in question.

Interestingly enough Izutsu was not only interested in the intellectual aspects of all of these and other subjects, but also in their aesthetic aspect and in fact in the aesthetic dimension of life itself. He was very sensitive to both visual and oral beauty. I shall never forget his penetrating comments upon the iconography of the Buddha image as we stood in 1970 before the great statue of the Buddha in Kamakura, nor his almost uncontainable joy and ecstatic state when we attended a performance of flamenco music and dance in Madrid a year later. After the performance which had moved him beyond my expectations, he uttered, "but this is Islamic art in one of its highest forms."

This aesthetic appreciation was not only personal. It also involved penetrating studies of subjects as far apart as *haiku* and Japanese screen painting, some of these carried out in collaboration with Mrs. Izutsu who is herself a writer and has been deeply involved in the study of art. It is of significance that Professor Izutsu showed great interest in both the plastic arts and literature not to speak of music. Who has given a deeper explanation of the subdued colors of Japanese and Chinese landscape paintings or the relation between the inner state of the poet and his poem in Japanese poetry than Izutsu? Often people in whom the power of abstract, philosophical thought is developed, do not pay much attention to the artistic aspect of reality. For Izutsu the intellectual and the artistic were combined in both his personal life and in his writings.

Izutsu has left behind works which are known the world over and have been translated into many languages. He has also trained numerous students in Japan, Canada, Persia and elsewhere many of whom are now themselves well-known scholars. It is therefore not only appropriate but necessary to publish this *Festschrift* to commemorate his memory and to celebrate his achievements.

This volume reveals in the diversity of its essays and perspectives of the authors the vast and multifarious influence of the scholar to whom it is dedicated and the different domains of knowledge to

which he was attracted and to which he contributed in one way or another. The contributors are from Japan as well as Persia, Canada as well as France, Switzerland as well as Tunisia, the United Kingdom as well as Malaysia. Their list includes his colleagues as well as students and friends and two generations of scholars ranging from those already retired and world-famous such as W. C. Smith, Charles J. Adams and Hajime Nakamura to eminent scholars nearing the end of their careers to younger scholars who are only now gaining prominence. It includes eminent Muslim scholars such as Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, Mehdi Mohaghegh, Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī, and Nasrollah Pourjavadi and well-known Western Islamicists such as R. L. Nettler, William Chittick and Hermann Landolt as well as younger scholars from both East and West. It also includes philosophers such as Christian Jambet and practicing artists such as the architect Nader Ardalan. Most of the contributors are naturally Japanese and Persian reflecting the phases of the life of Izutsu.

Most of this rich collection concerns Islam and deals with subjects ranging from the Islamic religion to philosophy and Sufism. But as can be seen from the table of contents there are also essays devoted to Judaism, Hinduism and Buddhism, more general philosophical issues and psychology. Altogether the ensemble is a worthy tribute to the vast interents of the scholar whose memory is being commemorated and whose achievements celebrated here.

May Toshihiko Izutsu serve as model for the new generation of Japanese scholars of Islamic and comparative studies as well as for those elsewhere who are seriously interested in penetrating into a universe of discourse other than their own. The memory of this indefatigable scholar and thinker will continue to live in the minds of those who knew him personally. May this volume expand the awareness of the significance of the works of Izutsu to those who never had the opportunity to encounter him face to face and to turn them to the study of his writings which reflect the depth, precision and insight of one of the outstanding scholars and thinkers of this age.

Seyyed Hossein Nasr

I

Perspective on History and Global Society

Islamic Resurgence

Wilfred Cantwell Smith

The interpretation of current developments in the Muslim world proffered in this paper endeavours to set them in historical context, even at times rather long-range. Also, it presents them in terms of involvement with the West. One might imagine that that is what would be expected of me, since I am an historian and a comparativist. Actually, however, it is the other way round. I gradually became an increasingly long-range historian after having begun to study current affairs in Muslim societies, and finding that my attempts to understand at a serious level what is now going on, first there and later in other cases, pushed me ever more deeply into a large historical approach; and finally also into a comparativist one. This last was because the development of any society proves on scrutiny to be interinvolved with that of neighbouring ones around the world: covertly so in the more distant past; more and more conspicuously, of course, in our century. By “history” I mean not the past, as do some—and certainly not the study of the past, which is historiography, and is a present-day activity. Rather, to me history is a process: one that began no doubt long since, but continues to-day, with—the optimists among us hope—a future still to come, currently being fashioned. The most interesting chapter in Islamic history to date is the one currently being written by the Muslims, and/or being written for them by

outsiders, but it is only one chapter following the fourteen centuries that have gone before. It is not perhaps the greatest chapter: greatness lies for them, they feel, manifestly in the past; and, they dream, or resolve, also somewhere in the next fourteen.

I begin my presentation, then, with two historical incidents, separated from each other by a thousand years. The first is from Cordoba, in Muslim Spain, in the mid-10th century A.D.; the second, from the U.S. at the beginning of the present decade. I see certain parallels that can be drawn between the two.

The first scene, in Cordoba, took place when the world was in a different phase from now. The incident that I proffer occurred at the rather splendid court of the Muslim caliph 'Abd al-Rahman III; the occasion is the formal visit to that court of Queen Toda of Navarre, along with her young grandson Sancho el Gordo. Before I mention the official objectives of her mission, and its substantial results, let us notice something of the setting. The surrounding scene was impressive. 'Abd al-Rahman was one of the wealthiest, most powerful, most cultured, and most able monarchs on this planet at that time. His court, and his situation, were grander than even his rival Muslim caliph's at Baghdad. The then Japanese capital at Kyoto might perhaps be compared—although the two courts were unaware of each other. Certainly there was nothing in Western Europe to compare. 'Abd al-Rahman himself had ruled long and had worked hard and well. His navy was without question the most powerful in the world. His domain was prospering and at peace. Queen Toda, whose realm of Navarre was one of the minor principalities to the north—in Christendom—, was greatly impressed by what she saw. The city itself, a much bigger metropolis than she had ever known, she found imposing. Surprisingly, the streets were paved, were lit at night by street lamps, there were several hundred public baths, many public libraries, hospitals, and schools, and of course splendid mosques. She admired the recently completed and sumptuous summer retreat nearby which the caliph had erected with funds bequeathed to him by a wealthy concubine to ransom Muslim prisoners of war but it had been found that there were none of these.

Queen Toda's purpose was on behalf of her grandson, and was

twofold. She had come to seek medical help: “Sancho el Gordo” means “Sancho the Fat”, and evidently his obesity was indeed striking. Also, she had come to seek political help, towards realizing his claim to the throne of Navarre’s neighbouring municipality, Leon. In due course her mission proved successful on both counts. Medically, the boy was treated by the caliph’s prime minister, one Hasdai ben Shaprut, a Jewish physician. (Readers will recall that at this time in Western Europe—shall we not say, in Christendom—not many Jews held major public office!) And presently, in no insignificant part through this court’s influence, he did indeed become king of Leon.

An analogy with the present day, but in reverse, is I hope obvious. One knows of instances when in our day, from the underdeveloped countries (among which at that time Europe of course was), persons in a position to make the trip visit, say, New York for advanced medical treatment; and petty rulers or would-be rulers visit Washington in the hopes that the great power will, by pulling appropriate strings, help to actualize some desired local political goal back home; and in the course of their visit are deeply impressed by the sights that they observe.

The other occasion that I conjure up here is, as I said, a recent one—from the beginning of the present decade: the U.S./Iranian hostage issue. Americans called this “the Tehran crisis”; I, who was living in the States at the time, came to think of it rather as the American crisis, into such stark turmoil emotionally was this country thrown by the events. U.S. society was deeply startled and disturbed; and when the group of Americans being held finally returned home, this nation was exuberant. One can learn something from this, I felt. Not irrelevant, surely, was that it followed on the tense confusion—shall we say, disaster—of Vietnam. My suggestion was that a nation recently grown accustomed to being great, powerful, accustomed to the feeling of getting what it wanted if it tried hard, was both bewildered and furious to find itself being pushed around by what it irritatedly called a “little pip-squeak” group of “nasty foreigners”, and to find itself apparently impotent. Americans do not like being pushed around.

Neither do Muslims. I have related my tale of Cordoba to remind

us that for several centuries the Islamic world was an unchallenged great power, and centre of culture and sophistication. It was Muslims who wrote the letters of credit, as well as the poetry; who were world leaders not only in banking and navy dominance but in mathematics and science, in historiography and architecture; of whom other people were at times afraid, or whom others envied or emulated, while they themselves lived in prosperity and enormous and well grounded self-confidence.

As is well known, the first period of the brilliant success of Islamic civilization was presently dealt a severe blow with the fall of Baghdad to the Mongols in the 13th century, and of Spain to the Reconquista in the 15th. Yet that civilization presently not only recovered but resumed its triumphant onward march. This is represented in the 16th and 17th centuries by the Ottoman, the Persian, and the Indian Muslim empires, all magnificent; and by the expansion of the Islamic community by conversion into much of Africa, Indonesia, and to a less extent elsewhere, such as China.

By the 18th century, on the other hand, this world greatness of the Islamic movement had begun to peter out, just as the West was blossoming and expanding in the greatest outburst of energy that the world had ever seen. Presently most Muslim countries were, simply, conquered by the West; all were soon economically and to some degree culturally dominated.

It is not pleasant, after being dominant, to feel oneself debased, and demeaned. However true may be the poet's dictum that it is better to have loved and lost than never to have loved, some Canadians, for instance, maybe self-righteously feel that it is better—simpler, anyway—never to have had great power than to have had it and lost it. The election of Reagan, the seizure of Granada (my father's original home, it so happens), the obsessive arms build-up, are in part moves of an American populace resolute to gain back that power, and not to let it be jeopardized again. As I have said, Americans do not like being pushed around.

As I have also said, neither do Muslims. A good deal of their current mood is a resolve to throw out the alien civilization that has humiliated them; to re-assert their own; and to regain the power that

they have lost.

One might almost imagine—if I may be allowed a fanciful flight of conjecture—that Americans since the hostage crisis should of all people be the ones most able to understand the plight and mood of Muslims, recognizing that they too have been smarting under a great reversal of fortune. The United States, after all, has been top dog for only a few decades, and has suffered only minor set-backs, compared to the centuries of Islamic pride and then the radical subjection to outsiders. Muslims had a century or two to brood over their loss of power and prestige; and to feel that they were paying for it dearly.

All this sets the stage for the modern situation; but not yet for the current one. There intervened a period of half a century or more, when the encounter with the West was fruitful. We might call it the liberal period; better, the Western-liberal period. For some Muslims it began, of course, earlier; and for some continued later, and indeed still continues. In general, however, we may say that this phase of Islamic history began on a substantial scale near the beginning of this century, and has of late shown signs of being superseded by a newer phase, of the so-called “Islamic resurgence”.

From the point of view of many of those participating in this newer movement, as well as from that of various Western observers who may deplore it, the chief explanation for the rise of the newer venture is what is perceived as the failure of the preceding one. Some would say, the abject failure. The resurgence of what may be called conservative or traditional Islam (either adjective over-simplifies) is a result of the community's having tried for a couple of generations or so to fashion itself in terms of a Westernizing liberalism, and finding that it has not worked. That the experiment failed is a moral judgement on the part of Muslims turning from it to the other. On the part of neutral outside observers it is an historical judgement: one based on at least its evident failure to win the support of the newer generation, and of groups that now seem increasingly numerous. There are other grounds for the historical judgement, also, which I will endeavour to set forth and to elucidate.

To illustrate the broad movement and to epitomize the liberal failure, I once again select two single episodes as illuminating. First

is the role of the late Shah of Iran. In short compass his career poignantly sums up embarrassingly much of the whole matter. He was educated at the University of California, and after graduating returned to his own country brimming with Western secular liberalism, an intelligent and emancipated free-wheeling chap, vaguely idealist. He set about to effect what both he and his fellow-travellers, and the Western world, all called the "modernizing" of his country. (We have tended to hold that modernization is the process of becoming like us.) The veiling of women (as it was called; no one at that point spoke of women's veiling of themselves) was made illegal; large-scale land reform was pushed; revenues from the world oil market flowed in; motor cars and television sets became common in Tehran, and jazz music and night clubs: affluence and alcohol.

Lord Acton, however, who long ago summed up his observation of human history in one generalization, "Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely", was not to be cheated in this instance. The Shah gradually developed from being a young modernizing idealist into a not so young and, we now realize, brutal dictator. The good times of those who prospered rested increasingly on a ruthless oppression and terrorizing of the rest.

Decisive in all this was a close collaboration maintained with the West, especially America. The Shah sided with the United States, and the West generally, in social and personal outlook and economic policy, and received much help, especially in building up ("modernizing") his army. (Oil meant wealth and cosmopolitanism for him and Iran; it meant strategic importance for Washington, which also had years before paved the way for his reign by using the C.I.A. to overthrow Iran's less Westernizing reformer Musaddiq ["Musaddegh"].) Washington also, Iranians soon discovered, helped train the Shah's secret police to torture and mutilate them when they showed discontent.

The tragedy of modern Iran is of course not altogether the West's fault, centrally incriminated although we unquestionably are. Without Western involvement it would not have happened (more on this later); yet neither would it have happened were it not that the Shah became an immoral man. The morale of a society, and the day-to-day

moral stature of its members, are historically consequential matters. My thesis is that in this case the lack of moral character of the Shah was neither fortuitous nor altogether atypical. Liberal values and ideas, like any others, are effete and in the end vacuous without persons' faith in them, which means interiorized commitment to them, stamina in pursuing them, seeing and feeling them as having priority over one's individual "self-interest". The ability to get up early in the morning, to work hard, to turn down bribes, to respect other people, is just as important in building and holding a liberal society as it is for any other. In Muslim countries, the only basis for morality and morale is—as been—Islam. (To this point too we shall return.) The Shah was more powerful than most, and more wicked than most; but throughout the Muslim world Westernized liberals as a class have repeatedly demonstrated an inadequate firmness in their loyalty to liberalism. This is normally not their own fault so much as it is due to an inadequate cultural underpinning for that loyalty. Western liberalism has largely been an alien value-system without foundations in Muslims' lives on which it can rest and by which it can be nourished and transmitted.

Again, however, the role of the West here has been crucial. My second illustrative scene is from Beirut in the early '50s. I was chatting with a delightful, intelligent, cultured, generous Arab intellectual with a degree from the Sorbonne, who told me of his dispiritedness over the way things were going. "I broke from my family tradition," he told me, "from my religion, from my culture, and cast in my lot with the new vision of the West. Relatives and friends accused me of betraying my people and its past; but I held firm to my new loyalties, and have lived and thought as a cosmopolitan in comradeship with the modern West. And now the West has utterly let us down. Almost to a man, the West's liberals have sided with Zionism against us." He was not complaining, so much as asking me if I could explain why liberals in Europe and America, priding themselves on fairness and justice and compassion for the uprooted, also for their commitment to the rights of peoples to freedom in their national homelands, showed so little sympathy for, or interest in, Arabs dispossessed of a land that had been theirs for long over a

thousand years; and indeed so little concern or fellow feeling for either Arabs or Muslims, so little appreciation of the religion and culture of Islam. At the time I realized only very partially how trenchant his question was and especially was going to be; or how widespread and significant the feeling would become that for a Muslim to think of the West, even of its liberal movement, as a friend is to be doomed to bitter disillusionment.

Zionism, and the Western support for Zionism, have come to crystallize a profound sense throughout the Muslim world that the West is not merely indifferent but fundamentally hostile to Muslims; and that even the West's liberal wing will in a crisis turn against them.

Recent deliberate deception of Muslim nations by the "Christian" or liberal West will be doing little to dispel this deep (and sorrowful) sense that we do not see them as equals or treat them with serious respect.

I have long argued that indeed an underlying enmity of the West for Islam has been of major significance, especially since lately it has been largely unconscious, yet unrelenting. This again is an historical point, of the long-range sort. Few Westerners have any inkling of how their perceptions of Islam follow a pattern set by the Crusades and in general by fourteen centuries of animosity and, for long, fear. Of Hindu and Buddhist cultures—India, China, Japan—the West became aware only recently, after having become powerful and grandly self-confident and after it could loftily afford to be at times patronizing. Of Islam, on the other hand, it has throughout been sharply aware, the two having shared a common frontier from the start, in the 7th century. For a millenium the two civilizations met regularly on battlefields, where the West repeatedly suffered defeat. Until the rise of Marxism, Islam was the only world movement of which the West has been afraid. Spiritually, also: Islam is the only religious movement in the world that attracted many converts away from the Christian form of faith and from the Christian community (by the millions). In the Middle Ages, a widespread Western perception of Islam was of something Satanic. Muhammad was pictured as a fiend with horns. Europe was frankly scared. And fear generated

hatred. Even to-day, lesser distortions are constant in the media, of a kind that would be quite libellous under anti-defamation rubrics if perpetrated against other groups. People who have no idea that they are involved in these bitter legacies from a distant past prolong or are victims of a scurrilous denigration of Muslims and Islam.

We are involved here in a new and ugly form of anti-Semitism. (The Arabs are also Semites.)

The long-standing enmity between the West and Islam, Islam and the West, works of course both ways. Only for a few centuries have Muslims been seriously afraid of the West; but current hostility has long historical roots to draw on. We have been their traditional enemy, as they have been ours, alas.

Western liberals, especially intellectuals, proud of their secularism, resist the charge of being caught up in these out-of-date religious considerations. In fact the early heritage still colours perceptions unwittingly. Yet in any case secularism has problems of its own. Western civilization is dual, one part of its inheritance coming from Greece & Rome, the other from Palestine. The two have proceeded sometimes in conflict, sometimes in harmony, sometimes juxtaposed, but never fused. In recent centuries, Western secularism, sufficiently dominant of late to be unself-conscious, has developed the concept "religion" to designate the other of these two traditions—and to designate also other movements around the world which it has named "Hinduism", "Buddhism", and the like, and Islam. Western liberals are profoundly convinced that religion either is a fallacy from the past, or else in any case is something to be distinguished from the rest of culture and separated from most of it, and especially from politics, law, and economics. Islam, however, is not a religion in this sense. Islamic civilization has been unitary, not dual. One misunderstands Islam if one fails to see it as the counterpart both of the West's Graeco-Roman tradition and of its Palestinian. I said earlier that Westernizing liberals in the Islamic world lacked a moral foundation for their liberalism. Secular Western liberals often forget how fundamental for theirs has been the West's classical tradition, with its further development at the Renaissance and the Enlightenment: a tradition that in world-history perspective must be seen as one of our

planet's great spiritual heritages, with its metaphysical rationalism, its concept of justice, and especially with its humanism as a particularly major force. (This tradition has had not only its intellectual expositors but also its art, its music, its institutions, and its martyrs.) When early in this century the great Turkish intellectual Ziya Gökalp advocated that Turkey become a secular state, the concept 'secular' was first rendered as *la-dini*, "non-religious"; but in Turkish this adjective popularly meant "dishonest", "immoral", and it seemed bizarre to be clamorously advocating an immoral government system. The solution found was to coin then a new term in the language, *laik*, imported from the French *laïque*. Leading Turks made an heroic endeavour to import the vision as well as the word; but that sort of transplant is precarious.

The Western failure to understand that (and why) Muslims cannot shunt "religion" aside and have anything of significance or worth left, has bedevilled much of Western foreign policy, aid policy, and intellectual discourse. There was for at least fifty years, I believe, a major possibility of the next phase of Islamic history being liberal; but it would have been, would have had to be, an Islamic liberalism, a liberal Islam. There are certainly elements in the Muslim tradition on which that could be constructed, and therefore rendered effectively operative in Muslim society. Western liberalism, however, and even to a considerable extent then its Muslim converts, took an emphatically different line. It held, well-meaningly but ineptly, that progress, in a liberal sense (was there any other?), was an alternative to Islam, or at best was something parallel with it. Islam, as merely a religion, was seen as something that in these matters did not, and should not, count.

I am endeavouring to explain, it will be recalled, the failure of liberalism in the Islamic world. It is ironic that the above outlook has proven a sort of self-confirming prophecy. The rise of a newer and anti-liberal Islam is being interpreted here as not a result of liberal failure but rather as corroborating the Western-liberal thesis that religion and politics do not mix. Rather, one should say that in the Islamic case they cannot be separated; so that if they are not mixed well, they will be mixed badly.

Liberalism in the Muslim world must be an Islamic liberalism—or it will always fail.

Another way of putting this point would be the following. In the 19th century, Christian missionaries from the West began with great confidence but ended by failing on the whole to convert Islam. In the 20th century the Western missionaries of secularism began with equal confidence, proved perhaps somewhat less unsuccessful, but they also are ending by failing on the whole to convert Islam. It has generated a deep crisis in Christian theology to have to come to a recognition that there are other religious visions as well as the Christian that must be comprehended in a global theory, of either the universe or human life. Secularist intellectuals have hardly begun as yet to wrestle with the fact that secularism too is one human vision among others, is an ideology of dignity and worth but not necessarily the best, and its categories certainly are not universally applicable (are not straightforwardly true).

This is not the place, however, to develop that large thesis. What is directly germane, for understanding the current Muslim scene, is the growing number of persons in the West who feel that liberalism has failed also here. That secularism has failed is the view underlying the rise of the so-called moral majority. Their disillusionment has led them to the sort of right-wing fundamentalism and religious reactionary stance that I myself certainly decry and imagine that most of us at this conference will too. That right-wing movement indicates, I contend, not that religion is inherently reactionary—I know too much history to be dupe of that fallacy. It shows rather that in the recent phase of Western history we liberals have failed to work out a general vision sufficiently moral and spiritual to be viable, and/or a religious vision sufficiently authentic and rich.

I certainly join in deploring a Falwell or a Khumayni. Yet even in the face of their movements, liberal secularists these days are in no position to feel self-righteous. After all, the substantially still more horrendous threat to each one of us and to humankind at large comes from secularism's proud progress in science, technology, and nationalism, with pollution of the oceans and the air, the accelerating arms race, and the prospect of nuclear winter. Liberalism in the West was

a mighty movement of the human spirit, comparable in world-history perspective to other great spiritual and religious movements that have arisen and flourished. And my heart is in large part still very much with it. Yet must we not recognize that it has flourished less long than have several others, is proving inadequate sooner and at least as much as they. Many voices would say, "even more inadequate"; would say that alas it is manifestly now turning sour.

Whatever be one's personal judgement on these issues, two facts stand out in elucidating the apparent failure of liberalism in the contemporary Islamic world. Muslims is eager to prove that the promising future of that world lies with a return to Islam rather than with a merging with the liberal West, point to two hard-to-confute present-day realities. One is the apparent moral and social decline of the West, from overt matters strident to outsiders, such as family breakdown, pornography, rape, the upsurge in crime and violence, to more subtle developments such as the blatant insincerity of advertising, aggressive competition, the focus on means rather than ends, and the forlorn loneliness of modern-Western life. And of course behind it all looms the madness of nuclear war.

The other fact to which Muslim critics of the West point is that Westerners themselves are fast becoming disillusioned with our current scene. A number of leading Western thinkers are critics of the culture, often severe critics. The status quo, nowadays the fluxus quo, comes in for considerable assault. It is possible to interpret this Western self-criticism as a sign of vitality, freedom, and hope. One finds that interpretation in modern Arabic, Persian, Urdu, or Indonesian writing rarely, if at all. Rather, the self-criticism is cited regularly with the implied or stated commentary: "Look, it is absurd of us Muslims to hitch our wagon to a star that even its devotees are recognizing as setting."

The West, in Muslim eyes, is losing or has lost its soul. And not all Westerners disagree. (It sometimes goes unnoticed in the West, by the way, that most Westerners long since traded in their soul for a self, a considerably more individualist and mundane, indeed isolated and self-centred, concept; and in recent decades even that seems to be giving way to an identity, rather—except that no one seems to have

an identity: it would appear to be something that we are all supposedly in search of.)

I close by entering a couple of substantial caveats. In order to present a thesis, I have allowed myself no doubt to over-state it. Current developments in the Muslim world are complex. What we are calling Islamic resurgence is only one among them. Furthermore, for it I have pointed to some relevant considerations, not to all, hoping that these would help at least towards making it less unintelligible. After all, one cannot in a few pages capture a huge population involved in an intricately dynamic congeries of movements. The situation is not black-and-white: it is human.

Another perception worth our noting and placing alongside the suggestions already proffered is the following. There is in Europe to-day what could perhaps by stretching be called fancifully a sort of shadow cabinet, of Muslim intellectuals and leaders in exile from their respective countries. It comprises ex-cabinet-ministers from Afghanistan and elsewhere, as well as ex-editors and ex-university professors and writers, who speak French and German and English as well as Arabic or Persian or Urdu or whatever, and who are thinking hard about contemporary things in the Muslim world and about a new day yet to come for which they plan and even are organizing. Some of them speak of the current "rise of fascism" in the Muslim world.

That phrase I find highly interesting, worth our pondering. The categories in terms of which one thinks are crucial. Most Westerners opt for words like "Islamic fundamentalism" for present-day trends. These signify a particular sort of adverse judgement: of something religious in a narrow sense, something obscurantist, benighted; also, remote from us. To speak, on the other hand, of "fascism", while no less deprecatory and indeed even more negative, modifies the perspective considerably. After all, fascism was something that we did, we in the West. Germany, it is often remarked, was in some ways the most cultured country in Europe, secular and enlightened. (It was also, I may add, reverting to my opening points, a country that had just suffered a defeat.) Fascism in the Muslim world understandably

takes an Islamic form, just as in the West it takes a nationalist one, or in Stalinist Russia a communist one. Yet for some it could be quite salutary to see present-day right-wing Muslim movements as a modern aberration—with emphasis both on “modern” and on aberrant. What these Westerners see and do not like may be discerned as not old-fashioned Islam unredeemed by Western wisdom (“the kind of thing one would expect from Muslims!”), but rather as a distortion of Islam reminiscent of Western distortions.

My own title, also, “Islamic Resurgence”, may be an unhappy choice (although it is better than “resurgence of Islam”—which sees Islam as a noun, a thing; we do better to think of it as adjectival, to think in terms of people, ones who are Muslim). I have not endeavoured to analyse what it purports to name, readers will have noticed; only to suggest some reasons for its rise. I myself do not adopt the term “fascism”; we do not know yet whether the closer analogy even in those special areas where that might apply may not be rather to the excesses of the Terror that was the price paid for the French Revolution. Nor do we know yet whether an analogy may prove not too ridiculous to the Protestant Reformation, which also began by presenting itself as a conservative movement returning to the original and the pure, but turned out in succeeding centuries to have been deeply and widely innovative, associated with novel developments in religious life, and in political and economic and linguistic and cultural life. [Its emergence too was accompanied by much conflict and bloodshed.—*Added from Regina.*]

Developments in the modern Muslim world are complex, and major. I can see dimly some facets of reasons for their emerging, perhaps; but do not feel that any of us can know how they will work out. This much we all know: that the Muslims involved in these matters are fellow human beings with whom we share the planet, like us in many ways, unlike us in some; and whom it is fascinating, and important, that we come to understand, and with whom it is requisite that we collaborate to build to-morrow’s world.

*Al-Wāqidī, the Orientalists
and Apologetics*

Charles J. Adams

One of foremost preoccupations of Muslim thought in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been the defense of Islam against criticisms, both explicit and implicit, that have accompanied the Muslims' confrontation with Western civilization. As European colonialism spread and dominated increasingly large areas of Muslim life, it awakened questions and doubts in many Muslim minds about the continuing validity and relevance of Islam in the modern world. For some religious leaders the situation posed what seemed to them a major crisis for the community as more and more Muslims, especially the young, were attracted by ideas and things Western to the detriment of Islamic faith. To counter this trend religious leadership has mounted a vigorous reassertion and defense of Islam that began in the mid-nineteenth century and continues until our own time. In consequence religious apologetics has become an integral part of modern Muslim religious expression.

A recurring theme—one perhaps may even say the principal one—of these apologetic efforts has been the defense of the Prophet Muḥammad, his actions, his teachings, his character, etc., against his detractors. The defense has been provoked in part at least by the often harshly condemnatory attitudes towards Muḥammad adopted by Westerners. Muḥammad has been accused of a multitude of sins

and shortcomings, ranging from insincerity and opportunism to lechery and violence. Now, few matters are capable of evoking a more passionate and fiery response from Muslims than something which they apprehend as an affront to the Prophet. Indeed, as Professor Wilfred Cantwell Smith has remarked,¹ Muslims are better able to sustain an insult to the deity itself than one directed to Muḥammad. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the refutation and correction of allegedly false, contemptuous or derogatory statements about Muḥammad occupy a central place among Muslim concerns.

Our attention here will be occupied by a particularly significant instance of the effort to defend Muḥammad against his critics. The case to be considered is of interest because of the particular turn that it took and because of the broad questions that it raises. Having begun with an imputation of cowardice to the Prophet by a journalist, the discussion quickly turned into a debate about the literary sources for the Prophet's life involving two well-known Orientalists and a famous Indian scholar.

The details are these. In 1925 an essay appeared in the *Manchester Guardian* in which the author stated that at the Battle of Badr, when the first blood began to flow, the Prophet fainted, presumably, though it is not stated explicitly, from fear. Challenging this assertion a Muslim wrote to the editor asking for the source of this information. The reference given in reply was to the book of D. S. Margoliouth, *Muhammad and the Rise of Islam* (p. 259), where Margoliouth recounts the incident without indicating whence he got it. When Margoliouth in turn was queried about his source, he replied in a letter dated 4 November, 1925, by citing the *Kitāb al-Maghāzī* of Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar al-Wāqidi which is, along with the *Sīrah* of ibn Ishāq in the version by ibn Hishām, one of the two most important sources for the biography of Muḥammad. Margoliouth, however, did not cite the original Arabic of the *Kitāb al-Maghāzī* though it had been partially published long before by the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal under the auspices of Aloys Sprenger (1855). Instead he referred to the German translation done by Julius Wellhausen entitled *Muhammad in Medina* (Berlin, 1882). The words being objected to, Margoliouth insisted, were the very words of al-Wāqidi himself as

translated by Wellhausen from British Museum manuscript no. 1617. His own understanding of the event and his way of presenting it, Margoliouth affirmed, rendered the meaning intended by al-Wāqidi.

The correspondent (Khawāja Kamāl al-Dīn, the well-known Imām of the Woking Mosque in Britain) then addressed another letter to Margoliouth in which he said that the citation of al-Wāqidi as authority was not acceptable to Muslims because they did not consider him to be trustworthy and truthful. In his response dated 17 November, 1925, Margoliouth indicated shock that a distinguished Muslim historian such as al-Wāqidi should be called a liar and pointed out that Yāqūt in volume vii of his *Muʿjam al-ʿUdabā*, then under print, gives the names of Muslim Imāms who considered him entirely trustworthy.

The whole of this correspondence was forwarded by Khawāja Kamāl al-Dīn to Sayyid Sulaymān Nadvī (1884-1953) of the famous Nadwat al-ʿUlamāʾ of Lucknow, India. Sulaymān Nadvī was one of the best known and most respected of the traditional Indian Muslim scholars of his time. Upon receiving the correspondence, he published an essay in the journal *Maʿārif*, dated January, 1926, in refutation of Margoliouth's implication that the Prophet had shown an unseemly fear in the face of the enemy. Subsequently, after a letter from Alfred Guillaume, the Durham University Professor of Arabic, was published in the *Islamic Review* of Woking, Sulaymān Nadvī published a second essay on the same subject in the January, 1927, edition of *Maʿārif*. Both essays, which set out the entire background of the controversy and the response to it, are available in the collected works of Sulaymān Nadvī.²

The Nadwat al-ʿUlamāʾ, where Sulaymān Nadvī did his work, had been founded in 1894 as a kind of counterweight to the modernism of Sayyid Aḥmad Khān and the ʿAlīgarh group on the one hand and to the extreme conservatism of the Dēōband school on the other.³ Its founders wished both to preserve and enhance Muslim awareness of the great tradition of Islam and also at the same time to accommodate modern sciences to a certain degree. As time went on, however, the institution became more and more conservative in its outlook and activities, and the modernist influence on it diminished.

One of the founders of Nadwat al-‘Ulamā’ was the famous Shibli Nu‘mānī (1857–1914) who had taught for a number of years with Sayyid Aḥmad Khān in ‘Aligarḥ and whose thought was no doubt in some debt to the great modernist leader. Shibli became formally associated with the Nadwat al-‘Ulamā’ in 1904, and until his resignation in 1913 (he died in the following year) he was the principal and best known figure in the madrasah. Sayyid Sulaymān Nadvī was Shibli’s student, and upon the death of the latter became his intellectual heir and the outstanding scholar of the Nadwat al-‘Ulamā’. For as long as he lived and even after, as the subject of the two articles in question here testifies, Shibli exercised a powerful influence on the agenda of the Nadwat al-‘Ulamā’. He strove to make the Islamic heritage better known among educated Muslims, to reform Muslim education, and to counter the criticisms of Islam by Western scholars and those who followed them. The refutation of criticisms was a particular concern for Shibli who felt that the misrepresentation and maligning of Islam at the hands of the Orientalists threatened to undermine the faith of the community’s youth. Sulaymān Nadvī carried on the task of warding off the attacks and refuting the errors of the Orientalists, adopting an even more aggressive stance than his teacher had done.

It was also due to Shibli’s initiative that the Nadwat al-‘Ulamā’ launched upon a major historiographical enterprise to prepare a biography of the Prophet that would both establish the facts of his life from the most reliable sources and elucidate those aspects of his character that offered continuing guidance for devout Muslims. The outcome was the well-known *Sīrat al-Nabī*, begun by Shibli but brought to eventual completion by Sayyid Sulaymān Nadvī.⁴

The first of Sulaymān Nadvī’s two essays to be considered here is a double-barreled attack upon the historian al-Wāqidi and the Orientalists who had depended upon him as the source of the report of the Prophet’s allegedly cowardly conduct at the Battle of Badr. Al-Wāqidi Sulaymān Nadvī dismissed categorically as a well-known liar with no standing among Muslim scholars, and the Orientalists he deemed even worse because they had failed, perhaps deliberately, to understand the Arabic of the report, had added elements to it, and in

consequence had presented a distorted view of the Prophet. In both of these stances he was reflecting the attitudes of Shibli before him. Shibli had also dismissed al-Wāqidī out of hand as completely untrustworthy. In the great biographical enterprise that he launched, Shibli, in fact, strove to avoid using the *sīrah* and *maghāzī* literature altogether, turning instead to the *āḥādith* of the Prophet as being more reliable materials.⁵ As stated above, it was also one of Shibli's prime purposes to refute the negative views of Islam and the Prophet that had been fostered by Western scholarship. Very much in the spirit of Shibli, Sulaymān Nadvī entitled his article, "Muḥammad ibn 'Umar al-Wāqidī: A New Error of the Orientalist Scholars with respect to the *Sīrah*," and he sets out with heavy sarcasm to show the *kamāl*, *faḥḥ* and *tabaḥḥur* (perfection, excellence and depth of understanding) of the European scholars.

The argument proceeds through three stages: first, a consideration of al-Wāqidī himself focussed on the issue of his trustworthiness, second, a consideration of the *Kitāb al-Maghāzī* and its shortcomings, and third, a consideration of the event at the Battle of Badr and the Orientalists' understanding of it.

The pages devoted to al-Wāqidī and his character consist of citations of Muslim authorities who either favored him or rejected him. On one thing, Sulaymān Nadvī says, both those who favor and those who disagree with al-Wāqidī come together, viz.: on the excellence of his memory. He quotes from al-Wāqidī's scribe, Muḥammad ibn Sa'ad, from the *Kitāb al-Ṭabaqāt al-Kubrā* as saying, "He knew the things relative to the *maghāzī*, the *sīrah* and the great conquests on which people differed as well as matters on which they agreed." Another who speaks of al-Wāqidī with great favor for his dissemination of knowledge is Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī in his famous *History*. In spite of these favorable notices and others he has received with respect to his knowledge and memory, there yet remains a vital question about al-Wāqidī according to Sulaymān Nadvī, that of his trustworthiness. Is he truthful, and does he occupy a high position with respect to the *sanads* of his reports? Although some may have respect for him, the majority of *ḥadīth* critics and those who know the science of *ʿilm al-rijāl* (criticism of the narrators of *ḥadīth*

reports) consider him untrustworthy, a liar and untruthful. Those who come down on the negative side in their evaluation of al-Wāqidī include such eminent persons as al-Shāfiʿī, al-Bukhārī, and Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal. For this reason the muḥaddithūn do not give a place to his ḥadīth in their books, and, moreover, his *Kitāb al-Maghāzī* has never gained the recognition from the ‘ulamā’, that is accorded to the *Sīrah* of ibn Ishāq. Sulaymān Nadwī recognizes but seems to see no significance in the fact that al-Wāqidī wrote other books in addition to *Kitāb al-Maghāzī*. The rejection expressed by some of the opponents cited may have to do with subjects treated in those other books, in particular with legal views set forth there, not with historical matters. The harsh evaluations by such figures as Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, al-Shāfiʿī and al-Bukhārī, all of whose interests were primarily legal, would thus be explained. Their negative judgments would not in that case necessarily reflect on the value and veracity of al-Wāqidī’s historical reports. Sulaymān Nadwī, however, presents him as only a narrator of ḥadīth and, in consequence, believes the rejection of his work to apply to the whole.

As for Margoliouth’s citation of Yāqūt’s *Muʿjam al-ʿUdabāʾ* in support of al-Wāqidī, this is useful information, but it has little bearing on the question of al-Wāqidī’s trustworthiness. Yāqūt was a man of literature, geography and history, and he had nothing to do with ḥadīth criticism. He was certainly not one of the great ‘ulamā’ (‘ulamā’-i uṣūl). In any case Sulaymān Nadwī argued, it is not necessary to cite literary, geographical or historical works to establish al-Wāqidī’s status. All of the necessary information about him has been gathered by the ḥadīth critics over the centuries, and nothing new will be gained when Yāqūt’s anticipated book (then under print) finally becomes available. Sulaymān Nadwī goes on to mention works of ʿAllamah Sayyid al-Nās Andalusī, al-Dhahabī, and Ḥāfiẓ ibn Ḥajar where everything that has been said both for and against al-Wāqidī and ibn Ishāq has long since been recorded. We can, he says, expect nothing new to be added to this body of information.

To undergird his attack on al-Wāqidī Sayyid Sulaymān presents a chart showing the Muslim authorities from the past who supported al-Wāqidī. Examination of this list, however, does not show the name

of any famous Imām or of anyone who was a pillar of ḥadīth criticism. On the contrary, some of the great figures of ḥadīth criticism uncompromisingly condemn him. Al-Shāfiʿī, for instance, is cited as saying that his books are a storehouse of lies. Al-Bukhārī wrote of him in his short history, "He is from Madīnah, was a qāḍī in Baghdād, and the muḥaddithūn have abandoned him." There follows a long list of authorities from both earlier and later times who expressed distrust of al-Wāqidi and of reports emanating from him. They include Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, al-Nisāʿī, Yaḥyā ibn Muʿīn and numerous others whose accusations against al-Wāqidi range from weakness to outright lying and fabrication of ḥadīth. All are agreed that his reports are weak and to be used with caution, and many hold that he is matrūk al-ḥadīth (abandoned with respect to ḥadīth reports).

It must be remembered that the *Kitāb al-Maghāzī* of al-Wāqidi has long been accepted together with the *Sīrah* of ibn Ishāq as one of the two fundamental sources for the life of Muḥammad. Further, al-Wāqidi's work was extensively used by other Muslim scholars of the early time such as ibn Saʿad, author of the *Kitāb al-Ṭabaqāt al-Kubrā*, who was his student, and al-Ṭabarī, the historian. The attack upon al-Wāqidi and his book, therefore, has implications of the most serious kind for knowledge of Muḥammad's biography, and the criticisms of him, if sustained, would undercut a great deal of early Islamic scholarship. In short Sulaymān Nadwī has raised methodological issues of the first importance but without, perhaps, having realized their full implications.

The second phase of the argument, that directed against the *Kitāb al-Maghāzī*, focuses upon al-Wāqidi's method and the organization of the book. Al-Wāqidi's way of proceeding involved the collection of a number of accounts from different sources which were then pieced together to form a connected story. For each event reported al-Wāqidi lists the names of a number of shaykhs from whom his information was drawn, but no attempt is made to provide a sanad for individual bits of information, and the reports from one source were often mixed with those of another to preserve the line of the story. Such a manner of writing has great appeal for common people who love a good tale, and it brought al-Wāqidi favor with the ʿAbbāsī

khulafā', and the Barāmakī amīrs, but it is quite unsatisfactory for the discriminating scholar who wishes to know the source of every individual particle of information. Al-Wāqidi tells nothing of the prior narrators from whom his shaykhs gleaned their information, and the chains of authority for the reports he uses are, therefore, munqaṭi' (broken or interrupted) at best. Further the people he cites are not well known. What use, Sulaymān Nadvī asks, can the muḥaddithūn have for a collection of such reports? It is for this reason that the *Kitāb al-Maghāzī* has no status in ḥadīth criticism.

Ibrāhīm Ḥarbī, one of al-Wāqidi's supporters, objected to this line of reasoning, saying: "If this is a fault in al-Wāqidi, then al-Zuhri and ibn Ishāq chose the same method." Sulaymān replies that they did not organize their entire books in this way as al-Wāqidi had done. Further, in contrast to his personal unreliability they were men of high character whose reports had a great claim to acceptance on that basis alone. The whole of al-Wāqidi's book, he contended, was based upon shādhdh (isolated reports with no support).

The third phase of the argument, the examination of the actual event at the Battle of Badr, begins by returning to the weakness of al-Wāqidi. Whatever al-Wāqidi says about the event cannot inspire confidence because he says nothing about the report on which he bases his account. There is nothing from which one might know who told him about the event. Nor is there any mention of an eye-witness or a participant in the event who might support what is said. The whole account, it is asserted, is without foundation, and there is no confirmation of it in any sound book of ḥadīth or of sirah.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to look carefully at what Margoliouth has said and to compare it with the original Arabic of al-Wāqidi's book. Such a comparison shows that al-Wāqidi is less at fault than Margoliouth and Wellhausen. Margoliouth wrote: "When the first drops of blood began to flow, the Prophet returned to his hut and fainted. When he had come to himself, he devoted his time to impassioned prayer, showing that he was thoroughly alarmed. The members of the cabinet who regarded these prayers as unseemly, remained by their master in his hut, issuing orders when necessary."⁶ This great invention on the part of Margoliouth, Sulaymān Nadvī

says, was taken from the German translation of Wellhausen who had written: "When the two armies confronted one another, Muhammad fainted . . . however, he quickly regained consciousness." (Als die Heere gegenüberstanden, ward Muḥammad ohnmächtig, kam aber bald wieder zu sich.)⁷ The comparison with the original text shows that where al-Wāqidi speaks of the Prophet lying down and being overcome by sleep, Wellhausen speaks of his fainting, and Margoliouth speaks of his fainting from fear. Can there be any better example of the taḥrīf (deliberate altering of a text) of the European Orientalists? Sulaymān Nadvī asks. In fact, Margoliouth did not write "fainting from fear"; no reason for the Prophet's alleged fainting is given. If it be argued that fear is implied by what Margoliouth wrote, then the same is surely true of Wellhausen's statement as well.

The defects of the Orientalists are, however, even more egregious when one reads the original text carefully, word by word. Where, Sulaymān Nadvī inquires, does the Oxford Professor get the words "fainting from fear"? Al-Wāqidi did not write them.⁸ The words "when the first drops of blood fell" are not found in the text; neither is there mention of the Prophet's returning to his hut. Further, the phrase "to regain consciousness" is not present in the text, nor is the reference to the two armies confronting one another. All of these things are additions that the Orientalists have made to the passage, and hence, they justify the charge of taḥrīf. Can one ask for a more telling proof of the deep insight of the Orientalists and of their objectivity in Islamic matters? Sulaymān Nadvī demands. And what does this comparison say of the depth of penetration, the excellence, and the lack of prejudice of the Oxford Professor of Arabic?

The mistake of the two Orientalists is explained by their misunderstanding of the Arabic verb, *ghashiya*. They have taken al-Wāqidi's phrase, "*ghashiya nawm 'alayhi*" to mean that the Prophet fainted, whereas according to Sulaymān Nadvī it signifies only that sleep enveloped or overcame him as in the Qur'anic phrase, "*wa-l layl idha yaghsha*."⁹ Not missing the opportunity to push his point home, Sulaymān Nadvī says that any ordinary student of Arabic knows that when the meaning of fainting or losing consciousness is intended, then the verb *ghashiya* occurs in the fourth form and in the passive voice.

In the case of al-Wāqidī's text the verb is used in the first form with a known subject (*nawm*), and it is followed shortly by a mention of the Prophet's waking up. Does it make any sense to speak of his fainting in addition to going to sleep?

In any case this entire tale of al-Wāqidī about the Prophet's going to sleep and waking up, to which he adds something about a dream in which Muḥammad saw the enemy diminished in number, according to Sulaymān Nadvī is a lie from beginning to end. The incident is recounted in the sound books of ḥadīth, but none of them has anything to say of Muḥammad's going to sleep, waking up or having dreams. On the contrary, the testimony is all of his being alert and of his participating in the ordinary activities attendant upon the battle shortly to follow. Al-Wāqidī apparently intended his report as a commentary on the Qur'anic verse, "Remember when God caused a drowsiness to overcome you and made you consider them fewer, etc."¹⁰ In his ignorance, Sulaymān Nadvī says, al-Wāqidī took this dream to have occurred at the time of the Battle of Badr, whereas the verse makes it clear that the dream was bestowed earlier. He does not, however, develop the proof for his own understanding of the verse.

The first of the two essays on al-Wāqidī and the Orientalists is rounded off by two other arguments. One is a demonstration of the courage of Muḥammad designed to show that he could not have acted as alleged. First, the incident is cited of his taking a handful of arrows and straightening the lines of his followers at the Battle of Badr; another has to do with his standing fast on a hill at the great Battle of Ḥunayn when many of the Companions had begun to retreat; and a third involves his imperturbability in the face of a Badū with a drawn sword who declared the intention to kill him. So impressed was the Badū with the Prophet's calm that he sheathed his sword and went away. It is true, says Sulaymān Nadvī, that Muḥammad never actually spilled the blood of any of his enemies, but that fact was due not to faint-heartedness but rather to his purity as a Prophet.

As a parting shot, Sulaymān Nadvī cites another mistake of Margoliouth that reflects badly on the Prophet. The Professor has, he says, developed great skill at distorting events, disarranging them,

and in interpreting good events in a bad way. Notable is Margoliouth's assertion that Muḥammad and his wife, Khadijah, used each night to perform a domestic ritual devoted to the pagan goddesses, al-Lāt and al-ʿUzzā. This is taḥrīf of the very worst kind, for the custom mentioned was that of the pagan Arabs, not of the Prophet. Again Margoliouth's error had arisen, Sulaymān Nadvī claims, from failure to understand the Arabic of the report he had used. He has taken verbs in the third person plural with an implied plural personal pronoun as their subjects to refer to Muḥammad and Khadijah, i.e., he has understood them as dual forms. In reality they are plural, he says, and they refer to the pagan Arabs, not to the Prophet and his wife. A beginning student of Arabic should understand that these verbs cannot refer to a dual subject, and it is probably because the English language does not distinguish dual from plural verb forms but uses the same verb forms and pronouns for both that Margoliouth has taken them as he has. As a result of this mistake a stain will remain forever on the skirts of the Orientalists.

Sayyid Sulaymān Nadvī begins his second essay, entitled "Phīr Wāqidi" (Wāqidi Revisited) by presenting the letter sent to the editor of the *Islamic Review* of Woking by Alfred Guillaume. Saying that he had read Sulaymān Nadvī's previous essay which had interested him greatly, Guillaume raises issues about which he solicits comments. He asks the editor to publish his letter so that he might gain more information about a subject he had treated in Chapter IV of his book, *The Traditions of Islam*. Nadvī's second essay is a lengthy, detailed reply to the problems that Guillaume posed.

The most important concern for Guillaume was to know the principles on which a writer is rejected or accepted. The question arises from Nadvī's harsh judgment of al-Wāqidi as untrustworthy. On what basis was this decision reached? It should be remembered, Guillaume wrote, that al-Wāqidi was a historian, not a theologian. Nadvī had argued that the evidence of an essayist, a geographer or a historian could never lead far towards establishing the reliability of al-Wāqidi, but why not? Why should the opinions of geographers, historians and other distinguished writers of the early Islamic period be set aside so arbitrarily? Is al-Wāqidi's work not precisely of a

nature that it calls for the opinions of such men? Is the decision in matters of this kind always to be left only to scholars of religion (mazhabī ‘ulamā’)?

Guillaume also makes objection to Nadvī’s criticism of the method which al-Wāqidī used in preparing the *Kitāb al-Maghāzī*. It should be remembered that the same method of not supplying a sanad for every detailed piece of information continued to be employed for a generation after the death of al-Wāqidī; both al-Zuhrī and ibn Ishāq followed it. The ‘ulamā’-i mazhab, it is true, have considered al-Zuhrī and ibn Ishāq to be on a higher level than al-Wāqidī, but Guillaume asks, why should that be? Were they more distinguished than he with respect to maghāzī which is the subject at issue? Has it been forgotten that al-Zuhrī himself bore witness that he was forced to transmit false ḥadīth?

As for al-Bukhārī, he died 50 years after al-Wāqidī and, therefore, does not qualify as one of the latter’s contemporaries. Further, there are many writers who reject ḥadīth that are found in the *Ṣaḥīḥān*. Also among the rāwīs whom al-Bukhārī accepts as trustworthy is Abū Hurayrah who reports the miracle of the splitting of the moon. In view of this situation why should anyone reject al-Wāqidī on the basis of al-Bukhārī’s opinion?

Guillaume closes his letter by declaring, “You will agree that when a man’s own contemporaries accept him as a high authority, it is hardly fair to brand him a liar in deference to the unreasoned opinions of the theologians of the next generation.” Guillaume’s questions clearly raise basic issues about the way in which historical evidence is to be evaluated and used. Sulaymān Nadvī, however, replies strictly in terms of the methods of the traditional Muslim science of ḥadīth criticism. Following Shiblī, he holds that ḥadīth are superior to every other variety of material from the early period—always of course, with the exception of the *Qur’ān*—because they alone are authenticated by reliable chains of transmission.

In the first of his essays he had presented al-Wāqidī from the perspective of his being principally a transmitter of ḥadīth—which he was not—and had found him wanting. In effect he condemned al-Wāqidī for being a historian rather than a muḥaddith, for not con-

forming to the standards of a profession that was not his own and for failing to adhere to criteria for the transmission of reports that were not yet firmly fixed in al-Wāqidi's time. The criteria used by the muḥaddithūn, Nadvī insists, should be applied not only to judge al-Wāqidi but all other early writers as well. It is, therefore, the science of ḥadīth criticism that provides the basis on which writers should be rejected or accepted.

In all of the discussion of ḥadīth in the two essays Sulaymān Nadvī shows no awareness whatsoever of modern critical scholarship bearing on the authenticity of the ḥadīth or the history of the development of ḥadīth criticism. There is not so much as mention of the name of Goldziher though his *Muhammadanische Studien* had been published many years before (1885-1890) and its conclusions had been embraced by scholars such as Margoliouth and Guillaume whom Nadvī was controverting. One must wonder whether Nadvī knew of the existence of the great Hungarian scholar. His discussion does not take into account the anachronisms, the tendentiousness, and the sectarian character of much of the ḥadīth, all matters to which Goldziher had drawn attention in his classic work. Of Sulaymān Nadvī's massive erudition there can be no doubt, but it does not reflect a historical consciousness. Thus, his replies to Guillaume in large part miss the point of the latter's queries and serve only to restate the traditional Muslim position.

Sayyid Sulaymān begins his reply by expressing pleasure that the Orientalists' field of interest has expanded. Whereas in the past they had depended only upon Abū al-Fidā for information about the life of the Prophet, they now also give attention to ibn Sa'ad, al-Wāqidi, ibn Ishāq and, most important, to the ḥadīth, especially to the thick volumes of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal. Nevertheless, they suffer from a great fault, for they have never learned to use the characteristically Muslim science for authenticating reports (ʿilm al-riwāyah).

The Muslims, he says, are the only people in the world to have established principles and rules for criticizing and verifying reports from the past. To this end they have developed a variety of specialized sciences such as uṣūl al-ḥadīth, asmā al-rijāl, jarḥ wa-l ta'dīl, khallāf al-ḥadīth, isnād, etc. In addition they have articulated the

rules of *dirāyah* and the principles of *naqd* (criticism). There are hundreds of books on these subjects, and they are included in the curriculae of schools in the East. In another dig at Guillaume he says that as admirable as it may be, knowledge of Arabic literature alone is not enough to penetrate the problems of these sciences.

Muslims investigate events from two aspects: first, in terms of the principles of *riwāyah* and, second, in terms of *dirāyah*. In short the principles embodied in the first of these are the following: (1) that from the beginning to the end of a report the transmitters must be trustworthy and reliable, (2) the first narrator in the chain must have been alive at the time of the event reported and have either been an eye-witness to it or have gotten his information about it from an eye-witness. Alternatively, a narrator must be known to have had the habit of transmitting only what he heard from eye-witnesses. (3) Narrators of events must actually have met the persons from whom they claim to have received the information transmitted, and there must be no break in the chain of narrators such as one missing somewhere in the middle.

Briefly, the rules of *dirāyah* are: (1) that the explanation of an event must not contradict other well-established explanations (2) that there be no better established explanation of an event that is contrary to the one in question (3) that there must be no mistake in understanding the meaning of the narrator (4) that the narrator must not transmit an incomplete report and (5) that none of the generally accepted and well-known beliefs of Islam be contradicted.

These are the principles upon which the transmission of the reports of the early history and the injunctions of Islam is based. All scholars, whether specialists in *ḥadīth*, *maghāzī*, or in history used these principles, and their works are ranked according to the degree of adherence to them. It is on this basis that the collections of *ḥadīth* of al-Bukhārī and Muslim have attained the highest rank. The difference between al-Bukhārī and Muslim and lesser writers is the latter's looseness in observing sound principles, and the writings on *maghāzī* and *sīrah*, especially, are notable for paying very little attention to them. The ranking of al-Wāqidī in a position inferior to that of al-Zuhri and ibn Ishāq is determined in the same way that the

rank of a writer on ḥadīth would be determined, i.e., by his observance of the principles of riwāyah.

From his letter it appears, says Nadvī, that Professor Guillaume has not understood the divisions among the Islamic ‘ulamā’. If an individual has not grown up in a certain milieu and has knowledge of it only through its literary heritage and books, he will be able to interpret it only in terms of his own background. Such seems to be the case with Guillaume. He speaks of two kinds of ‘ulamā’, theologians and historians, but there is no such division in Islām. A distinction is made rather in terms of scholars who transmit reports from the past (‘ulamā’-i naql) and scholars who operate with the speculative reason (‘ulamā’-i ‘aql). With the latter, however, he asserts, we have nothing to do in the present discussion.

The ‘ulamā’-i naql have different specialized names according to the nature of the event, injunction or report which they may forward. Those who report matters concerning the Prophet’s mission or the very earliest times are called muḥaddithūn. Those concerned only with the personal life of the Prophet are known as masters of the sirah, and those who study particularly his character and habits are designated masters of shamā’il. Individuals who have specialized in the study of the Prophet’s military activities and all that pertains to them are in a similar fashion known as masters of maghāzī. Now, Sulaymān Nadvī says, they may have different names and study different subjects, but all these people are ‘ulamā’-i naql who deal with matters of riwāyat. Thus all are to be weighed in the same scale. From this standpoint the most important difference between the reports from the past transmitted by Muslims and those of others is the fact that Muslims have established firm rules for testing and evaluating the reports relevant to them while others have not. Thus, while others may lack it, for Muslims there is a science with many branches known as uṣūl al-ḥadīth for separating the true from the false, the sound from the counterfeit.

In Europe the science of historical criticism has achieved great progress, a fact that Sulaymān Nadvī attributes to the influence of ibn Khaldūn. Every event reported is judged from the standpoint of the requirements of nature and the circumstances of the time and the

situation to decide whether it be possible or not. Thus, the Europeans have missed nothing relative to *dirāyah*, but what they do not ever do is to ask, “who saw the event? who heard about it? how did it come to us?” As this argument shows, Sulaymān Nadvī clearly had little acquaintance with European philological scholarship, but in any case he was not concerned to give an accurate description of what the European scholars did but rather to make a polemical point. He goes on to argue that the great importance given to testimony in European courts of law is well known. When there is such concern for authenticating testimony relative to current events, why is there none for events of the past?

In specific response to Guillaume’s question of why al-Wāqidī should be ranked lower than al-Zuhri and ibn Isḥāq, Nadvī points out that there are many sciences in the world, and there is no equality among the persons who may practice a certain science. Some touch only the fringes of knowledge while others are true experts in their field and make contributions to its advancement. There are some who go so far in their knowledge and accomplishments and who gain such recognition in the eyes of their contemporaries that they become the standards or norms for their particular sciences. It is in these terms that the differential ranking of the early Muslim writers and their books has been reached and by which such people as Mālik, al-Bukhārī, Muslim, al-Tirmidhī, Abū Dā’ūd, al-Nisā’ī and numerous others, including al-Wāqidī, are judged.

As to the reasons why the opinions of a geographer, a historian or an essayist should not count in the authentication of *riwāyat*, the answer lies in their not being experts in that field. One does not ask ibn Sinā about questions of ḥadīth, and one does not inquire from al-Bukhārī about the intricacies of metaphysics. For this reason it is entirely right, Sulaymān Nadvī asserts, that we do not turn to specialists in other fields, however good they may be in their own specializations, to authenticate the *riwāyah* of al-Wāqidī.

The mere fact that an individual is recognized as a scholar in some field or the other does not make him a scholar of *riwāyah*. Consider the first generation of Muslim writers; there were great differences among them in ability, excellence, religiosity, piety, memory, recol-

lective ability, and deductive capacity. So, it became necessary to test each of the narrators of reports, using the Islamic *uṣūl*, to determine which books of which authors and which events related in which books are to be considered authoritative.

For a report to be authoritative: (1) the writer himself must be a trustworthy, religious and truthful man, must know the chain of transmission of his report completely, and must have made every effort to learn about the individuals in the chain and have been successful in doing so, (2) every report must have a *sanad*, (3) the first narrator in the chain of transmission must truly have been an eye-witness of the event reported or must have heard about it with his own ear from an eye-witness, (4) every narrator between the original witness and the final reporter must be given, (5) it must be known of every narrator in the chain that he is trustworthy and truthful, (6) it must be shown that every narrator in the chain heard the report directly from the person from whom he claims to have received it, or, at least, that they were alive at the same time.

The above, as every student of Islam will recognize, are the criteria for judging the authenticity of *ḥadīth* reports. Sayyid Sulaymān insists that they must be used also to judge reports from the past of every other kind as well, since, as he proclaims, all our knowledge of past events of whatsoever nature comes to us through reports of witnesses to those events. Islam makes no distinction, Sulaymān Nadvī says, between reports about the *maghāzī* and those concerning other matters. All are judged by the same standard.

If we compare al-Bukhārī and al-Wāqidi in these terms, the superiority of one over the other becomes immediately evident according to Sulaymān Nadvī. Al-Bukhārī's contemporaries all held him to be an honorable, trustworthy, truthful and pious man and considered him the greatest authority on *ḥadīth* among the experts of that science. Al-Wāqidi on the other hand is called a liar, a propagator of falsehood, one who speaks untruth, and a person of not high character. If the reports emanating from these two men are compared rather than their personalities, it will be seen that al-Bukhārī satisfies all of the above criteria while in the case of al-Wāqidi we do not know from whom he heard a particular report, who was the eye-witness to it, etc.

Even if al-Wāqidi does occasionally cite authorities, they are without exception people who are not well known or who are not trustworthy and accepted. Further, there is confirmation in other authorities of the reports transmitted by al-Bukhārī but no support for the reports of al-Wāqidi. Such are the principles, Nadvī says, according to which one writer is accepted and the other rejected.

Sulaymān Nadvī admits that there may be differences of opinion concerning the narrators of traditions since different people have different experiences with their acquaintances. This fact, however, he holds to be a proof of the reliability of the Islamic science of ḥadīth criticism. Were there uniformity instead of difference, one might suspect collusion among narrators. Difference constitutes the evidence that the science rests upon individual experiences.

If there is disagreement among authorities in their judgment of a narrator who was their contemporary, there are again principles that may be employed in deciding which view is to be preferred, as follows: (1) Where does the majority of contemporary critics stand? (2) among the various ranks of critics, what does the highest rank think? (3) in what direction does the generality of critics tend?

When the opinions of a narrator who is no longer alive are to be assessed by scholars of a later time, the relevant principles are these: (1) what is the character of the collection of reports of the narrator concerned? Are the reports for the most part ma'rūf or munkar? (2) to what extent do the narrator's views agree or disagree with those of well-established people? (3) what opinions of the narrator's differing ideas are held by his contemporary colleagues? If these opinions differ, then what are the views of the best known and most reliable among them? and what is the position taken by the majority? (4) although later critics will not have met the scholar in question, have they heard what the shaykhs contemporary with him said about him?

The above considerations answer Professor Guillaume's question about the relevance and importance of al-Bukhārī's views of al-Wāqidi even though al-Bukhārī was only 14 years old at al-Wāqidi's death and died himself 50 years later. Sulaymān Nadvī returns to this matter some pages afterwards when he discusses the nature of

contemporaneity and endeavors to show that, intellectually at least, al-Bukhārī was the contemporary of the author of the *Kitāb al-Maghāzī* since he undoubtedly knew many persons who had known al-Wāqidī and had studied in an environment in which al-Wāqidī's ideas and reports were perfectly familiar. Contemporaneity is not determined, he argues, by the synchronism of chronological ages but by the atmosphere in which two people live their lives. By this measure al-Bukhārī had every ground to make the negative judgment of al-Wāqidī that he did.

Guillaume has also raised the question of why al-Zuhri and ibn Ishāq are considered to be of higher rank than al-Wāqidī when Ibrāhīm Ḥarbī, one of al-Wāqidī's defenders, said that they also transmitted reports without detailed sanads. Sulaymān Nadvī indicates that he has already replied to this question in the first of these essays, giving two reasons. First is the fact that al-Zuhri and ibn Ishāq were of more exalted character than al-Wāqidī, and, therefore, any of their reports that might lack sanads are necessarily superior to his. It has been shown that al-Wāqidī was a fabricator of ḥadīth, and these two, but especially al-Zuhri who is known as the Chief of the Imāms (Imām al-Ā'immah), are entirely free of such an accusation. While al-Zuhri enjoys a much higher status than ibn Ishāq, al-Wāqidī does not come up even to the latter's foot. The second reason has to do with the fact that al-Zuhri and ibn Ishāq never actually fail to provide sanads. It is true that from time to time they may mix up sanads, but for every separate event they give their authorities. Al-Wāqidī, in contrast, cites the names of a large number of men at the beginning of his account of an event and then proceeds to tell a story. Herein lies the essential difference in the reputations of these men.

If al-Zuhri and ibn Ishāq had transmitted unsupported reports as al-Wāqidī had done, these reports would be considered as more or less equal to his and treated in the same manner, but there would still remain a distinction because of the difference in their characters, virtues and qualities. This is one of the reasons why the books of maghāzī rank below the books of ḥadīth, not just the maghāzī book of al-Wāqidī but all works of the genre. The short reply to

Guillaume's question, therefore, is twofold: (1) al-Zuhri and ibn Ishāq were men of more trustworthy character and (2) they observed the rules for reporting events with strictness while al-Wāqidī ignored them.

Sulaymān Nadvī next turns to the issue of why the theologians (ʿulamā-i mazhab) consider al-Zuhri and ibn Ishāq to be superior to al-Wāqidī specifically in respect to maghāzī. Al-Zuhri, he says, is of the highest rank with respect to every kind of report, including maghāzī, while ibn Ishāq is of the highest rank in maghāzī matters but of lesser status with respect to the injunctions of Islam (the aḥkāṁ). As he has claimed repeatedly, Muslims recognize no distinction between reports of maghāzī and other reports; all are judged by the same measure. It is true that the ʿulamā' have exerted less effort in judging specialists in maghāzī and specialists in the faḍā'il (excellent qualities) of the Prophet than they have exerted in regard to specialists in the aḥkāṁ, and they have openly stated this. The unfortunate result is that some people have collected absurd stories about the maghāzī and the excellences of the Prophet. Persons who are ignorant of the science of transmission of reports have accepted them, and they are attractive to the common people. It is implied that such is the case with al-Wāqidī's famous book; thus, the general point remains that al-Wāqidī does not measure up to the standards of the science of transmission.

In the end of the second essay Sulaymān Nadvī takes up several other points of the English professor's letter. One has to do with the assertion that the practice of transmitting reports without giving a full sanad was not objectionable in al-Wāqidī's own time and was followed in the generation after him, specifically by al-Zuhri and ibn Ishāq. This claim, Sulaymān Nadvī holds, is simply not true. The people who criticized al-Wāqidī were his contemporaries, and their criticism shows beyond doubt that his way of dealing with reports was not acceptable. Here the argument about the nature of contemporaneity once again becomes important, and in the following pages to prove his point Sulaymān Nadvī constructs a chart showing the dates of birth of both al-Wāqidī's critics and his supporters. As a result of that piece of research he is able to show that the critics, who

were more numerous and who include some of the most famous men in Islamic history, were his contemporaries while his supporters were people so little known that for many of them it was impossible to establish their dates of birth. As for al-Zuhri, only 5 or 10 times in the whole of his work, Nadvī claims, does he transmit an incomplete report. While ibn Ishāq has more such reports than al-Zuhri, the whole of al-Wāqidi's book consists of such material. If al-Zuhri and ibn Ishāq are to be criticized for these occasional lapses, then what is to be said of al-Wāqidi? Sulaymān Nadvī asks.

Guillaume's mention of al-Bukhārī as having been criticized by other Muslim writers also evokes a reply from Sulaymān Nadvī. The objections made against the famous collector of ḥadīth, Sulaymān Nadvī says, were presented only to show the erudition of their authors. They were, furthermore, merely technical in nature and not substantive, and they have been refuted, point by point, by other authorities. No one, however, has ever had the audacity to accuse al-Bukhārī of lying as al-Wāqidi has been accused. While some people may disagree about the trustworthiness of some of the narrators whom al-Bukhārī cites, it does not follow from this fact that all 6000 of the ḥadīth he reports have fallen away from the strict standard. Again, every report emanating from al-Wāqidi is either silent about its authority or untrustworthy.

Part of Guillaume's questions about al-Bukhārī arose from the fact that he cites Abū Hurayrah, who, according to Guillaume, transmitted reports about miraculous events such as the splitting of the moon, as one of his authorities. The implication is clear, that one cannot accept such reports as having serious historical import. Sulaymān Nadvī, however, disagrees. To argue from the possibility or impossibility of miracles in the light of reason is no way to prove anything, he says. Were it so, then every religion in the world would be under suspicion since they all entertain reports of miraculous happenings such as someone walking on water, feeding a multitude from a small supply of food or the advent of darkness upon someone's death, all obvious references to Christian beliefs. The issue should not turn, Sulaymān Nadvī says, upon whether or not one believes in miracles though he himself accepts those evidentiary miracles that are support-

ed by reliable testimony. In any case discussion of this matter he did not think appropriate in the present context but referred the reader to *Sīrat al-Nabī*, vol. 3, where it is considered at length. Further and perhaps more decisive, Sulaymān Nadvī says that Abū Hurayrah did not report the miracle of the splitting of the moon, and the miracle is not mentioned in al-Bukhārī, nor does any other book he knows attribute it to Abū Hurayrah. In fact, according to Sulaymān Nadvī, Abū Hurayrah became a Muslim only some eight years after the miracle in question.

Guillaume is deemed in error in another important matter as well, i.e., in his statement that al-Zuhrī admitted being forced by the ruler of the time to fabricate and transmit false ḥadīth. Sulaymān Nadvī says that he scarcely dares to suggest that the distinguished Professor of Arabic of a major English university has deliberately misread a simple passage of Arabic. Fortunately, Guillaume cites the original Arabic from which he drew his erroneous conclusion. The passage reads, “these rulers forced us to do this” (akrahanā ‘alayhi hā’ulā’ al-‘umarā’). But the question immediately comes, what were they forced to do? Upon tracing the report in several different books Sulaymān Nadvī believes himself to have found the answer. The statement has to do with the writing down of ḥadīth (tadwīn al-ḥadīth), not with fabrication. There were ‘ulamā’ in the early period, including al-Zuhrī, who objected to recording the ḥadīth in writing, and they persisted in this attitude until the Umayyads compelled them to write the ḥadīth down and organize them. Afterwards, according to al-Zuhrī, he never met a Muslim who objected to what had happened. Sulaymān Nadvī invites the reader to note the difference between what he holds al-Zuhrī to have said, “By the order of the ruler we wrote down and organized collections of ḥadīth” and what the English Professor says, “the rulers forced us to fabricate and make up ḥadīth.”¹¹

The essay closes with two other briefly made points that contribute to the weight of the evidence cited against al-Wāqidi. One is a comparison of the virtues and perfections of his supporters as against those of his detractors. As one looks at the lists of names given, it is relatively easy to decide which group, viz.: the detractors, has the

most importance in Islamic literature and which enjoys the most respect. The concluding point is an argument to show that the famous men who condemned or abandoned al-Wāqidī were in a better position to know him and his work than were those who supported him for the reason that most of the former lived in Baghdad. Although al-Wāqidī passed his early days in Madīnah, his later life as a qāḍī was lived in Baghdad, and it was there that he attained his reputation. Several of his defenders never lived in Baghdad at all or died before he went there. They were, therefore, in a less favorable position than residents of the city to know about him. The conclusion, says Sulaymān Nadvī, is obvious.

What is to be made of these extended and sometimes bitter essays? Their purpose to discredit the European Orientalists and their connection with the agenda of the Nadwat al-‘Ulāmā’ are quite clear. Sulaymān Nadvī’s eagerness to uphold these objectives is evidenced not only in his direct attacks upon the Orientalists but in several other ways as well. One is his willingness to use arguments that are sometimes strained or not directly relevant to the issue under discussion. Noticeable also is the tone of the writing which is sharp, even abrasive. At times he is quite unable to restrain his sarcasm when he points to what he considers the ignorance or the deliberate and studied distortion seen in the views which the Orientalists propound. The essays are argumentative, lacking in the cool objectivity of purely scholarly analysis. Evidently, Sayyid Sulaymān Nadvī subscribed to the unfortunate but widely held Muslim conviction that there exists a conspiracy in the West to denigrate and even to destroy Islam. Hence he was endeavoring not simply to counter scholarly mistakes and misunderstandings but to combat positions that he saw as stemming from an evil intent. The tone of his essays may be accounted for by his perception of what was at issue, but, needless to say, such suspiciousness and hostility do not promote creative scholarly exchange.

Even more striking, however, is the attack on al-Wāqidī which is unrelenting and at times vicious. It is more an indictment of the man than of the material reported from him. Al-Wāqidī’s allegedly low character is repeatedly advanced as the reason why no reliance at all

should be placed on the reports he narrates. In Sulaymān Nadvī's eyes al-Wāqidī appears to have absolutely no merit of whatever kind. There is no seed of good grain that might be recovered from the chaff of fabrication and falsehoods that make up his works. The possibility of there being elements of truth of much value to the historian mixed among the alleged lies for which al-Wāqidī is condemned simply does not arise. Hence, there is no need for devising a method for ferreting them out. The attitude is somewhat softer but still negative towards other maghāzī literature which is also held to be inferior to ḥadīth. Were al-Wāqidī entirely the unworthy person Sulaymān Nadvī paints him to be, it would be difficult to understand how he could have won the support of even one Muslim scholar in his own time or later, or how he could have been entrusted with the highly responsible post of qāḍī. The sustained assault upon al-Wāqidī and the unequivocal rejection of all that he did may perhaps in part be explained, as Qāsim Zamān has perceptively suggested,¹² by the fact that many of the most objectionable things said about the Prophet have their source in al-Wāqidī. To discredit the source is to discredit all that comes from it. Such may well, indeed, be the basis of Sulaymān Nadvī's attitude towards al-Wāqidī as well as that of Shiblī Nu'mānī before him.

Refusal to recognize any merit in the *Kitāb al-Maghāzī* and, ergo, to refuse to use it poses most serious problems for realization of a biography of the Prophet. There is no account of his life written by himself and none by a contemporary observer of the events. Very little of the earliest writing about Muḥammad has survived though we know of its existence and a bit of its content from quotations by other writers. Indeed, the oldest connected report of a substantial part of Muḥammad's life to have survived is precisely al-Wāqidī's maghāzī book which was composed well more than 100 years after Muḥammad's death.¹³ The *Qur'ān*, which is held to contain the very words of Muḥammad's revelatory experiences, alludes to events in Muḥammad's life but does not describe them. The biographical material that might be deduced from it is so limited that literally no reconstruction of Muḥammad's life is possible on the basis alone of what the *Qur'ān* says. The situation is but little better, if at all, with

the ḥadīth whose concern is not historical but largely legal. A chronological framework for the major happenings and developments of Muḥammad's life can no more be derived from the ḥadīth than from the *Qur'ān*.¹⁴ While there may be serious doubts entertained about the maghāzī and sīrah literatures by both traditional Muslims and modern literary critics—though for different reasons, to be sure—these two are indispensable to the construction of a biography of the Prophet, for without them we should be unable to know even the major events of Muḥammad's life or to establish their chronological sequence. So far as Muḥammad's early life is concerned before his emigration to Madīnah next to nothing can be asserted with confidence. Not only is the material reported very brief in contrast with the mass of detail about him in the period after he assumed an important public role, but it consists in large part of a mass of legends and miraculous events that strain credulity. It is only with the advent of the Prophet in Madīnah that it seems possible to put his life, to some degree at least, on a realistic basis. It is precisely with this later period that al-Wāqidi's work deals. Granted that the sīrah of ibn Ishāq has generally been accepted as the more basic resource for the biography of Muḥammad, it is nevertheless true, as Guillaume says, that "the sīrah is incomplete without Wāqidi."¹⁵

While Sulaymān Nadvī explicitly rejected al-Wāqidi's *Kitāb al-Maghāzī*, he was at the same time compelled to accept its general outline. For it to be possible to construct a prophetic biography on the basis of ḥadīth as he and Shibli had hoped to do, there must be a temporal framework into which the various sayings and reports about the Prophet can be fitted. Since the ḥadīth themselves do not provide that framework, it is necessary to turn elsewhere to find one. What, in fact, happens is that scholars who wish to rely principally on ḥadīth must adopt the broad structure of the sīrah and maghāzī works and then attach or explain various ḥadīth reports in terms of it. An excellent example of this process is the development of the science of *asbāb al-nuzūl*, or the occasions of revelation, which seeks to link particular Qur'anic verses with events in Muḥammad's life. The verses do not describe the events; rather the events are assumed and are used to supply a context or derive a meaning for the verses,

whether literary, legal or otherwise. But from whence does knowledge of the events come? It derives undoubtedly from the traditional *sīrah* and *maghāzī* literatures. In our present state of knowledge to reject these literatures or to impugn their validity is to render the reconstruction of the Prophet's biography all but impossible.

Notes

1. Wilfred Cantwell Smith: *Modern Islam in India* (London, Victor Gollancz, 1946), p. 65
2. Sayyid Sulaymān Nadvī: *Maqālāt-i Sulaymān*, ed. Mu'īn al-Dīn Nadvī, vol. 2 (A'zamgarh, Maṭba' Ma'ārif, 1968) pp. 111-165. I also discovered quite belatedly that there is an English translation of the articles under study here in *Islamic Review*, vol. 14, 1926, pp. 135-148 and vol. 15, 1927, pp. 136-144, 214-222, and 247-254. The English translation is embellished with some additions and explanatory glosses and employs more colorful language than the original which is itself quite forceful. The translation has the virtue of providing the original texts of the letters of Margoliouth and Guillaume. The discussion here is based on the original Urdu.
3. Smith: *op. cit.*, p. 42 ff.; also, Aziz Ahmad: *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan* (London, Oxford University Press, 1967) p. 109.
4. For an insightful account of Shibli, the history of the Nadwat al-'Ulamā', and the historical work done in the institution, see the article by Muḥammad Qāsim Zamān: "Venture in Critical Islamic Historiography and the Significance of its Failure," *Numen*, vol. 41, 1994, pp. 26-50.
5. Zamān: *ibid.*, p. 34.
6. D. S. Margoliouth: *Muhammad and the Rise of Islam* (London and New York, 1906) p. 259.
7. Julius Wellhausen, tr.: *Muhammad in Medina* (Berlin, de Gruyter, 1882) p. 54.
8. Neither did Margoliouth. See above.
9. Sūrah 91: 4.
10. Sūrah 8: 43.
11. The good relations of al-Zuhri with the rulers of his time and his willingness to co-operate with them in providing ḥadīth that "justify the politically motivated reform of religion" and "promote the interests of the dynasty" was treated *in extenso* by Goldziher in his *Muhammadanische Studien*. See pages 44-49 of the translation by S. M. Stern: *Muslim Studies* (London, Allen and Unwin, 1967-1971) 2 vols.
12. Zamān: *ibid.*, p. 34.
13. In fairness to Sulaymān Nadvī it must be said that approximately one-third

only of the *Kitāb al-Maghāzī* was available to him, that being the portion contained in the manuscript published by the Royal Asiatic Society. The whole of the work has since been edited and published by Marsden Jones: *Kitāb al-Maghāzī* (London, Oxford University Press, 1966) 3 vols.

14. See the article by F. E. Peters, "The Quest of the Historical Muhammad," in the *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 23, 1991, pp. 291-315.

15. Alfred Guillaume, tr.: *The Life of Muhammad, A Translation of Ibn Ishaq's Sirat Rasul Allah* (London, Oxford University Press, 1955) p. xxxii.

*The Quranic Commentaries
of Mullā Ṣadrā*
Seyyed Hossein Nasr

Toshihiko Izutsu, to whom this essay is dedicated, was at once a major scholar of the Noble Quran and of Islamic philosophy and nowhere do these two domains meet in a more perfect fashion than in the Quranic commentaries of Mullā Ṣadrā.¹ Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī known also as Mullā Ṣadrā has become fairly well known during the past two or three decades in the West and more and more studies are being devoted to his vast intellectual synthesis known as *al-ḥikmat al-muta‘āliyah* (literally “Transcendent Theosophy”).² But as yet little attention has been paid to his Quranic commentaries which are of great significance from the point of view of both the history of Quranic commentary and Islamic philosophy.³ Without doubt these commentaries are the most important by an Islamic philosopher or theosopher (*ḥakīm*) and also the most voluminous by a representative of the Islamic philosophical tradition until the present century when a follower of the school of Mullā Ṣadrā, ‘Allāmah Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’i (d. 1983), wrote his monumental *Tafsīr al-mizān*.

Even in Persia, the home of Mullā Ṣadrā and his school, until the past fifteen years most attention to his works were concentrated upon his properly speaking philosophical works such as the *Asfār* and *al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyyah* and the Quranic commentaries did not

receive as much attention as the philosophical texts on even Mullā Ṣadrā's commentary upon the *Uṣūl al-kāfi* of Kulaynī. Since 1980, however, thanks most of all to the indefatigable efforts of Muḥammad Khwājawī, the different commentaries, all in Arabic, have been published in new editions usually with Persian translations both as separate volumes and together in a collected work which the editor has entitled *Tafsīr al-qur'ān al-karīm*.⁴

In the same way that Mullā Ṣadrā's "Transcendent Theosophy" marks the synthesis of the various schools of gnosis, theosophy, philosophy and theology within a Shi'ite intellectual climate, his Quranic commentaries mark the meeting point of four different traditions of Quranic commentary before him, the Sufi, the Shi'ite, the theological and the philosophical.⁵ Both Sufi and Shi'ite commentaries trace their origin to the commentaries of Imām Muḥammad al-Bāqir and Ja'far al-Ṣādiq, which in turn go back to 'Alī about whom Ibn 'Abbās was to say, "What I took from the interpretation of the Quran is from 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib."⁶ The 3rd/9th century Egyptian Sufi Dhu' l-Nūn al-Miṣrī made an edition of Imām Ja'far's *tafsīr* and was the spiritual predecessor of Sahl al-Tustarī, the author of the oldest extant continuous Sufi commentary upon the Quran.⁷ The same *tafsīr* was given a new recension by Ibn 'Aṭā', a recension that was later incorporated by Sulamī in the 4th/10th century in his *Ḥaqā'iq al-tafsīr*, the second oldest Sufi Quranic commentary after Tustarī's.

From this early tradition there flowed the major Sufi commentaries of later centuries such as the *Laṭā'if al-ishārāt* of Imām Abu'l-Qāsim al-Qushayrī and the commentary of Khwājah 'Abdallāh Anṣārī in the 5th/11th century. The latter was completed and much expanded in the monumental Sufi commentary of Anṣārī's student, Rashīd al-Dīn Maybudī, which is one of the masterpieces of the Persian language. The next two centuries were witness to the continuous flowering of this tradition with the appearance of the two colossal figures of Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazzālī and Rūzbihān Baqlī Shīrāzī, whose *'Arā'is al-bayān* brings this early chapter of Sufi Quranic commentary to its culmination and close.

A new chapter in Sufi Quranic commentaries was inaugurated a

generation after Baqlī by Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn ‘Arabī who left a most profound mark upon all later esoteric commentaries and particularly on those of Mullā Ṣadrā. The *Futūḥāt al-makkiyyah* of Ibn ‘Arabī is in so many ways a Quranic commentary and brings out over and over again some of the most profound meanings of the verses of the Sacred Book.⁸ Ibn ‘Arabī is also the author of a monumental commentary that is as yet unpublished while the well-known commentary, *Ta’wīl al-qur’ān*, attributed to him, belongs to the 8th/14th century follower of his school, ‘Abd al-Razzāq Kāshānī. In any case this long Sufi tradition of *tafsīr* and *ta’wīl* was well known to Mullā Ṣadrā and constitutes one of the four traditions of Quranic commentary which became wed together in his own works on the subject.

The second tradition, namely the Shi‘ite, also begins with the work of Imām Ja‘far al-Ṣādiq and included not only more formal and “external” commentaries such as *al-Tibyān fī tafsīr al-qur’ān* of Abū Ja‘far Muḥammad al-Ṭūsī and *Majma‘al-bayān fī tafsīr al qur’ān* of Abū ‘Alī al-Faḍl al-Ṭabarsī, but also works of Shi‘ite gnostics such as the 8th/14th century figure Ḥaydar Āmulī and his successor in the 9th/15th century Ṣā‘in al-Dīn ibn Turkah Iṣfahānī. Again Mullā Ṣadrā may be said to stand directly within this tradition with which he was very familiar, being himself a Shi‘ite gnostic and philosopher of the highest order. This tradition is also to be seen in the works of some of Mullā Ṣadrā’s contemporaries and students such as Sayyid Aḥmad ‘Alawī and Mullā Muḥsin Fayḍ Kāshānī.

As far as theological commentaries, by which we mean commentaries associated with the schools of *Kalām*, are concerned, it is necessary to state that Mullā Ṣadrā was in general opposed to *Kalām* as such and believed that the *mutakallimūn* had no right to deal with the subjects with which they were for the most part engaged, and that these subjects, having to do with God, His Names and Attributes, the human soul, etc., should be treated by the “theosophers” (*ḥukamā-yi ilāhī*) who had access to divine inspiration as well as reason and the external form of the revelation. Nevertheless, Mullā Ṣadrā was closely familiar with *Kalām* especially the works of Ghazzālī and Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī among the Ash‘arites and the *Tajrīd* of Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī in Shi‘ite *Kalām*. As far as Quranic commentaries from

the perspective of *Kalām* are concerned, however, it is especially the *Tafsīr al-kabīr* of Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī that must be mentioned. Like nearly all later Quranic commentators, Sunni and Shi'ite alike, Mullā Ṣadrā knew of this immense commentary and most likely had studied at least parts of it.⁹ One can see also traces of Ghazzālī's methodology of commentary upon the Quran in Mullā Ṣadrā, this influence being predominantly from the Sufism of Ghazzālī but also to some extent from the aspect of the thought of Ghazzālī as an Ash'arite.

Finally, a word must be said about philosophical commentaries upon the Quran by which we mean commentaries written by those technically called *faylasūf* or *ḥakīm*. Already in al-Fārābī there is some concern with Quranic commentary especially if we accept the *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikmah* as being by him. But the founder of philosophical commentary in the Islamic intellectual tradition is Ibn Sīnā who not only wrote separate commentaries upon verses of the Quran, but also provided a famous commentary upon the "Light Verse" in his *al-Ishārāt w'l-tanbīhāt* which influenced even Ghazzālī's *Mishkāt al-anwār* despite the latter's opposition to Avicennan philosophy. Strangely enough, however, this corpus has not been taken as seriously as it should in most of the studies on Ibn Sīnā in the West, and even in most of the contemporary Islamic scholarship on the subject.¹⁰

After Ibn Sīnā, it was especially Suhrawardī who turned to the Quran in his exposition of *ishrāqī* doctrine. In contrast to Ibn Sīnā, however, Suhrawardī did not write separate Quranic commentaries, but his works are replete with Quranic quotations upon which he comments amidst his exposition of various philosophical and theological theses in contrast to Ibn Sīnā who did not quote the Quran directly in such major works as the *Shifā'* and *Najāh*.

Mullā Ṣadrā's commentaries may be said to be a synthesis of all these four schools of Quranic commentary with which he had various degrees of familiarity and the situation of his commentaries in the context of the history of Quranic commentary cannot be understood except in the context of these schools. Of course Mullā Ṣadrā was also acquainted with the standard commentaries common among Muslim scholars such as those of Bayḍāwī, Ṭabarī, Zamakhsharī and Abu'l-Futūḥ al-Rāzī. But one should not think for one moment that

Mullā Ṣadrā's commentaries are simply an eclectic gathering of elements from these commonly known commentaries and the four particular traditions of Quranic commentary mentioned above, namely, the Sufi, the Shi'ite, the theological and the philosophical, any more than the *ḥikmat al-muta'aliyah* is simply the sum of the teachings of the schools which preceded it. In many of his Quranic commentaries Mullā Ṣadrā states that this or that meaning was unveiled to him by inspiration from the Divine Throne and that no one will be able to understand the inner meaning of the Quran without that unveiling (*kashf*) which enables the "eye of the heart" to gaze directly upon the realities of the spiritual world and even beyond them to the Divine Reality from which the Quran has descended.

The Quranic commentaries of Mullā Ṣadrā are as follows:¹¹

1. Commentary upon chapter LVII, *al-Ḥadid* (Iron), with one introduction, twenty nine parts¹² and a conclusion.
2. Commentary upon the "Throne Verse" (*āyat al-kursī*), (II; 255), one of his longest and most important commentaries consisting of an introduction and twenty chapters.
3. Commentary upon the "Light Verse" (*āyat al-nūr*), (XXIV; 35). Consisting of an introduction, a prolegomena, five chapters and a conclusion, this work is in a sense the synthesis and peak of the long tradition of commentaries upon this verse and is one of the major works of Islamic metaphysics.
4. Commentary upon chapter XXXII, *al-Sajdah* (The Prostration), consisting of an introduction, a prolegomena, nine parts and a conclusion.
5. Commentary upon chapter I, *al-Ḥamd* or *al-Fātiḥah* (The Opening), consisting of five parts in which the various meanings of *bismi'llāh* with which the chapters of the Quran begin are discussed.
6. Commentary upon chapter II, *al-Baqarah* (The Cow), which was completed only up to verse sixty-six and in which he refutes many of the theses of the Ash'arites and Mu'tazilites.
7. Commentary upon chapter XXXVI, *Ya-Sin* (Y-S), consisting of eight principles to prove bodily resurrection followed by sixteen

chapters.

8. Commentary upon chapter LXII, *al-Jum'ah* (The Congregation), consisting of an introduction, twelve parts and several "inspirations from the Divine Throne" (*al-hikmat al-'arshiyyah*), a gnostic affirmation and a conclusion.
9. Commentary upon chapter LV, *al-Wāq'ah* (The Event), consisting of an introduction followed by the text, the introduction containing autobiographical material about his journey from the outward to the inward.
10. Commentary upon chapter LXXXVI, *al-Ṭāriq* (The Morning Star), consisted of an introduction and the text in which he states that there are great secrets hidden in this chapter unveiled to him by God.
11. Commentary upon chapter LXXXVII, *al-A'lā* (The Most High), with an introduction and seven chapters.
12. Commentary upon chapter XCIX *al-Zilzāl* (The Earthquake), with an introduction and the text.

In addition to these commentaries there are three works of Mullā Ṣadrā which are directly related to the subject at hand. The first and by far the most important is *Mafātīḥ al-ghayb* which is one of Mullā Ṣadrā's most important works ranking with the *Asfār*, *al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyyah* and *Sharḥ usūl al-kāfi*. In it he speaks of his method in the interpretation of the Quran (especially in the first two chapters, that is, *al-miftāḥ al-awwal* and *al-miftāḥ al-thānī*). Secondly there is the *Mutashābihāt al-qur'ān* which summarizes the discussion of the *Mafātīḥ al-ghayb* as far as the "ambiguous" verses of the Quran are concerned. Finally there is *Asrār al-āyāt* which contains a section on the esoteric meaning of the abbreviated letters at the beginning of certain chapters of the Quran.

It must not be thought, however, that these fifteen works taken together contain all of Mullā Ṣadrā's Quranic commentaries. To include all of his commentaries one must also include the many verse quoted and commented upon in such philosophical works as the *Asfār*, *al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyyah al-Mashā'ir*, *al-Mabda' wa'l-ma'ād*, *al-Ḥikmat al-'arshiyyah*, etc. As we have occasion to remark before,¹³

although Mullā Ṣadrā's works can be categorized into those dealing with the intellectual sciences (*al-'ulūm al-'aqliyyah*) and those dealing with the transmitted sciences (*al-'ulūm al-naqliyyah*), this categorization is not based on mutual exclusion. The predominantly 'aqli works still possess naqli elements and viceversa. Therefore, in a sense the whole corpus of Mullā Ṣadrā is related to Quranic commentary while all of his Quranic commentaries are replete with philosophical and theosophical discussion. The works cited above, however, constitute his Quranic commentaries in a more exclusive sense and should be studied precisely as Quranic commentary. In fact together they constitute one of the major intellectual and gnostic commentaries upon Quran in Islamic history.

The method of Mullā Ṣadrā in his Quranic commentaries is based on the avoidance of both pitfalls of remaining bound only by the outer meaning of the Sacred Text and of neglecting or negating the outward and formal meaning altogether. While at the beginning of his commentary, upon *Sūrat al-sajdah*, he expresses his opposition to those satisfied only with the external meaning of the Text, in his commentary upon *Āyat al-nūr* he criticizes those who, in the name of carrying out *ta'wīl*,¹⁴ pay no attention to the external meaning of Quranic terms as those words are understood in ordinary language. He even goes so far as to claim that such interpreters and commentators (*mu'awwilūn*) are more dangerous than those who limit the Quran simply to its outward meaning.¹⁵

According to Mullā Ṣadrā, authentic Quranic commentary is possible only for those whom the Quran calls "firm in knowledge" (*al-rāsikhūn fi'l-'ilm*). Even among this exalted group of people of knowledge, there is a hierarchy and levels of understanding, some being able to reach more inner meanings of the text than others. But even the highest among those "firm in knowledge" cannot gain access to the whole meaning of the Quran. The highest and profoundest meaning of the Sacred Text is known to God alone. On all levels, moreover, what those "firm in knowledge" utter about the meaning of the Text is not opposed to the outward meaning (*al-ẓāhir*) but complements it. To reach the inner meaning is not to oppose the outward

sense.

Authentic Quranic commentaries must rely on two basic sources: clear transmission of the text of the Quran and vision of the truth which is so evident as not to be open to doubt or refutation. This latter source he identifies with unveiling (*mukāshafah*) and knowledge received by the heart (*al-wāridāt al-qalbiyyah*), terms which are used often by Mullā Ṣadrā to refer to knowledge received through intellection and illumination. To gain full access to this latter source, the commentator must undergo ascetic practices and self-purification. Otherwise he is simply fooling himself. Despite being an outstanding speculative philosopher, Mullā Ṣadrā insists that when it comes to the Quran, ordinary use of reason as understood by rationalistic philosophers is not sufficient. The heart must be purified and illuminated before the inner meaning of the Quran can be understood and transmitted. In his commentary upon the *āyat al-kursī* he goes so far as to say that he is addressing only the elite among the people of God (*ahl Allāh*), the lovers of God and those who believe in what the first two groups have attained. For those who display opposite characteristics, the reading of Mullā Ṣadrā's commentaries are even juridically forbidden (*ḥarām*).

An excellent example of Mullā Ṣadrā's method of Quranic commentary is to be found in his commentary upon the *āyat al-nūr* which demonstrates the depth of his metaphysical knowledge as well as knowledge of the earlier tradition of sapiential commentary in Islam. At the beginning in his discussion of the meaning of light (*al-nūr*) he writes:

"God is the light of the heavens and the earth. The similitude of His light is a niche wherein is (a lamp). . . ."

PREFACE

"The indication (*ishārah*) regarding the verification (*taḥqīq*) of this verse is prefaced by (our saying) that the word "light" is not—as the veiled ones (*al-mahjūbūn*) from among the experts (*ulamā'*) on language (*lisān*) and theology (*kalām*) understand it—a subject (*mawḍū'*) of the accident (*'araḍ*) which consists of bodies (*ajsām*). They have defined it as a thing which has no duration (*baqā'*) for two moments of time, belonging to created

things (*ḥawādith*) which are defective (*nāqisa*) in existence. Rather, this light is one of the Names of God the Almighty. He is the one who illuminates the lights, establishes the realities (*ḥaqā'iq*), manifests the ipseities (*huwiyyāt*) and existentiates the quiddities (*māhiyyāt*).

“Light, in its unqualified sense, bears many meanings in vulgar opinion, some of which are homonymous (*bi-al-ishtirāk*), some literal (*bi-al-ḥaqīqa*) and some figurative (*al-majāz*), such as: the light of reason, the light of faith, the light of piety, the light of sapphire, the light of gold, and the light of turquoise.

“In the opinion of the Illuminationists (*al-ishrāqīyīn*) and their followers such as Shaykh al-Maqtūl Shihāb al-Dīn (al-Suhrawardī)—the one who unveils their symbols (*rumūz*), extracts their treasures (*kunūz*), records their sciences, sheds light on their understandings (*fuhūm*), exposes their stations (*maqāmāt*), and explains their allusions (*ishārāt*)—(light) is a simple (*basīṭa*) and self-manifesting (*zāhira bi-dhātihā*) reality (*ḥaqīqa*), which brings other things to manifestation. Accordingly, (this reality) cannot possess genus (*jins*) or differentia (*faṣl*) because it is not constructed of parts, nor is it made known by definition (*ḥadd*), nor unveiled by description (*rasm*), for it is not hidden in itself, rather it is the most manifest (*azhar*) of things, since it is the opposite of darkness (*ḡulma*) and hiddenness (*khafā'*), (just as) negation (*salb*) is the opposite of affirmation (*ījāb*). Thus there is no demonstration (*burhān*) for it; rather it is the demonstration for everything.

“Hiddenness and veiling, however, occur (*yaṭra'ān*) to it only according to levels (*marātib*), such as (occurs in the case of) the level of self-subsisting (*qayyūmī*) light—because of its extreme manifestation (*ḡuhūr*) and apparentness (*burūz*). For (what is) intensely manifest and theophanized (*tajallī*) may cause what is manifested to become hidden due to the abundance of (light) and the extreme deficiency of the illuminated thing, just as one observes in the case of bats when strong visible sunlight shines in their pupils. If the situation is thus with regard to sensible light, what would you think about the light of intellect which reaches the peak of intensity and power?

“Light is interpreted by the elder (*akābir*) Sufis according to this meaning, as can be gleaned from their compilations and

symbolic tales (*marmūzāt*), although the difference between their school of thought (*madhhab*) and that of the illuminated sages is that light—although it is, according to those elders (Sufis), a simple reality—is exposed, in accordance with its essence (*dhāt*), to variations (*tafāwut*) in intensity and weakness (and exposed to) plurality (*ta'addud*) and multiplicity (*kathra*) in accordance with modes of being (*hay'āt*) and in individualities (*tashakkkhuṣāt*), (as well as exposed to) differences in necessity (*wājibiyya*) and contingency (*mumkiniyya*), substantiality (*ja-whariyya*) and accidentality (*'araḍiyya*), independence (*al-ghinā*) and dependence (*al-iftiqār*).

“As for the opinion of the most erudite noble ones (the illuminated sages), these properties (*aḥkām*) do not occur to it with respect to the definition of its essence, but rather with respect to its theophanies (*tajalliyyāt*), entifications (*ta'ayyunāt*), traits (*shu'-ūnāt*) and considerations (*i'tibārāt*). Thus truth is one, and plurality occurs only in accordance with different loci of manifestation (*maẓāhir*), mirrors (*marā'i*) and receptacles (*qawābil*). It is not unlikely that the difference between the two schools of thought is attributable to their disparity in terminology and ways of alluding to things, their artistry in clarification and intimation and their ways of summarizing and detailing—despite their agreement as far as the foundations and principles are concerned. What Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazzālī mentions in the *Mishkāṭ al-Anwār* when he says, “Light is an expression by which things are made visible,” is in accord with the statements of the Imāms of wisdom.”¹⁶

For Mullā Ṣadrā, as for other Islamic esoterists, in the deepest sense the Quran is being (*wujūd*) itself, and his major work on Quranic commentary the *Mafātīḥ al-ghayb*, literally “Keys to the Invisible World” is a key to both the Quran and its complement the world of existence. As expressed by a leading contemporary Persian authority in his introduction to the *Mafātīḥ al-ghayb*:

“The Quran and being (*wujūd*) are parallel to each other for the Quran issues from the unique and total Name of God and because of its being the theophany of the total Name, reflects all the Divine Names. That is why the *Sharī'ah* of the Quran is the seal of all *Sharī'ahs* and the sanctity (*walāyah*) of the Quran is for the

same reason the seal of divine sanctity.¹⁷

“Like the Quran, being (*wujūd*) possesses letters (*ḥurūf*) which are the keys to the invisible world. From their composition words are made and from their composition verses (*āyāt*)¹⁸ and from their composition chapters. Finally from the (gathering of) chapters the evident book of being with its two aspects of *qur’ān* (gathering) and *furqān* (discernment) is realized. The *furqānī* aspect of the evident book (*kitāb-i mubīn*) is the macrocosm with the total of its details. Its *qur’ānī* and collected (gathered) aspect is the reality of the lordly universal man.

“The lordly Names (*asmā’-i rubūbī*) are the keys to the invisible world and the universal principles of being. And the immutable and unique theophany run through all the great stars as well as in one’s children. The science of the Divine Names is the most notable of the sciences and the knowledge of the Prophet and his inerrant family is such a science. . . .”¹⁹

Shāhrūdī goes on to show the close correspondence between macrocosmic existence as reflecting various Divine Names and the chapters and verses of the Quran which are also reflection of God’s Names and the key to both of these realities through the science of the Names which was possessed by the Prophet and later transmitted to those who are “firm in knowledge.”

In fact the very name *Mafātiḥ al-ghayb* was chosen by Mullā Ṣadrā for the work which is the key to his Quranic commentaries because he was seeking “to provide means to gain access to the inner and invisible dimensions of being and of the Quran. For Mullā Ṣadrā, as for many other gnostics and philosophers, the Quran is in complete harmony with being, for it has issued from the Source of being, the Principle of reality and the core of the archetypal world. Therefore, the means which unveil the inner meaning of the Quran also provide an opening toward the inner meaning of being. The key to the invisible aspect of the Quran is also a key to the invisible dimensions of being and viceversa.”²⁰

In the *Asfār*, his major philosophical masterpiece and similar works, Mullā Ṣadrā begins with the discussion of *wujūd* and turns from time to time to Quranic verses. In the *Mafātiḥ al-ghayb* and his Quranic commentaries, he begins with the Quran and then turns to

the mysteries of *wujūd*. The two types of writing complement each other and reveal the Quranic commentaries of Mullā Ṣadrā as not only journeys into the inner meaning of the Word of God, but also penetrations into the inner dimension of universal existence itself. In these majestic commentaries, so little studied until now outside of Persia and even within the land of Mullā Ṣadrā's birth, one finds one of the most eloquent expositions of not only the meaning of God's revelation in the form of the Word but also the meaning of that other primordial revelation that is the cosmos and the abode of existence itself.

Notes

1. Izutsu, always attracted to linguistic studies, had already devoted important works to the study of the Quran when in the Winter of 1962 we met him for the first time at the McGill University Institute of Islamic Studies. After delivering a lecture on Mullā Ṣadrā, we were told by Izutsu, who attended the lecture, that he was so deeply attracted to what had been said about the Safavid sage that he wanted to leave aside his Quranic and *Kalām* studies to devote his time fully to Mullā Ṣadrā and later Islamic philosophy and theosophy. This is in fact exactly what happened as the works of Izutsu during the last two decades of his life bear witness.
2. See H. Corbin (ed.), *Le Livre des pénétrations métaphysique*, Paris, 1993; Corbin, *En Islam iranien*, vol. IV, Paris, 1971, pp. 54-122; S. H. Nasr, *The Transcendent Theosophy of Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī*, Tehran, The Imperial Iranian Academy of Philosophy, 1977; Nasr, *The Islamic Intellectual Tradition in Persia*, London, Curzon Press, 1996; Nasr, "Mullā Ṣadrā," in Nasr and O. Leaman (eds.), *History of Islamic Philosophy*, 2 vols., London, Routledge, 1996, pp. 635-662; F. Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā*, Albany (N. Y.), State University Press of New York, 1976; and J. Morris (ed. and trans.), Mullā Ṣadrā, *Wisdom of the Throne*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1981.
3. The essays of L. Peerwani on the subject are a rare exception. See her "Quranic Hermeneutics: The Views of Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī," *British Society for Middle East Studies Proceedings*, 1991, pp. 468-477. Also Mullā Ṣadrā's commentary upon the *Āyat al-nūr* (Light Verse) has been translated and analyzed Muḥsin Sāliḥ in a doctoral thesis presented to Temple University in 1993.
4. The fuller title is *Tafsīr al-qur'ān al-karīm ta'līf Ṣadr al-muta'allihīn*, 7 vols., ed. M. Khwājawi, Qum, Bidār Press, 1366, A.H. solar/1987-1369/1990.
5. On these traditions of commentary see A. Habil, "Traditional Esoteric Com-

mentaries," in S. H. Nasr (ed.), *Islamic Spirituality-Foundations*, New York, Crossroad Publications, 1987, pp. 24-47.

6. Muḥammad al-Dhahabī, *al-Tafsīr wa'l-mufasssīrūn*, 2 vols., Cairo, Dār al-Kutub al-Ḥadīth, 1967, vol. I, pp. 89.

7. See G. Böwering, *The Mystical Vision of Existence in Classical Islam: The Quranic Hermeneutics of the Sufi Sahl al-Tustarī*, Berlin and New York, de Gruyter, 1980.

8. See M. Chodkiewicz, *An Ocean without Shore, Ibn Arabi, The Book, and the Law*, trans. D. Streight, Albany (N. Y.), State University of New York Press, 1993.

9. We remember that in the 1960's and 70's when 'Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā'i was writing his *al-Mizān* commentary, he would often discuss in his weekly meetings with us his reading of Rāzī's commentary concerning the particular chapters and verses with which the 'Allāmah was concerned at that time. He would consider Rāzī's verses carefully before writing his own words without always agreeing with him. Once when we asked him why he considered an Ash'arite commentary so important, he said that although he was an Ash'arite, Rāzī's Quranic commentary contained so much valuable material that it had to be consulted by even those opposed to Ash'arism. As a direct intellectual descendent of Mullā Ṣadrā, 'Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā'i stated that over the centuries the *ḥukamā-yi ilāhī* of Persia, all of whom opposed Ash'arism philosophically, nevertheless used to consult the *Tafsīr al-kabīr* of Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī.

10. An exception is L. Gardet who, in his *La Pensée religieuse d'Avicenne* (Ibn Sinā), Paris, J. Vrin, 1951, realized the significance of these commentaries although even in his case the interpretation given are different from those of later followers of Ibn Sinā in Persia. See also A. f. von Mehren, *Traité mystiques d'Abou Alī al-Ḥusain b. Abdallāh b. Sinā ou d'Avicenne: texte arabe avec l'explication en français*, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1889-1891.

11. We follow here the order given by M. Khwājawī in his *Lawāmi' al-'arīfīn fī aḥwāl Ṣadr al-muta'allihīn*, Tehran, Āriyan Press, 1366, A.H. solar/1987, pp. 109 ff.

12. As in his philosophical works, so in the Quranic commentaries, Mullā Ṣadrā uses all kinds of gnostic and theosophical terms to designate the chapters of a work, terms such as *mukāshafah*, *kashf*, *rukn* and *tasbīḥ*. In this text, however, we have translated all such terms into simply chapters or parts.

13. See our *The Transcendent Theosophy of Ṣadr al-Dīn Shirāzī*, pp. 39 ff.

14. Usually translated as hermeneutic or esoteric interpretation and commentary, *ta'wīl* means literally to take back something to its origin. Since all things issue from an inward center, to reach the inner meaning of things means precisely to take things back to that center which is also their origin. To go from the outward (*al-ẓāhir*) to the inward (*al-bāṭin*), which is how *ta'wīl* has been defined by most traditional masters, is also to return to the Origin from which all that is outward and manifested issues.

15. Mullā Ṣadrā's methodology in commenting upon the Quran has been dis-

cussed by M. Khwājawi in his *Lawāmi' al-'arīfīn*, pp. 107 ff.

16. Translated by Muḥsin Ṣāliḥ, *The Verse of Light: A Study of Mullā Ṣadrā's Philosophical Qur'ān Exegesis*, Ph. D. Thesis, Temple University, 1993, pp. 4-9.

17. This doctrine associated with the Muḥammadan Reality as the Logos as such seen within the Islamic universe has been treated by many earlier Sufis especially Ibn 'Arabī. On Ibn 'Arabī's theory of *walāyah/wilāyah* in general see M. Chodkiewicz, *Seal of the Saints-Prophethood and Sainthood in the Doctrine of Ibn 'Arabī*, trans., L. Sherrard, Cambridge, The Islamic Text Society, 1993.

18. It is of the utmost significance to recall here that *āyah* means both verses of the Quran and phenomena of nature. See S. H. Nasr, *An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines*, Albany (N. Y.), State University of New York Press, 1993, pp. 5 ff.

19. From the introduction of 'Ābidī Shāhrūdī to the *Mafātīḥ al-ghayb* reprinted in Khwājawi, *Lawāmi' al-'arīfīn*, p. 202.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 200.

The Meaning and Experience of Happiness in Islām

Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas

Happiness according to the perspective of Islām is expressed by the term *sa'ādah*, and it relates to two dimensions of existence: to the hereafter (*ukhrawiyyah*) and to the present world (*dunyawīyyah*). The contrary of *sa'ādah* is *shaqāwah*, which conveys the meaning of great misfortune and misery in general. With respect to the hereafter *sa'ādah* refers to ultimate happiness, which is everlasting felicity and bliss, the highest being the Vision of God, promised to those who in worldly life have lived in willing submission and conscious and knowing obedience of God's commands and prohibitions. This being so, we see that the relation of *sa'ādah* to the hereafter is very closely connected with its relation to the present world, with respect to which it relates to three things: (1) to the self (*nafsiyyah*) such as pertains to knowledge and good character; (2) to the body (*badaniyyah*) such as good health and security; and (3) to things external to the self and the body (*khārijiyyah*) such as wealth and other causes that promote the well-being of the self, the body, and the external things and circumstances in relation to them.¹ Happiness in the present world pertains therefore not only to the secular life, it has also to do with life as interpreted and guided by religion whose source is Revelation.

The meaning of religion in Islām is expressed by the term *dīn*, which is not merely a concept, but is something which is translated

into reality intimately and profoundly lived in human experience. Its ultimate source of meaning is derived from the Quranic revelation of the covenant (*al-mithāq*) of man's recognition and acknowledgement of God as his absolute Lord, which man's pre-existent soul has sealed with God.² The very name of the religion: *Islām*, apart from being understood in its application as a verb as well as a noun, is in reality also the definition of religion: *submission to God*. Already in the very idea of submission, feeling, belief, and action are implied; but the fundamental element in man's act of submission to God is his sense of *indebtedness* to God for His gift of existence, so that this sense of indebtedness, which involves recognition and acknowledgement of God as the giver of existence, is a prior condition to true submission (*islām*).³ The ultimate aim of religion is for man to return to the state in which he was before he acquired external existence, and this involves the quest for his identity and transcendent destiny through right conduct. This 'returning' is what life is all about, and it involves the pursuit of true knowledge,⁴ the understanding of God's signs and symbols in the pages of the book of nature by means of the guiding light of His words and interpreted in the sacred person of His messenger. It also involves the application of the sound senses to the experience of reality and the application of the sound reason to the apprehension of truth.⁵

Religion (*islām*) and belief (*īmān*) are not identical, but they are mutually inseparable and indispensable. Belief in the sense we mean is to have faith, not quite in the sense faith is understood in English, but in the sense that it involves the becoming true to the trust by which God has confided in one, not by profession of belief with the tongue only, without the assent of the heart and the action of the body in conformity with it; and this is more than knowledge, which is prior to faith, so that it is also verification by deeds in accordance with what is known to be the truth.⁶ It is recognition and acknowledgement of the truth necessitating its actualization in one's self. Recognition of the truth is in this case arrived at simply because it is clear in itself as apprehended by the intuitive faculty we call the heart, that is, by means of divine guidance (*hudā*), and not only by rational propositions and logical demonstrations. The truth is at once objec-

tive and subjective; and the objective and subjective, like religion and belief, are inseparable aspects of one reality. True religion is then not something that can succumb to the confusion arising from the objective-subjective dichotomy of the Greek philosophical tradition; nor is it that personal, individual, privatized and internalized 'religion of humanity' that emerges out of the secularizing process which seeks to abolish the institutionalization of religious belief.

As to the relation of happiness to the self, which we say pertains to knowledge and good character, Islām teaches that the seat of knowledge in man is a spiritual substance variously referred to in the Qur'ān as his heart (*qalb*), or his soul or self (*nafs*), or his intellect ('*aql*), or his spirit (*rūh*). It has many names because of its accidental modes or states. Thus when it is involved in intellection and apprehension it is called 'intellect': when it governs the body it is called 'soul' or 'self'; when it is engaged in receiving intuitive illumination it is called 'heart', and when it reverts to its own world of abstract entities it is called 'spirit'. Indeed, it is in reality always engaged in manifesting itself in all its modes. These four terms used in relation to man each conveys two meanings; the one referring to the body and the other to the soul of man.⁷ Man is a double associate, his body animal, his soul rational. The first meaning denotes that aspect from which originate the blameworthy qualities in man, and they are the animal or bodily powers which in spite of their being beneficial to man in some respects, are in conflict with the intellectual powers. The attachment of blameworthiness to the animal powers or faculties in the physical aspect of man should not be confused with the idea of denigration of the human body, which is against the teaching of Islām. The human being is created "in the best of moulds", but without true faith and good works he is worse than the lowly beasts.⁸ It is against the non-beneficial aspects of the animal powers that the Holy Prophet urged us when he alluded to the greater struggle (*jihād*) of man, for they are the enemy within.⁹ The second meaning refers to the reality of man and to his essence. To this meaning refers the well-known Prophetic tradition: "Whoever knows his self knows his Lord". The reality or essence of man is indicated by everyone when he says "I", and is the seat of knowledge.¹⁰ When it inclines

towards the right direction, that is towards what is true and good for it in conformity with its nature, the divine peace (*al-sakīnah*) will descend upon it,¹¹ and the effusion of divine liberality will successively be diffused in it until it achieves tranquility in the remembrance of God and abides in the knowledge of His divinity, and soars towards the highest levels of the angelic horizons. The Qur'ān calls this state of the soul the tranquil soul (*al-nafs al-muṭma'innah*).¹² The faculties or powers of the soul are like armies engaged in constant battles of alternate success. Sometimes the soul is drawn towards its intellectual powers and encounters the intelligibles whereby their eternal truths cause it to affirm its loyalty to God; and sometimes its animal powers drag it down to the lowest foothills of the bestial nature. This vacillation in the state of the soul is the state of the soul that censures itself (*al-nafs al-lawwāmah*);¹³ it is in earnest struggle with its animal powers. By means of knowledge, moral excellence, and good works it is possible for man to attain to the angelic nature, and when he does, he no longer has in common with his fellow man the animal nature in him except in outward form and fashion. But if he falls into the degrading depths of the bestial nature and remains captive in that condition, then he is severed from the nature common to humanity and appears as man only in shape and construction. This is the state of the soul that incites to evil (*al-nafs al-ammārah bi'l-sū'*).¹⁴

Since the self is intimately involved in a dual aspect of body and soul, it is described on the one hand as the animal soul (*al-nafs al-ḥayawāniyyah*) and on the other hand as the rational soul (*al-nafs al-nāṭiqah*); and its destiny in the attainment of happiness here, and of ultimate happiness in the hereafter, depends upon which aspect it chooses to align itself with in a preponderant way. Both aspects possess powers or faculties (*quwā*). The faculties of the animal soul are motive and perceptive. The former is appetitive (*nuzū'iyyah*), and its activity is directed by two sub-faculties; the faculty of desire (*al-shahwāniyyah*) and the faculty of anger (*al-ghaḍabiyyah*).¹⁵ The latter comprises five external senses which perform the function of perception of particulars in the external world, and in addition five internal senses which perceive internally the sensual images and their meanings, combine or separate them, conceive notions of them,

preserve the conceptions thus conceived, and perform intellection of them.¹⁶ The faculties of the rational soul are active and cognitive. In so far as it functions as the active intellect it is the principle of movement of the human body. It is the practical reason, and directs individual actions in agreement with the theoretical faculty of the cognitive intellect. In relation to the motive power of the animal soul, which is responsible for the exertion of willing that desire or aversion shall issue in action, it produces human emotions. In relation to the perceptive power and its representative, estimative, and imaginative faculties it manages physical objects and produces human skills and arts; and in relation to its faculty of rational imagination it gives rise to premises and conclusions. In so far as it governs and manages the human body, it induces ethical behaviour in man involving the recognition of vices and virtues.¹⁷

Virtue (*faḍīlah*) may be classified under a general heading of excellence of mind or discernment and good character.¹⁸ Character is a stable state of the soul. If this state causes actions commended by the intellect and by religion it is called good character. Good character may be achieved by learning and habituation, and in some cases it may come by nature as a divine gift. Character may change from bad to good, and conversely from good to bad.¹⁹ The goal of good character is happiness, both in this world and in the hereafter. In order to produce virtue and good character the animal soul and its bodily faculties must be subordinated to the practical faculty of the rational soul, which directs individual action after deliberation in accord with what agrees with the theoretical faculty. In order to achieve good character the intellect must be trained in deliberate thinking and reflection. Only when this has been accomplished can it realize *wisdom*. The faculty of desire, when trained, will realize *temperance*, and that of anger *courage*. When desire and anger are subordinated to intellect *justice* is realized; and the mean (*al-waṣaṭ*) is then to be achieved by these two bodily faculties after they have been trained and disciplined by the practical faculty of the rational soul leading to the attainment of good character. The training of the bodily faculties needs free choice.²⁰ Contrary to the invariable translation by most people of the word *ikhtiyār* by 'choice', we maintain that *ikhtiyār* does

not simply mean 'choice'. The word *khayr*, meaning 'good', which is bound in meaning with *ikhtiyār* and being derived from the same root, determines that the choice meant is towards what is good. This point is most important when aligned to the philosophical question of freedom. A so-called 'choice' towards what is bad is therefore not a choice. Since we affirm that freedom is to act as our real and true nature demands, only the exercise of that choice which is good can properly be called a 'free choice'. A choice for the better is an exercise of freedom. It presupposes knowledge of good and evil. A 'choice' for the worse is not a choice, as it is based upon ignorance and on the instigation of the soul that inclines towards the blameworthy aspects of the animal powers.

The philosophic virtues of temperance, courage, wisdom and justice are not in themselves sufficient to produce in the self the kind of happiness that is experienced to be abiding and not determined by external and temporal circumstances. We do agree that if happiness is understood to relate only to the temporal, secular dimension of life without any reference to the hereafter, it is a state that undergoes changes and variations in degrees from moment to moment; or it is something that cannot be consciously experienced from moment to moment here in this world, and can be judged as having been attained by one only when one's worldly life, if virtuously lived and attended by favourable circumstances, has come to an end. But we do not restrict our understanding of happiness only to the domain of temporal, secular life; for since we affirm that the relation of happiness to the hereafter has an intimate and considerable bearing upon its relation to worldly life, and since in the former case it is a spiritual and permanent condition, there is—even in its temporal and secular involvement—an element of happiness that we experience and are conscious of and that once attained is permanent. We do not agree, therefore, with the Aristotelian position that virtue and happiness relate only to this world, and that consequently happiness as a permanent condition experienced consciously in the course of our worldly life is unattainable.

According to the tradition of Western thought there are two conceptions of happiness; the ancient, which goes back to Aristotle

and which in the Middle Ages goes back also to Muslim philosophers and theologians such as chiefly Ibn Sīnā and al-Ghazālī; and the modern, which gradually emerged in Western history as a result of the process of secularization. This philosophic and scientific process which I call 'secularization' involves the divesting of spiritual meaning from the world of nature, the desacralization of politics from human affairs, and the deconsecration of values from the human mind and conduct, both the last two mentioned following logically from the first, which in my opinion found initial movement in the experience and consciousness of Western man in the philosophical foundations laid down chiefly by Aristotle himself.²¹ It is the modern conception of happiness that is acknowledged to be prevalent in the West today, and this means that for that civilization the meaning of happiness, and necessarily of the virtues that lead to it, has undergone change, bringing with it not only moral decadence and crisis, but political dissension and conflict as well. Both the ancient and the modern conceptions agree that happiness is an end in itself, but whereas for the former the end is considered in terms of a standard for proper conduct, the latter considers it to be terminal psychological states having no relation with moral codes.²² In reality, however, the so-called modern conception of happiness, apart from the sophistication with which it is formulated and pursued, is not much different in essence from the ones known and practiced in ancient times by pagan societies.

Although philosophic virtues, which have been conceived allegedly through human choice and by means of reason alone, are in themselves not sufficient for the realization of enduring happiness in the self, their acceptance is justified when they do not come into conflict with religion; and their usefulness for the attainment of happiness is acknowledged when some reformulation of their meanings has been effected in agreement with religion. This reformulation is effected by drawing them into the conceptual ambit of other virtues of a higher order unknown to the Greek philosophical tradition, such as those virtues derived from the Qur'ān and from the life of the Prophet. Knowledge of God in accordance with revelation is a religious virtue which is derived from wisdom; and wisdom itself, whether theoretical

or practical, is a religious virtue because it is a gift of God and not an acquisition of unaided reason.

Religious virtues are classified into two kinds, the external (*ẓāhir*) and the internal (*bāṭin*). The external pertains to fulfillment of the divine commandments such as acts of worship directed solely toward God; practices directed toward fellow men for the continued well-being of social and political order; the performance of the five essentials of the religion of Islām including ritual purity, recitation of the Qur'ān, remembrance of God, invocation; and fulfillment of the requirements of Islamic custom or habit such as religious etiquette regarding food, clothing, personal cleanliness, marriage, business transactions, things allowed and things forbidden, rules of neighbourliness, companionship, travel, observance of the model actions and sayings of the Prophet, and obligations of brotherhood in Islām.²³

The internal virtues refer to the activities of the heart; activities that are grounded upon knowledge of God and of the self derived both from reason and from revelation, and that require a positive disposition in the self inducing good intention (*niyyah*) to be followed by action (*'amal*) with sincerity of purpose (*ikhhlās*) and truthfulness to oneself (*ṣidq*). Knowledge of the self leads to knowledge of its good and bad qualities, and to the assigning of duties to oneself to overcome the bad in order to purify the soul of impurities.²⁴ This action on the part of the self means that the rational soul must keep watch over the animal soul (*murāqabah*) to ensure that the duties assigned to oneself are carried out. It also entails self-examination to observe whether the carrying out of such duties has been executed in the proper way, and to correct any deviation from what is proper (*muḥāsabah*). As to the knowledge of God it means the knowledge of who He is, of His nature and oneness as He has described Himself in Revelation, and this knowledge leads to comprehension of the proper relationship between the self and God. In the Revelation also God speaks about His creation and about man's self as signs indicating His reality and truth;²⁵ and contemplation and reflection of His works and of the nature of man and the psychology of his soul are then prerequisites to the attainment of that knowledge. All this involves meditation (*tafakkur*) and brings about the gradual realization in the

self of other virtues of a higher order, such as repentance (*tawbah*), patience (*ṣabr*), gratitude (*shukr*), hope (*rajā*), fear (*khawf*), divine unity (*tawhīd*), trust (*tawakkul*), and finally the highest virtue for the attainment of happiness in worldly life, love of God (*maḥabbah*).²⁶

The external and internal virtues actually overlap one another, and the possibility of virtuous activities which involve only the one without being in some way connected with the other is inconceivable. Their classification into external and internal is only to distinguish the inward activities of the heart which characterize the latter from the outward activities of the body; the emphasis on inner meaning evident in the latter from the practice of what is apparent demonstrated in the former. Some may preponderate in the realization of the external virtues and some in that of the internal virtues; but it is not possible for some to realize only the external virtues without recourse to the internal virtues, nor for some to realize only the internal virtues without having accomplished the realization of virtues that are external. Thus both the external and internal virtues are necessary for the attainment of happiness in this life and ultimate happiness in the hereafter. Finally, since virtues classified as philosophic have been reformulated and assimilated into the religious framework wherein the interpretation of human destiny extends to horizons beyond temporal existence, and since this religious framework is established not only upon reason but upon reason as verified by Revelation, all virtue in Islām is religious.

In order to understand what *sa'ādah* means it seems to me necessary first to present a concise explanation of the meaning of its exact opposite *shaqāwah*. The Arabic lexicons from the earliest times and going back to Quranic usage describe *shaqāwah* as conveying the approximate equivalent in English of 'great misfortune', 'misery', 'straitness of circumstance', 'distress', 'disquietude', 'despair', 'adversity', 'suffering'. Every one of these conditions obviously involves serious internal and external activity. Indeed *shaqāwah* is a generic term as it encompasses all forms of misery, so that other terms expressing similar conditions but more specific in their contextual application are only constituent elements of *shaqāwah*. These include, among others for example, *khawf* (fear, of the unknown, of utter

solitude and incommunicability, of death and what lies beyond, a foreboding of dread, *angst*); *huzn* (grief, sorrow, sadness, roughness of soul); *dank* (narrowness, straitened, misery in the soul and in the intellect rendered incapable of fathoming something causing agitation of doubt in the heart); *hasrat* (profound grief and regret for something gone and never to be experienced again, such as—when referring to the hereafter—the exceedingly keen grief and regret of the man who turns away from God and spends his life in self-waste when he discovers after death how he has lost his soul and bitterly laments the impossibility of a return to worldly life to make amends). These terms are used specifically for those who turn away from God and reject His guidance, and are applied to conditions both in this world and in the hereafter. Other terms expressing misery of one kind or another and applicable to all in this life are, for example, *ḍiq* (straitened, of heart and mind, constrained); *hamm* (disquietude, anxiety, distress of heart and mind due to fear of impending calamity or harm); *ghamm* (same as *hamm*, only that the harm that is feared would come has come, so that it becomes anguish); *ʿusr* (hard, difficult and unpleasant of circumstance).

It seems to me that the above gist of the meaning of *shaqāwah* already clarifies that in its generic sense it refers to what is understood in the West as *tragedy*—tragedy not merely in its dramatic sense as a form of art, but more so in its philosophic sense as the drama of life enacted in the experience and consciousness of man when he rejects religion and turns away from God. This statement needs elaboration. According to Aristotle in the *Poetics* tragedy in its dramatic sense is an artistic imitation of an action that is serious, complete in itself, and of adequate magnitude, that is, for example, enacted in poetic language, having a moral purpose portraying character (*ethos*), and discursive understanding (*dianoia*), that enables the tragic character to exercise the power to say what is appropriate in a given situation. The protagonist in Greek drama must have stature, undergo physical as well as mental suffering, being brought low by an error of judgement due to lack of insight, a tragic flaw (*hamartia*), in the dramatic process that is brought about by some tempting opportunity (*kairon*). He must also have pride (*hubris*), a

presumption against the gods which effends them. The causal factor is fate (*ananke*), which pursues the tragic character relentlessly with a fatefulness (*ate*), a curse, that runs inherited through generations. The framework of incidents upon which the drama is constructed forms a unity comprising a beginning, a middle, and an end; and within this unity of events there must occur a process of reversals (*peripeteia*) such as from happiness to sorrow, from good fortune to ill, and of discovery (*anagnorisis*) such as from ignorance to knowledge of something dreadful. The effect of tragedy is to arouse pity and fear in such a manner as to effect their purging from the soul and give it relief (*katharsis*).²⁷

According to the Greek lexicons the purging that is meant by *katharsis* is of sin and of guilt from the soul or self.²⁸ This being so, and from what we have outlined above about the nature of tragedy in Greek drama, the purging of fear and of pity aroused by tragedy may be understood to mean fear in the self of impending misery brought about by a feeling of guilt due to sin committed in the past. Now tragedy is not merely a form of art, for the fact that it manifests itself so uniquely in the intellectual, religious and secular tradition of Western thought and spirituality in all ages and establishes itself in its mythology is succinct indication that tragedy—at least in the experience and consciousness of Western man—is a fact of life, and its dramatic form is only a reflection of what is happening in real life. It were as though in that experience and consciousness there is made to dwell always that nagging guilt religion attributes to original sin committed by man's progenitor, who by a tragic flaw succumbed to tempting opportunity urged on by an adversary bent upon his fall from grace. In consequence of his fall a hereditary curse dogs his descendants causing them to sense the guilt that continues to plague their hearts and minds throughout the ages. Man's common ancestor was of high nobility brought low by the tragic flaw. In the beginning he dwelt in great honour and happiness in a different world. Then after his downfall he was banished to this world; and his descendants now find themselves in the middle part of the unity of events that are unfolding in a process of reversals and discoveries, and play their parts in conflict and violence. But the final discovery is yet to come

in the dreaded end when every one must leave this world and return to come to face with the truth. The obsession with tragedy and with the art that depicts it is such that even religion had to be cast in the crucible of tragedy. The world has become a stage in which man contrives, enacts, and beholds his own drama of existence in order to effect the purging of fear and of self-pity. Humanistic philosophy and the gradual process of secularization together with the rise of secular philosophy and science, made tragedy, instead of religion, the exaltation of man. Fear must be purged not by faith in God, but by the banishment of God from the realm of creation; self-pity must be purged not by remembrance of God, but by pride in humanity and defiant acceptance of the human predicament. The causal factor in tragedy is no longer the old Greek Fate nor the God of religion, but social and individual conflicts, biological heredity, the psychology of the unconscious, defeat by frustration, man confronted by the mystery of the universe, the eternal quest of man, and the absurdity of life. Freedom of the will becomes a firm *belief* because it helps in the perpetual struggle against obstacles that prevent from reaching the goal. But the goal itself is ever-shifting. Can Sysiphus ever be happy in having eternally to push the stone up the hill where at the top it is destined to roll down again? Fitzgerald was not really translating the intended meaning of the Persian poet, even though that was what he claimed to do, when he wrote:

O Thou, who Man of baser Earth didst make,
 And ev'n with Paradise devise the Snake;
 For all the Sin wherewith the Face of Man
 Is blacken'd—Man's forgiveness give—and take!

He was only expressing the prevalent spirit of defiance that rages in the experience and consciousness of man when he rejects God and turns away from His guidance.

The Qur'ān relates how Adam was tempted by Satan, disobeyed God, and allowed himself to be seduced by Satan. Adam and his consort, however, conscious of their error and unlike Satan, admitted their sin, were filled with remorse at their own injustice to themselves, and sought God's mercy and forgiveness. They both were forgiven, but were sent down together with Satan to this world to live

a life of trial and tribulation. God assured Adam and his progeny that guidance would come from Him and that whoever follows His guidance will not go astray nor fall into misery; but whoever turns away from remembrance of Him will surely live a miserable life assailed by doubt and inner tension heightened by blindness to the truth and to the reality of their predicament.²⁹

The Quranic application of the meaning of *shaqāwah* in its various conjugated forms such as *shaqā*,³⁰ *yashqā*,³¹ *tashqā*,³² *ashqā*,³³ *al-ashqā*,³⁴ *shaqiyy*,³⁵ and *shiqwah*³⁶ relates, some to the hereafter, some to this world, and some to both. All of them refer to those who turn away from God and reject His guidance. *Shiqwah*, for example, refers to those who have lost their souls (*khasirū anfusahum*)³⁷ in this world by being overwhelmed by worldly pleasures leading them astray and making them fall into error. They may feel and think that they are happy in what they do in worldly life, but the underlying misery of their true condition that they may not now acknowledge because they have lost their souls but will be realized in the hereafter is unspeakable; a Day of Distress (*yawm al-ḥasrat*), of Sighs and Sobs, awaits them there.³⁸ Indeed according to the Qur'ān all mankind are in a condition of utter loss (*khusr*) except those who have true faith (*īmān*), and do righteous deeds, enjoin one another to the Truth and to patience.³⁹ The doing of good works is accomplished by means of virtues—*īmān* being the source of the principal ones—and good character. The meaning of happiness in this worldly life and ultimate happiness in the hereafter is then very closely bound up with *īmān*, whose general meaning as understood and experienced by those who have it I have already stated in the beginning.⁴⁰ The root *amina* conveys the meaning of becoming secure, becoming free from fear. The infinitive noun of *amina*: *amnu*, means security, freedom from fear. The fear that is meant here is the fear of the unknown, of utter solitude and incommunicability, of death and what lies beyond, a foreboding of dread—in short it is the fear that refers to ultimate destiny. Those who have *īmān* and persevere in the doing of righteous deeds preserving themselves from disobedience of God are then not affected by such fear (*khawf*), which is the contrary of security (*amnu*).⁴¹ The term 'fear' relates to two psychological conditions.

When it refers to one who turns away from God and rejects His guidance it means fear as explained above; however, when it refers to one who submits to God and cleaves to His guidance, it means reverential fear or awe of His majesty, which also means to know Him. For such a one fear of God means fear of disobedience, of committing acts forbidden by God, of being evil, of being veiled from God and denied nearness to Him. Such fear, which arises from knowledge of God and His absolute freedom to do what He wills, and of human acts of transgression and their dreadful consequences, encourages the realization of virtues such as temperance (*'iffah*), abstinence (*wara'*), piety (*taqwā*), and truthfulness (*ṣidq*).⁴² According to what has been and still is verified by "those who have faith (*āmanū*) and whose hearts are rendered tranquil (*taṭma'innu*) by remembrance (*dhikr*) of God, for serenely in the remembrance of God are hearts made tranquil",⁴³ faith (*īmān*) and remembrance (*dhikr*) are necessary for the attainment of that stable and peaceful calmness of heart that is called *ṭuma'ninah*. This condition refers to the state of the tranquil soul (*al-naḥs al-muṭma'innah*) mentioned earlier.⁴⁴ *Ṭuma'ninah* describes the calm, restful condition of the heart, which we said is an aspect of the self.⁴⁵ It is freedom from worry resulting from doubt, freedom from disquietude; it is inward peace, satisfaction, joy, happiness, which comes about when the soul or self is submissive to God. Being submissive to God is what is known as freedom, for it is a return to one's true nature acknowledged by man's pre-existent soul when it sealed its covenant with God. Being submissive to God involves remembrance in the heart of God's presence, and remembrance means recollection of God, recognition and acknowledgement of His Lordship. This being submissive to God is the soul's reconciliation with God, which causes in the soul the consciousness of safety, security, freedom from corruption and failure, the consciousness of peace called *islām*. These activities of the soul or self imply a prior condition of consciousness in the soul of the truth that comes from guidance. This consciousness is that of certainty (*yaqīn*) of the truth. *Yaqīn* is the contrary of doubt (*shakk*) and conjecture (*ẓann*); it is the removal of doubt and conjecture from the heart and the verification of the truth in the past, present, and future.

The Qur'ān mentions three degrees of certainty in knowledge: that which is derived by inference, whether deductive or inductive (*'ilm al-yaqīn*),⁴⁶ that which is derived by observation or direct vision (*'ayn al-yaqīn*);⁴⁷ and that which is derived by direct experience (*ḥagg al-yaqīn*).⁴⁸ These degrees of certain knowledge pertain to truth, whether manifest or hidden, empirical or transcendental; and the certain knowledge of what is hidden has the same force of certainty as that of what is visible. These degrees of certainty also pertain to the heart and refers to faith (*īmān*).

We said that it is remembrance of God that brings about the state of tranquility in the soul; and that this and other virtuous activities imply a prior consciousness in the soul of the truth that comes from divine guidance. This consciousness arises as certainty (*yaqīn*). How then can one who forgets God find peace of heart and mind and calmness of soul when in reality forgetfulness of God involves also forgetfulness of the soul of itself? There can be no consciousness of certainty of the truth in the soul when that soul has forgotten itself, that is, when its rational aspect has been suppressed by its animal aspect such that it becomes conscious only of its involvement in its bodily faculties and the pleasures and amusements of worldly life, or the pursuit of secular philosophy and science and contemplation of facts derived from them, or even of both together. This is why the Qur'ān warns that those who forget God will be made to forget their souls or their selves.⁴⁹ The forgetting of the self here must mean, among other possible meanings, unconsciousness of the rational soul of itself, and consciousness only of the animal soul which inclines toward the satisfaction of bodily desires. One who forgets his self in this way is one who has lost his soul (q.v. *khusr*) and whose condition is "baser than the lowest of the low".⁵⁰

Feelings and emotions are involved in consciousness, and those who are conscious of God, verifying this consciousness by remembrance, experience in their feelings and emotions the consciousness of the happiness upon which their lives are established—I mean that their lives are secured upon a substratum of happiness. In their case the experience of suffering in the course of worldly life, which they must undergo from time to time just like the others, is not consciously felt

by them as misery in the tragic sense. Rather suffering is recognized by them to be probation, a testing of their faith in God and virtuousness of conduct in the face of hardship and calamity. Such suffering is not called *shaqāwah*; it is called *balā'*, and the probation *ibtilā'*. In spite of the suffering, then, they know and are conscious of the truth that the substratum upon which their lives is lived is ease and happiness, to which condition, they always return. The Qur'ān reveals this truth by declaring twice for emphasis the assurance that "with every hardship ('*usr*) there is relief (*yusr*)".⁵¹ But as for those who turn away from God and are blind to His guidance, the substratum of life upon which they live is misery and tragedy, and no amount of feelings, or emotions, or activities they believe to be happiness is going to clear away that substratum. It is this condition that we believe to be the reason for their need of perpetual purging of the soul by means other than remembrance of God, such as by means of various forms of art and music contrived with magnitude and nobility of execution in a way that renders their predicament palatable to the aesthetic taste; by means of restless work and struggle against themselves, against others, against the world, against nature—to distract from the tragedy of unattainment, and to prevent a return to the substratum of life. That is why their philosophers speak of suicide as a philosophical problem. Unfortunately that is why also that from time to time there occur pessimistic outbursts of indignant anger in the form of violence somewhat like the sacrificial *sparagmos* of Old Greek tragedy. And that explains too the reason for the continual preoccupation with the quest of happiness regarded as an end in itself.

Happiness (*sa'ādah*) being the exact opposite of misery (*shaqāwah*) and as known in the experience and consciousness of those who are truly submissive to God and follow His guidance is not an end in itself because the highest good in this life is love of God. Enduring happiness in life refers not to the physical entity in man, not to the animal soul and body of man; nor is it a state of mind, or feeling that undergoes terminal states, nor pleasure nor amusement. It has to do with certainty (*yaqīn*) of the ultimate Truth and fulfillment of action in conformity with that certainty. And certainty

is a permanent state of consciousness natural to what is permanent in man and perceived by his spiritual organ of cognition which is the heart (*qalb*). It is peace and security and tranquility of the heart (*ṭuma'nīnah*); it is knowledge (*ma'rifah*) and knowledge is true faith (*imān*). It is knowledge of God as He has described Himself in genuine Revelation; it is also knowing one's rightful and hence proper place in the realm of creation and one's proper relationship with the Creator accompanied by requisite action (*'ibādah*) in conformity with that knowledge such that the condition which results is that of justice (*'adl*). It is only through such knowledge that love of God can be attained in earthly life.

From the foregoing brief but comprehensive exposition of the meaning and experience of happiness in Islām we derive conclusion that happiness in this life is not an end in itself; that the end of happiness is love of God; that in worldly life two levels of happiness can be discerned. The first level is psychological, temporal and terminal states which may be described as feelings or emotions, and which is attained when needs and wants are achieved by means of right conduct in accord with the virtues. The second level is spiritual, permanent, consciously experienced, becoming the substratum of worldly life which is affirmed to be probationary, the testing of conduct and virtuous activity being by good fortune or ill: i.e., not swayed to error by good fortune nor defeated in suffering by ill fortune. This second level, when attained, occurs concurrently with the first, except that wants are diminished and needs are satisfied. This second level of happiness is a preparation for a third level in the hereafter of which the highest stage is the Vision of God. There is no change in this meaning and experience of happiness in the consciousness of genuine believers throughout the ages.

We have discussed briefly but comprehensively and in a straight forward manner the meaning and experience of happiness as known in the consciousness of man when he is submissive to God and cleaves to His guidance. Happiness, we said, is related both to temporal, secular life as well as to the hereafter. Since religion is fundamental in its relation to man and to his well-being, the meaning of religion is first explained, followed by a brief outline of the nature of man and

the psychology of the human soul derived from reason and Revelation. As a prelude to an explanation of the nature of happiness which is here defined in terms of the opposite state, we maintain that the activity proper to man is virtuous activity of his body and his soul in accordance with reason aided by Revelation. Virtuous activity is defined not merely in terms of philosophic virtues, but in terms of their reformulation within the conceptual ambit of religious virtues described as external and internal. In defining happiness in terms of its exact opposite, other related terms describing happiness and misery are brought into focus and explained. The explanation is made more meaningful by making comparative analysis of certain salient features of Aristotelian and modern Western conceptions of happiness with the Islamic conception of happiness in order to show significant divergences between the former and the latter. It is maintained that three levels of happiness are discerned in the Islamic conception, two of them in worldly life and one in the hereafter. In this summary exposition the Qur'ān is the direct source of our interpretation of happiness, which we maintain is verified in our experience and consciousness according to the various degrees of attainment, in belief and in practice, among the varying classes of people. It is also maintained that in our experience and consciousness there has been no change throughout the ages in the meaning of happiness in Islām. A general definition of happiness is set forth at the end. Finally, it may be noted that references to "those who turn to God and follow His guidance" are not necessarily meant to indicate only those who profess to adhere to the religion of Islām, just as those who profess to follow the religion of Islām are not all necessarily included among those who turn to God and follow His guidance.

Notes

1. See al-Ghazālī, *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn*, Cairo, 1939, 4 v., vol. 3, p. 229. As for the terms *sa'ādah* and its contrary *shaqāwah*, these are ultimately derived from the Qur'ān, Hūd (11): 105-108. With regard to the three things to which happiness relates in this world, see also Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, tr. Sir David Ross,

- O. U. P. London, 1963, Ethics 1. 8. 1098 b 5.
2. See *al-A'raf* (7): 172.
3. By 'true submission' (*islām*, the first letter in lower case) we mean conscious and willing submission for the whole of one's ethical life in the manner indicated and demonstrated by the Prophet and by the prophets sent before him.
4. By 'true knowledge' we understand it to mean knowledge that recognizes the limit of truth in its every object. Cf. my *Islām and the Philosophy of Science*, ISTAC, Kuala Lumpur, 1989, pp. 26-32.
5. On the meaning of religion or *dīn* in Islām, see my *Islām: The Concept of Religion and the Foundation of Ethics and Morality*, Kuala Lumpur, 1976.
6. The 'truth' here means what has come down by way of revelation to the Prophet about the nature and reality of God, of His creation, of human destiny, of the relationship between man and God and man's individual responsibility and freedom.
7. *Iḥyā'*, vol. 3, p. 3; see also his *Ma'ārij al-Quds fī Madārij Ma'rifat al-Nafs*, Bayrut, 1978 (3rd. pr.), p. 15 fol.
8. *Al-Ṭīn* (95): 4-5.
9. Bayhaqī, *Zuhd*, from Jābir. Ibn Hajar says this *ḥadīth* is well known. *Kashf al-khafā'*, vol. 1; p. 511, no. 1362.
10. See *Ma'ārij*, pp. 18; 19-22; 23-25; also further my *On Quiddity and Essence*, ISTAC, Kuala Lumpur, 1990, p. 12 and references in note 20 on p. 12.
11. *Al-Baqarah* (2): 248; *al-Tawbah* (9): 26; 40; *al-Fath* (48): 4.
12. *Al-Fajr* (89): 27.
13. *Al-Qiyāmah* (75): 2.
14. *Yūsuf* (12): 53.
15. *Ma'ārij*, pp. 37, fol.; Ibn Sinā, *Kitāb al-Shifā'*, Cairo, 1975, pp. 33; *Kitāb al-Najāt*, Bayrut, 1985, pp. 197-198.
16. *Ma'ārij*, p. 41; *Shifā'*, pp. 33-34; *Najāt*, p. 198.
17. *Ma'ārij*, pp. 49-50; *Shifā'*, p. 185; *Najāt*, pp. 202-203. See further my *The Nature of Man and the Psychology of the Human Soul*, ISTAC, Kuala Lumpur, 1990.
18. See al-Ghazālī's *Mizān al-'Amal*, Bayrut, 1986, p. 59.
19. *Mizān*, p. 54, fol.
20. *Ibid*, pp. 55-56.
21. See my *Islām and Secularism*, Kuala Lumpur, 1978.
22. This is clearly reflected, for example, in the writings of two contemporary major thinkers in the West, namely Mortimer Adler in his *Reforming Education*, Macmillan, N. Y. 1988, e.g. pp. 81-89; 239-253; 254-274; and Alasdair MacIntyre in his *After Virtue*, University of Notre Dame Press, Indiana, 1984, e.g., pp. 1-5; 181-203; 226-243; 244-255; 256-263.
23. A comprehensive and detailed account of the religious virtues sketched here in bare outline is to be found in the Quarters and Books of al-Ghazālī's *Iḥyā'* (*op. cit.*), vols. 1-2.
24. The soul, according to the Qur'ān, is created in due proportion and order. It

knows what is right for it and what is wrong for it. Its success is achieved when it is purified, and its failure is assured when it is corrupted (91: 70-10). The purification of the soul is to be achieved by means of virtue and good character as formulated and conceptualized in accordance with the tenets of Islām.

25. *Fussilat* (41): 53.

26. *Ihyā'*, vol. 4.

27. *Poetics*, tr. with comm. by S. H. Butcher, 1911. The definition of tragedy is on 1449 B.

28. *A Greek-English Lexicon*, comp. by H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, etc., Oxford, 1968, p. 851, col.; and F. E. Peters, *Greek Philosophical Lexicon*, New York, 1967, pp. 90-99.

29. *Al-A'rāf* (7): 19-25; *Tā Hā* (20): 117-124; *Banī Isrā'il* (17): 72.

30. *Hūd* (11): 106-107.

31. *Tā Hā* (20): 2; 123.

32. *Tā Hā* (20): 117.

33. *Al-Shams* (91): 12.

34. *Al-A'lā* (87): 11; *Al-Layl* (92): 15.

35. *Hūd* (11): 105; *Maryam* (19): 4; 32; 48.

36. *Al-Mu'minūn* (23): 107.

37. *Al-An'ām* (6): 12; 20; *Al-A'rāf* (7): 9; 53; *Hūd* (11): 21; *Al-Mu'minūn* (23): 103; *Al-Zumar* (39): 15; *Al-Shūrā* (42): 45.

38. *Maryam* (19): 39.

39. *Al-'Asr* (103): 2.

40. See above, p. 2, para 2.

41. *Al-Mā'idah* (5): 69; *Al-An'ām* (6): 48; *Al-A'rāf* (7): 35; *Yūnus* (10): 62; *Al-Ahqāf* (46): 13.

42. *Ihyā'*, vol. 4, p. 153. By 'piety' we mean cautiously guarding oneself from the commission of sins and the omission of duties. *Taqwā* is reverential awe of God's majesty; it is deliberate activity of guarding from disobedience by righteous conduct in accordance with virtue resulting in justice, i.e., being in the proper place of the self in relation to God such that peace is achieved in the soul.

43. *Al-Ra'd* (13): 28.

44. See above, p. 4.

45. See above, p. 3.

46. *Al-Takāthur* (102): 5.

47. *Al-Takāthur* (102): 7.

48. *Al-Hāqqah* (69): 51.

49. *Al-Hashr* (59): 19.

50. *Al-Tīn* (95): 4; q.v. p. 4 above; and for *khusr*, p. 71 above.

51. *Al-Inshirāḥ* (94): 5-6.

Danishnamah-i *Maysari*,
the Oldest Medical Compendium
in Persian Verse

Mehdi Mohaghegh

In Iran, since the earliest times, the science of medicine held a place of high importance, and the *pijishkan*, the Pahlavi term for physician, was considered as a distinguished special class together with the other classes that is the *star shmaran*, *zamik patmanan* and *danakan*, the astronomers, men who measure the land, namely the engineers, and the wise men namely the philosophers. The story of Burzuyah the physician, at the beginning of the *Kalilah va Dimnah*, shows the nobility of medicine and its ethical structure during the pre-Islamic period. The Jundishapur Hospital in Ahwaz was one of the most important centers for both medical study and practice, in which both Iranians and non-Iranians belonging to different religions were engaged in that field. The continuity of this medical tradition can be seen centuries after the advent of Islam.

In Islam, after theology and jurisprudence, medicine has been considered as the most noble science. In a tradition attributed to the Holy Prophet, the *ilm al-abdan* (medicine) has been given priority to the *ilm al-adyan* (religion), for it is argued that if the body is not in good health, one cannot think of God in order to pray and to worship Him properly.

In view of the above-mentioned statements, it becomes clear that medicine was greatly developed after Islam, and that a large body of

literature was produced by Muslim scholars such as *al-Havi* by Razi, *Kamil* by Majusi, *Qanun* by Ibn Sina, in Arabic, and *al-Adviyah* by Hiravi, *Hidayah* by Akhawayni, and *Zakhirah* by Jurjani in Persian. One of the characteristics of Islamic medicine is its variety in different aspects. This variety relates to subjects such as medicine, veterinary science, pharmacology; or to the ways of treatment like *al-kayy* cauterization, *al-jabr* bone setting, *amalmedcine*, such as the schools of the *ashab al-qiyas* (dogmatists), *ashab al-tajribah* (empiricists), *ashab al-tibb al-hiyali* (methodists); or to the different states of man such as *tadbir al-asihha* treatment of the healthy people, *tadbir alhubala* treatment of pregnancy, *tadbir al-mawludin* treatment of the new born, *tadbir al-sibyan* treatment of children, and *tadbir al-mashaikh* treatment of the old.

The variety and ramifications in medicine shows itself in the writings of scholars. Some of the works are written as encyclopedias, such as *al-Havi* by Razi or *Qanun* by Ibn Sina; other works are monographs such as The Book of Diabetes by Abdul Latif al-Baghdadi, The Book of Stomach by Ibn Jazzar al-qirawani, and The Book of Fevers by Ishaq ibn Sulaiman.

Another variety was to present medicine in poetry in order for it to be attractive, easily memorized and readily quoted by the students. For this purpose a simple meter would be chosen, such as the meter *rajaz* in Arabic and *hajaz* in Persian. One of the most notable examples in Arabic is the *Urjuzah* by Ibn Sina, published with a French translation in Paris in 1956. It begins with:

الطَّبَّ حِفْظُ صَحَّةٍ بِرَأْسِ مَرَضٍ مِنْ سَبَبٍ فِي بَدَنِ عَنْهُ عَرَضُ

It says that medicine is the knowledge through which health is preserved and is useful for the healing of the sickness caused to the body.

At this meeting where we are concerned with science in Iran, I wish to introduce a medical compendium entitled *Danishnamah* by a physician called Maysari, written in Persian poetry. It should be noted that this book was first introduced by the professor Gilbert Lazard in *Les Premiers Poètes Persans* (1964) where fragments have been both quoted in Persian and translated into French.

Fortunately the complete text of *Danishnamah* was edited by Professor B. Zanjani, and it was published in Tehran in 1987 in the series of "History of Science in Islam", under the supervision of the present author by The McGill Institute of Islamic Studies Tehran Branch.

Maysari has chosen the *methnawi*, and the simple metric *hazaj* as used in *Vis va Ramin* by Fakhr al-Din Asad Gurgani. The *Danishnamah* is based on the unique manuscript preserved at the Bibliothèque Nationale r 7799-310, and it contains 4481 verses. At the end of the book the author refers to his name, to the name of the book and the date in which it was written. On his name he says:

نیاز آرد بگوید ازدل پاک که یارب "میسری" بدبود و ناپاک

On the basis of the Islamic tradition he confesses to his sins and errors in this verse. On the name of his work he says the following:

بینجامید "دانش نامه" من برآمد زمراد و کامه من

The word *Danishnamah* was used at that time for all kinds of scientific compendia, and as we know Ibn Sina has named his philosophical work dedicated to 'Ala al-Dawlah Kakuyah, *Danishnamah 'Alai*. Today we use the word *danishnamah* in Persian for encyclopedia, like the Arabic *dairat al-ma'arif* or *mawsu'ah*.

On the date of compilation, Maysari says that it was in the year 370 AH/980 AD.

بسال سیمصد و هفتاد بودیم کزین نامه همی پردخته شودیم

Since in the following verse he refers to the fact that he was 46 years old when he wrote the book:

من ازدو بیست و دوسه برگزدم و دیوان جوانی برنوشتم

It can be concluded that he was born in 324 AH/935 AD. In the following verses he notes that since he lived in a region where the people did not know Arabic, he wrote his book in Persian so that it could be understood by everyone.

و پس گفتم زمین ماست ایران که بیش از مردمانش پارسی دان
و گرتازی کنم نیکو نباشد که هرکس را ازو نیرو نباشد

On the basis of similar or common expressions used by both Nasir Khusraw and Maysari it can be suggested that the author is from the region of Khurasan. For example the expression which says that if you do not have greased wheat bread your words should be in this way. Maysari says:

اگر نانت نباشد گندمین روی سخن باری بخوان برگندمین گوی

And Nasir Khusraw has said:

مر سخن را گندمین و چرب کن گرداری نان چرب گندمین

Maysari does not specifically mention the names of any of his teachers, or students, or the books which he has used. Time by time however he refers to his masters and to books:

ز استادان من این نسخه گرفتم درین نامه ترا نیکو بگفتم
بگویم آنچه زین بابت شنیدم و آن کاندرا کتبها نیز دیدم

The *Danishnamah* is dedicated to a wise and enlightened king, of whom he only mentions the position and the title, that is *sipahsalar* and Nasir al-Dawllah

فراوان با نلم اندیشه کردم خردمندی و دانش پیشه کردم
که بگزینم شهی دانا و بیدار که هست این خوب دانش را خریدار
نبد این جز سپسالار ایران کزو آباد شد ایران ویران
بدو مر شاهیان را عز و کاست به بینی ناصر دولتش نامست

Since many persons were given this title Prof. Zanjani compared the dates and concludes that the king is Amir Sabuktakin, father of Sultan Hahmood who came to power in the year 366 AH, four years before the compilation of the text.

Maysari has begun his book by the name of God and his positive and negative attributes. Then he goes on to expose the problem of the creation and contingency of the world. This is due to the fact that at that time it was customary for physicians to mention some philosophical and theological notions at the beginning of their works. The best

example of this, at the time of the author, is the *Firdaws al-Hikmah* by Ali ibn Rabban Tabari and *al-M'alajat al-Bugratiyah* by Abu al-Hassan Tabari which is based on the old tradition that a good physician must know philosophy because philosophy is considered to be the medicine of the soul, while medicine is the philosophy of the body. In this connection all Muslim and Iranian physicians have paid special attention to the famous work of Galen entitled "An excellent physician must necessarily be a philosopher". Moreover Maysari seems to have been influenced by a tradition in which the knowledge of religion has been considered as parallel to the knowledge of medicine. In the following verses he specifically declares that medicine saves the body while religion is the protector of the soul. He further states that it is necessary for the body to be healthy in order to receive the light of knowledge through which one can recognize the Almighty God.

زیانست این جهان و آن جهانی	پزشکی را و دین را گردانی
دگر جان را بدانش بر فروزد	یکی تن را ز بیماری بسوزد
و دین دانستش جان را سپاهست	پزشکی دانشش تن را پناهست
نه باریش و نه بادرد و نه بیمار	تنی باید درست و راست کردار
بدانش جان خود بتواند افروخت	که دین ایزدی بتواند آموخت

In the first chapter the author explains the composition of man. After enumerating 246 bones in the body and 360 blood vessels, he introduces the heart (*dil*) as the ruler of the body, the brain (*maghz*) as the minister, and the liver (*jigar*) as the commander of the body. Then he explains the four natures, namely yellow and black bile, phlegm and blood. Also he describes the four faculties, namely attraction, retention, digestion and excretion. Then he takes up the discussion to explain the nature of the world, the four seasons, year and months, day and night, and the different kinds of winds, in order to show the influence of nature on human beings and to specify the position of the *alam-i saghir*, microcosm, namely man as a parallel to the *alam-i kabir*, the universe.

After the introductory points he mentions different kinds of drugs and herbs in order to give a brief knowledge to the students. Then on the basis of the tradition by the Prophet, which says that God has not

sent any sickness without providing a medicine for it, he emphasises that the knowledge of pharmacology is both very important and essential for the physician.

چنان واجب که داروها بدانی	زنام و طبعها شان در نمانی
خدای ما که ما را درد دادست	بهر دردیش صد دارو نهادهست

For the diagnosis of the disease he recommends the taking of the pulse and the observation of urine. This was the method practiced by most physicians, and for this reason some Muslim physicians compiled independent monographs on the pulse and the urine. Among them we can mention *Kitab al-Nabd* and *Kitab al-Tafsirah*, both by Ibn Ridwan from Egypt, published in Louvain in 1984. In addition to pulse and urine, he advises that power and weakness, appetite and the lack of it should be investigated.

زنبش بررس و از بول و قوت	زطبعش بررس و از صنف و شهوت
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He goes on to say that if through these indications the sickness is not diagnosed, the physician should advise the patient to abstain from food, and this, he says, is much better than to prescribe medicine without a clear diagnosis of the sickness of the patient. Maysari no doubt had in mind the tradition which says that the fullness of the stomach is the source of every kind of sickness, and to refrain from eating is the first step towards treatment. He further recommends that healthy people should avoid being close to those with contagious diseases such as cholera, leprosy, scab, eye diseases and infected wounds.

هر آنجائی که آنجا هست طاعون	بباید رفت از آنجا زود بیرون
جذام و گر زود آید بعدوی	و طاعون نیز باوی چند بلوک
و دردچشم باشد نیز که گاه	بعدوی یابد او زی مردمان راه
وریش زشت و هرچ او بوی دارد	بعدوی زود زی مردم سپارد

Like his predecessors, who begin the treatment of sickness from the head and end with the feet, *min al-farg ala al-qadam*, Maysari starts to explain about the diseases that cause the loss of hair. This is called the illness of foxes, *da'al tha' lab*, and in explaining the term he says:

چراکش داء، ثعلب نیز نامست	ندانی تو که داء، ثعلب کداهست
بریزد موی و گردد سخت بدحال	که مرروپاه را زین درد هرسال

Then he introduces the medicine for this disease and explains its composition and quantity. Then he mentions other diseases of the head and their treatments such as *suda'*, headache, *shaqiqah* pain in half of the head, and *davar* dizziness.

In this way he mentions the different kinds of diseases together with the definition and the description and he recommends the appropriate treatment. In fact he uses the same methods used by Akhawayni in *Hidayat al-Muta'allimin*, and Jurjani in *al-Aghraz al-tibbyah*.

Since Maysari has wanted to limit medical knowledge within the boundaries of rhythm and rhyme, he has fallen into certain unnecessary errors which is more than what has been permitted by men of letters. For this reason the medical works written in prose are more telling and useful for the students.

The aim of this paper was to introduce the *Danishnamah* to the historians of medicine and to show its position in the Islamic and Iranian medical literature. It is hoped that in the future both the historians of medicine and the students of Persian literature will make more detailed studies of this text.

II

Religion and Aesthetical Order

Why Decline of Buddhism Took Place in India?

Hajime Nakamura

Buddhism is the teaching that Gautama Buddha preached about two thousand five hundred years ago. It has spread almost all over Asia, and it has been revered and cherished by the Asian people at large. In the case of India where Buddhism originated, however, it is almost extinct at present. In India, Buddhism was almost extinct by the 13th century A.D. Though Buddhism exists as an important religion in other Asian nations, we can say that the religion is almost extinguished in its birthplace. Why is it so? We would like to consider this problem in the following discussion.

It is generally pointed out that Buddhism disappeared from Indian soil after the destruction of Vikrama'sila monastery, the then Buddhist center in India, and the Massacre of Buddhist priests there by the Muhammadan invaders.¹ However, even if invaders attempt to force adherents of a religion to convert to other faith with the use of arms, it would be impossible to annihilate the religion if it had been deep-rooted in the society. In fact, since olden days, India experienced repeated invasions of foreign rulers, and she was subjected more by such rulers than by her indigenous rulers. Despite such circumstances, many people still profess Hinduism and Jainism even today. Even the invading foreigners with arms elements could not eradicate the two religions. Therefore, there should be some causes behind the fact that

the virtual extinction took place only in the case of Buddhism.

As one of the causes, what we have to point out at the outset is that there seemed to have been a tendency that the rationalistic and philosophical nature of Buddhism prevented the general public to feel familiar with the faith right from the beginning. Buddhism denied such elements as the magical rites and the black art. Moreover, it rejected even the Brahmanical yajña, saying that it was useless. Besides, Buddhists went against the traditional caste system prevalent in Indian society, and it advocated equality of all the human beings. Therefore, sadly speaking, Buddhism and Brahmanism became quite irreconcilable elements in Indian society. It would be needless to state that Brahmanism is the Indian national religion.

Due to such reasons, traditional Buddhist organizations tend to alienate themselves from Indian common people, while maintaining self-righteous, highbrow attitude. The traditional and conservative faction of Buddhism was called Hīnayāna. It mainly sought support from the affluent well-to-do section of the society. It received the patronage of ruling kings, aristocrats and wealthy merchants. The kings, aristocrats and big landowners donated land to the Buddhist order. The merchants who had been engaged in overseas trade donated an abundant amount of money to the Buddhist saṃgha. We can find many examples of such cases in the contemporary Buddhist inscriptions and manuscripts. Many Buddhist monasteries belonging to the Hīnayāna Buddhism lived on the tenancy fee from such donated land. Besides, they invested such donated money to several merchant guilds, and they used the monthly interests from such investment for the maintenance of the order. That is to say, the order degenerated itself to become the landed class or the class living on the interest. Thus, the then Buddhist monks tended to alienate themselves from the people, living in well-established monasteries, while meditating upon the Dharma or indulging into the study of difficult Buddhist philosophy. They lacked the spirit for extending helping hands to the general people. What they required was the missionary zeal.

There is an interesting record that shows the aloofness of the then Buddhist order from the general public. It is the land charter of the

emperor Candragupta II, recording that the emperor donated the land to the Buddhist order in 412 A.D. A phrase in the last sentence of the charter says that those who encroach upon the donated land would be committing the same grave crime as killing cows and Brahmins.² As Brahmins and cows were cherished in Brahmanism, it was pointed out that killing of Brahmins and cows was a venomous crime. On the basis of the idea, the people were alerted that a man would be committing the crime equal to killing Brahmins and cows, if he trespassed and infringed on the donated land. Therefore, the reason why the people respected the landed property of Buddhist temples is not due to the religious faith they had to Buddhism. Though people were the adherents of Brahmanism or Hinduism, as they were threatened by the emperor like above, they dared not to touch the landed properties of the Buddhist monasteries. The traditional and conservative Buddhist order seems to have depended solely upon the support from monarchs and wealthy merchants, and it appears to have lacked the zeal to approach the ordinary people.

Even in the case of the Mahāyāna, when it came to organize large orders, the same tendency was felt. The Mahāyāna Buddhism developed profound and extremely refined philosophy and logic. Even when it reached the pinnacle of its development, the philosophical discussions remained in being carried out in the innermost chambers of Buddhist monasteries, while the then general public did not have any knowledge of them. These great Buddhist monasteries were protected by powerful monarchs, and they were maintained by the economic strength yielded from their manors. The mass continued to believe in the magical rites and superstition from ancient days, and they continued to indulge in them. Estrangement of Buddhist leanings from the people was taking place. Therefore, when the Muhammadans invaded and conquered India, and when the downfall of the former ruling class took place, Buddhism too had to be vanished from the soil.

It is not to say, however, that all the Buddhist monks were maintaining such highbrow and self-righteous attitudes. Not a few Buddhists tried to propagate Buddhism to the general public and to guide them. In Mahāyāna Buddhism, especially in its early stage, such

tendency for reaching the people seems to have been significantly strong. These monks and priests, while pursuing their movement, felt it strongly that enlightening the imbecile populace was not an easy task. The general public continued to indulge in the age-old magical rites. As we have pointed out earlier, Buddhism, from the outset, denied the magical rites, therefore, there was a factor that prevented the general public from feeling familiar with Buddhism.

Paying attention to such tendencies of the populace, the magical elements were tentatively approved in Mahāyāna Buddhism. They aimed to elevate the mass to the noble ideal stage step by step. Thus, many dhāraṇīs were compiled and the merit of chanting scriptures was extolled. Along with it, the then prevalent popular cults, in its original form or in modified style, were also incorporated into Buddhism. This tendency reached its climax in Esoteric Buddhism. In Esoteric Buddhism, gods of other religions were also considered to be the manifestations of the great Vairocana Buddha. The unfavorable repercussion of such syncretic spirit was the adoption of Tantricism by a section of adherents of Esoteric Buddhism. Tantricism was an indecent cult practiced among the general public of the days, and it considered the sexual intercourse between a man and a woman as an absolute element. Especially, this degenerated Buddhism. Adultery was prohibited in Buddhism from the beginning. It was for rightly maintaining the ethics concerning sex. However, in the degenerated Buddhism of the last phase of its development, odd teachings that corrupted public morals came to be advocated. Besides, drinking of intoxicants was also prohibited in Buddhism. It means not to drink liquor. However, in the final stage of Buddhism, liquor or chemicals that provided very strong stimuli came to be used in the religious rites and ceremonies, and the use of them came to be openly recognized.³ Therefore, Buddhism transformed itself drastically, and it degenerated itself.

In such a way, as the Indian people were conservative and bigoted in cherishing the magical religious rites, Buddhism tended to alienate itself from the general public. On the other hand, the movements of those Buddhists who tried to come closer to the populace ended up in being incorporated into vulgar popular cults, degenerating itself.

Besides, the emergence of powerful and wealthy saṃghas itself tended to become an element to lure people. It has been reported that many people joined the order just to avoid public and private debt. Further, there were some people who joined the order with impure motives, such as wishing to use the common property of affluent temples and monasteries. Some people, driven by economic hardship, joined the order while wishing to be reborn as a king in their future births.⁴ It seems possible that such tendencies ushered in the process of repression against Buddhist order by the monarchs in the post-Gupta period.

Further, we can point out another weak point of Buddhist order in India. The Buddhist order did not pay much attention to the lay adherents, and it failed to organize strong religious organizations of lay devotees. This point is antipodal to Jainism. Here lies the weakness of Buddhism. Though Buddhism tried every possible effort to adjust itself to the general public, it ultimately lost in the competition against other Hindu religious sects. Other Hindu religious sects were maintaining close relationship with lay devotees to guide them.

Especially, Buddhism never introduced any religious rites of passage in the family life of its adherents. According to many commentaries on Brahmanical rites, it appears that many elaborate magical rites were carried out in each of the important stages of human life. At the occasion of birth, naming, initiation, marriage and death, specifically prescribed intricate religious rites were performed. Buddhism, however, denied them and ignored them all. It stuck to the standpoint of removing all superstitions. While boycotting such rites of passage, it did not replace them by new Buddhist rites of passage. Not only the rites of marriage, initiation and baptism, but also those of funeral and death memorial services, which are even considered as the essence of Buddhism in Japan today, did they deny. Buddhism did not try to take deep root in family life and it did not try to organize the religious organization of lay devotees. These are some of the remote causes that led to the downfall of Buddhism in India.

Due to such reasons mentioned above, when ruling monarchs and wealthy merchants ceased to be patrons, the Buddhist order rapidly declined. It was the establishment of the Gupta dynasty in 320 A.D.

that became the turning point. The ruins of architecture prior to it were either those of the Buddhists or the Jains. However, with the establishment of the Gupta dynasty, almost all of those newly established buildings were Hindu temples. And, Buddhist temples were rarely constructed.⁵ Then, when the overseas trade with the West came to an end with the downfall of the Roman empire, the decline of those commercial capitalists who till then supported Buddhism took place.⁶ With it, the rapid decline of Buddhist order was set in motion.

The condition of the decline of Buddhist saṃgha is recorded in Buddhist scriptures, for example in the Esoteric Buddhist scriptures. Depicting the circumstances of the degenerate age, it was recorded that the kings and monarchs harassed and exploited the populace. It was mentioned that the people had to go to the heterodox temples, as the Buddhist temples had been in ruin, no matter how intensely they wished to go to the Buddhist temples for taking refuge.⁷

Buddhism could not resist the external violence, especially the destruction inflicted by the Islam. The Muhammadans attacked the then ruling class, i.e., the aristocrats and the monks. The religious center of Buddhist order was the monasteries. Therefore, once the monasteries were destroyed, the Buddhist order itself disappeared. It could no longer withstand the vicissitude. The destruction was so thorough that even the location of Lumbini, the birthplace of the Lord Buddha, fell into oblivion.

Thus, various factors interacted each other, the decline of Buddhism was ushered in. The Muhammadan oppression worked as a catalyst; It activated the process of decline of Buddhism in India.

Notes

1. It is not that Buddhism disappeared from India right after the destruction of the Nalanda monastery. In Tibetan, we have a travel account of Chos-rje-dpal (Dharmasvāmin) who traveled Magadh region in the Thirteenth Century A.D. It records the condition of Buddhism at that time. See the article by Fujiyoshi Jikai in the *Indo Gaku Bukkyo Gaku Kenkyu* [Journal of Japanese Association of

Indian and Buddhist Studies, Vol. 11, part 1, 1963, pp. 142-143] and the article by Sakurabe Ken in *Bukkyo Shi Gaku* [Vol. 9, part 1, 1960, pp. 27-30]. In Assam, a type of Buddhism, which merged with some local cult, has survived to this day.

2. The inscription records the donation of a land called Isvaravasaka and twenty-five dināras to the Mahāvihāra of Sāñcī (Kākanāda-boṭa-sri-mahāvihāra) by a public servant called Āmrakārdava in the year ninety-three of the Gupta era (i.e., 412-413 A.D.). After explaining the purpoperpose of the donation, it was mentioned that those who violate the rule would be the same as committing the killing of cows and Brahmins, and that five ānanatrya would be committed. Cf. Fleet, *Gupta Inscriptions*, No. 5. It reflects the fact that Brahmanic ideas remained strong in the mind of the general public. It also shows the fact that the economic foundation of the Buddhist order was secured by appealing to the Brahmanical faith of the people. It was just like the case of manors which belonged to Japanese temples. Village shrines were established in such manors and the religious authority of such shrines were used for maintaining the manors. In both the cases, it shows that the economic foundation of Buddhist temples was ensured by the religious authority of the popular cults.

3. e.g., M. Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature*, vol II, pp. 394-400.

4. *Shugo-kokkai-shu-darani-kyo* (『守護国界主陀羅尼經』) fascicle 10 (*Taisho Tripiṭaka*, vol. 19, pp. 572c ff.).

5. Fleet, *Gupta Inscriptions*, passim.

6. It is mentioned, "Descendants of traders used up the family business" (『貿易の子孫、家業蕩尽す』). Cf. *Shugo-kokkai-shu-darani-kyo* (『守護国界主陀羅尼經』), *Taisho Tripiṭaka*, vol. 19 p. 573c. We can infer that among those who took refuge in Esoteric Buddhism, many were the merchants.

7. *Loc. cit.*

The Paradise Garden Paradigm

Nader Ardalan

Introduction

Professor Izutsu sought to conduct a world survey of the actual ethical words and key concepts of as many peoples at as many historic periods as possible. Only on the basis of such a rigorous, comprehensive firsthand survey could a sound, unprejudiced and normative ethical code become possible, in Izutsu's view.

Inspired, in part by Professor Izutsu's quest, but in the field of architecture, I first began with a personal survey of my own of the architectural vocabulary and concepts in the history and cultures of Persia. This initial work resulted in the 1973 publication by The University of Chicago Press entitled: *The Sense of Unity—The Sufi Tradition in Persian Architecture*.

Next, I expanded this survey to those parts of the Islamic world in which I (as a practicing architect and teacher) had received projects or lecture invitations. The regions included the entire Arabian Peninsula, starting with the research and publications for the work entitled *The Masjid-Al-Harem* in Mecca. The studies extended to the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar, and on to Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Turkey, the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent, Malaysia and Indonesia. This search was much aided by the advent of the Aga Khan Award for Architecture program, for which I served on The

Steering Committee and thus had the opportunity to journey throughout most of the Muslim lands. The partial results of this cycle of study were presented in the article entitled "On Mosque Architecture" in *Architecture and Community* published by Aperture in 1983, which surveyed the typologies of Islamic Mosques in the major ecological-cultural zones of the Muslim world. Eight generic forms were observed as recurring themes in most of the mosques surveyed. Their repetition represented a natural Islamic language of visual forms for mosque design, potent with symbolic, archetypal meanings.

Through a "strange working of fate" as Professor Izutsu sometimes described human events, the change of regime in Iran in 1979, caught me teaching comparative architectural theory at the Graduate School of Design in Harvard University. The research studies further extended the range of my academic "hobby" to pre-Columbian South America and Mexico, Pharaonic Egypt, Celtic Ireland and Native American cultures. The unique opportunity of the Jerusalem studio program at Harvard allowed me to also study the major architectural traditions of the old historic city of Jerusalem resulting in the publication: *Blessed Jerusalem* in 1985. In Boston from 1979 to 1994, these broadening dimensions of research continued, with a particular emphasis on the key concepts of Western architecture, as a result also of the Post-Modern movements increased interest and scholastic publications on the early roots of classical Greco-Roman architecture. Specifically through my Boston-based architecture, I explored the new world architecture of America through the works and writings of H. H. Richardson, Louis Sullivan, Frank Lloyd Wright and Louis Khan. Those studies were presented in fragments over a number of years through lectures, symposia, published articles and built architectural works.

Previous and at times parallel to these studies of Western architecture, had been added my keen interest in the architectural traditions of the Far East—in particular, the aesthetic traditions of Japan. I am most indebted philosophically to Professor and Madame Izutsu for guiding my consciousness to this art through their writings, teachings and their personal tour that they arranged in 1977 for my wife Shahla, and myself of the key Zen gardens and temples of Japan. Architectur-

ally, the philosophic guidance provided by my friend, Professor Gunter Nitschke, served as my first and sustaining insight to which were added the architectural observations of Professor Kenzo Tange, Fumihiko Maki and Arata Isozaki.

Professor Izutsu observed very early in his career that at the “high level of abstraction, the human nature is the same world around . . .” However, at the outset of his remarkable career he stated that he sought a “marked personal coloring to (his) outlook on the problem of ethical terms”. He, therefore, focused on the divergences and particularities manifest through an informed, primary source based on exploration of the empirical facts of the “lower realms of human existence and practical experience”. It was thus under the careful scrutiny of the trained philologist’s “Microscope” that he cast his scholastic gaze upon human cultures—with particular emphasis on the Islamic cultures of the Middle East and Buddhist and Confucian cultures of China and Zen Buddhist and Shinto cultures of Japan.

Through this rigorous introspection and inspection of the “lower realms”, he seemed to find, at the core of the kernel of his empirical, philological research, a recurring, transcendent conceptual seed that constantly linked him, as though by an “invisible golden thread” to the universal, higher realms of the Absolute. By seeking ever deeper into the concrete and measurable, he was led also in his research to the most abstractly immeasurable, archetypal, immutable truths.

Professor Izutsu’s intellectual contribution lies, in my opinion, in the fact that he was erudite enough to describe these two dimensions of knowledge with scientific accuracy, without losing the full poetic flavor of the interconnectedness of this phenomena.

In my own much less erudite, and far less complete studies, I too was made conscious of the unity of cultures as expressed in the various great architectural traditions of the world. In fact, the universal and mythic dimensions of architecture that transcend the limitations of place and time have taken my personal attention in my more recent writings and designs, although my specific explorations of such universal expressions have focused upon Islamic cultures.

In this Festschrift, I wish to demonstrate one example of this particular way of viewing Islamic architecture, as both an outgrowth

of the measurable forces of the “lower realm” and the unmeasurable forces of the “higher realm”. This exploration shall be placed within the general theme of the “*Wahdat-i-Wujud*” as conceived by the very original thinker of the 12th Century, Muhammad Ibn Al-Arabi of Andalusian Spain and brilliantly elucidated and explained by Professor Izutsu in many of his research works, most specifically in *Sufism and Taoism*.

The specific theme selected is the concept of paradise, from its ancient conceptual beginning in the Middle East, its incorporation into the Islamic culture as a key idea within the Koran and as manifested in the classical and informal gardens of Islamic Persia. Further, how this theme, as an ever vital design conception of placemaking, has been integrated into contemporary designs will be presented.

The Paradise Garden as a Paradigm of Form

A paradigm is a mental model. Thomas Khun's *Structure of Scientific Revolution* brought the term into common usage in the 1960s. The term is somewhat analogous to Carl Jung's use of “archetypes” and the early Platonic concept of the world of “ideas” and “hanging forms”.

One of the most profound and historically ancient paradigms is that of the Paradise Garden. Metaphorically, this paradise paradigm deals with the concept of a primal, timeless unity at the mythic creation of humankind in the Garden of Eden and the ultimate promised place of return on Judgment Day for the righteous life.

Philologically, the English word “paradise” is simply a transliteration of the old Persian word *Pairidaeza* referring to a walled garden. From the Greek *Paradeisoi*, this became the Latin *paradisus* and first appeared in Middle English as *Paradis*. Thus the word paradise came into Western languages as an idea and into the history of landscape architecture as a specific, well defined design paradigm.

In Xenophon's Socratic Discourse, *The Oeconomicus*, Socrates describes the *Pairidaeza* of Cyrus the Younger in the year 407 B.C., while the oldest such garden for which it is possible to make a schematic reconstruction was built by Cyrus the Great at Pasargadae

in 546 B.C.

In all cases, this paradigm concept can be visually described as a walled garden of orthogonal geometry of plan containing water-courses laid out in precise, straight line channels and most often in a Mandala form nourishing rows of trees, shrubs and fragrant flowers.

The mental idea, however, of paradise as a garden is much older and is one of man's oldest ideal mythic quests. The paradise myth first appears in written text in Sumerian Cuneiform tablets. In the 27th Century B.C. tablets of the *Epic of Gilgamesh*, the paradise myth is given full form. Through the Babylonian captivity of the Jews, from which the first Achaemenid King, Cyrus the Great released them in 538 B.C., the concept of *Pairidaeza* became known to the Jewish faith and came into the Hebrew Old Testament as *Pardes*. Through the Bible, the earthly paradise as a *Garden of Eden* became identified with Heaven—the celestial abode of The Divine. The sacred vision of the garden of Paradise varied from a single place of total bliss to several gardens of varying degrees of bliss. In the New Testament, Paul in the *Corinthians II* describes a man caught in the “third heaven of Paradise”.

Within the Ibrahmic traditions, the Koranic promise of Paradise (Al Ferdows) as the ultimate grace of human submission to the Divine Will, plays a very special place in this essay, in fact it is its central focus of investigation.

The Koran makes more than 120 references to the Gardens of Paradise, referring as well to the concept in such terms as Gardens of Eternity, Gardens of Felicity, Gardens of Bliss (*Jannat un Na'im*) and Gardens of Delight.

In order to gain better knowledge of the particular image and metaphoric landscape of the Koranic paradise, the next section shall analyze some of the key Suras of the Koran that deal with this subject.

Key Concepts and Images of Paradise in the Koran

We turn now to some of the key passages in the Suras that focus upon the ideal of Paradise. The intent here is to identify the unique philosophic aspects of this topic while gaining insight into the visually

metaphoric descriptions used to create the "*mise en scène*" of the Islamic heavenly garden(s).

We have read in the Old and New Testament of the primal beginning of Adam in the Garden of Eden. In Sura II: 35 it is written:

"We said: 'O Adam! Dwell thou and thy wife in the Gardens; and eat of the bountiful things therein. As (where and when) ye will; but approach not this tree, or ye run into harm and transgression'."

This passage alludes to a primal place on another plane above the earthly one perhaps before even time and space came into existence (according to the 20th c. commentary on the Koran by Abdullah Yusuf Ali). The forbidden tree is left a mystery, as it was not The Tree of Knowledge for man had already been taught "the Names of all Things" by the Divine.

"Then did Satan make them slip from the (Garden) and get them out of the State (of Felicity) in which they had been. We said: 'Get ye down, all (ye people) with enmity between yourselves. On Earth will be your dwelling place and your means of livelihood for a time'." (II: 36)

". . . And if, as is sure, there comes to you guidance from Me, whosoever follows My guidance, on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve." (II: 38)

Thus the cycle of the place of origins, the fall and the promise of eventual return begins. The promise is often repeated in the Koran, as in Sura IX: 72:

"God has promised to Believers, men and women, Gardens under which rivers flow, to dwell therein, and beautiful mansions in Gardens of everlasting bliss. . . ."

We will concern ourselves with some of the guidance provided later in this paper, but will for now focus upon the actual promised images and elements of Paradise, as allegorically described in the following Suras:

"(Here is) a Parable of the Garden which the righteous are promised: In it are rivers of water incorruptible; rivers of milk of which the taste never changes; rivers of wine, a joy to those who

drink; and rivers of honey pure and clear. . . .”
(XCVII: 15)

The parables refer to the symbolic nature of the four rivers. In the Book of Genesis, it is said: “And a river went out of Eden to water the garden. And from thence it was parted and became into four heads.” The mythic beginnings of the Persian *Pairidaeza* very strongly dealt with a walled garden image divided into four quarters by four rivers flowing in the four cardinal directions from a singular source of water, symbolizing Absolute Unity. The specific references to the four types of liquids have been commented on in Islamic history and generally it is conceded that water represents purity; milk—phenomenal knowledge; wine—the ecstasy of gnosis and mystical knowledge of the Absolute; and honey—to sweeten life and the reward in the hereafter given for temporal humility before the Divine. Entry to the walled garden, of course, has been by way of Gateways and Sura XVII: 80 provides a perfect admonition often found inscribed over great and small gateways:

“Say: ‘O my Lord! Let my entry be by the Gate of Truth and Honor, and likewise, my exit by the Gate of Truth and Honor. . . .’”

The Koran describes more than one garden of Paradise, in fact no less than four gardens are mentioned in the very poetic Sura LV: 46, *Al Rahman* :

“. . . There will be two Gardens, . . . in them (each) will be two springs flowing (free). . . . In them will be fruits of every kind two and two. . . . They will recline on carpets whose inner linings will be of rich brocade: The fruit of the Gardens will be near (and easy to reach). . . . In them will be Maidens chaste, restraining their glances, whom no man or *Jinn* before them has touched. . . . Like unto rubies and coral. . . . And besides these two, there are two other Gardens, . . . Dark green in color (from plentiful watering). . . . In them will be two springs pouring forth water on continuous abundance. . . . In them will be fruits, and dates and pomegranates. . . . In them will be fair (companions), good beautiful companions restrained (as to their glances) in goodly pavilions.”

Yusuf Ali in his commentary upon this Sura writes that the first two gardens may be dedicated to the category of *Mugarrabun* (those Nearest to God) and the latter two for the Companions of the Right Hand. "The duality is to express variety and the whole scheme of the Sura runs in twos," Yusuf Ali says.

The specific descriptions continue in Sura LXXVI: 13 to 20:

" . . . They will see there neither the Sun's (excessive heat) nor (the moon's) excessive cold. . . . And amongst them will be passed round vessels of silver and goblets of crystal . . . and they will be given to drink there a cup (of wine) mixed with *Zanjabil* (ginger). . . . A fountain there called *Salsabil* . . . and when thou lookest, it is there thou wilt see a bliss and a Realm Magnificent."

This Sura describes a mythic place where there will be no sun or moon, but a blissful light allowing a temperate, balanced environment for life. A heavenly banquet is described upon arrival to Paradise after the Day of Judgment. The allusions are made to the beauty and dignity of pure crystalline vessels, the serving of the ritual *Sharab* (wine) mixed with ginger from the fountain *Salsabil* which literally means "seek the way". Thus the mythical association of seeking the right way through gnosis of the ritual drink is alluded to here again. Similarly and earlier in this Sura the drink *Kafur* (a wine with camphor) is mentioned, while in Sura LXXXIII: 27, nectar from the heavenly fountain named *Tasnīm* is described. The latter fountain is especially reserved for Those Nearest to God, but the Companions of the Right hand may also partake of it.

Finally, the description of the Islamic Paradise is involved with the qualities and opportunities of the individuals that comprise these "Companions of the Garden". Sura XXXVI: 57 says: "They (the Companions) shall have whatever they call for", and that they shall not be in solitary isolation but rather in shared association with deserving family, friends and companions of like age and inclination. Yusuf Ali writes: "It further figures the psychological inner satisfaction, unconnected with outer circumstances, but reflecting the inner taste and (development of individual) personalities: The musician's heaven will be full of (his) music; the mathematician's will be full of

mathematical symmetry and perfection; the artist's will be full of beauty of form: the light will be one, but its rays will be many."

It is therefore understandable when Asiya (wife of Pharaoh) one of the "four perfect women" referred in the Koran (along with Mary, Khadija and Fatima) yearns in Sura LXVI: 11:

"O my Lord, build for me with you, a dwelling in Paradise."

and the Koran concludes in Sura XXXVIII: 49:

"(Paradise) is a beautiful places of the (Final) Return."

In the next section, some of the more profound Islamic interpretations of the deeper meanings of the Paradise paradigm will be discussed, with particular attention being paid to the allegorical nature of paradise. How can the Absolute be better understood through the *paradisical* metaphor?

Paradise as the Essential Field of Reference

We have reviewed in the previous section the theological origins of man in the primal, timeless garden of Eden. God, man and angels lived within a state of "participation mystique" wherein there was little perceived separation between the Creator and His creations.

Paradise is the place of unity whence humankind sprang into being before it "slipped" down to the earthly plane. Paradise is the silent, still pond of Basho's haiku poetry that Prof. Izutsu used to illustrate, from the totally different culture of Japan, the universal idea of man's ontological beginnings.

"Breaking the silence
Of an ancient pond,
A frog jumped into water—
A deep resonance."

(Basho, 17th c.)

At the antipole of beginnings, there awaits the ultimate end. In the Islamic perspective, that end is the Day of Judgment and ultimately the reward of Paradise for those "Nearest to God" (*Mugarrabun*) and the "Companions of the Right Hand". Hell and damnation awaits the "Companions of the Left Hand", those who lapsed into forgetful-

ness of the Divine.

Thus from Alpha to Omega, paradise serves as one of the main fields or loci of man's referential journey in life. It is that place from whence he was "plucked" and to which he nostalgically yearns to return as expressed in the classic poem of "The Reed" by the great 13th century Persian mystic, Jalalu'l-Din-Rumi:

"Harken to this Reed forlorn,
Breathing, ever since 'twas torn
From its rushy bed, a strain
Of impassioned love and pain.

The secret of my song, though near,
None can see and none can hear.
Oh, for a friend to know the sign
And mingle all his soul with mine!

'Tis the flame of love that fired me,
'Tis the wine of love inspired me.
Wouldst thou learn how lovers bleed
Harken, harken to the Reed!"

(Rumi, 13th c.)

Paradise, however, within its profoundest dimension is only a visual and sensory symbol of the Divine made known to man.

"How can man cultivate such an ability for seeing things symbolically?" Prof. Izutsu asked. He went on to describe how Ibn Arabi answered this difficult question in his classic work, the *Fusus*. "It is a way of discipline, a way of practice for cultivating what he called the 'spiritual eyesight' (*ayn al-basirah*). It is a way that renders possible the inner transformation of man and allows him the understanding of the 'unity of existence' (*wahdat-i-wujud*)."¹ This unique theory of the essential unity of all existence formed the cornerstone of Ibn Arabi's perception of Reality and man's relationship with the Absolute.

The *wahdat-i-wujud* concept is based upon the simultaneous knowledge of two basic aspects of the Absolute in His Transcendence (*tanzih*) and His Immanence (*tazhibih*). How can these two diametrically opposed aspects be understood by common men? Ibn Arabi

ultimately proposed that this capacity resides only in the Perfect Man (*insan-i-kamil*) who was personified in the Prophet Mohammed.

Various degrees of comprehension of this simultaneous knowledge of the Absolute are possible to ordinary human beings depending upon their spiritual training in the “unveiling” (*kashf*) of ultimate Truth. This unveiling requires first, an understanding of the tools or language of ontological knowledge (*ilm*) available to man. The *tazhbih* or measurable knowledge is accessible through man’s five senses and his faculty of rational thinking and discourse, Reason (*aghl*). This is the primary key to the material manifestation of the Absolute in His aspect of Immanence.

The *Tanzih* or unmeasurable knowledge is comprehensible through the faculty of man’s creative imagination whose principle key instrument is his intuition. Ibn Arabi specifically uses the phrase “creative imagination” (*khayal*) to describe this faculty.

Reason then is needed to collaborate with the intuitive imagination to generate an organic and complementary condition in order that a balanced perception of Ultimate Reality may be possible. “Reason and imagination need to be brought into perfect harmony, with imagination holding sway,” wrote Ibn Arabi. “Only by combining the two concepts of *Tazhbih* (through reason) and *Tanzih* (through imagination) simultaneously does one generate a state or formula of (spiritual) perplexity that truly captures the essence of the Absolute in our possible comprehension of the Absolute.” Prof. Izutsu wrote.

This unique simultaneity knowledge lies at the root of the Islamic *Shahada* or Statement of Faith: “There is no God, but God” (*La Illaha il Allah*). In Sura XLII: 11 this special state of comprehension is addressed: “There is nothing like unto Him and He is All hearing, All seeing.” But how can something exist beyond all description in a plane of nothingness, yet also have the anthropomorphic, earthly qualities of seeing and hearing?

The clue to this perplexing question is partially given in the Sura XLI: 53:

“We will show them Our Signs in the horizon as well as within themselves so that it be made clear to them that it is the Truth.”

Man then in his complementary reason/intuition consciousness role exists in a very special relationship to the Absolute. In the manifest world, the Absolute reveals himself through "His Signs" which lie veiled in each and every created aspect of the material universe. All of material existence has, in this view, its phenomenal, measurable reality and its symbolic dimension that reveals to our imagination the unmeasurable, transcendent aspect of the Absolute. How often has this feeling been aroused in us when viewing a fantastic sunset or scenting the fragrance of a beautiful rose?

The two dimensions of the revealed "signs", one without and the other within, will now be addressed. In this regard, Rumi's poem entitled "The Truth within us" can serve to illustrate the order of priority with which these "signs" are regarded:

"'T was a fair (Paradise) orchard, full of trees and fruit and vines and greenery. A Sufi there sat with eyes closed, his head upon his knees, sunk deep in meditation mystical. "Why," asked another, "dost thou not behold these signs of God, the Merciful displayed around thee, which He bids us contemplate?" "The signs," he answered, "I behold within, without is naught but symbols of the signs."
(Rumi, 13th c.)

The inner spiritual development of the individual aided by the *ayn albasirah* (spiritual eyesight) is the real goal of human existence, in the view of Rumi and Ibn Arabi.

The role of the manifest world and man's creations in this world are to serve as training grounds to heighten one's sensitivity to the "inner signs". Yet foremost for humanity, in the Islamic perspective, regardless of the degree of preparedness and personal inner growth, the ultimate completion of the "individuation" process to use a Jungian phrase lies in the hereafter. The hereafter can be experienced through gnosis and a *fana-baqa* (death and rebirth) process on this earth or it can be experienced through physical death and theological rebirth for those deserving of Paradise. In the next section, the role that Paradise is said to play metaphorically in the completion of the individual personality will be explored.

The Persistence of Personality in Paradise

The persistence of personality and its complete development as an ideal in Paradise was reviewed briefly in the previous sections. The 12th century thinker and mystic, Ibn Arabi, nurtured this aspect through his unusual powers of insight and inspiration. He was particularly concerned about the actual relationship of the Absolute and Man as antipoles of One Essential Being. Some of the specific Suras of the Koran allowed his ever fertile imagination to develop a unique series of lessons on this topic. Sura LXXXIX, Fajr serves to illustrate his field of exploration and illuminates a deeper dimension of the Paradise motif. The 30th Ayat of this Sura reads:

“Enter into my Paradise.”

Ibn Arabi wrote in the *Bezels of Wisdom*. “My Paradise is none other than you, for it is you who hide Me (the Absolute) with yourself—nor am I known except by you, but you have being only through Me. Who knows you, knows Me...” Here, Ibn Arabi based his view on the famous Hadith which states: “He who knows himself knows his Lord.” On this point, Prof. Izutsu observed: “We should abandon the futile effort to know the Absolute *per se* in its Absolute non-manifestation, that we must go back into the depth of ourselves, and perceive the Absolute as it manifests itself in particular forms.”

Here with respect to this self-understanding, Ibn Arabi developed the concept of the Triplicity of knower—knowledge—known. The knower is the Absolute in the state of non-manifestation. The knowledge is represented by man, who alone among all of creation has been given the consciousness to potentially read the “signs” of the Absolute, as described previously in Sura XLI: 53. The known is the Absolute in the state of manifestation. Ibn Arabi based his conception in part upon the previous Sura as well as on Sura II: 15 which reads: “Wheresoever you turn, there is the Face of God.” God is omnipresent in essence, but reveals himself in his outer and limited form through parables and signs that man can begin to comprehend Him.

Similarly in another Triplicity theme, Ibn Arabi refers to the Hadith where the Prophet Mohammed has said:

“Three things have been made beloved to me in this world of

yours: women, perfume,
and prayer.”

Ibn Arabi elaborated this Hadith in a very special manner to help elucidate his vision of Reality through the triplicity in singularity theme. “Women” represents, in this interpretation, the cosmic pole of multiplicity of the manifest world. All nature and its forms and the fecundity of earthly things are represented by the feminine principle. The Paradise Garden, as one special theme of this paper, is most assuredly an excellent example of the feminine qualities.

The “perfume” is the vital relating factor in this triplicity. It is not entirely physical, yet not totally spiritual. It is as the fragrance of a flower that excites and soothes the senses to return to the Paradise Garden. It is as the spiritual nostalgia that draws the human soul back to the Absolute—back from the state of material manifestation to non-existent subsistency in the Absolute.

“Prayer”, and in this case ritual prayer, symbolizes the highest spirit and its reflection in humankind. In a state of prayerful meditation, the total awareness of the essential ontological cause brings humanity close to the realm of the Absolute.

Women, therefore as the antipole of the Absolute, having been created after man and all of nature, can serve as the most perfect mirror of the Absolute in its state of manifestation and through her capacity of reproduction can help perpetuate the Divine Wish on this earthly plane. But the feminine quality is even more precious as Rumi says:

“Woman is a ray of God: She is not the earthly beloved. She is creative: you might say she is not created.”

(Rumi, 13th c.)

Professor Reynold Nicholson wrote of this passage: “Sweeping aside the veil of form, the poet beholds woman the eternal Beauty, the inspirer and object of all love, and regards her, in her essential nature, as the medium through which that Beauty reveals itself and exercises creative activity.” Ibn Arabi went so far as to say: “The most perfect vision of God is enjoyed by those who contemplate Him in Women.”

In the metaphor of “unveiling” the Absolute, Ibn Arabi developed




Fig. 1 *The Five Planes of Being.* Conceived by Ibn Arabi in the *Fusus*.

a rather precise model to aid in comprehending humankind's relation to the Divine. He conceived of a hierarchic, pyramidal system composed of five planes (see fig. 1). The base of the pyramid constitutes the Plane of the Senses (*Mushahadah*) related to the phenomenal, material world, where we exist. Each ascending plane unveils another transcendent dimension of the Absolute. The most immediately accessible plane higher than that of the lowest level of the senses is the plane of symbolic Images (*amthal*) and Imagination (*khayal*). The things of the lower planes serve as symbols or keys for the things of the higher planes. The evermore difficult ontological climb continues through the plane of Actions (*Rubuiyah*) onto the plane of Attributes and Names (*uluhiyah*). Ultimately the highest plane of Essence (*Dhat*) is reached, where the Absolute in total non-manifestation (*al ghayb al mutlaq*) pervades.

Here in this ultimate plane Absolute Being in His manifest aspect has completely disappeared, even in its minutest form. There is only Pure Being in its state of *tanzih*—hidden in non-manifestation.

The Sufis believe that only through the world of archetypes or paradigms (*alam-i-mithal*), for example as described above in Ibn Arabi's system of Being perception or other such mystical systems it is possible for human beings to grasp directly and personally some knowledge of Ultimate Reality.

Reviewing Ibn Arabi's pyramid once again, we summarize that the three top planes are purely spiritual states of consciousness in con-

trast to the most bottom plane of the senses which is only material. The intermediary fourth plane of the imagination and archetypal image represents a borderline between the lowest material and the higher spiritual planes. Similar to the Triplicity models, the intermediary plane of the archetypal images is a sort of "perfume" giving us some scent or glimpse of the higher, more veiled and hidden truths.

It is precisely in the fourth plane of the Archetypal Images and the World of the Imagination that can be found the possible conceptual location for the Koranic images of Paradise. The Islamic Paradise, in particular, is so richly described in the Koran with such sensory images that it captivates man's imagination vividly. However, the noted commentator on the Koran, Yusuf Ali cautions: ". . . some ignorant critics of Islam imagine that Islam postulates a sensual heaven. . . . It is true that Islam uses the most varied imagery for describing spiritual matters which are really beyond description in words except by such imagery. But it carefully avoids using such imagery for God Himself, lest it should be misunderstood by shallow minds. . . ." The simplest and yet most far-reaching allegory that we can employ is that of the Garden—the Garden of Bliss.

The Application of the Paradigm

The architectural application of the garden concept reflects the "sense of place" (*ma'kan*), the garden being viewed as a defined space encompassing within itself a total reflection of the cosmos. This concept, which fosters order and harmony, may be manifested to the senses through numbers, geometry, color, and matter; at the same time, it reflects for the intellect, the essence, the hidden dimension, latent in positive space. *Bagh*, Garden, as a manifestation of the centrifugally oriented form of the macrocosm. The Manifest (*al-Zahir*); and courtyard, *hayat*, as a manifestation of centripetally oriented form of the microcosm, the Hidden (*al-Batin*), may be viewed as mutually complementing and thereby completing aspects of "place" (figs. 2 & 3).

The garden concept in Iran had already reached a high level of development by the Achaemenid period (500–300 B.C.) as has already been mentioned in earlier sections. Gardens in this period were set out




Fig. 2
Concept of Garden (*Bagh*)




Fig. 3
Concept of Courtyard (*Hayat*)

in precise compartments within overall symmetrical arrangements. The Sasanian paradise parks (A.D. 200-600) created magnificent garden plans of mandala designs with palace pavilions at the intersection of four avenues. Here, as in the later city plan of Herat or the later Taj Mahal in Agra, India, the use of the *Chahar Bagh* design and the mandala form merely extended an ancient cosmological ideas of early Mesopotamia and later Central Asia. Microscale creations of the ancient Iranians, such as the fabled spring carpet of Khusraw II and the pavilioned structure of the Takht-i-Taqdis, set amidst a grove of trees; as well as the reiteration of the symbol of the sacred tree and the lotus motif throughout the wall decorations of the Achaemenid, Parthian, and Sasanian monuments, perpetuated the idea of the garden and man's dependence upon nature.

The idea of the garden and courtyard organically complemented the hot arid environments of Persia and the rest of the Middle East. Although there ensued political and religious changes in this region in the 7th century with the advent of Islam, it was only natural that the garden tradition would remain.

"The Muslim (mind) found the Persian garden the earthly counterpart of the Promised Koranic Paradise," wrote Elizabeth Moynihan

in her very sensitive book *Paradise as a Garden*. The tradition of the *Pairidaeza* with its four quartered watercourses, symbolic trees and fragrant flowers spread with Islam. East it spread to India and the Asian sub-continent, ultimately reaching its height of development with the great Mughul garden tradition. Through the Timurid era it spread north to Samarkand and Central Asia. Through the Arab conquests of the Levant and Egypt, the Paradise Garden spread to the Maghrib, Sicily, Spain and ultimately helped spawn the classic French Garden through its principles of geometric order. Still today, in the Court of the Lions in the Alhambra of Granada, Spain, a classic Persian garden with a four quartered cosmic plan is the admiration of world visitors.

The garden conformed to the iconography of the ancient Iranian motif of the enclosure planted with trees surrounding a central pavilion. Royal garden plans in the Islamic cultures of the Middle East invariably manifest this concept. The 17th c. Safavid *Hasht Bihisht*, or garden of the Eight Paradises (figs. 4 & 5) quite literally recreates a dynamic paradise not only in its overall plan but in the very concept of its central pavilion. Here the attributes of the mandala are fully expounded, providing both a centrifugal movement outward into the paradise of nature and a centripetal motion inward, through its four porches, to the central basin of water and the fountain, its spiritual center. Generating ripples of ever-expanding diameters, the effusion of the fountain recommences the cycle of conscious expansion and contraction. Parallel examples abound such as the 17th century *Bagh-i-Fin* in Kashan (fig. 6), each exhibiting a subtle development of the theme of man's ultimate reintegration with the source through his encounter with nature.

The open garden, however powerful its symbolism is, is a supreme luxury that few can afford within the urbanized context. The idea of the courtyard paralleled that of the open garden plan. The courtyard plan which generates a centripetal force, is a more feasible urban form, capable of providing that basic contact with nature so essential to life. This plan dominates the architectural activity of "place making" and within the Islamic period became the model of *makan*, unifying house (fig. 7) with mosque, caravanserai with college, the




Fig. 4 Hasht Bihisht, 17th c. Isfahan, Iran. Perspective by Pascal Coste, *Les Monuments Modernes de la Perse*, Paris 1867.




Fig. 5 Hasht Bihisht, 17th c. Isfahan, Iran.
Plan by E. Galdieri, *Ismaeo*, 1988.




Fig. 6 Bagh-i-Fin, 17th c. Kashan, Iran.
Sketch plan by N. Ardalan 1970.




Fig. 7 Section of Kashan Bazaar, Iran.
Plan by N. Ardalan.

individual parts with the whole. This unity is achieved through the visual interaction of space, shape, and surface, complemented by their qualitative correspondence. Space, as the place of the “hidden treasure” of the house, is enclosed by shape, just as in man the body encloses the soul which encompasses the Spirit. Walls are thus a prerequisite for defining and isolating this sacred place within which the soul can be sensed and its spiritual quest fulfilled. The interaction of shape and surface must create a space that is totally at rest, devoid of tensions and conducive to contemplation. Such a solidified shape is to be found in the cube, a perfect form whose symbolic essence is stability, man, and the earthly paradise. Within this tranquil space, the placement of the traditional mirror-like pool provides a center and a positive direction for the creative imagination. The pools cause the heavens to be reflected in their shimmering surfaces, thus uniting the transcendent (*tanzih*) dimension of the Absolute with the Immanent (*tazhibih*). Thus the horizontal creation of man is linked to the Vertical Cause, and man’s recapitulation of paradise is complete.

Contemporary Applications

We have seen that the enclosed Paradise Garden theme has pervaded and inspired the most poignant metaphors in many cultures. It has served as a key gesture towards man’s harmonious relationship with nature and ultimately with the Absolute. In the Islamic cultures of the Middle East, in particular, the garden concept has complemented the harsh, hot, arid climates of this region.

Over the past thirty years, as a practicing architect and planner, I have had the occasion to experientially recreate the Paradise Garden paradigm in various scales related to a variety of project types. It has been reassuring to observe the sympathetic resonance that this theme has generated in clients and users of every walk of life and economic income level.

I have chosen here to illustrate briefly two of the more recent applications that are now under construction. The Paradise theme in both of these projects serve as examples of the vitality and efficacy of this approach to uniquely different design problems. The first example is a very classic design of a Sea Palace in Abu Dhabi, UAE.

The second example is also from Abu Dhabi, but as applied to a contemporary high-rise office building.

A Sea Palace

On the Gulf Coast of Abu Dhabi, on a six hectare of flat site surrounded on three sides by high walls, we received a commission to design a palace and garden complex by the Sea. From the very first sketches, it was proposed and accepted that the enclosed Paradise Garden theme become the generating design paradigm (figs. 8 & 9).

The setting out of the geometric plan created a series of gardens related to different functions and to a progression from the land side to the sea side. The outer garden, square in shape, is approached through a main gateway place accommodating guards quarters and service spaces. The visitor traverses a date palm grove through an avenue of tall fan palms to the inner garden. The inner or main garden is set out as a golden rectangle in a proportion of 150×250 meters. The actual palace is located exactly on the central axis and at the center of an imaginary square held by four fountains. The Sea Palace is designed as a “Hasht Bihisht” or “eight paradise” concept. This ancient design motif has historical origins in the region and has spread west to Morocco and Spain, while eastwardly it has influenced the Mughul architecture of the sub-continent. The special feature of the design has already been described in the previous section. In summary, it is a mandala plan. The form provides an outward movement through the octagonal plan of the palace into the great surrounding garden of orchards and flowers. An inward movement is generated by the central fountain set within the atrium of the palace. Finally, an upwards movement from there is served through the ontological, vertical section of the naturally illuminated atrium.

The essence of the main garden is the creation of the world of shadows; of quiet cooling reflecting pools; of regeneration and fertility; and ultimately of a sense of inner tranquility and equanimity. By contrast, two courts of approximately equal size are placed on the water side. Each are “Courts of the Sun”. One court contains a health spa, a place of recreation with a swimming pool and tennis courts. The other is a water court serving as a marina. Through the gateway




Fig.8 The Sea Palace Paradise Garden. Plan by Nader Ardalan for K.E.O. Drawn by M. Paliwar and A. Khosla.




Fig. 9 The Sea Palace Paradise Garden Miniature.
By Nader Ardalan for K.E.O. Drawn by R. Doust.

leading to this final court, the whole complex is extended into the waters of the Gulf and beyond.

An Office Tower

An international design competition was held in 1990 to select a concept for a state-of-the-art headquarters building to accommodate the office and support needs of 1200 staff related to the oil and gas industry of Abu Dhabi. The site was located on the well landscaped Corniche of Abu Dhabi. The client sought a landmark design that functionally integrated the architectural heritage of the region with the contemporary advances available in the construction industry. Our entry was selected as the winning submission and it is now under construction, with a completion date set for 1996.

One of the outstanding features of the design is the great atrium placed at the very heart of the building. The atrium contains the "hidden" vertical garden that brings filtered natural light, view and a symbolic sense of regeneration of a verdant garden to the very center of the office tower (figs. 10 & 11).

The main interior garden begins at the base of this atrium with the Corniche Palm gardens and fountains moving into the building lobby floor level and rising the full twenty floor height of the atrium. This vertical garden will resemble a classic Paradise Garden carpet. Porches, niches, *Mashribiyahs* and a transition garden on the twelfth floor at the level of a prayer hall, "*Mousalla*", will allow the stress relieving quality of the garden to pervade a contemporary office building. This *Mousalla* will be placed at a crescent shaped garden level, where the place of prayer, nature and the work place meet in a tranquil, innovative integration of tradition and technology.

Just as the interior or (*Al Batin*) of the tower is characterized by the garden theme, so too is the building exterior inspired by the same unifying theme. The building exterior is to be clad in light hued granite panels. A studied use of thermal and polished finishes of the granite panels has added a subtle, rich pattern to the exterior facade. The pattern theme and system designed is that of the "Tree of Life". Conceived at three metamorphic levels, the "Tree of Life" motif integrates the ancient historic roots of the Mesopotamian cultures of



Fig.10 The ADMA-OPCO and ADGAS Headquarters exterior night perspective. Designed by Nader Ardalan with JBA/ARUP Joint Venture.




Fig.11 The ADMA-OPCO and ADGAS Headquarters interior atrium perspective. Designed by N. Ardalan with JBA/ARUP Joint Venture.

the Gulf, the Islamic “Paradise Garden” theme and the virtual fact that petroleum and gas products, which motivated the very need for the new building, were once vegetative, organic groves that covered this land.

The Unending Quest

By seeking the meeting point between the measurable forces of the “lower realm” and the unmeasurable forces of the “higher realm”, Professor Izutsu carefully climbed onto the wonderously elusive mountainscape of the *Mundus Imaginalis*. Historically, however, the realists of this world have always admonished caution regarding the practicality of this perception of reality. In the 12th Century *Rubaiyat* of Omar Khayam, one quatrain intones:

“’Tis said Paradise is made blessed by Angels,
I hold that the nectar of grapes is blessed—
Take the cash and forget the credit
As the sound of kettledrums is better heard from afar.”

Here the realist existential reaction to the religious/theological perspective is the issue of contention, but that dialectic misses the point—for the basic issue is neither—it is spiritual.

Writing on this point, S. H. Nasr observes that the spiritual view of existence, particularly for the contemporary Muslim, has been limited by two major factors—both caused by the Westernization of Islamic culture. The first effect is secularization with its strict separation of the profane world of material existence from the sacred. The second effect of this contact with the West is “the narrowing of the (religious) tradition (*al-din*) to include only the principles of human action as embodied in the *Shariah*, not the (broader) principles of wisdom (*hikmah*). The consequence, he writes, “is the neglect for the most part of Islamic art and the metaphysical and philosophic principles underlying it.”

However astute these explanations are, they are still limited to placing humankind into one or another confined cultural perspective. The full depth of the issue must be, in my opinion, at an even broader and more universal dimension. Today, at the threshold of the 21st century with the dynamics of “globalization” transforming our world

population and the critical world environmental crisis to contend with, the root questions need to address humankind and the Absolute. Humanity at the more unified, transcendent level of the homosapiens Archetypes, beyond cultural and historical limitations, needs to be the focus of our concern. Similarly, on the antipole, the Absolute, in its purest, undifferentiated state beyond the names and attributes given by any particular culture needs to be made more conscious. Here in this state of the *Mundus Imaginalis* of the collective consciousness of all humanity, we may become aware of the mythic paradigms, gestures, memories and signs that resonate with all of humankind. It is this place of the creative quest that Professor Izutsu sought to study and make known.

The Paradise Garden myth can be one of these quintessential paradigms that is universal to most or even all of humanity and deserves greater scholastic research and professional application in the phenomenal world.

The creative spirit of the Absolute seeks material expression. Our mandate is to be as perfect instruments through which the expression of the Unity of all existence can be elegantly made manifest.

“We are the flute
Our music is thine.”

(Rumi, 13th c.)

*The Pīr-Murīd Relationship
in the Thought of
'Ayn al-Qudāt Hamadānī*
Forough Jahanbakhsh

An indispensable element in the mystic life of a Sufi is the presence of a spiritual master, *Shaykh* in Arabic, and *pīr* in Persian. In fact, the master-disciple, the *pīr-murīd*, relationship has developed into the keynote of the whole system of Sufism. The custom started first among the Iranian Sufis of Khurāsān in the third century A.H. when they no longer regarded Sufism simply as the individual piety of mystically inclined Muslims.¹ The development of the master-disciple relationship in Sufism is delineated by F. Meier in his two major articles.² The gist of Meier's conclusion is given by Bowering:

The Sufi master of the 3rd/9th century presents himself foremost as a teaching master (*šaiḥ at-ta'lim*) while, from the 5th/11th century onward, he takes on the predominant features of a novice master (*šaiḥ at-tarbiyah*). Similarly, the Sufi disciple of the 3rd/9th century is a pupil (*tilmiḍ*) and companion (*šāḥib*) who, for the purpose of instruction, joins his tutor (*ustād*) by personal association (*ṣuḥbah*) whereas, from the 5th/11th century onward, he is a postulant (*murīd*) and novice who, for the purpose of education, cleaves to his director (*muršid*) by affiliation (*silsilah*). The transition in the master-disciple relationship from the former type (teaching master and pupil, instruction and association) to the latter type (novice master

and postulant, education and affiliation) has been demonstrated in the Sufi milieu of Naisābūr of the 3rd/9th to 5th/11th centuries.³

‘Ayn al-Qudāt Hamadānī (492/1098–525/1131) was not simply an heir to this transition. He himself was an ardent advocate of this theory of mystical education (*tarbiyat*). Hamadānī deals with this matter not only in his passionate mystical Persian writings, but also in his more philosophically oriented Arabic work, *Zubdat al-Haqā’iq*.

To understand the nature of this basic foundation of Sufism, there are certain questions to be answered such as: Why is it necessary to have a *pir*? What qualifications should he possess? What is his function? Who is the disciple, the *murid*? What are his obligations to his master? What is the relationship between the master and the disciple? And what is its significance with regard to the relation to God? These are the questions that the present paper attempts to answer in the light of Hamadānī’s thought. These will be dealt with at first from a theoretical or doctrinal point of view and then from a practical perspective, both of which are inseparable dimensions of the issue.

From the theoretical angle, the whole system of the *pir-murid* relationship goes back to the question of perception of the Truth (*ma‘rifat Allah*) and the divine mysteries which, according to Hamadānī, can be obtained only through an organ of mystic perception (*baṣīra*).⁴ But not everybody is endowed with this inner vision. It is exclusively possessed by gnostics (*al-‘arīfūn*). Therefore those who are not given such an organ “should seek assistance in perceiving those realities by purifying their hearts, and perhaps they might perceive them by themselves.”⁵ Hamadānī categorizes people into two groups according to the kind of heart that each possesses. The first group consists of those whose hearts are directly open to whatever the pen of Allah may write on them.⁶ In other words they are in direct contact with the source of true knowledge. The owner of such a heart, the *pir* in particular, thus, does not need to acquire the knowledge. Rather he possesses *‘ilm-ladunnī*, the knowledge imparted directly by God through mystic intuition. To learn whatever he does not know he will refer directly to his heart; and it is his duty to give a portion of this treasure to the disciple as alms (*zakāt*).⁷

On the other hand there are those whose hearts are unprepared (*khām*) to be the direct recipient of Allah's pen. They are incapable of hearing God directly, but they are capable of doing so through a *pir*. Therefore whatever they need to know they should learn through the hearts of the *pirs*.⁸ The holders of this type of heart are the *murīds*.⁹ Therefore, the theoretical necessity of having a *pir* is grounded in the need of the vast majority of people for certain intermediaries between themselves and God in order to acquire the knowledge of the Truth. The intermediary should be either a prophet or a very well experienced and well-versed *pir*.¹⁰ The concept of *murīdī* (apprenticeship) emerges out of this necessity.¹¹ In his interesting discussion regarding the *Ta'limiān*'s question as to whether *ma'rifa* is acquired through the intellect ('*aql*') or through the infallible Imām, Hamadānī elaborates on the doctrinal necessity of having a *pir*.¹² He gives examples of Abū Bakr, 'Alī and 'Umar whose perfection and certitude could never have been achieved were it not for the presence of the Prophet and their association with him. Nevertheless, he does not rule out the possibility that one may find one's way to the Truth without having a *pir*, even though such cases are very rare exceptions.¹³

The prophet or the *pir*, the intermediary, is none other than the perfect servant of God, who owing to his seeking refuge in his own servanthood, which is equal to the acceptance of his own nothingness, has become qualified to manifest God's attributes, while others, the *murīds*, perceive the attributes of God reflected within him.¹⁴ Ibn 'Arabī's understanding of the perfect man who gained "subsistence" (*baqā'*) after his "annihilation" (*fanā'*) in God leads him almost to the same position of Hamadānī regarding the role of this perfect servant as being necessarily the spiritual master of the disciples. Ibn 'Arabī's words on this matter read as follows:

It is impossible for the effect of lordship not to become manifest from him [the perfect man or the shaykh] for when the disciple knows that the shaykh is of this sort, God opens up to the disciple that in which is his felicity. For he becomes disengaged from everything for God's side just as the shaykh is disengaged. He trusts in God, not in the shaykh. Then he remains looking upon

the shaykh to see what state God will cause to pass over him in respect of the disciple, such as speaking with a command or a prohibition or uttering knowledge which will benefit him. Then the disciple takes that from God on the tongue of the shaykh. The disciple knows in himself about the shaykh what the shaykh knows about himself: that he is the locus for the flow of the properties of lordship. Even if the shaykh should pass away, this disciple would not feel his loss as such, since he knows the state of his shaykh. Such was Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq with the Messenger of God, when the Messenger died.¹⁵

Hamadānī asserts that the disciple contemplates God in the mirror which is the spirit of his master; and the master contemplates himself in the mirror which is the spirit of his disciple.¹⁶ He gives the example of Abū Bakr whose heart was not capable of receiving the commands of God. Therefore he had to hear them with his physical ears from the tongue of Muḥammad. Referring to the Qur'anic verse which says: "he who obeys the Prophet obeys Allah" (surah 4: 80). Hamadānī assigns to himself and to other pīrs the same role of the Prophet.¹⁷ He goes further and presents the image of the relationship between the pīr and the murīd as the relation between God and His creation, i.e., God through creating the world, creates the mirror in which He contemplates Himself.¹⁸ Hamadānī goes far beyond Ibn 'Arabi's statement that "the shaykhs are deputies of the Real in the cosmos, like the messengers in their time."¹⁹ In fact he claims a sort of divinity for the pīrs and equates the worship of God with the worship of a pīr: "You are not a worshipper of God unless you worship a pīr" (*tā pīr parast nashavī khudā parast nabāshī*).²⁰ Although one may argue that this is an equivocal statement, there are other examples, that will be presented later in this paper, which enhance the fact that in this mystical education the position assigned to a pīr and his supervision over the disciple is greater and beyond those of the Prophet in relation to his people. In any case, this might be understood better if we remember that Hamadānī throughout of all his writings severely denounces dedication and preoccupation with anything, including the *sharī'a* itself, which may hinder man from worshipping the one absolute divine Truth. He calls it conventional-

ism (*‘ādat parastī* or *sharī‘at parastī*). Therefore when he advocates worshipping a pīr it is quite evident how he sees the position of the latter. Also, the command of the pīr is the command of God and wherever the disciple may go he will be under the command of his pīr.²¹ An example of this exaggeration about the role of a pīr could be Shibli’s claim of possessing the power to be with his disciples and to protect them and keep them safe wherever they might wander.²² The point is that for Hamadānī the pīr is not just the ladder toward heaven, which is the role that Rūmī ascribes to him.²³ Neither is the pīr an agent as ‘Aṭṭār implies by calling him the spiritual alchemy (*kibrit-i aḥmar*) that can transform the base material of the disciple’s soul into pure gold.²⁴ He seems to be the intermediary, but in fact when the murīd reaches perfection he will find in his pīr nothing but God.

Regarding the part of the disciple, we will see more in the following section. Here it may suffice to mention that according to Hamadānī not all the “seeking disciples” (*sālikūn*) may successfully reach the ultimate goal of this mystic quest under the guidance of the pīr. The *sālik* should be capable of reaching the goal. Following the instructions of the pīr may serve to purify the heart of the *sālik*, but he will reach the goal if he is one of those destined to reach it.²⁵ The extent of his success depends on the will of Allah.²⁶ He should exert every effort on this path because he does not know whether he is one of the destined ones or not.

From the practical point of view the whole pīrī-murīdī relationship is a system of spiritual education (*tarbiyat*) in which the presence of the pīr as an existential model is inevitable. The necessity of the presence of the pīr emerges from the goal and the method of this system of education. The objective of this system is that the murīd’s character be molded by the model of his pīr (*takhallaqa bi akhlāq-i al-shaykh*).²⁷ Of course the pedagogical method is the disciple’s imitation of the pīr and not the study of books. The fundamental requirement in this method is the same whole-hearted and unquestioning obedience of the murīd to his pīr that Moses was expected to offer to Khidr. Moreover, the mystical path (*ṭarīqa*) is a narrow unknown way, dangerous and full of pitfalls. No disciple would dare by himself

to enter this Path without the guide who has himself travelled the Path, encountered the dangers and overcome them. The absolute necessity of the pīr is given Qur'anic justifications by the Sufis, too. Besides the famous verse "O, You who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the Messenger and those of you who are in authority" (4: 59), they have also recourse to "Enter houses by their doors" (2: 189). The door to knowledge of the unseen is either the Prophet or his inheritors, the pīrs.²⁸ Therefore the pīr has a mandate from heaven to guide, to open the doors for others. Supervising every breath of the murīd, the pīr leads him through different stations and points the way toward the goal.

Travelling the Path requires special qualifications on the part of both the wayfarer, the murīd, and his master. The pīr should have a great deal of psychological understanding in order, first, to determine whether his disciple is willing and able to undergo the hardships of the Path, and, second, to discern his talent and character in order to train him accordingly; because the approach of each murīd is not the same as that of his other fellows and innumerable different states (*aḥwāl*) may occur to each wayfarer each of which requires its own way of handling.²⁹ A *ṭarīqa* is not like the *sharī'a* in which all individuals are treated equally and one has to follow the same and unchangeable rules and ways throughout one's life. In every moment of the spiritual journey one may enter in and pass through several states and stations.³⁰ Therefore a genuine pīr is the one who knows all the words and deeds of a disciple from the beginning to the end and to whom the disciple's states are evident. This is, in the practical dimension, the meaning of the pīr being the mirror for the murīd.³¹ A perfect pīr also knows from the very beginning to what level each of his murīds will ultimately progress; as was the case, for example, with one of Hamadānī's masters, Fataḥa, who had foreseen the ultimate stages of his disciples.³² Ibn 'Arabi's words in this respect contain more details:

He [the shaykh] has knowledge of the sources and origins of people's activities. He possesses the science of incoming thoughts (*khawāṭir*), both the praiseworthy and the blameworthy, and how a person can be duped by them when the

blameworthy thought becomes manifest in the form of the praiseworthy. He knows the breaths and the complexion and what they possess and comprise of the good that is pleasing to God and the evil that is displeasing to Him. He knows the illnesses and the medicines. He knows the times, the lifetimes, the places, and the foods; that which will make the constitution sound and that which will corrupt it; and the difference between unveiling which is “true” (*ḥaqīqī*) and that which is “imaginal” (*khayālī*). He knows the method of training (*tarbiyat*) and the passage of the disciple from infancy, to youth, to old age. He knows when to stop exercising control over the Nature of the disciple and begin controlling his rational faculty, and when to tell the disciple that his incoming thoughts are true. He knows the properties that belong to the soul, those that belong to Satan, and what is under the power of Satan. He knows the veils which preserve man from the satan’s casting into his heart and what the disciple’s self conceals from him without his being aware. When the disciple experiences opening in his inward dimension, the shaykh differentiates for him between spiritual opening and divine opening.³³

The image of the pīr as the physician who diagnoses and heals the murīd’s illnesses and the defects of his soul occurs frequently in almost all mystical works. Hamadānī also attributes the same role to the prophets and the pīrs. Consequently it is obligatory for them to cure the disciples.³⁴

Another interesting point is that it is not necessary for a pīr, in order to be worthy of imitation, to have a perfect knowledge of the religion as the scholars have. The pīrs, unlike the exoteric scholars (*‘ulamā’-i ṣāḥir*), are the interpreters of the esoteric teaching of the Prophet. They are the possessors of taste (*dhawq*) rather than the bearers of knowledge (*‘ilm*). They rule over hearts, they are not commanders of minds. Hamadānī, quoting the Prophet Muḥammad, insists that the knowledge of *sharī‘a* (*‘ilm-i farā‘id*) is only half of the true knowledge. The other half, which is furthermore superior to the first half, is the gnosis (*ma‘rifat*) of the essence and the attributes of Allah.³⁵ In fact Hamadānī’s argument throughout the *Zubda* is that the means of obtaining *ma‘rifat Allah* is not by gaining scholarly

recognition but by acquiring the *dhawq*. This is what Hamadānī had found in his beloved and very revered pīr, Shaykh Baraka, an illiterate gnostic who could not even recite the Qur'an except for a few chapters. But according to his disciple, Hamadānī, he had the true esoteric knowledge of the Book.³⁶ Hamadānī's writings, particularly those in Persian, which are full of Qur'anic references, indicate his own good command of the Qur'an. Nevertheless he claims that, comparing to Baraka, his Qur'anic knowledge is incomplete; and even that much was gained not through reading the works of exegesis and other Qur'anic sciences but through serving Shaykh Baraka. Hamadānī recapitulates all the qualifications of a good pīr into two. First, the pīr should possess a perfect mastery of what he is doing, i.e., spiritual direction, and second he should be extremely compassionate (*mushfiq*) to his disciple, like a father to his child.³⁷ In one of his letters Hamadānī gives a summary of the content of one of his books, *Risālat-i Jamālī* which if it were available could perhaps provide us with a detailed discussion of this theory of *tarbiyat* in general and about the function and the characteristics of the pīrs in particular.³⁸

Who is the murīd and what are his obligations to his master? The primary but fundamental duty of a disciple is that he must show reverence to his pīr. As was implied above, reverence to God lies in reverence to the pīr. In the practical dimension, it is the nature of the system of *tarbiyat* which requires it to be so; for as we will see later in this paper, the whole system is based on this discipline, known as *ihtirām*. In fact, this kind of spiritual education will not bear any fruit for the disciple if he does not revere the pīr. The manuals of Sufism, both classical and contemporary ones, are full of stories and instructions clarifying the correct behaviour in the presence or the absence of the pīr. Abū Ḥafs al-Ḥaddād, one of the great Sufis of the 3rd century A.H. believed that "the whole of Sufism, including the highest mystical experience, is only 'rules of conduct' (*ādāb*)."³⁹ Devoting one chapter of the *Futūḥāt* to "the true knowledge of the stage of reverence (*ihtirām*) for the shaykhs", Ibn 'Arabī points out the consequences of the lack of this duty as:

If a person becomes the companion of a shaykh who can be

followed as a guide and does not show reverence to him, his punishment is that his heart will lose the finding of the Real (wujūd al-ḥaqq), he will be heedless (ghafla) of God, and he will show discourtesy toward Him. He will intrude upon Him in his speaking and annoy Him in His level. For the finding of the Real belongs only to the Courteous. The door is closed to every one other than the Courteous. So the disciple has no greater deprivation than to be deprived of reverence for the shaykhs.⁴⁰

Referring to his personal experiences with Baraka and his other shaykhs, Hamadānī on a number of occasions throughout his writings advises his followers to observe the importance of this principle. A novice should always see himself as in the presence of his master and should show reverence to him even when the latter is physically absent. Only later when he reaches the point of perfection will the presence or the absence of the pīr make no difference to him.⁴¹ Besides *iḥtirām*, Hamadānī sets forth other regulations that a murīd should follow in his relation with the pīr. One is that the murīd must not conceal from his pīr anything. It is obligatory for him to relate to his master all the states of his mind and his heart. He should particularly inform him about the visionary experiences that he encounters.⁴² It is exactly like a patient who should let his doctor know everything about the symptoms of his disease in order to enable him to heal him. Since it is only the pīr who has the power of differentiating between the genuinely divine visionary experiences (*wāqī'a*, *ru'yā*) and the satanic inspirations (*wāridāt-i shayṭānī*), the disciple should not talk about them with anyone else. Otherwise he will be misguided. Any time that the murīd may feel uplifted and encouraged by the inspiration of his lower self or satanic power, it is only the pīr who knows the solution to the problem. The latter restrains him and drives him back onto the right path. Another reason for keeping the visionary experiences secret is that not everybody is capable of understanding and digesting certain dreams or inspired messages; as Ḥāfiẓ says: "*Gūsh-i nāmāḥram nabāshad jāy-i payghām-i surūsh*." Therefore relating them to an unauthorized person may hinder the disciple's progress because he might be deprived of receiving more divine inspirations, each of which may function as

a key to a door to the next stage. Hamadānī giving the example of Yūsuf and Ya'qūb points out that relating the visions to others may bring about envy on the part of other Sufis and it will cause surprise and disbelief among non-Sufis.⁴³

On the mystic path, the murīd has no will of his own. He should have absolute trust in his pīr and simply do everything according to his will. Even the performance of the incumbent religious duties (*farā'iḍ*) are valid only when they are done under the command of the pīr, a man of heart (*ṣāhib dil*); otherwise they are invalid.⁴⁴ This is because Hamadānī, as mentioned above, condemns the conventionalism of Islamic Law as *'ādat parastī*; he insists that the first step for the murīd toward progress is to free himself from this conventionalism. He considers one prayer and one day of fasting performed by the order of the pīr as being far better than one thousand prayers and one thousand days of fasting performed conventionally.⁴⁵ He argues that observing the *shari'a* in the routine way that is followed by other people will not bear any fruit for the *sālik*. Furthermore, he claims that under the command of a pīr even if a murīd performs his religious duties with impure intention, i.e., hypocritically, he will ultimately reach perfection and sincerity.⁴⁶ The true essence of the religion will be revealed only when the conventionalism is removed. This is what the pīr does, and this is what Hamadānī means by repeating the famous Sufi saying that someone who has no shaykh has no faith (*man lā shaykh-a lahu lā dīn-a lahu*).⁴⁷

To proceed in the stations of the Path, the pīr should follow every moment of the conscious and subconscious life of the murīd, while the latter should show complete devotion (*iradāt-i tāmm*) to his pīr, that is absolute obedience to him.⁴⁸ Even if the pīr asks him to do something contrary to the religious law he should obey without questioning.⁴⁹ Frequently in his correspondence Hamadānī warns his disciples that they should not argue with him about the instructions he already wrote to them. He insists that the first condition of progress is devotion, submission (*taslīm*), and silent obedience.⁵⁰ He cites in this regard the traditional Sufi saying that in the hands of the pīr a murīd should be as passive as a corpse in the hands of an undertaker (*kal mayyit-i bayn-a yaday-i al-ghassāl*).⁵¹ Ghazzālī also believes that abso-

lute obedience is necessary even if the master should be wrong: "Let him [the murīd] know that the advantage he gains from the error of his shaykh, if he should err, is greater than the advantage he gains from his own rightness, if he should be right."⁵² Alluding to the story of Moses and Khidr, Hamadānī maintains that the disciple not only should not question the method of his pīr, but he should not also expect impeccability (*ma'ṣūmiyya*) from him.⁵³ He goes further and adds that even the Prophet Muḥammad who is the master of all masters and prophets was not impeccable, for the Qur'an says: "Allah may forgive you of your sin, that which is past and that which is to come." (sura 48: 2)⁵⁴ It may seem a little strange that Hamadānī who always gives mystical and supra-theological interpretations of the Qur'anic verses, should here align himself with certain Sunni theologians and accept their literal interpretations, citing them in support of his argument. But if we analyze his frequent references to the story of Moses and Khidr, we find that he does not use the term "sin" in the literal sense; rather he means those acts of the pīr which seem strange and even sinful to the murīd, according to his own standards. He insists that the murīd should not evaluate the pīr according to his own conventional criteria, avoiding thereby Moses' error when he judged Khidr according to his own reasoning.⁵⁵

All in all the relationship of the murīd to the pīr which constitutes the whole system of *tarbiyat* is designated by the terms "serving" (*khidmat*) and "companionship" (*ṣuḥbat*). What is meant by *khidmat* is absolute obedience, even if the murīd may be ordered to do very low and unreasonable things. The underlying philosophy of this technique does not depend on its material outcome but on the effect which it leaves on the soul of the disciple, i.e., humiliation and suppression of the self (*nafs*) which is most of the time a veil over the heart of the seeker (*sālik*). Hamadānī does not mention any specific method of humiliation, such as ordering the future Sufis to beg; rather he tries to rationalize the benefits of serving a pīr. Mentioning how he profited through his association with Baraka, Aḥmad Ghazālī, and other pirs, Hamadānī encourages his followers, a number of whom were political figures such as Azīz al-Dīn Mustawfī, a Saljūq vizier, and Kāmil al-Dawlah, to disassociate themselves from worldly

and unjust services and joining serving the men of gnosis (*ahl al-ma'rifat*), the pīrs.⁵⁶ He calls it "shoe-serving" (*Khidmat-i Kafsh-i mardān*). He regards serving in the king's court as contradictory to acquiring the knowledge of the Truth. The best way to achieve perfection is this "shoe-serving". He maintains that unveiling (*Kashf*) occurs in the service of these men and through close attachment to their door-steps, not in the king's court.⁵⁷ He clarifies the philosophy of *khidmat* in chapter seventy one of the *Zubda*. There, he argues that serving the pīrs removes vanity which is one of the perils of the Path. He warns the masters of speculative and rational knowledge that if they disdain to follow a man of gnosis as a result of their vanity for their knowledge they are wasting their time and they will not aim at the goal, which is perfection.⁵⁸

Companionship (*ṣuḥbat*) with the pīr is also another technique for undergoing spiritual training at his hands. As a result of this association concentration upon the pīr (*tawajjuh*) will occur; and the murīd will see his model always present. The pīr also will practice *tawajjuh* through his control of the disciple's heart and mind at every moment. This concentration of the two partners upon each other results in the experience of spiritual unity known as annihilation in the pīr (*fanā' fi al-shaykh*) which leads ultimately to annihilation in God. Hamadānī regards the companionship of the people of taste (*ahl al-Dhawq*), i.e., the mystics, and serving them from the bottom of the heart as an excellent help for the murīd to purify his heart, to heal and strengthen his faith, and to be re-animated by God in a wonderful life (*hayāt-i ṭayyiba*).⁵⁹ The most valuable benefit that a murīd may gain from his close association with the pīr is the possibility that in one single spiritual experience, being attracted (*majdhūb*) by the pīr's view (*naẓar*), he might be exalted into higher experiences and reach the end of his quest.⁶⁰ However, the most rational reason for a murīd to devote himself with all his spirit and heart to the service of his pīr seems to be the one that Hamadānī calls "the shortest Path" (*aqrab-i ṭuruq*), because it saves the murīd going over the same path that his pīr has already travelled.⁶¹ He illustrates this by the example of an ant, who in its desire to travel a great distance to visit the Ka'ba, clings to the wing of a bird in order to get there easier, safer, and

faster.⁶²

Undoubtedly a *pir* as the ideal mystic may be regarded as one of the saints (*awliyā'*), those who have attained the highest mystical stage and exercise the highest authority in the social and spiritual life of the people, who serve to remind the people of God, and who are friends of God because they befriend those whom God has befriended.⁶³ Therefore, one related topic which this paper should explore is the theoretical problem of the relationship between the *awliyā'* and the Prophet Muḥammad, and Hamadānī's position in this respect. In fact *walāya* or *wilāya*, saintship, has been discussed in the works of great Sufis since the late ninth century,⁶⁴ and most especially the controversial theme of whether or not *wilāya* is superior to prophecy (*nubuwwa*). The traditional Sufi schools have always agreed upon the superiority of prophecy. Al-Hakīm al-Tirmīdhī (d. after 318/930) seems to have been the first who dealt with this subject in his essays. Once he was accused of implying in his teachings that saints might be superior to prophets, and he was sent into exile. Later he defended himself in his apologia where he develops the theory that saintship is the initial stage of prophethood, meaning that prophets are saints before they become prophets.⁶⁵ However, Tirmīdhī's discussion in his *Khatm al-Awliyā'* is very controversial and the notion of superiority of saintship over prophecy is discernable in his thought.

Other Sufis express a variety of positions in their writings. Abū Sa'īd al-Kharrāz (d. 890) for instance regards prophecy a grace additional to saintship. Therefore *awliyā'* are inferior in rank to prophets.⁶⁶ Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj (d. 378/988), in rejecting the superiority of *wilāya*, maintains that those who have asserted this err in doing so because they wrongly interpret the story of Moses and Khidr. He says: "saintship is illumined by the splendour of prophecy, but it never equals prophecy, much less surpasses it."⁶⁷ Hujwīrī (d. 465/1072) says in his *Kashf al-Maḥjūb* that: "the foundation of Sufism and knowledge of God (*ma'rifa*) rest on saintship."⁶⁸ Nevertheless he strongly denounces the views of those who believe in its superiority to *nubuwwa*. He maintains that "it is impossible to place a follower above his leader. Moreover, one single breath of prophets is much nobler than the total of the whole life time of all *awliyā'*."⁶⁹ Finally, we

might point out that Ibn 'Arabī's (d. 638/1240) teachings in this respect are very complicated and provocative. However, he asserts "a prophet as a saint is more perfect than himself as a prophet; and it is the meaning of the saying that saintship is higher than prophethood."⁷⁰

Hamadānī's view in this respect seems to be inconsistent. In the *Zubda* he maintains that the stage of sainthood precedes the stage of prophecy.⁷¹ In the *Shakwa al-Gharīb*, too, he maintains this position where he says that "the end of sainthood is the beginning of prophecy."⁷² But in the *Tamhīdāt* he holds the unorthodox view that saintship is superior. He compares the characteristics of the prophets and the saints. The prophets are endowed with three prerogatives, namely, the power of performing miracles (*mu'jiza*), the ability to see the state of affairs of the hereafter (*mushāhida*), and the ability to perceive the unseen (*al-ghayb*) in the state of wakefulness. He explains that all the saints are endowed with the same characteristics, which are: *karāmāt*, their miraculous deeds; *futūh*, their intuitive knowledge; and *wāqī'a*, their spiritual visionary experiences. Then he adds that these prerogatives are the very beginning stages of sainthood. If the saints stop at this point these would turn into a veil that will deprive them of their position of nearness to God (*qurb*). They should therefore strive to leave these prerogatives behind in order to preserve the position of *qurb* where distance from the position of prophecy is as great as that as between the Throne and the earth.⁷³

As we see, Hamadānī's words in the *Tamhīdāt* leave no doubt that he places *awliya'* above *anbiyā'*. Nevertheless, Omar Jah tries to prove that Hamadānī does not contradict himself in his works on this issue. He argues that Hamadānī in *Tamhīdāt* has not placed *awliyā'* above *anbiyā'*; and that this is demonstrated by the vulnerability of the *awliyā'* to temptations of their prerogatives, whereas the *anbiyā'* are impeccable (*ma'sūm*) and they are never tempted.⁷⁴ Jah's argument is weakened by the fact that the last part of his statement, i.e., "the *anbiyā'* are impeccable", depends on Hujwīrī and not on Hamadānī, who for his part believes that none of the prophets were impeccable.⁷⁵ However, as both 'Usayrān and Landolt rightly understand, Hamadānī does contradict himself on the issue.⁷⁶

Another interesting point to be mentioned is Hamadānī's ambiguity with regard to the Prophet Muḥammad. In one place he differentiates the Prophet Muḥammad from other prophets. To show the superiority of *wilāya* he quotes a tradition from the prophet Muḥammad which reads:

I was shown a group of my people [*awliyā'*] who enjoyed the same position as I have in front of God. They were neither the prophets (*anbiyā'*) nor the martyrs (*shuhadā'*); rather the *anbiyā'* and the *shuhadā'* envied such their position.⁷⁷

He goes on to clarify this statement by saying that *wilāya* is superior to *nubuwwa* because it is the position of nearness to God. But the prophecy of Muḥammad is different, it is unique because he enjoys the position of nearness to God (*qurb*), too.⁷⁸ He has both the *Risālat* and the *Wilāyat*. Thus it implies that the Prophet Muḥammad is above other *anbiyā'*. In another passage he places *awliyā'* above the prophet Muḥammad. He states that whereas the Prophet received revelation through the intermediacy of Gabriel, the *awliyā'* enjoy direct attraction (*jadhba*) which is equal to the pious acts of both the Jinns and human beings. If the Prophet is granted the signs of oral speech with God (*'alāmat-i mushāfaha*), the *awliyā'* have the honour of being addressed directly (*amārat-i mukhātabāt*).

In any case, Hamadānī's words in this respect are as provocative as his other views, in comparison to his predecessors. His conception of *wilāya* and the role that he assigned to the pīr as guarantor of the faith is in some ways similar to, if not rooted in, that of the Shī'is' understanding of *Imamat*.

Notes

1. Hermann Landolt, "Two Types of Mystical Thought in Muslim Iran", *Muslim World* 68 (1978), p. 195.
2. F. Meier, "Quṣayris Tartīb as-sulūk", *Oriens* 16 (1963), pp. 1-39; "Ḥurāsān und das Ende der klassischen Sufik", in: *Atti del convegno internazionale sul tema: la Persia nel medioevo* (Roma: Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1971), pp. 545-570.
3. G. Bowering, *The Mystical Vision of Existence in Classical Islam* (Berlin &

New York: Walter De Gruyter, 1980), p. 75.

4. 'Ayn al-Quḍāt Hamadānī, *Zubdat al-Haqāiq*, ed. 'Afif 'Usayrān (Tehran: Tehran University Publications, 1341 H. SH./1962), p. 28.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 71.

6. Hamadānī, *Tamhīdāt*, ed. A. 'Usayrān. (Tehran: Tehran University Publications, 1341 H.SH./1962), p. 9; *Nāmahāy-i 'Ayn al-Quḍāt-i Hamadānī*. ed. A 'Usayrān and 'Alī Naqī Munzawī. 2 vols. (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Bunyād-i Farhang-i Iran, 1348-1350 H.SH./1969-1971), vol. 2, pp. 108-109.

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*

9. Hamadānī, *Nāmahā*, vol. 1, p. 279.

10. Hamadānī, *Nāmahā*, vol. 2, p. 86.

11. *Ibid.*

12. *Ibid.*, see letter # 75, pp. 113-126.

13. *Ibid.*

14. According to the thesis of the *Zubda*, man is nothing except the existential relation between him and the source of emanation, God. Man in himself is non-existent, while God is manifest Being. Thus, the gnostics ('*arīfūn*) who through their *baṣīra* have understood this fact are the perfect servants of God.

15. Ibn 'Arabī, *Futūḥāt al-Makkīyya*, as cited by W. Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Knowledge* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1989), p. 324.

16. Hamadānī, *Tamhīdāt*, pp. 9, 30; *Nāmahā*, vol. 1, p. 269; *Nāmahā*, vol. 2, p. 109.

17. *Nāmahā*, vol. 2, p. 110.

18. Hamadānī, *Tamhīdāt*, pp. 271-273.

19. Ibn 'Arabī, *Futūḥāt*, as cited by Chittick, *Sufi Path*, p. 271.

20. Hamadānī, *Tamhīdāt*, p. 333.

21. Hamadānī, *Tamhīdāt*, p. 35.

22. Ruzbihān Baqlī Shīrāzī, *Sharḥ-i Shaṭḥīyāt*, ed. Henri Corbin (Tehran: Anstītū-i Irān-o Faransih, 1966), p. 239.

23. Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, *Mathnawī-i Ma'nawī*. ed. and trans. by R. Nicholson. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1933), vol. 6, line 4125.

24. Farid al-Dīn 'Aṭṭār, *Muṣibat Nāmah*, ed. Nūrānī Wasāl (Tehran: Zawwār, 1338 H.SH./1959), p. 62.

25. Hamadānī, *Zubda*, p. 71.

26. Idem, *Nāmahā*, vol. 2, p. 119.

27. Idem, *Tamhīdāt*, p. 33.

28. Chittick, *Sufi Path*, p. 270.

29. Hamadānī, *Tamhīdāt*, p. 351.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 352.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

32. Idem, *Nāmahā*, vol. 2, p. 119.

33. Ibn 'Arabī, *Futūḥāt*, as cited by Chittick, *Sufi Path*, p. 271-272.

34. See for example, *Tamhīdāt*, pp. 10-11; *Nāmahā*, vol. 2, pp. 482-488

35. Hamadānī, *Tamhīdāt*, p. 352.

36. Hamadānī, *Nāmahā*, vol. 2, pp. 50-51.
37. *Ibid.*, pp. 118, 353.
38. *Ibid.*, pp. 483-488.
39. A. Hujwīrī, *Kashf al-Mahjūb*, as cited by H. Landolt in "Two Types of Mystical Thought", p. 195.
40. Ibn 'Arabī, *Futūhāt*, as cited by Chittick in *Sufi Path*, p. 273.
41. Hamadānī, *Tamhīdāt*, p. 34.
42. *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.
43. Idem, *Nāmahā*, vol. 1, p. 367.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 441.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 54-55.
47. See for instance *Nāmahā*, vol. 1, p. 475, and *Tamhīdāt*, p. 11.
48. Hamadānī, *Nāmahā*, vol. 1, p. 409.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 270.
50. See for instance *Nāmahā*, vol. 1, pp. 251-252; *Nāmahā*, vol. 2, p. 103.
51. *Nāmahā*, vol. II, pp. 476-477.
52. Hamilton Gibb, *Muhammedanism: An Historical Survey* (London: Home University Library, 1949), p. 150.
53. *Tamhīdāt*, p. 31; *Nāmahā*, vol. I, p. 251; *Nāmahā*, vol. II, pp. 103, 407.
54. *Nāmahā*, vol. I, p. 118.
55. *Nāmahā*, vol. II, pp. 407, 426.
56. Hamadānī sees himself as being indebted to his shaykhs, for on several occasions in his writings he mentions that he did not gain his mystical knowledge nor was he rescued from error through reading books but through his association with these men of God. See for example, *Zubda*, p. 72; *Nāmahā*, vol. 2, p. 51.
57. Hamadānī, *Nāmahā*, vol. 1, p. 228; *Nāmahā*, vol. 2, pp. 57-58, 68, 125, 368, 389.
58. Idem, *Zubda*, pp. 73-74.
59. Hamadānī, *Zubda*, pp. 71-72; *Nāmahā*, vol. 1, p. 52.
60. Idem, *Nāmahā*, vol. 2, p. 368.
61. *Ibid.*, pp. 420-422.
62. *Ibid.*, pp. 476-478; *Nāmahā*, vol. 1, p. 75.
63. For the definition of *awliyā'* (plural of *walī*) see: H. Landolt, "Walayah", *The Encyclopedia of Religion*, vol. 15, pp. 316-323. Also see B. Carra de Vaux, "Wali", *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, vol. IV: 2, pp. 1109-1111.
64. Annemarie Schimmel, *Mystical Dimension of Islam* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1975), p. 199.
65. Sayyid Sh. Hussainī, *Sayyid Muḥammad al-Ḥusaynī-i Gīsūdirāz* (Delhi: Idārah-i Adabiyāt [n.d]), p. 47.
66. H. Landolt, "Walayah", p. 322.
67. Abū Naṣr Al-Sarrāj, *The Kitāb al-Luma'*, ed. and trans. by R. A. Nicholson (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1914), p. 114.
68. S.A.J. Hujwīrī, *Kashf al-Mahjūb*, ed. by Qawīm (Tehran: Chāpkhāna-i M. Fardīn, 1337 H.SH./1958), p. 118.

69. *Ibid.*, pp. 212-214.
70. Toshihiko Izutsu, *A Comparative Study of the Key Philosophical Concepts in Sufism and Taoism* (Tokyo, 1966), pp. 257-263.
71. Hamadānī, *Zubda*, pp. 30-31.
72. Idem, *Shakwa al-Gharib*, ed. A. 'Usayrān (Tehran: Tehran University Publications, 1341 H.SH./1962), pp. 44-45.
73. Idem, *Tamhidāt*, pp. 45-46.
74. Omar Jah, "A Critical Annotated Translation of Zubdat al-Haqaiq", unpublished M.A. thesis (Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal, 1970), p. 26.
75. Hamadānī, *Nāmāhā*, vol. 1, p. 118.
76. See 'Usayrān's remarks in the introduction to his edition of Hamadānī's *Shakwa*; and Landolt, "Two Types of Mystical Thought", p. 196.
77. Hamadānī, *Tamhidāt*, pp. 44-45.
78. *Ibid.*

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Refiguring Postmodern Times

Mark C. Taylor

My most extensive and intense contact with Toshihiko Izutsu came during the spring of 1983 when we were both fellows at the National Center for the Humanities in Research Triangle, North Carolina. The commonality of our intellectual and scholarly interests was evident to both of us from the outset. I was finishing a manuscript that eventually was published under the title *Erring: A Postmodern A/theology*. Professor Izutsu had come to the Center to learn more about deconstruction and post-structuralism, which at the time were at the center of critical debate in the United States and Europe. While most of my previous writing had been on nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophy and religion, *Erring* represented a sustained effort to appropriate the insights of deconstruction in the formulation of a new theological perspective. My project, therefore, was of immediate relevance to Professor Izutsu's agenda.

But Professor Izutsu's expertise was also pertinent to my work. Intensive study had persuaded me that while deconstruction is deeply imbricated in the Judeo-Christian theological tradition, it nonetheless intersects in surprising ways with tendencies in certain non-western religions. The recognition of these lines of potential connection had drawn Professor Izutsu to the States. As we talked formally and informally over the course of several months, our convictions about

the mutual relevance of our different traditions deepened. Professor Izutsu's astonishing erudition enabled him to see similarities where others saw only differences. In a few short months, I learned an immense amount from him.

After completing my manuscript, I left the Center to travel to Paris where I followed the final sessions of Derrida's seminar. Knowing that Professor Izutsu planned to stop in Paris to purchase books on his way back to Japan, I was able to arrange the meeting between him and Derrida that resulted in Derrida's remarkable *Lettre à un ami japonais* (1985). The implications of this brief text have yet to be fully appreciated. When future scholars begin to plumb the depths of the conversation between Professor Izutsu and Derrida, they will, I believe, begin to discern the lines of connection between East and West that began to emerge during our exchanges that took place at the National Humanities Center in 1983.

In the years since the publication of *Erring*, I have been drawn evermore deeply into debates surrounding deconstruction and post-modernism. This journey has taken me from philosophy and religion to art and architecture. The more I have studied, the more complex the issues have become. In this essay, I attempt to rethink postmodernism in a way that reflects this complexity. I offer these remarks as a tribute to the extraordinary contributions of Toshihiko Izutsu and as a continuation of our conversation, which continues even in his irrevocable absence.

The scene has become so familiar that its novelty has long been forgotten: Charlie Chaplin frantically struggles to tighten bolts on an assembly line whose speed steadily increases until everything breaks down. Perhaps it is because we have become accustomed to the dehumanizing effects of industrialism that we tend to overlook the critical edge of *Modern Times*. Nor do we usually recognize the remarkable range of Chaplin's social commentary. From factory, to asylum, to prison, *Modern Times* portrays a world in which everything seems to be spinning out of control.

The very familiarity of the world that Chaplin projects obscures some of his most prescient insights. The film opens by explicitly

focusing on the question of time. The first image is a clock ticking down to 6:00 AM—the start of a new workday. As the credits draw to a close, the full-screen clock gives way to a herd of sheep, which, in turn, is displaced by a herd of workers rushing toward the factory where they spend the day. The mechanization of labor required the synchronization of human activity. When Chaplin falls into the gears that run the factory, he becomes quite literally a cog in the machine of industrial production.

Modern Times first appeared in 1936—two years after Walter Benjamin published “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” It is as if Chaplin produced the work of art that Benjamin theorized. Though more intrigued by photography than film, Benjamin was, nonetheless, keenly aware of the significance of Chaplin’s art. Commenting on the effectiveness of Chaplin’s social criticism, Benjamin writes:

Mechanical reproduction of art changes the reaction of the masses toward art. The reactionary attitude toward a Picasso painting changes into the progressive reaction toward a Chaplin movie. The progressive reaction is characterized by the direct, intimate fusion of visual and emotional enjoyment with the orientation of the expert. Such fusion is of great social significance.

While Benjamin’s comment is characteristically insightful, *Modern Times* is progressive in ways that not even he realized.

In the midst of the factory, with its mechanical means of reproduction, Chaplin inserts a device that utilizes an electronic mode of reproduction. From behind the glass door of his office, the president of the company directs his workers by projecting his image in real time throughout the factory. When adjustments need to be made or workers are not producing fast enough, the boss’s image suddenly appears on large screens scattered throughout the factory from which instructions are issued and orders handed down. No longer film but not yet television, this electronic device allows the president to be present *virtually* everywhere at once. Workers, who have become prostheses for machines, are unable to escape the panoptical gaze of management.

While modernism is inseparably bound to the mechanisms of industrial production, postmodernism is an extension of electronic telecommunications technology. Chaplin could not, of course, have predicted the extraordinary revolution that has been brought about by the progressive shift from mechanical to electronic modes of production and reproduction. Nevertheless, the remarkable interplay he establishes between the assembly line and something approximating broadcast television anticipates the advent of what has come to be known as postmodernism. Furthermore, by indicating the way in which modes of production and reproduction transform structures of temporality, Chaplin implicitly suggests one of the most important points of difference between modernism and postmodernism. The question of this difference remains a matter of time.

A shift of gears: If we are honest, we must admit that it is no longer clear whether theology has a future. More precisely, it is no longer clear whether theology has a future that involves anything other than an impossible repetition of the past. What *is* clear is that *if* theology is to have a future, it is necessary to develop a far more sophisticated understanding of our present cultural condition. And yet, one searches in vain for careful theological analyses of literature, music, painting, and architecture, to say nothing of photography, film, television, and video. It is as though theologians who resist modernity accept the modernist doctrine of the autonomy of different forms of cultural expression. As a result, theology all too often becomes either irrelevant or reactionary.

In an effort to force theology to confront a world it apparently would prefer to ignore, I will attempt to articulate some of the theological implications of our postmodern times. While it is obviously impossible to resolve the questions that continue to swirl around postmodernism, a consideration of the problem of temporality can help to distinguish two competing strands of postmodernism and to contextualize them in relation to major alternatives that governed theological debate during the nineteenth century.

Initially coined to describe an architectural style characterized by historical eclecticism and ironic ornamentalism, the term "postmodernism" has rapidly been expanded to cover a broad range of

social and cultural phenomena. According to Lyotard, "postmodernism" does not merely designate a particular architectural style or philosophical stance but defines our very cultural condition at the end of the millennium. He contends that postmodernism involves the breakdown of the metanarratives that have governed the lives of selves and societies since at least the Enlightenment. This dissolution of the narrative quality of experience issues in profound spiritual, social, and political dislocation. In the absence of an over-arching framework, questions of meaning and motivation become unanswerable and the problem of legitimation irresolvable. Without an intelligible past and a meaningful future, the passing moment of present experience becomes all-consuming. It is precisely such temporal dissociation that Jameson takes to be definitive of postmodernism. "As temporal continuities break down," he argues, "the experience of the present becomes powerfully, overwhelmingly vivid and 'material': the world comes before the schizophrenic with heightened intensity, bearing a mysterious and oppressive charge of affect, glowing with hallucinatory energy." Such personal and social dissolution, according to Jameson, is attributable to the socio-economic mechanisms of consumer capitalism in which commodities are fetishized and exchange value supplants use value.

Jameson's foreshortened historical perspective prevents him from realizing that his analysis of postmodernism repeats, without essentially revising, Kierkegaard's critique of modernism. Furthermore, Jameson's ideological bias blinds him to recognizing the theological implications of postmodernism. It is hardly an exaggeration to insist that the debate between postmodernists and modernists reenacts Kierkegaard's critique of Hegel in the context of twentieth-century philosophy, literature, religion, and art.

Hegel's speculative system is the metanarrative of metanarratives in which modern philosophy reaches closure. The heart of the Hegel's position is the dialectic of identity and difference. Through his logical rendering of the principle of inner teleology, which Kant articulates in the Third Critique, Hegel defines the structure of self-reflexivity in which identity and difference are mutually constitutive. Self-reflexivity is not only an epistemological axiom but is an ontological

principle. Hegel insists that his speculative ontologic involves nothing more than the philosophical translation of the correlative Christian doctrines of the incarnation and the trinity. Within this scheme, the logos of thought and being is the structure of self-reflexivity that defines both divine and human self-consciousness. So understood, Hegel's system is thoroughly *logocentric*.

If expressed in terms of twentieth-century structuralism, the self-reflexive logocentrism and logocentric self-reflexivity of Hegel's system must be understood both synchronically and diachronically. Synchronically, the principle of self-referentiality defines the eternal structure that grounds the determinate being of any entity and delineates the contours of every concept. Diachronically, the principle of self-reflexivity reveals the unchanging structure of the stages of development through which individuals and societies must pass in order to reach fulfillment. Though all reality is constituted by the structure of self-reflexivity, this foundational principle only becomes transparent when human self-consciousness reaches fulfillment. With the emergence of absolute knowledge, Hegel maintains, temporal dispersion is transcended as past and future are integrated in the eternal presence of the present. In this all-encompassing moment, is and ought become one and, therefore, history comes to an end.

Kierkegaard's unsystematic philosophical fragments represent an ironic, even a parodic reading of Hegel. The interrelated issues upon which the debate between Hegel and Kierkegaard turns are time and the self. From Kierkegaard's perspective, Hegel's logocentric speculation negates the significance of temporality and abstracts from the specificities of human existence. To counter Hegel's speculative dialectic, Kierkegaard elaborates an existential dialectic comprised of three stages: the aesthetic, ethical, and religious. These stages are defined by alternative modalities of temporality and, correspondingly, contrasting structures of subjectivity.

For our purposes, Kierkegaard's analysis of aestheticism is of particular interest. The aesthetic stage of existence is comprised of two contrasting poles: immediacy and reflection. While insisting that the modern era as a whole is essentially aesthetic, Kierkegaard associates alternative aesthetic tendencies with certain artistic, philo-

sophical, and theological styles. The religious romanticism of Schleiermacher and the romantic irony of the Schlegel are characteristic of aesthetic immediacy, and the philosophical speculation of Hegel and his Danish followers like Martensen and Heiberg is typical of reflective aestheticism. Though representing alternative theological, philosophical and religious approaches, both immediacy and reflection have as their aim union with that which is taken to be real or absolute.

The word "aesthetic" derives from the Greek *aisthetikos*, which means "pertaining to sense perception." While many modern writers, artists, and critics follow Kant by associating aesthetics with that branch of philosophy that presents a theory of the beautiful and the fine arts, Kierkegaard expands the notion of the aesthetic to describe a style of life defined by a longing for, or absorption in sensual immediacy. In the first volume of *Either-Or*, he develops examples of aesthetic immediacy ranging from the sensuous erotic genius paradigmatically represented by Don Juan to the modern-day everyman whom Heidegger, one century later, dubs *das Man*. For Don Juan and his modern and postmodern counterparts, the essence of experience is the enjoyment of the passing moment. Anything that distracts from the pleasurable immersion in the here and now is assiduously avoided. In a certain sense, reflection negates immediacy by introducing self-consciousness into the seemingly uninterrupted flow of sensuality. With the capacity to reflect, distinctions can be drawn within the flux of sensation and between the subject and the object of cognition. Such distinctions, however, are as fleeting as the sensations they arrest. The goal of reflection is perfect knowledge in which the *difference* between subjectivity and objectivity is erased through the perfect union of the self and the absolute. This union, which is an inverse repetition of the moment of sensuous immediacy, realizes the *nunc stans* in which presence is undisturbed by absence.

In what follows, I will appropriate Kierkegaard's analysis of aestheticism to describe modernism and what I will label modernist postmodernism. Through a consideration of examples drawn from painting and architecture, I will proceed to attempt to define the intricate interrelation of these two cultural moments. Finally, I will

describe an alternative postmodernism, which more closely approximates Kierkegaard's religious stage of existence, and opens the possibility for a new theological language. To clarify these distinctions and indicate their significance, I will examine important tendencies in twentieth-century art and architecture.

It is not only contemporary philosophy that is preoccupied with the linguistic turn. From the theology of Barth to the drama of Beckett, from the poetry of Stevens to the music of Cage, from the anthropology of Lévi-Strauss to the psychoanalysis of Lacan, the question of language pervades cultural theory and praxis throughout this century. Paradoxically, however, the more language is investigated, the less transparent it becomes. Nor is the question of language merely linguistic *sensu strictissimo*. Within the domain of the visual arts, for example, the problem of language takes the form of a sustained interrogation of the nature and limits of representation. What does representation represent? How does representation re-present? When rephrased in semiotic terms, the question becomes: Within the overall structure of the sign, what is the relationship between the signifier and the signified? To pose this query is to acknowledge that the lucidity of signs has disappeared and, therefore, representation has become problematic. Far from providing access to the signified, signifiers all too often seem to obscure rather than reveal. When signifiers become veils instead of windows, there seem to be at least three ways to resolve the problem of representation: (1) Erase signifiers in order to discover the signified; (2) Collapse the signified into a play of signifiers, which refer to nothing beyond themselves; (3) Accept the impenetrability of the veil of appearances and admit the unknowability of the true and the inaccessibility of the real. While the first alternative defines the strategy of many leading modern painters and architects, the second option defines the strategy of what is commonly known as postmodernism. I defer consideration of the third alternative for the moment.

Though few modern painters and architects were directly familiar with the complexities of nineteenth-century German idealism, the philosophical and theological principles informing many of their aesthetic theories and practices bear a striking similarity to the

fundaments of Hegelian philosophy. The two primary conduits through which these speculative ideas entered the mainstream of aesthetic modernism were the theosophical musings of Helena Petrovna Blavatsky and the anthroposophical writings of Rudolf Steiner. While differing in important but subtle ways, theosophy and anthroposophy present what is, in effect, a popularized version of philosophical idealism according to which the world of appearances is grounded in an underlying structure that constitutes the eternally present absolute. The goal of human striving is to achieve union with the absolute by penetrating or stripping away the realm of appearances. In Hegelian terms, this strategy represents the movement toward universality by the negation of particularity. In the semiotic terms defined above, signifiers must be erased in order to create the possibility of *direct* access to and union with the transcendental signified, which is both the real and constitutes truth itself.

Mondrian, Kandinsky, and Le Corbusier, among others, were deeply influenced by theosophical doctrine. For Mondrian, the absolute was the universal geometric structure that provides the ground of being. Through his non-objective paintings, which were usually executed in black and white or primary colors, he thought it was possible to wipe away the appearances that obscure the absolute structure of the real. Kandinsky's abstract forms and color theory were borrowed from theosophic doctrine according to which artist representations have the capacity to engender spiritual dispositions. Le Corbusier shares Mondrian and Kandinsky's theosophical faith and idealistic convictions. The blank whiteness and austere geometricism of his buildings express a purist aesthetic in which the real is identified with abstract structure. Never accepting art for art's sake, Mondrian, Kandinsky, Le Corbusier as well as many of their contemporaries and followers, saw art as providing something like what Schiller described as an "aesthetic education," which would renew humankind spiritually and, in this way, prepare for something like the arrival of the kingdom of God on earth. Even though the absolute is eternally present, the experience of it must be opened by the presence of the work of art. From this point of view, art and architecture assume the mantle of religion in works that bear no

manifest trace of traditional religious art. The course of avant-garde art throughout the first half of this century is marked by an increasing dematerialization, which, for many artists, was the distinctive mark of spiritualization. By the 1960s and 1970s, this movement reached its logical conclusion in minimalism and conceptualism. Reversing Hegel's translation of the artistic and religious the *Vorstellung* into the philosophical *Begriff*, the material *œuvre d'art* disappears in an idea or concept.

The spirituality and idealism that inspire much of the greatest western art in our century could not be sustained. In the hands of epigones, lofty ideals give way to stylistic imitation contrived to achieve commercial success. Art that originally had been motivated by political criticism and social idealism became the preferred style of corporate capitalism. The abstraction and non-objectivity that modernists tend to regard as essential issue in an art is, for many of its critics, insensitive to and uninvolved with the concrete dilemmas of individual life and social existence. Echoing Kierkegaard's analysis of reflective aestheticism, artists and architects disenchanted with the abstractions of modernism called for a return to the materiality and temporality that are the inescapable conditions of human life. The form that this protest took was a return of figuration and ornamentation in pop art and postmodern architecture.

Robert Venturi's much-heralded call for a shift away from the elitism of International Style and turn to the populism of vernacular architecture was, of course, anticipated by Pop art. In the early work of Robert Rauschenberg, Jasper Johns, for example, figure reemerges in painting with a vengeance. When figure reemerges, however, it returns with an important difference. The image no longer refers to objects or a world other than, or outside the work of art. Johns, for example, paints and sculpts signs that are, quite literally, *signs*—targets, flags, beer cans, light bulbs, etc. In these works, the figure is the figure of a figure, the image of an image, or again, in semiotic terms, the sign of a sign. Through this endless play of signs, the transcendental signified virtually disappears.

The play of signs that Rauschenberg and Johns initiate becomes riotous in Pop art and postmodern architecture. Though not explicit-

ly theorized for several years, the practice of Pop art and postmodern architecture involves a strategy of appropriation that presupposes a thorough-going rejection of the modern avant-garde's obsession with originality and fetishizing of the new. Implicitly elaborating Nietzsche's insistence that "there are no facts, only interpretations," artists from Johns and Warhol to David Salle and Cindy Sherman, as well as architects from Venturi and Charles Moore to Philip Johnson and Michael Graves contend that everything is always already encoded. What we take to be "real" is actually an image or sign constructed to erase its imaginary status. The original, in other words, is derivative; the primary is secondary. Since the real is forever encoded, the sign is always the sign of a sign and the image is inevitably the image of an image. The artistic tactic of appropriation does nothing more than make this unavoidable condition explicit.

To underscore the importance of these developments, it is helpful to situate these aesthetic tendencies culturally, philosophically, and theologically. There is a noteworthy connection between the aesthetics of postmodernism and post-industrial capitalism. This relation is becoming increasingly complex as the electronic networks in which we are entangled steadily expand with the exponential growth of the so-called information society. In a certain sense, post-industrial consumer capitalism represents a parodic realization of the avant-garde's dream of transforming society into a work of art. The dematerialization of the real prefigured in modern art and architecture is "concretely" actualized in electronic culture. In the postmodern world, reality is not only mediated but is also mediaized. Ours is a world in which media constitute the real. This is the condition that Jean Baudrillard describes as the "precession of the simulacrum." The simulacrum is an imitation for which there is no original. Whatever appears to be original is actually a citation with erased quotation marks; whatever seems real is an artifact that represses its artificiality. In the postmodern culture of the simulacrum, *there is nothing outside the image*.

The apparently frivolous play of postmodernism appears to be worlds apart from rigors of nineteenth-century idealistic philosophy and austerity of abstract painting and modern architecture. There

are, however, important similarities that are easily overlooked. What is usually described as postmodernism is an *idealism of the image*. When the real becomes an image, the image becomes real. In the absence of any exteriority, difference and otherness disappear in a play of the same. If understood in this way, the postmodern play of the signifier reinscribes Hegel's speculative idealism in the register of the imaginary. The self-reflexivity of the Hegelian concept is refigured in the self-reflexivity of the postmodern image. By bringing together our previous remarks on the socio-economic conditions of postmodernism with the recognition of the latent idealism of the image, it becomes possible to argue that the wiring of the world through which reality is dematerialized is something like the "material" embodiment of Hegelian *Geist*.

From Kierkegaard to Hegel and back again. For postmodernism, as for modernism, the privileged time is the *present*. The apparent return of the historical in postmodern architecture, as well as other artistic and literary practices, might seem to render this claim questionable. The postmodernist, however, approaches history ironically in order to put *historical* reference into the service of *present* enjoyment. As I have suggested, postmodern aestheticism exemplifies Kierkegaard's immediate aesthetic form of life. When the real is absorbed in an imaginary flux, experience loses its coherence and continuity; everything becomes scattered in a decentered play of signs from which there is no exit.

If approached from a theological perspective, this style of postmodernism is the aesthetic expression of the death of God. The death of God theology took shape during the very years in which Pop art and postmodern architecture enjoyed their broadest appeal. As its leading proponent, Thomas Altizer, makes clear, the death of God theology involves an Hegelian critique of the Kierkegaardianism inherent in the neo-orthodoxy of Barth and Bultmann. The God who dies in Altizer's theology is the God who is other—wholly other and radically different. Altizer insists that this death is actually the full realization of the divine in which the wholly other empties itself in the historical and cultural process in such a way that the absolute is totally *present* here and now. The death of God theology involves a

realized eschatology that construes the present cultural moment as the *telos* of the cosmo-historical process. When the divine is totally present in the present, what is, is what ought to be. It can be argued that the death of God is the disappearance of the transcendental signified in a play of cultural signs that appears to be absolutely real. In the absence of anything other than what is, there *is nothing* to fear—and nothing for which to hope. Ideality and reality become one in the postmodern world of simulation. Ironically, the utopia of which religious prophets and idealistic artists and architects have long dreamed is actualized in the culture of simulacra. For many, the realization of this dream is a nightmare. If what is, is not what ought to be, how can we promote critique and sponsor resistance in a world absorbed in appearances?

There is, however, an alternative postmodernism—a postmodernism that is not an extension of modernism but that calls into question the very foundation of modernism and its extension in modernist postmodernism. This version of postmodernism is often labeled post-structuralism or deconstruction. Though usually confused with what I have described as modernist postmodernism, post-structural postmodernism represents a significant departure from the trajectory of modernism. In ways that are too tangled to be adequately unraveled in this context, post-structuralism can be understood as a sustained critique of Hegel in which many of Kierkegaard's misgivings are reformulated in a contemporary idiom. As a result of the seminal readings of Hegel developed by Alexandre Kojève and Jean Hyppolite, several generations of French philosophers, artists, and critics have interpreted Hegel as a proto-structuralist and structuralism as latter-day Hegelianism. In this reading, the problem with both Hegelianism and structuralism is that they tend toward totalism by privileging identity at the expense of difference. For people who lived through twentieth-century totalitarianisms of the right as well as the left, the repression of alterity and consumption of otherness are issues whose significance exceed the bounds of philosophy. What unites writers as different as Derrida, Foucault, Lacan, Kristeva, Irigaray, Cixous, and de Certeau is the conviction that our psychosocial survival depends upon the persistent social cultivation

of differences, which create the possibility of resisting the totalizing systems and structures threatening to consume us.

If we are to avoid the mistake of confusing this version of postmodernism with modernist postmodernism, it is important to understand the precise contours of difference and other. The difference that resists totalization is no ordinary difference but is more radically different than the difference that is the opposite of identity. If, for example, we follow Derrida, *différance* is not a difference but is a "quasi-transcendental," which is the condition of the possibility of every difference and all identity. *Différance* or, as I prefer, altarity does not exist as such; nor does it not exist. It is neither present nor absent. Neither origin nor ground, *différance* "is" that in and through which what is, is and what is not, is not. Never present, altarity is always already past and, thus, is, in a certain sense, always yet to come. Like Freud's primal scene that never actually took place, altarity approaches without ever arriving.

Within the space or spacing of altarity, the issue remains time. If postmodernism is not merely an extension of modernism, then the time that is its space is other than the present. Indeed, the temporality of *différance* is incomprehensible within the terms of modernism and modernist postmodernism. The timing of this different difference dispels the dream of presence that haunts what Heidegger labels the western onto-theological tradition. This "outside of time in time" is the exteriority that modernism and modernist postmodernism not only ignore but are constructed to repress. Since the present (time) and presence (space) inevitably imply something that can never be present, they are forever incomplete. The *hic et nunc* is never totally present here and now. The dislocation of presence and the present exposes every realized eschatology as a violent repression of that which nonetheless never goes away.

Post-structuralists' rejection of utopian dreams should not obscure an important point upon which they agree with modernist postmodernists. From both perspectives, originality is impossible because the origin, which is taken to be real, is always missing or is never present as such. The conclusions drawn from this lack, however, differ significantly. As we have seen, modernist postmodernists interpret

the ostensible absence of the real as the lack of what we never had in the first place. The real is a chimera fabricated to make us believe that there is something beyond the play of simulacra. Once we have been disabused of this illusion, we are free to enjoy the passing moment. When what is, is what ought to be, there is need for neither critique nor resistance. For post-structural postmodernists, the absence of the real is the trace of a lack that can never be overcome. This lack is no simple absence but is the elusive margin of difference that allows appearances to appear and disappear. Since a nonabsent absence repeatedly disrupts the present and defers the enjoyment of the present, what is, is never what ought to be. Consequently, critique and resistance are not only possible but are unavoidable.

In ways that are not immediately obvious, the issue of critique returns us to Kierkegaard's theological preoccupations. Far from an irrelevant supplement to ethico-political concerns, transcendence is the notion or quasi-notion that makes both criticism and resistance possible. As long as there is something else or something other, what is can never exhaust what might be. In an effort to name the unnameable, Kierkegaard frequently substitutes "the absolutely different," "absolute heterogeneity," and "the infinitely and qualitatively different" for the word "God."

In these puzzling terms, Kierkegaard is struggling to formulate something like the different difference evoked by Derrida's neologism *différance*. The problem for Kierkegaard is that he thinks the only alternative to the both/and of Hegel's speculative logic is the either/or of a logic that presupposes the principle of non-contradiction. What Kierkegaard does not discern is the strange logic—if, indeed, it is a logic—of neither/nor. But the *style* of his writings indicates that he suspects a third alternative that is *neither* both/and *nor* either/or. Kierkegaard describes the style of his most important works as "indirect communication." Indirection is not simply an aesthetic choice but is necessitated by the commitment to communicate something that resists communication. What is "infinitely and qualitatively different" or "absolute heterogeneity" cannot be represented and thus can be neither described nor defined. The best for which we can hope is to trace the after-effect of that which is forever elusive in and

through the folds, faults and fissures of language. The dilemma for the Jewish Derrida is strictly parallel to the predicament of the Protestant Kierkegaard: to speak the unspeakability of alterity. Since *différance* and God are never present as such, they cannot be re-presented. In an effort to say the unsayable or write the unwriteable, Derrida devises strategies of indirection that irritate and frustrate many of his critics. These linguistic innovations, however, are neither frivolous nor useless. To the contrary, through the play of signs Derrida stages a performative utterance whose failure is the only success for which we can hope in a world that knows neither certainty nor security.

Post-structuralism raises difficult questions for artists and architects. It has long been fashionable to view painting and architecture in linguistic terms. Since post-structuralism emerges as a critique of the linguistic assumptions that inform structuralist analysis, deconstruction's critique of structuralism can be extended to painting and architecture. But, as we have discovered, deconstruction is not merely a strategy of criticism, for it is obsessed with an alterity that can never be represented. Indeed, it is precisely the inevitable imbrication of alterity and structure that undoes every structure as if from within. Painters and architects who acknowledge the force of post-structuralism face a twofold task: first, they must develop an *artistic* critique of previous artistic practices; and, second, they must use figure and form to suggest that which can be neither figured nor formed.

While it is possible to identify a broad range of artists who directly and indirectly probe issues raised by post-structuralism, no one has addressed these questions in a more sustained way than Mark Tansey. Tansey's work is especially interesting because it both continues the classic genre of easel painting and remains highly figurative, indeed, even representational. During Tansey's formative years, the ruling orthodoxies in the art world were Minimalism and Conceptualism. Painting was regarded by many artists and critics as retrograde, if not reactionary. Convinced that questions of representation are considerably more complex than they appear to be in modernism, Tansey began probing figuration in a way that has

gradually displayed its richness and complexity. Relentlessly critical of the myth of the avant-garde, he ridicules many of the most cherished convictions of this century's leading artists. His more effective paintings, however, are less didactic and more subtle. Through a variety of strategies ranging from traditional *trompe d'œil* to innovative compositional methods that combine found images, xerography, and the handwork of painting, Tansey investigates the aporias of representation.

Around the mid-1980s, Tansey began to address directly the debate between structuralists and post-structuralists. In many of his most interesting works from this period, he actually incorporates selections from the texts of Derrida and Paul de Man in paintings that obscure the line between word and image to create a graphic practice of uncommon power. As Tansey's exploration of deconstruction deepens, leading post-structuralist figures actually begin to appear in his paintings.

However, as long as the painted word is visible, the process of erasure is incomplete. The disappearance of the word is not a simple absence but leaves a play of traces flickering in non-representative representations. "Mont Sainte-Victoire" is one of Tansey's most intriguing paintings. Combining elements of Cézanne's famous paintings "Mont Sainte-Victoire" and "The Bathers," Tansey's work depicts a group of men along the border of a lake. Among the bathers are Derrida, Roland Barthes, and Jean Baudrillard. The more one gazes at this painting, the more puzzling it becomes. Though everything seems perfectly precise, nothing actually fits. Most important, reflections do not reflect but form polarities in which opposites are reversed. For example, men become women and women become men. Furthermore, the painting as a whole appears to be reversible. If one inverts the canvas, Cézanne's mountain becomes something resembling Plato's cave. There are, however, two details framing the picture that are particularly arresting. On the left border of the painting at the edge of the lake, there is an umbrella and on the right border, there is a bridge with multiple arches. These details echo other paintings. As his preparatory studies indicate, "The Bricoleur's Daughter," emerges from Tansey's investigation of Derrida's *Spurs*,

which is, among other things, a prolonged meditation on a fragment in which Nietzsche writes: "I think I forgot my umbrella." Moving from the left to the right edge of the work, we discover a bridge that anticipates two later works: "Bridge over the Cartesian Gap" and "Leonardo's Wheel." The only element in "Mont Sainte-Victoire" that is not doubled is the umbrella. It is as though the umbrella marks the margin or border in and through which all differences and oppositions emerge.

This border preoccupies Tansey in "Leonardo's Wheel." For more than a decade, Tansey has been fascinated by the possibilities created by fractal geometry and chaos theory for the reconfiguration of classical oppositions like order/disorder and singularity/totally. Leonardo was intrigued by the problem of turbulence and subjected it to careful scientific and artistic study. In "Leonardo's Wheel," the boundary simultaneously joining and separating opposites, which is marked by Nietzsche's umbrella, returns as margins within margins and frames within frames. The bridge does not so much span gaps and join opposites as mark the site of transition through which differences emerge and pass away. Though figured in a certain way, this site is nonetheless invisible. Like the Heideggerian cleaving and clearing that creates the space for appearances to appear, the edges and wakes *within* Tansey's painting appear by withdrawing and withdraw by appearing.

The task of figuring the unfigurable is even more challenging for the architect than the painter. To develop a post-structural or deconstructive architecture might seem to be a self-defeating undertaking. Nonetheless, one of the most interesting developments in recent architecture is what has been labeled "Deconstructive Architecture." In June, 1988, Philip Johnson attempted to bring a semblance of order to the disorder of contemporary architecture by mounting an exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art entitled "Deconstructivist Architecture." While all of these architects share misgivings about modern and traditional post-modern architecture, only the work of Bernard Tschumi, Peter Eisenman, and Daniel Libeskind seriously engages the critical issues raised by Derrida and other post-structuralists. But even here, differences are as important as similarities. Each of these

three architects focuses on a different aspect of the post-structuralist debate.

Tschumi's most important work to date is La Vilette, which is a park located on the northern border of Paris. This project brings to fruition theoretical reflections that Tschumi had been developing for many years. Having been deeply influenced by the events of May, 1968, Tschumi draws much of his theoretical inspiration from the writings of Georges Bataille. While Bataille's work was known and admired by many Left-Bank artists and intellectuals, it did not gain a wide audience until Derrida published his reading of Bataille, "From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism without Reserve," in *Writing and Difference* in 1967. This essay has created many confusions for readers who only know Bataille through Derrida's work. Even though there are important points of intersection between Derridean deconstruction and Bataille's transgressive writings, there are also significant differences. Whereas Derridean *différance* eludes the binary of presence and absence in such a way that something is always missing or lacking, Bataillean heterogeneity entails an excess that ruptures structures constructed to contain it. In La Vilette, Tschumi stages a non-dialectical play of opposites that more closely approximates Bataille's excess than Derrida's trace. By combining the point grid with an assemblage of diverse "follies," Tschumi remarks non-representable points of interruption that reason both needs and yet cannot comprehend. Folly is the madness that reason must exclude in order to be itself. As such, folly is reason's double, which repeatedly returns as an embarrassment that turns white buildings and faces red.

In its original design, La Vilette was to include smaller works by other architects. One of these projects within the project brought together Eisenman and Derrida. Though this collaboration has not resulted in an actual construction, it has generated a record of the exchange between Eisenman and Derrida that is extremely informative and suggestive. The difference between Tschumi and Eisenman repeats the difference between Bataille and Derrida.

Eisenman's career might be understood as an architectural enactment of the debate between structuralism and post-structuralism. In

his early work, he appropriated Chomsky's notion of generative grammar to produce a series of highly influential houses. Though Eisenman never associated Chomsky's grammar with Saussure's account of language, which forms the basis of structural analysis, the similarities between the two positions are sufficient to make the critique of the latter relevant for a rethinking of the former. In the writings of Derrida, Eisenman discovered a new opening for architectural theory and practice. The results of this discovery appear for the first time in the Wexner Center.

The Wexner Center is a complex building that weaves together several conflicting strands. Instead of simply rejecting his earlier style or styles, Eisenman reexamines his previous works in an effort to disrupt and dislocate assumptions that once seemed secure. Straight lines, geometric forms, and grids do not simply disappear but proliferate to the point of excess. In some cases, Eisenman becomes overly didactic. For example, when Eisenman wedges the museum in a crevasse created by cutting the existing structure in half, it is as if he were attempting to literalize the deconstructive notion of the fault in a way not unlike Tansey's depiction of "Doubting Thomas." On the level of detail, Eisenman breaks columns, interrupts staircases, and creates irregularly shaped galleries that frustrate viewers's expectations. It is a detail, which is more supplemental than integral, that most effectively captures the architectural drift of deconstruction. Wexner Center is built on a site that was once occupied by an armory. In a gesture that seems quintessentially postmodern, Eisenman appends a reconstruction of the armory's tower as a decorative ornament. Again giving in to didacticism, he does not merely repeat the tower but splits it in such a way that it is unclear whether it can be reassembled. In addition to this "artificial" tower, Eisenman had intended to preserve the "real" foundation of the "original" armory but during construction, workers accidentally destroyed this foundation. Undaunted, he constructed a simulacrum of the absent foundation on its original site. It is possible to read Eisenman's entire project through the erasure and reinscription of this foundation. Like *différance*, this trace, which is a foundation that is not a foundation, simultaneously grounds and ungrounds the structure surrounding it.

Though their media are vastly different, the work of Tansey and Eisenman often seems to be haunted by the ghost of illustration. In those cases where an illustrative element is undeniable, the very notion of representation that deconstruction renders problematic is reinvoked. Daniel Libeskind's relation to deconstruction is considerably deeper and more subtle. Few architects have exercised more influence without actually building than Libeskind. With the construction of the addition to the Berlin Museum, which will house the collection devoted to the history of Jewish life in Berlin, he is finally translating his ideas from page and model to steel and concrete.

Libeskind's addition to the Berlin Museum is a supplement to a building that stands on Lindenstrasse near the center of the old city of Berlin. This building is not original but is a substitute for an 18th century baroque edifice that once was the seat of the Prussian supreme court and housed the offices of the German author, composer and critic E.T.A. Hoffmann, who was immortalized in Freud's famous essay on the uncanny. As if to underscore the marginality of his work, Libeskind names his project "Between the Lines." Though endlessly complex, we can only consider three interrelated aspects of this project: the interior of the so-called original museum, the tower outside the addition, and the structure of the addition.

The Berlin Museum does not remain unscathed by the extension constructed to house the Jewish Museum. In the midst of the old building, Libeskind inserts an empty volume that inversely mirrors one of the negative spaces in the addition. This void cuts through every floor of the baroque building in a way that disrupts the stability of the existing structure. At the base of the empty space, he locates a stairway leading to an underground tunnel that connects the museum to its supplement by inserting the supplement into the middle of the museum. The floor of the corridor is slanted to create the sensation of an unstable ground. There are no right angles in this strange space. The main axis of the building is intersected by two additional axes that form an elongated X that represents the two poles of Jewish history. Surreptitiously establishing a link between inside and outside, this disruptive X charts the course to both the Holocaust and the Promised Land. Beyond the "outer" wall of the

museum stands a twenty-two-meter tower whose irregular shape is the reverse image of the negative space that forms the empty volume inside the old museum. This is the Holocaust Tower. Doublings that are redoubled, negations that are negated, reversals that are reversed create a vertigo that removes the ground from beneath one's feet. At the end of one of the long, buried passages, a vast empty space opens that extends upward for more than five stories. There is nothing in this space except five enormous "veils" stretching from the top of the structure to several meters above the floor. Veils upon veils reveal by revealing in a play that is endless.

The space of the Holocaust Tower creates time for a twofold remembering of forgetting. In the darkness of the first night, the forgotten are remembered. Victims whose names have long since faded from memory are recalled—as forgotten. The memory of forgetting does not erase the tragedy but deepens a wound that never heals. Far from a therapy that cures, memory revives the pain of forgetting. In the midst of this wound, another night approaches by withdrawing to clear the way for a second remembering of forgetting. The Holocaust Tower not only remembers the forgotten but is also a memorial to the Im-memorial. As the unrepresentable before that we remember by forgetting, the Immemorial is the ever-outstanding future that approaches as the past we have always left behind.

Libeskind's museum is haunted by another void—or by a different inscription of the same void. The zigs and zags of the building are cut by the straight lines of a void that comprises one-third of the total volume of the structure. The aberrant line of the z's plots the course of Berlin's deviant history. This story line is faulted, fissured, and fragmented by a void opening in its midst. On the walls of this void in the middle of the structure, the history of the Jews of Berlin hangs. From the outside, the addition to the Berlin Museum appears to be a continuous building. But appearances are deceptive, for the structure is inwardly divided. The broken line of the void cuts the convoluted line of the museum to form what are, in effect, seven separate structures. While intricately related, these parts never have and never will form a totality. "The new extension," Libeskind explains, "is

conceived as an emblem. The invisible has made itself apparent as the Void, and not the invisible. Void/Invisible: these structural features have been gathered in this space of the City and laid bare. An Architecture where the unnamed remains: the names keep still."

In this void . . . along this void . . . at the edge of this void, the unnamed remains and names keep still. Whose name is inscribed in this emptiness? What is the name of the unnameable? Though Libeskind offers no direct answer to these questions, Blanchot points in the direction of a response when he suggests that one of the names of the unnameable is *God*.

The name of God, he writes, signifies not only that what is named by this word would not belong to the language in which this name occurs, but that this name, in a way that is difficult to determine, would no longer be a part of this language, even apart from it. The idolatry of the name or only the reverence that makes it unpronounceable (sacred) is related to this disappearance of the *name* that the name itself makes appear. . . . Pure name that does not name, but is rather always to be named, the name as name, but, in that, hardly a name, without nominative power, attached as if by chance to language and, thus, transmitting to it the devastating power of non-designation. . . .

This is the power—the devastating power—the power that is always the force of the disaster haunting the void inside the supplement to the Berlin Museum as an outside that can never be incorporated.

The religious motifs informing Libeskind's work bring us back to the theological issues framing our analysis. By way of conclusion, I would like to return to Kierkegaard. The question of God, as Kierkegaard teaches us, is the question of otherness. The question of otherness, as Derrida teaches us, involves neither fundamental difference nor simple opposition. The challenge of postmodern theological reflection—and no theology that is not postmodern is adequate for our times—is to refigure the otherness of God as non-dialectical, non-oppositional difference. Every difference that defines itself in dialectical or oppositional terms is inevitably the other *of* same and, therefore, is reducible to the very identity from which it struggles to distinguish itself. To think unthought difference is to think theology

otherwise by reading contemporary postmodern culture differently.

Throughout the theological tradition, the otherness of God has been conceived either oppositionally or dialectically. In contrasting ways, these construals of altarity entail a difference that makes no difference. Since difference identifies itself as an oppositional identity, its ostensible otherness is really a covert sameness. What oppositional and dialectical thinking cannot conceive is an altarity that is *neither* identical *nor* different. To insist that this strange altarity is not present in the western onto-theological tradition is not, however, to claim that it is merely absent. From the beginning, perhaps even before the beginning, altarity has always already been thought *as unthought*. To think this unthought otherness is to unthink traditional theological thinking. Consistently non-dialectical and non-oppositional, this unthinking is not anti-theological or atheistic but is a/theological. A/theology is *not* a latter-day version of negative theology. As the inverse of the *via positiva*, the *via negativa* creates a mirror image that changes nothing. Negation is covert affirmation, emptiness implicit fullness, and absence covert presence. A/theology, by contrast, seeks to think the unthinkable margin of difference that is the condition of the possibility and impossibility of all affirmation and negation, emptiness and fullness, presence and absence.

When so understood, a/theological reflection consists of two inter-related gestures, which roughly correspond to historic and constructive theology. First, it is necessary to reread the theological tradition against the grain to discern the points at which thought is constructed by excluding or repressing altarity. As I have indicated, to think this unthought is to unthink classical theology. Second, having begun to think the unthinkable, it is necessary to inscribe altarity in images and texts that are unavoidably *performative*. When altarity is in question, language can be neither representational nor referential but must be improper and indirect. The twists and turns of tropological discourse stage the incessant withdrawal in and through which altarity approaches without ever arriving. The perpetual deferral of the end reflects the infinite retreat of the origin, thereby leaving nothing but an endless middle where aimless erring becomes unavoid-

able.

The space of this erring is the culture of simulacra; its times postmodern. When not interpreted in terms of the metaphysics of presence, the culture of simulacra does not appear to be the scene of realized presence but as the stage of a relentless disappearance, which allows nothing to appear. In the midst of the non-absent absence of nothing, presence is never present. Forever calling from a beyond that is (impossibly) "within," altarity challenges us to keep searching for an elsewhere we can never know. To heed this call is to confess that ending never ends.

*In the Gardens—
A Psychological Memoir*

James Hillman

Every year in late August from 1967 through 1982 Toshihiko Izutsu and I met with a gathering of scholars in the Eranos gardens on the shore of Lago Maggiore at the southernmost extremity of Switzerland. This region, sheltered from the North by steep mountainsides and tempered by the large lake, produced its own microclimate so that botanical wonders abounded. The weather, however, was utterly unpredictable at times, astounding us with horrific thunderstorms, shocking cold spells, or bone-dry air and dazzling sunshine. Airs, waters and place, as Hippocrates wrote, have a particular effect on the inhabitants and even on sojourners who partake in the *genius loci*. And there was in the Eranos gardens a stone carved with those very Latin words, reminding us who brought out written contributions and made our two-hour long lectures, of the *genius loci*. By that stone we ate our meals, winds and rain permitting, under the trees, especially a magnificent, almost primordial, cypress, pungent bays, and several eucalyptus giants swollen with the lake waters that fed their roots.

Each year I eagerly anticipated Izutsu-sensei's talk: his ordered mastery of a complex topic and the clarity, in English, with which he presented his thesis. Whereas I spent six weeks at least writing and rewriting in preparation for my lecture, he told me that he wrote his in one draft—but after a long while thinking.

Whether condensing Taoism, Shamanism, Zen, or Confucian philosophy into a single lecture or expounding upon a particular obscure aspect of these traditions, something beyond his scholarly competence and quiet authority were important to me. It was the *psychology*: the implications, the insights that I was able to draw from seemingly nonpsychological topics and texts. Listening to his lecture I was learning psyche, psyche uncorrupted by the burdens of Western logos that usurped the soul into a profession and a department called Psychology, where the soul becomes isolated by the language employed to speak for it. Yet, none of Izutsu-sensei's lectures could be called "psychology."

How did his mind achieve this sophistication of psychology all the while elaborating metaphysics, cosmology, ontology, philosophy, epistemology and the disciplines of the spirit derived from prepsychological texts, that is, before the modern era that gave rise to this field, Psychology?

Only much later after our annual meetings in the gardens of Eranos had come to their conclusion and after my three visits to Japan (during two of which I enjoyed the hospitality of my Eranos friends) did some light break through. While walking in a garden in Kyoto, I recognized suddenly the possible source of Izutsu-sensei's "psychology," possibly even his "psyche."

In the garden I was in the psyche. I realized that psychology was all around me, everything spoke psychologically. It became slowly clear that psychology is not a study of the human self or a body of knowledge about that self, that perhaps there is no such "self," that it is only a fiction necessary to do "psychology" in the modern mode. Instead, psyche might better be imagined as the interiority, even subjectivity, of any and all things, exemplified to perfection by the garden in its display of interiority. The world, like a garden, is on self-display, it is a world of things like trees and paths and bridges and also a world of insights, metaphors and teachings available to any passing soul, given as easily as the reflections on a lake. The garden makes the interiority of soul more intelligible and more beautiful.

It further occurred to me that the psychology which emanates from

Toshihiko Izutsu's work arises from some garden in the culture of his personal soul and from gardens in the soul of his culture. I thought too that what might have drawn him back to Eranos for many years was its garden, and that the special discipline which was his calling, Islam, is also a culture that elevated the garden to a divinely cosmic place.

Let me try to express what I began to understand about psychology while walking in the gardens of Kyoto.

First: we notice that the garden has no central position in which to stand and from which we can view it all. We can examine but a part at a time. Every viewing point is limited; there is no overall inclusive vision. Instead of overview and wholeness, there is perspective and eachness. The world changes as we move. Here a clump of iris, there a mossy rock. Instead of center (with its etymological roots in the Greek word *kentron*, "goad" or "prick," which compels toward a destination and encourages abstract distancing), there are shifts of focus, and these foci are relative to the body's stance.

Second: as one strolls, each vista is seen again from a different perspective. A maple branching down to a pond's edge casts a different shadow and shows a different angle as you walk along; floating leaves look less melancholic after the path bends; blossoms brightly visible half disappear behind a screen of foliage. These shifts of seeing again, of second sight, are precisely what the word "respect" means. To re-spect is to look again. Each time we look at the same thing again, we gain more respect for it and increase its respectability. We discover the innate relation of "looks"—of regarding and being regarded, words in English that refer to dignity. We find that the garden gives back to us a heightened regard, a refreshed sense of self-respect.

Third: once the garden, rather than a dream or a memory, becomes the *via regia* of psychic awareness, then we begin to think again about the word "in." "In" is the dominant preposition in all psychoanalysis—not *with*, or *from*, or *for*, but "in." We look *in* our souls, we look *in* the mirror, *inside* our memories and past, and imagine that these memories and thoughts and pains are all within us. "In" has been understood utterly literally, as an invisible and spaceless stuff, a

ghost, inside our skins. Psychological interiority has been possessed by personal ownership.

Interiority of the garden, however, is wholly objective and displayed. We are in it, moving inside it, much as when we dream we move inside the dream which embraces and includes us in its images.

C.G. Jung often said, the psyche is not inside us; we are inside the psyche. In the Kyoto gardens this statement becomes palpably real. It is much like being inside a Greek temple, where you feel surrounded by a psychic field; or in the tomb of the Kings near Luxor, where walking among the painted underground images you are in the psyche itself; or in a mosque in Isphahan where the soul's splendor is displayed by the tiles and you are surrounded completely by the soul's presence. In these places, the relation of body and psyche reverses completely—no longer the soul in the body, but the body strolling through the garden which is the soul. The world itself transforms into a psychic body, and our personal bodies, as we move, stand, pause, turn, wait, look back, performing an activity of psychic reflection in correspondence with surroundings, a reflection that in the consulting room seems only mentally possible in the mirror of introspection. To know oneself in the garden of the world requires being physically in the world. Where you are reveals who you are.

Fourth: therefore, all reflections, feelings and intentions occur within a place. This placing of consciousness within a field goes beyond modern perspectivism and subjectivism. For, placing is not in the subject and its viewpoint, but in the site itself—the setting, the season, the time of day and clemency of the weather. The garden “displaces the subject” by precisely placing its subjectivity. This further suggests that the garden/psyche speaks through the reflections, feelings and intention of the subject, and that the subject cannot speak as an independent observer.

Fifth: the Kyoto gardens also change our usual notion of individuality. In these gardens the trees are usually trimmed at the top and encouraged to grow sideways. Rather than the individuality of the lone tree set apart and towering, the Kyoto garden trees stretch their branches toward others. The individuality of a tree is within a community of trees in a relation with this community of trees. The

gardeners work at subtly refining these relations by their art of pruning.

Pruning goes even to the tufts of pine needles. Twigs are shaped by pulling out needles, allowing enough emptiness to individualize the shape of each twig, each branch. Individuality requires a surrounding emptiness; and yet, the twigs remain close to one another and only subtly different from one another. Individuality does not require isolation and radical difference, but rather staying on the same branch within the same “family”—the family of pine—and yet by the emptiness around you, you are individualized.

Sixth: aged trees are supported by crutches and encouraged to flower. Blossoming belongs not only to youth. We may blossom forth at any age. And, the garden includes and gives significance to dead trees. We walk among the twisted, crutched, dependent and dead. Moreover, the very shape of the trees today and the way the water courses among stones was laid down by gardeners three hundred years ago. Their skills determine present effects. Causality is a long time affair. We can understand little in the soul with short-term thinking and change little in the soul with short-term measures.

Seventh: the seasons are somehow all present at once. In the bare branches of Winter plum Spring lies latent, and Summer too. As the leaf unfurls exposing its face to receive Spring sunlight, already Autumn’s inner desiccation begins.

Eighth: there are few or no animals. Or, we humans are the only animals in the nature that is both natural and artificial at once. The animal world which obsesses Western psychology both in its research and its formulation of the human as a bundle of animal desires, emotions, needs and fears, slips away. Instead, the plants, rocks, stones, sand, water—behavior slowed to an imperceptible time scale.

Ninth: basic categories of usual psychological thinking fade into uselessness in the garden. There are no symbols here; each thing is what it is. A tree is not a symbol of life, a bud not a symbol of renewal, a rock not a symbol of endurance. The tree, the bud and the rock correspond with particular psychic states of the visitor on that day in this season, speaking to the individual soul from the wealth of soul contained and displayed by the tree, the bud and the rock.

Like symbols, so too psychopathology. The twisted branch, the pockmarked boulder, the cut off limb, the crumpled dying leaves, the trickling water that runs on and on—these belong to the state of things and are fundamental to the garden as they are to the soul. They display psychic nature, the nature of the psyche, as it is. Only one kind of psychopathology is excluded from the garden: symmetry, the dysfunction of excessively abstract order which represents a psyche that no longer corresponds with nature.

Ownership, too, becomes irrelevant. You have the feeling that this garden has always been here, that it came with the Beginning and belongs to no one, was built by no one, and has no private name. Egoless. It does not reflect back on its creator as if the artistic production of a landscape architect, or built by a great Shah of Persia, King of France or Prince in Italy. The thought that designed it and the hands that still shape it never enter the mind except afterwards in reflections, such as these, when out of the garden and in the mode of modern psychological comparisons.

Tenth: the Western garden, represented by the *hortus inclusus* of Biblical religion, tends to divide psyche from life. The Biblical *pardes* or Garden of Eden, too, is set apart in *illo tempore* and idealized as a Paradise, much as the Elysian fields and gardens of other theologies. We may enter only through a barrier, as if death and heaven were on the other side, radically separate from life. These Western garden images inspire a yearning away from the world and do not promote a psychology that turns the heart toward the world.

The larger Japanese gardens, however, often pass imperceptibly into their surroundings, their perimeters indistinguishable from the hills at the horizon. They are landscaped to fit into and belong within this world here. Even the small monastic gardens open into passageways, affording glimpses out. Separations are porous: rushes, canes, bamboo, translucent screens, or stone and wood that form arches, shaping the air which flows invisibly between garden and not-garden. We are in a territory without defining walls that force decisions between inclusion and exclusion.

Eleventh: the garden asks for mind. The mind of the designer, the mind of the pruner, the mind of the one who searches the rivers for

found stones and unusual mosses. The garden has its structure, its formal properties that are disguised (and not laid out on exhibit as in French gardens). Without these formal structures that keep the relations between the garden and its surroundings (distant hillsides and trees), between placed structures and vegetation, between water running and water quiet, between cared for and careless, between seasons and their timings of display, between scale and closure, surprise and calm—we would simply be in nature, or in the sentimental blurring profusion of Romanticism. The mind of the garden reminds us that mind is essential to the beauty of the psyche.

Twelfth: the Karesansui gardens or Zen-inspired gardens present mainly white sand and found stones, rarely trees. In this bare place the mind watches itself making meanings. The nine rocks in the raked sand are a tiger family swimming through the sea; the nine rocks are mountain tops peaking through white mist and clouds; the nine rocks are simply rocks, placed with aesthetic genius. One such legend after another, one set of meanings arises and replaces the former; one philosophy, theory of literary criticism, or psychological interpretation rises to the mind and falls back into the white sand, and then raked into quiescence. The garden becomes wholly metaphor, both what it is and what it is not, presence and absence at once. The visible concrete koan of the rock garden transforms the mind itself into metaphor, its thinking processes pass and repass. Only the image itself endures beyond the mind's comprehension, the mind cleansed like sand of its own subjectivism.

Earlier I said that the gardens make the soul more intelligible and more beautiful. Like the work of alchemy, they are a work with natural materials that is not, however, merely Natural. The alchemist was called an *artifex*; and the garden, we must always remember is artificial. It is designed and tended to maintain an artificiality that imitates nature, uses nature, bends nature, heightens nature—for the sake of what? For the sake of soul. We make gardens to make soul, to bring soul out of its hiddenness, to let it show itself. Nature, alone, loves to hide, said Heraclitus; the garden is its cultured display.

In Fort Worth, Texas a large and marvelous Japanese garden was

constructed some years ago. But since funds were not set aside for gardeners to come from Japan, nature slowly destroys the garden. Without the pruner's knife and twisted perception that shapes each inch of nature, the garden declines into merely another part of the forest. A garden's elaborated display of soul-in-the-world is an *opus contra naturam*, like alchemy. And like alchemy, the garden calls for a work of intense and daily cultivation.

Because the garden is artificial, ideas of the psyche must be plucked of naturalistic fallacies. The human soul does not simply grow; it requires raking, pruning, arranging, crutches, and even the importation from distant places of appropriately odd contents that bring forth its delight. The soul as an *opus contra naturam* will not be served adequately by fallacious comparisons with organic growth, cyclic process, idealized childhood or nature Goddesses. Nor is the garden paradise, delivered from the vicissitudes of worldly time, weather or catastrophe.

By insisting upon the artificiality of the garden—that it is *worked* nature, *made* nature—I am as well insisting that the soul too asks to be made, and that work with soul, too, is an art, requiring artifice. Bearing this in mind, we may be kept from the Romantic error of confusing the ideal (Eden and Elysean fields; Horaiko in Japanese) with the natural. The garden as a metaphor and as a place of psyche offers a more sophisticated romantic vision, one that saves us from naturalistic romanticism by twisting nature into an imitation of nature all the while remaining natural. I like to believe Izutsu-sensei understood this very well.

Legacy of the Prophetic Experience in Judaism

Hiroshi Ichikawa

“Human kind cannot bear very much reality”, said T. S. Eliot in his poem, and his penetrating insight has ever been recognizably taken over by perceptive thinkers. Indeed, those who were called to be prophets in the Biblical tradition can be counted among a few people who could bear very much reality in the long history of human kind. Among the prophets of the Bible, Moses has been revered as the prophet par excellence in Judaism, in the sense that he offered the means to get to the way of God, i.e., the methodological device to bear very much reality. This method is the commandments of God revealed to Moses at Sinai. This brief essay tries to understand how the sages who recognized themselves as the legitimate successors to the prophetic legacy developed the practical method of ritual precepts so that the common people could attain the spiritual height of the prophets.

I. The Religious experience of the prophets and its significance

Almost all the prophets of the Bible were firmly concerned with the morality and social justice of the people concerned at the given circumstances, but it is also true that they had an experience in the sphere of the perception of nature at the moment when they were chosen as the prophets from among obscure people.

Let me begin with my personal experience. Several years ago I was deeply touched by a picture of Van Gogh at a special exhibition in Tokyo.¹ It was the rods with full bloom against the background of blue sky that was depicted. At first I thought he painted a picture of cherry blossoms because the theme of the exhibition was the influence of the Japanese Ukiyoe printings upon him and his contemporary European painters and the way of exhibition was devised to make us know their relation. But it was not cherry blossoms but an almond tree. My excitement was multiplied since I was immediately reminded of the passage of the book of Jeremiah: "Jeremiah, what seest thou? And I said, I see a rod of an almond tree"² (Jeremiah 1, 11). I guessed that Van Gogh painted exactly what the prophet Jeremiah would or could truly have seen. It is not the problem whether Van Gogh was really intended to paint the sensation of Jeremiah. What is important is the assumption that what was painted by Van Gogh has the same quality with what Jeremiah sees. Here we do talk about the religious experience or, philosophically termed, the ontological aspect of human consciousness rather than the aesthetic perception. Further, the image of almond tree has far-reaching implications in the Biblical and the Jewish imagination. The Menorah, or the seven-branched candelabrum of pure gold which was commanded by God to make, setting before the ark in the tabernacle in the wilderness of Sinai, was like almonds (Exod. 25, 31 ff.). The putting fire on the Menorah symbolized the presence of God in the sanctuary of the Temple of Jerusalem and the Menorah had been kept lighting all day and night from generation to generation. We can safely assume that before the prophet Jeremiah was someone who had perceived the presence of Being in blooming almond flowers and made it into the authoritative ritual of the worship of God. This image enforced the efficient psychological power of impact upon the religious consciousness of the Jewish people.

How was the case of the prophet Isaiah? The encounter of Isaiah with the revelation of God is depicted as his Vision in the temple. He felt as if his whole existence was being oppressed to death by the overwhelming power of divine presence and he realized himself totally impure and unworthy in God's presence. Suddenly Seraphim

flew near to him with a live coal and touched his lips with it and then he was purified of sinfulness and was the prophet. In this description we have a passage being told by Seraphim saying: "Holy, holy, holy, is the Lord of hosts: the whole earth is full of his glory" (Isaiah 6, 3). This passage may give us an impression as if the world is covered with something mysterious like glorious mist or fog. This impression may have come from some aesthetically biased preconception. But the literal meaning of the passage in Hebrew original reads that the fulness of all the world is (itself) his glory. This implies something different intrinsically from an aesthetic sensation. It is hard to explain away but we may say using analogy that as Van Gogh tried to depict not the appearance of sunflowers but their real being, so Isaiah could see the ontological aspect of all the things of the world. But this view was attained by him only at the moment when he experienced that his former existence was wholly nullified and then purified of the sinful state by the shock of a live coal touching his lips. He was newly born indeed through the total conversion. What was happening in his mind can be recognized as the religious experience.

Not only Isaiah but each and every prophet of the Bible beginning from Moses onwards could attain the supreme religious experience and then was chosen as the prophet of the God of Israel. However, when the ancient Israel became a religious community after the Exile to Babylon, prophecy declined. Here the question should be asked how the spiritual tradition of the prophets was taken over and institutionally established by the sages or the Rabbis who recognized themselves as the legitimate successors to the prophets in the rabbinic Judaism. Supposing that the sages tried to keep the height of the religious consciousness, how could they do so that the Jewish people could reach to that height of consciousness through the religious precepts? As this query demands a large amount of enquiry, the writer confines the consideration in this essay only to a small topic of some Jewish ritual precepts on the perception of the nature.

II. The Rabbinic Judaism and its Place in the Development of the Religious Consciousness

Good use can be made of the comparison with the Greek religious

experience, in order to consider the characteristics of the cultural pattern of the Rabbinic Judaism. For Greek citizens, the worship of gods was the main act of their public life and this worship was practiced through two basic elements of the religious life, i.e., dramas and sports. Greek poets including dramatists were highly respected whose role was to catch the reality and to mould into poems. According to M. Bowra, the Greek poetry was a unique synthesis of two contradictory views. It was a combination of an inspired activity of Muse on the one hand and a form of craft as a human wisdom on the other.³ It may be safely assumed that the poet took the part as the mediator between the reality and the human world of appearance and this role can be compared to that of the prophet in Israel.

The future prosperity of Athenian Empire which was named 'Miracle of Athens' by K. Popper,⁴ was in part initiated by the publication of the Homer and its distribution to the noble families by the tyrant Peisistratos in the middle of the sixth century B.C.E. which caused public education of Homer and the development of the publication of every kind of literary creation from poems to philosophical treatises and their trading in the market in Athens.⁵ It should be reminded that the development of the Greek tragedy as the act of worship for the god Dionysos was inseparably connected with the reformation of the festival of the Great Dionysia by Peisistratos. In this manner, we may say that the Miracle of Jerusalem was partly initiated by the authorization of the Torah of Moses and the solemn covenant between God and the Jews in newly built Jerusalem in the middle of the fifth century B.C.E. Whereas the Greek religious consciousness was cultivated by the citizens in the dramas and sports practiced at such great festivals as Dionysia, Panathenaea, and the Olympic games etc., we can find in the rabbinic Judaism that Jewish religious consciousness was fostered in the network of the Mosaic ritual precepts in the ordinary life prescribed by the sages.

We can see three main characteristics in the ideas of the sages towards the tradition of the prophets.⁶ First, the primary important idea was the special status of Moses who has always been called with the appellation 'Our Rabbi Moses' ('Moshe Rabbenu' in Hebrew). He was looked upon as the supreme example of the servant of God, the

Master of masters, which has been the primary aim of all the sages and all Jewish people to be attained in their life. The second is the concept of the Oral Law. According to the belief of the sages, Moses was given by God at Sinai both the Written Law and the Oral Law. The Oral Law was not written down but was transmitted to the later generations. No later prophets have changed even a word of the Law of God. Therefore Moses was the sole source of the Law of God in the broad sense of the word Torah. The third element is the notion that the Law including the Oral Law was directly transmitted from Moses to Joshua, the servant of Moses for the whole forty years of wandering in the wilderness, and then from Joshua committed to the elders, from the elders to the prophets, and from the prophets to the Great Synagogue or the Great Assembly, and then from them to the sages.⁷ If we take these three elements into account, we can say that every sage has taken over, as it were, the immeasurable inheritance of the prophetic tradition of Israel. For we can not estimate how much the Oral Law was. In addition, the tradition has it that even the rules and precepts which wise disciples of the future generation would dictate were believed to have been given to Moses by God in Sinai. We can infer that the sages would have had the feeling as if they were living in the desert under the direction of Moses.

The study of the Law was of essential importance for their life in order to follow the way of Moses. They tried every effort to know what Moses would think and act if he were put in such and such situations. They tried to make rules in the assembly of the sages collecting every tradition using some basic rational principles of legal expositions. The study of the Law was indispensable because it leads to the good and righteous actions.

It may interest us to know the expositions of the sages on the passages of the prophets how they interpret the visions of the prophets. In the Midrash Rabbah, one of the Midrashic collections of the rabbinic exposition on the Pentateuch and other scriptures, we have only a brief exposition concerning the name of God who appeared to Moses at the burning bush, namely 'I AM THAT I AM', the name which has been regarded even as the most significant passages in the history of Christian theology. What was of vital importance for

the sages was how to act duly according as Moses might have acted if he would have been in the same situations.

The emphasis on the acts by the sages was motivated by the danger of the deviation from the Jewish religious consciousness through excessive speculative indulgence by the people. The authoritative Jewish commandments require obedience of the Jewish people and claim the right to replace people's own judgment of the merits of the commandments. They demanded practice of the people and let them abstain from occupying themselves in the activity of over-conceptualizing speculation on the problem of the existence of God. In this sense the Jewish sages pursued the empirical reality.

Here it is advisable to refer to the view of G. Scholem on the development of the religious consciousness so that we can assign the place of the rabbinic Judaism in it. In his celebrated work on Jewish mysticism, he defined mysticism as a definite stage in the historical development of the religious consciousness. Mysticism is the third stage, or the Romantic one, preceded by the second stage, the stage of Religion in the classical form which is the stage of duality in the sense that "religion signifies the creation of a vast abyss, conceived as absolute, between God, the infinite and transcendental Being, and the Man, the finite creature".⁸

It is not sure whether the religious consciousness of Abraham should be included in this second stage, but if we take into consideration the theory of E. Gilson on the analysis of the religious experience of Moses, we can infer that the second stage of religious consciousness begins with Moses at the burning bush. According to the Bible, when Moses wished to know the name of God, God said to Moses in two different ways. At the first time, God said to Moses "I AM THAT I AM: and he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM hath sent me to you" (Exodus 3, 14). But soon later without being asked by Moses—using the phrase of Y. Leibowitz⁹—, God proceeded to tell him other names thus saying: "The Lord [i.e., YHWH] God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob" (ibid. v. 15). Gilson pointed out that St. Thomas interpreted the name of God 'I AM THAT I AM' to mean 'I am the pure act-of-being'.¹⁰ Later, Descartes defined God as the

Infinite, or the Infinite Being, that which is essentially distinguished from indefinite thing.¹¹ It is sure that Scholem uses the term the Infinite designating God exactly in the same meaning as that of Descartes. From Moses onwards, the God of the Israelite prophets is God of Being.

In the second stage of religious consciousness, God becomes the Infinite beyond the reach of intellectual knowledge and man becomes aware of the vast abyss which can be bridged at least theoretically either by the voice of God revealed to the prophets or by a certain contemplation of all phenomenal world including human existence which could now appear as an effable representation of Being.¹²

Here man is endowed with the two means by which to have access to the reality. It is true that the Jewish religion has been a religion of the revelation by voice and letter as God's commandments, but the second means has also been available. Our question mentioned above should be specialized in such a manner as whether the speculation on the Infinite Being through nature was suppressed and even prohibited by the sages in the institutionalized religion or not. In other words, was there not any affirmative element in the ritual precepts of the rabbinic Oral Law towards the enhancement of the religious consciousness on the part of people, not in the sense of the mystical dimension of the religious experience but as the means of approaching the religious consciousness of the classical prophets?

In the following section, we shall analyse several precepts enforced by the sages concerning the speculation on the natural phenomena including the activity of the human mind, so that we can see how they viewed the universe and the human existence and how they dictated prescriptions so as to lead both themselves and common people to the profound religious consciousness of the prophets.

III. The Rabbinic Imagination on the Life and Nature of Human Kind

i) Speculation on the Outlook

The sages were certainly aware that some secret knowledge should not be taught to disciples who have not had enough ability of understanding in their studies, and we are told in the Mishnah saying: “. . .

nor the Story of Creation (may be expounded) before two persons, nor [the chapter of] the chariot before one alone, unless he is a Sage that understands of his own knowledge".¹³ After this famous passage comes the more radical and depressing expression. According to Danby's translation we read as follows: "whosoever gives his mind to four things it were better for him if he had not come into the world—what is above? what is beneath? what was before? what will be hereafter? And whosoever takes no thought for the honour of his Maker, it were better for him if he had not come into the world".¹⁴ These last two categories of men do not seem to belong to the same rank of evilness, the second one being more dangerous for the Jewish community, but did the sages of the Mishnah dictate the same verdict to the different sinful acts? Was the former category indeed be regarded as sinful whatsoever? But it would be absurd to prohibit any speculation on the universe so severely, since human kind has the desire to know according to Aristotle, especially for the knowledge of the world outlook which has been one of the most influential ideas giving orientation to human actions in life.

There is a clear distinction by one Hebrew word between those two categories of men if we read the Mishnah carefully in the Hebrew original text. Those who committed the speculation on the four things do not immediately verdicted. The Mishnah precisely distinguishes those two categories of men and says that whosoever gives his mind to four things *as if* it were better for him if he had not come into the world, whereas whosoever takes no thought for the honour of his Maker, it *was* better for him if he had not come into the world. The Mishnah warns that those who would speculate other worldly things were more liable to stumble for fear that they would do so without sufficient knowledge and understanding, but their life in this world was not immediately regarded as worthless. On the other hand, the latter one was ontologically renounced his existence in this life. The sages have a famous story of four sages in the Paradise instructing how dangerous it was to speculate four things, because it leads to the three typical deviations without taking thought for the honour of Creator, i.e., suicide, mental derangement, and blasphemy.¹⁵

ii) Human Consciousness and its Existence

There is a famous teaching of a sage which seems at first glance to imply the negative attitude of sages against either the appreciation or the admiration of the beauty of the natural things. Rabbi Jacob said that "If a man was walking by the way and studying and he ceased his study and said, 'How fine is this tree!' or 'How fine is this ploughed field!' the Scripture reckons it to him as though he was guilty against his own soul".¹⁶ In this admonition we have some problems which would make us hesitate to conclude the general attitude of the sages against the appreciation of the nature. In the first place, though it is declared that the Scripture condemned the man who admired a fine tree, no text is alleged here. In addition, this saying refers to a specific occasion where a man is walking by the way. We are taught that "one who walks alone on a road is exposed to harm from evil spirits; and if he breaks off his Torah, which is his safeguard, he incurs a danger which he might have avoided".¹⁷ If he would be charmed by the aesthetic beauty of a tree, forget the Creator, and lose his mind even for a moment, then it would be so dangerous for him that the evil spirit could catch his mind and enter into him. On the other hand, the rabbis taught in the Baraita that one who beholds beautiful creatures or beautiful trees shall say: "Blessed be He who has such things as these in His world".¹⁸

So we may assume that though this admonition of Rabbi Jacob did not represent the general attitude of the sages against the beauty of nature, it seems to imply that it was a tendency among them to abstain from appreciating the aesthetic beauty of nature solely for its own sake, which would lead to the deviation from the normative way of life; and that there was a sharp distinction between the aesthetic perception of beautiful things in the first place, and the consciousness of the ontological aspect of the creatures in the other. We could compare this distinction with that presented in the Creation story, in which the goodness which God saw in each creature and said that it was good was sharply distinguished from the beauty which Eve felt when she saw the tree that it was pleasant to the eyes (Genesis 3, 6).

The awareness of this distinction leads us to ask whether the rabbis could discern between the epistemological aspect of human percep-

tion and the ontological view of the being. We shall look for their conceptions in their directives on the prayer and the benedictions. The general idea of the rabbinic way of thinking today is that one should thank God for every thing that pleases his senses. When one sees a beautiful thing or creature, or one hears a good tiding, or one eats something or one smells fragrance, he should thank God for it.¹⁹ One should say the benediction even over the misfortunes and bad tidings.²⁰ The Mishnah said with the scriptural exposition as follows: "Man is bound to bless [God] for the evil even as he blesses [God] for the good, for it is written, *And thou shalt love thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul and with all thy might. With all thy heart*—with both thy impulses, thy good impulse and thine evil impulse; *and with all thy soul*—even if he take away thy soul; *and with all thy might*—with all thy wealth".²¹ This exposition of a most celebrated passage of the Torah (Deuteronomy 6, 5) on the love of God suggests that the human existence is wholly dependent upon God in favour of His graceful act of creation.

Further, Jewish Daily Prayer book begins with the benediction recited at the awaking in the bed and thanks God for His act of letting one's soul return to him.²² Should we regard this prayer as a remnant of archaic sentiments which might have been struck out of the liturgical text? First of all, we have to put it in the whole framework of the religious consciousness of the Rabbinic Judaism and to see the significance of the notion in terms of epistemology. The sages were aware that the human perception through the senses was the act of the mind which was endowed by God every morning. And epistemologically speaking, without the activity of consciousness in his mind one can not be aware of the fact that he is living. So they believed that this activity of consciousness was endowed in the shape of the mind by God and they recognized this endowment at the immediate moment when one was awoken to find himself conscious. So the epistemological aspect of life is substantiated by the ontological act of Being.

This benediction is inseparably connected with the benedictions recited at the burial service which has been called 'the justification of the judgment' ('Tziduk Ha-Din' in Hebrew). This name signifies the

expression of the resignation to the will of God in the very moment of the death of a beloved one. The sequence of benedictions begins with the following: "The Rock, his work is perfect, for all his ways are judgment: a God of faithfulness and without iniquity, just and right is he. The Rock, perfect in every work, who can say unto him, what workest thou? He ruleth below and above; he ordereth and restoreth to life: he bringeth down to the grave, and bringeth up again . . .".²³ The death judgment is sometimes regarded as unfair in the eyes of men, especially for the relatives. The problem of the justice of the judgment and the prosperity of the evil, i.e., the so-called theodicy has been one of the most crucial issues of the morality and theology of the Monotheistic religions. The sages prescribed that even if the judgment of God seemed unfair for the eyes of men, it should be accepted as the righteous verdict and should neither inquire into the would-be causes of the judgment nor appeal to men against the unfairness of the verdict, only blessing the favour and righteousness of God. This was the firmly established faith in God who is beyond human intelligence.

From these arguments we may conclude that there were two substantial aspects of epistemological view of the human consciousness and the ontological basis of its existence in the notions of the sages; in other words that the human consciousness is the primary source of knowledge of the existence of God, whereas the whole existence of human beings is substantiated by the act of creation.

iii) Food, Sacrifice, and Surrender of Self

We shall reflect upon the religious aspect of food and examine a certain Jewish law concerning the preparation of food which is seemingly a small topic but will be found closely related to some of the most important concepts of religion, i.e., sacrifice, holiness, and surrender of the will. It is a commandment of the separation of the Heave offering and the tithes from the harvests. According to the Mishnah, it is commanded based upon the Torah that the Jews should separate and take the Heave offering for the priests and then the first tithe for the Levites and then the second tithe for the consumption with joy in Jerusalem.²⁴ Those products from which these are not yet

taken are called 'tebel' and are strictly forbidden to consume,²⁵ whereas those products from which these are already taken are 'secularized' and are valid to be eaten by common people for the first time. Those products which are suspected whether the Heave offering and the tithes were separated are called 'demai' and was an issue of controversy. The Pharisees are said to have been very much concerned with the strict enforcement of this commandment of separation. Why was 'tebel' so strictly forbidden to consume by the Pharisees? And how was this conception of 'tebel' with the sense of awe taken over by the rabbis after the destruction of the Second Temple of Jerusalem?

Some may give a psychological explanation that this feeling of awe was caused by the directive which commands them to separate. The existence of this directive makes men feel that breaking the directive would lead to blasphemy. Others may suggest a sociological one that the separation of the Heave offering and the tithes may have come from the social concern for supplying food for priests and Levites who serve the sacred task of the temple. It is true that the directive was authorized by the fact that the existence of the Temple of Jerusalem sustained the authority of the whole social and religious order of Jewish society in Palestine. But what would happen if this firmly established order will be destroyed?

This very thing happened when the Second Temple of Jerusalem was destroyed by the Roman army in 70 C.E. It was at this catastrophe that the sense of dependency of human living upon the grace of God was made forcibly conscious among the Jews. There remains Jewish religious literature preserving this emotion.²⁶ Men are totally dependent upon the food taken from the natural products. Men have to live at the expense of the lives of animals and plants. But they are God's creation belonging to Him as men do to Him. Without God's grace there is no food, no social order, no life. Blessed are those who were not born; Doomed are those who were born to see this catastrophe. The lives of animals and plants are holy and men might well feel that they can hardly be consumed because men are afraid of profaning God's creation by eating them. Meats and crops have to be made secularized into food through some ritual act; The act of sacrifice is

indispensable for men to get free from the religious awe of trembling. This was exactly the original context in which the religious experience would have been crystalized in the form of the socio-ethical directive of separating crops. But now there is no means to offer sacrifice of sheep, goat, oxen, wheat, wine, water, and even incense, since there is no Temple.

In facing this crucial fact, there happened the radical breakthrough in the imagination of the sages in that the incredible drastic reinterpretation of the concept of sacrifice has been brought forth, which was later established as the foundation of morality of the rabbinic Judaism. The animal sacrifice and other service at the Temple was deprived of its primacy in the service of God and was replaced by such notions of religious act as loving-kindness, prayer, study of the Torah, and devotion, etc.²⁷ How shall we understand the development of the religious consciousness in this fact?

It is of much importance to reflect upon the concept of sacrifice in order to make an assessment of this radical change. The word sacrifice means the act of making sacred of a thing, consecrating it from its ordinary usage for some specific religious purpose. The things consecrated are in essence chosen from among the most valuable things for the performer of the sacrifice. When decisions are required at the crucial moment in our life, men should choose one at the cost of the other. The more crucial the situation, the more valuable the cost; Abraham followed the commandment of God at the cost of the life of his beloved son Isaac (Genesis 22); Jephthah the Gileadite made a supplication for the triumph of his people over his enemy at the cost of the life of his only daughter (Judges 11). The act of sacrifice is meant for the performer the surrender of his own will. This is the most significant aspect of the concept of sacrifice. The service of the animal sacrifice at the Temple may have obscured the original meaning of this act. But at the destruction of the Temple the sages would have realized the importance of the original sense of the concept and declared that what is really important is not the animal sacrifice but the giving up of one's will, i.e., the sacrificing of his self. The sages did not use these terminology but the basic idea has been eventually incarnated to such concrete directives as the act of devo-

tion, the act of loving-kindness, and the study of the Torah. Although seeing the Temple of Jerusalem being really destroyed was the shock for the sages and people, it was in a sense 'the ontological violence' nullifying the foundation of human existence as was the case with Moses at the burning bush.

Here it is interesting to refer to an ethical teaching based upon the Biblical interpretation by the sages saying the importance of the habits of the mind as well as performing of the commandments.²⁸ At the time when the Torah of Moses was given to the people, there were many righteous people in Israel who could keep all the 613 commandments, but after some generations the number of the righteous was gradually reduced to the extent that some prophets tried to make the commandments into a small number of precepts in order that the people could keep up with the will of God. David came first and made them into eleven precepts as is found in the Psalms (15, 1-5). And came Isaiah and made them into six precepts (Isaiah 33, 15) and next came Micah and made them into three (Micah 6, 8), and came Isaiah again and made them into two, saying: "Keep ye judgment, and do justice" (Isaiah 56, 1), and came Amos and made it into one precept, saying; "Seek ye me, and ye shall live" (Amos 5, 4), but this opinion was opposed and then came Habakkuk and made it into one precept, saying; "the just shall live by his faith" (Habakkuk 2, 4). This passage is exactly the same that Paul the Apostle cited as the proof of the righteousness of God which is revealed in the gospel of Christ from faith to faith (Romans 1, 17).

Concluding Remark

If we could use the philosophical terminology in analysing the Rabbinic way of thinking, we are able to assume at least such three factors as have been presented above. First, there is a clear distinction between the empirical and the non-empirical things in the view of the sages. The speculation of 'the four things' is obviously the speculation on the empirically unknown things, therefore if men wish to grasp them, they would resort to some metaphysical ideas which tend to mislead them if they have not enough knowledge and understanding. For men would see things as they see rather than as things

really are. Second, there is also another distinction between the aesthetic and non-aesthetic points of view in their mode of thinking; in other words, the sages distinguished epistemology and ontology in the relation of men to Being. The sages did not endeavour to articulate what the prophets experienced in the philosophical terms, lest they might conceptualize the immediate experience and then idealize its conception which might lead them to fallacy, or 'idolatry' if we use religious term. Third, the religious experience of a person necessarily has the effect upon the moral attitude of his own; what was required of men are humility instead of arrogance, decency instead of rudeness, and compassion instead of cruelty. These moral qualities are to be generated from the idea of the Creation and the self-consciousness of the finite in the presence of the Infinite and the emotion of awe towards the Creator.

These are the reinterpretation of the Rabbinic view of the life and nature of men and the universe that is to be distilled from certain Jewish laws. But for the sages themselves, what was tantamount was the act of the ritual and religious precepts; the religious ideas and imagination that are the basis of those precepts served as the force orientating the will and desires of men. Without ideas men can not act. In this sense this role of the ideas should be seriously examined. K. Popper distinguished sharply between the 'formulated' hypothesis based upon the critical verification and the 'believed' theory of vague subjective knowledge.²⁹ After the manner of his critical thinking, we have to be aware that the same precept will turn into something quite different, as we see it from the different views. So in due course, we shall have to ask further if, in terms of the practical reason, the empirical precept itself was duly looked upon as the appearance of the reality, or on the contrary was believed as the absolute reality itself, which would be something idolatrous. However, this is beyond the present scope.

Notes

1. The painting is called "Branches of an Almond Tree in Blossom", Oil on canvas, 73.2×92 cm, Saint-Remy, Feb. 1890. The special exhibition, "Vincent van Gogh & Japan", was held in 1992 at Setagaya Art Museum in Tokyo.
2. In this essay the Biblical passages are all cited from the King James Version if not otherwise remarked.
3. Maurice Bowra, *The Greek Experience*, 1957, paperback edition by Phoenix, 1994, p. 126.
4. This term was used by Karl R. Popper in his lecture 'The Origin of the European Culture', which was read at the special workshop commemorating his award winning of Kyoto Prize in 1992. This lecture appeared in Japanese version in *Annals of the Association of the Comparative Study of the History of Law, Historia Juris 2, Rekishi to Shakai no-naka-no Hou* (Law in context of History and Society), Mirai-sha, Tokyo, 1993.
5. Karl R. Popper, 'The Origin of the European Civilization' (Japanese), *Historia Juris 2, Rekishi to Shakai no-naka-no Hou* (Law in context of History and Society), Mirai-sha, Tokyo, 1993, pp. 39-51.
6. This topic was treated in detail in some of my articles including 'Jewish Thought in the Talmudic period' (Japanese), *Touyou-shisou Yudaya-Shisou I* (Thoughts of The East, Jewish Thought 1), Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1988, pp. 229-312. Here I have presented it in summary, without missing the point.
7. The Mishnah, Avot 1: 1.
8. G. Scholem, *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism*, Schocken, New York, p. 7
9. Yeshayahu Leibowitz, *Notes to the Weekly Tora Readings* (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1988, pp. 39-41. Concerning this strange context, Y. Leibowitz asked the question why God revealed two different kinds of His name to Moses. He pointed out that here the Bible teaches two kinds of human knowledge concerning God. The First name is given to men who have the profound apprehension of the transcendence of God for His own sake, whereas the second group of the names correspond to men who believe in God for the purpose of their own welfare and happiness.
10. Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, Eng. tr. by L. K. Shook, University of Notre Dame Press edition, 1994, p. 93. Chap. 4 of his book discussing the interpretation of the name revealed to Moses at the burning bush has the Latin title "Haec Sublimis Veritas".
11. Descartes, 'Principles of Philosophy' in *Descartes, Selected Philosophical Writings*, Cambridge University Press 1988, pp. 166-169.
12. G. Scholem, *ibid.* p. 27.
13. The Mishnah, Hagigah 2: 1, Herbert Danby (tr.), *The Mishnah*, Oxford U.P. 1933, p. 213.
14. H. Danby, *The Mishnah*, *ibid.*
15. Alan Unterman, *Jews—Their Religious Beliefs and Practices*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981, p. 92. He lists death, madness and heresy as the three possible

consequences of a malfunction in the mystical attempt.

16. The Mishnah, Avot 3: 8. H. Danby, *The Mishnah*, p. 451. This saying is in some texts attributed to R. Simeon. There are also opinions on the identification of R. Jacob.

17. R. Travers Herford, *The Ethics of the Talmud*, Schocken Books, 1962, p. 73. This saying is Avot 3: 9 in his numbering.

18. The Babylonian Talmud, Berakhoth 58b. English translation was taken from *The Talmud with English Translation and Commentary Berakhoth*, ed. Rabbi Dr. A. Tvi Ehrman, El-Am, Israel, 1982, p. 1059.

19. This basic idea was impressively introduced by Shmuel Yoseph Agnon in his speech of the Nobel Prize award for literature at the Swedish Academy in 1968.

20. The Mishnah, Berakhoth chapter 9.

21. The Mishnah, Berakhoth 9: 5. H. Danby, *ibid.*, p. 10.

22. This benediction is prescribed both in the Ashkenazic and the Sepharadic versions of the daily prayer books published in Israel. But the book *The Authorized Daily Prayer Book* (Joseph H. Hertz, New York 1948, 16th printing 1979) begins with the Morning Service in the Synagogue in which the benediction praising God who "restoreth soul unto me" not in every morning but hereafter, is included among the sequel of the early morning benedictions in the Synagogue Service.

23. Joseph H. Hertz, *The Authorized Daily Prayer Book*, New York 1948, 16th printing 1979, p. 1074. 'Rock' is the appellation of God designating His unchangeableness and the Refuge to men. The opening verse is taken from the Farewell song of Moses. This prayer of the 'Tziduk Ha-Din', whose portions had been found in the Talmud, was formulated in Gaonic times. Theological significance of this conception was deeply examined by Ephraim E. Urbach in his book, *The Sages* (Hebrew), Magnes Press, Israel, 2nd version, 5th printing 1983, especially in Chapter 15, Section 8 'Darkei Tziduk Ha-Din', pp. 454-464. Also see *The Sages*, English tr., Magnes Press, 1975.

24. The Mishnah, The First Division, Zeraim ('Seeds'), such tractates as 'Heave-offerings', 'Tithes', 'Second Tithe' ect. This religious law is now practiced by observant Jews in the 'Land of Israel'. If you go to the market or venders drawing cart with fruits and vegetables, you will find a small board on which written "the heave offering and tithes are separated and taken from the fruits and vegetables of this shop of such and such a person on such and such a date under the direction of the Council of the Koshherhood (Kashrut in Hebrew) of the observant communities".

25. The Mishnah, Berakhoth 7: 1.

26. See for example 'Syriac Baruch Apocrypha', Chap. 10, and Tosephta 'Sanhedrin', Chap. 7.

27. There are many teachings concerned. Torah was identified with the deed of loving-kindness, in the Babylonian Talmud, Sotah 14a. It was taught that the iniquity is expiated by means of the Torah study and the acts of charity, in the Babylonian Talmud, Berakhoth 5b. There was a controversy on which is more

important, the Torah study or the deed of loving-kindness, among the sages at the time between the destruction of the Temple and the Bar-kokhba revolt, and came to the conclusion that the study is more important than the deed because the study leads to the righteous deed. See the Babylonian Talmud, Kiddushin 40b. There is a famous legend on Rabban Yohanan Ben Zakkai, who lived at the time of the destruction of the Second Temple and took the decisive role of enforcing the breakthrough and founding the Rabbinic Judaism. Seeing the temple in ruin, he is said to have told his crying disciple Rabbi Joshua as follows; "My son . . . be not grieved; we have another atonement as effective as this. And what is it? It is acts of loving-kindness, as it is said, *For I desired mercy, and not sacrifice* (Hosea 6, 6)", *The Fathers According to Rabbi Nathan* tr. by Judah Goldin, Yale Univ., New Haven & London, 1983, p. 34. Gedalya Alon interpreted this saying of Rabban Yohanan Ben Zakkai not as an consolation but as the decisive declaration of his resolution. G. Alon, *Jewish History in the Land of Israel in the Mishnah & Talmud Period* (Hebrew), Vol. 1, Israel, 6th printing, 1977, p. 31.

28. The Babylonian Talmud, 'Makkot' 24a.

29. K. R. Popper, *Objective Knowledge*, revised edition 1979, Oxford Clarendon Press, pp. 23-26.

Avatars japonais de l'ascension d'Alexandre

Hideichi Matsubara

La publication en 1888 de la Bibliographie des imprimés de la Mission jésuite au Japon d'Ernest Satow: *The Jesuit Mission Press in Japan, 1591-1610*, marqua une date capitale dans l'histoire des recherches sur l'introduction du christianisme au Japon. Limitée à cent exemplaires, cette publication privée d'un mince volume in-folio de 54 pages suscita l'intérêt des historiens et des philologues à l'égard de ce domaine peu exploré et amena découvertes sur découvertes d'autres imprimés de la presse à caractères mobiles des Jésuites, presse apportée de Venise et installée en 1591 dans le sud du Japon. Le catalogue d'Ernest Satow ne contenait que 14 titres. Inspiré de la *Bibliothèque asiatique et africaine* de Ternaux-Compans et aidé de la *Bibliothèque japonaise* de Léon Pagès, Satow avait recherché ces imprimés dans les bibliothèques universitaires et publiques aux vacances qu'il a passées en Europe en hiver 1887 au retour de Bangkok, où il avait été nommé consul général en 1884, avant d'être nommé à Montevideo en Uruguay (1888). Il découvrit notamment à la bibliothèque bodleienne à Oxford et à la Bibliothèque Britannique de Londres des plus anciens imprimés de cette presse, dont l'un nous occupera dans le présent article. Nommé à nouveau au Japon en 1895 comme Ministre, il y continua ses recherches et, en 1898, il mit la main à Kaga sur un volume de *l'Abrégé du Taiheiki* imprimé par le père

Manuel Barreto, avant sa mort en 1610.

Nous savons aujourd'hui que beaucoup de publications ont été perdues pendant les trois siècles d'interdiction du christianisme dans ce pays et qu'il nous reste seulement comme épaves vingt-neuf ouvrages produits pendant les 23 ans d'existence de cette presse au Japon, la presse avant qu'elle fût expulsée en 1614 à Macao avec les convertis japonais, à la suite de l'interdiction du culte chrétien.

Le catalogue d'Ernest Satow fut réédité par ses collègues et ses disciples japonais en 1925. Remplacée aujourd'hui par la bibliographie classique publiée par le Révérend Père Jean Laures de la Société de Jesus: *Kirishitan Bunko, A Manual of Books and Documents on the Early Christian Mission in Japan* (3^e édition révisée et augmentée en 1957), la bibliographie commentée d'Ernest Satow, amplement illustrée des extraits, reste toujours recherchée et en 1976 l'Université Tenri a reproduit le livre dans une édition limitée de 200 exemplaires en y ajoutant un article de douze pages de Satow paru en 1898 dans le 27^{me} volume de la *Transaction of the Asiatic Society of Japan* sur deux autres ouvrages découverts par lui.

Parmi les premiers inspirés du catalogue d'Ernest Satow, il faudrait tout d'abord citer le nom de Shinmura Izuru qui en 1908 visita l'Angleterre, notamment la bibliothèque Bodley à Oxford et la Bibliothèque Britannique à Londres, pour examiner les imprimés découverts par Satow. Il copia le recueil de *la Vie d'Esope et ses Fables et Le Dit de Heiké* en forme dialoguée, tous deux imprimés en lettres latines à la fin du seizième siècle. Ce volume, décrit par Satow dans son catalogue comme le deuxième en date des imprimés de la Presse jésuite, est composé de quatre parties: *Le Dit de Heiké mis en dialogue, La Vie et les Fables d'Esope, Les phrases dorées tirées de Confucius, Mencius et des Sept Livres* et *Le Lexique des mots du Dit de Heiké et des Fables d'Esope*.

Shinmura avait alors trente-deux ans et étudiait la philologie occidentale à Berlin depuis le mois d'avril 1907. Sur le chemin de son retour au Japon, il se rendit en Angleterre du 3 septembre 1908 au début février 1909 pour copier sur les originaux à Londres et à Oxford, des textes sortis de cette presse des Jésuites. En prenant en mai 1909 la chaire de linguistique à l'Université alors impériale de

Kyoto, il se mit à restituer en japonais les quatre textes imprimés en lettres latines: Le *Guide du pêcheur* (*Guia de pécador*, 1599, conservé à la Bibliothèque Britannique), Le *Lexique des mots composés* (*Râcuyoxu*, 1598, découvert au Japon par Satow et offert par lui à la Bibliothèque Britannique en 1883), Le *Dit de Heiké dialogué* (*Feiqe no Monogatari*, 1593, conservé à la Bibliothèque Britannique) et *Esopo no Fabulas* (*Les Fables d'Esope*, 1593), la suite du précédent ouvrage. Le titre dit expressément que le livre fut traduit du latin: *Esopo no Fabulas, latinuo vaxite Nippon no cuchito nasu mononari* et ajoute au verso *L'Abrégé de la Vie d'Esope traduit du grec en latin par Maxime Planude: Esopo ga Xogai no monogatari ryacu, corevo Maximo Planude toyu fito Gregono cotobayori Latinni fonyacu xerarexi mono nari*.

Il faut remarquer que le choix de Shimmura Izuru porte plutôt sur la littérature profane, à l'exception du *Guide du pêcheur*, traduction du *Guia de Pecadores* de Luis de Granada. Les trois premiers textes transcrits ont été composés pour l'instruction des missionnaires occidentaux dans la pratique de la langue japonaise quotidienne; ce sont là des témoignages linguistiques précieux, puisqu'ils peuvent servir de repère pour cerner la prononciation des idéogrammes et des lettres japonaises (*kana*) de la fin du seizième siècle. Après avoir fait paraître deux études sur le *Heike-monogatari* et sur le possible auteur de ce récit dialogué, Shinmura Izuru a publié dans la revue universitaire mensuelle *Geibun* du mois d'avril au mois de décembre 1910 en neuf articles successifs, sa restitution en orthographe en usage du japonais de la fin seizième siècle de *La Vie et les Fables d'Esope*, qu'il avait copié à Londres. Ces articles ont été repris en forme de livre en 1911 avec des appendices comprenant des notes complémentaires. Depuis lors, Shinmura a publié de temps à autre des recherches sur la question des Fables ésoques au Japon. Toutes ses études sont recueillies dans le volume 7 de ses œuvres complètes.¹ L'édition de Shinmura Izuru des Fables ésoques a suscité beaucoup d'intérêt et son jeune collègue à l'Université de Kyoto, Ueda Bin, en fit en 1912 le sujet de ses conférences. Le texte remanié de ce cours a été publié sous le titre de *Isopo-Monogatari-kô* ou *Etude sur les Fables d'Esope*. C'est une excellente synthèse de la question, basée sur *Les Fabulistes*

latins de Léopold Hervieux,² le *Pantcha-Tantra* de Théodor Benfey,³ le *Romulus* de Hermann Cœsterley, la synthèse de Joseph Jacobs,⁴ etc. L'importance de Steinhöwel y est clairement mise en relief, et Ueda Bin y ajouta le résultat de ses recherches personnelles qui l'avaient conduit à découvrir des thèmes parallèles dans la collection des textes canonique bouddhiques: dite Tripitaka chinois.

Les Fables d'Esope furent la première œuvre occidentale traduite en japonais et l'unique ouvrage occidental ayant échappé à la censure anti-chrétienne du shogounat Tokugawa. Ces *Fables* et *Vie d'Esope* ont dû plaire au public japonais, puisqu'on les a rééditées et reprises sous diverses formes jusqu'à la fin du 18^e siècle.

Shinmura Izuru, grand bibliophile fut directeur de la bibliothèque de l'Université de Kioto de 1911 à 1936, l'année de sa retraite à 60 ans. En 1928, il organisa à Kyoto une exposition sur la littérature ésopique réunissant plus de 161 items. Le catalogue de l'exposition est repris dans le tome 7 de ses oeuvres complètes.⁵ L'intérêt qu'il portait aux Fables d'Esope le conduisit à faire paraître en 1929, deux ans après sa retraite universitaire, une traduction adaptée pour les enfants de *la Vie et des Fables d'Esope* d'après l'édition des Jésuites du 16^e siècle. Il choisit douze anecdotes de la Vie d'Esope et 81 Fables prises dans l'édition de 1593 et dans les éditions postérieures du 18^e siècle. Toutes ces éditions dérivent de ce que nous appelons par commodité *l'Esope* de Steinhöwel. *L'Esope* de Steinhöwel est un recueil composite. Commenant par *La Vie d'Esope* apportée en Italie par le byzantin Maxime Planude au XIV^e siècle, il comporte quatre livres de *Romulus*, qui sont la mise en prose du recueil de Phèdre, aussi bien que les traductions d'Avianus, les *Exempla* de Pierre Alphonse et les *Facéties* du Pogge. Ce recueil fut tout de suite traduit en diverses langues occidentales. D'abord en français par Julien Machot, docteur en théologie, moine des Augustins de Lyon. La traduction fut publiée à Lyon chez Mathieu Husz en 1486. Ce *Livre des subtilles hystoires et Fables d'Esope*⁶ fut utilisé pour les versions hollandaises et espagnoles. Il servit de base à William Caxton pour son édition anglaise d'Esope publiée à Westminster en 1484. On dénombre jusqu'à 150 éditions différentes en latin de *l'Esope* de Steinhöwel publiées dans les 30 années qui suivirent sa première parution. L'identification

de la source de la version japonaise reste encore, malgré les nombreuses études savantes des chercheurs tant japonais qu'occidentaux, du domaine de la supposition.

La version pour enfants que fit paraître Shinmura Izuru en 1929 a été accueillie avec bienveillance du public et rééditée en 1938, en 1947, en 1951, en 1954, en 1962 et en 1963. L'édition princeps de 1911 de Shinmura a même été recueillie en 1940 dans la collection Iwanami de livres de poche.⁷ Donc, à côté des Fables d'Esopé traduites d'abord sur la version en anglais et ensuite sur le texte grec, la version faite sur la tradition de Steinhöwel est, sinon en totalité, familière au peuple japonais. En tout cas, une partie de la Vie d'Esopé transmise en Europe par Maxime Planude est aussi bien connue au Japon que dans le monde francophone où cette vie d'Esopé est connue par la version de La Fontaine.

Parmi les dix-sept anecdotes remaniées par Shinmura Izuru de la *Vie d'Esopé* figure celle où Esopé résout une demande déraisonnable du roi d'Égypte de construire un palais (une tour, d'après La Fontaine) en l'air:

“Necténabo, roi d'Égypte, sur le bruit de la mort d'Esopé crut à l'avenir rendre Lycérus (roi de Babylone) son tributaire. Il osa le provoquer, et le défia de lui envoyer les architectes qui fussent bâtir une tour en l'air, et par un même moyen, un homme prêt à répondre à toutes sortes de questions. (. . .) au défi de Necténabo, Esopé choisit des aiglons et les fit instruire (chose difficile à croire), il les fit, dis-je, instruire à porter en l'air chacun un panier, dans lequel étoit un jeune enfant. . . .” (La Vie d'Esopé le Phrygien selon la version de La Fontaine)

Le procédé ayant bien réussi, Esopé put déjouer une ruse du roi *Necténabo*. La version japonaise suit plus fidèlement le texte latin.⁸ Protégé par *Ermippo* (Heropé), Esopé échappe à la mise à mort ordonnée par le Roi *Lycero* (Licure, Licurius), et consulté par le roi pour répondre à la requête du roi *Necténabo*, Esopé demande de capter “quatre oiseaux qu'on appelle *Gripho*” et attacher à la serre de chacun un panier et y mettre un garçon. Se rendant à Babylone avec ses griffons et les garçons, Esopé fit mettre les griffons aux quatre coins de la place. Les garçons, une truelle à la main, une perche à

viande dans l'autre pour appâter le griffon afin de se faire porter en l'air, demande du haut du ciel au roi Necténabo de leur apporter le matériel de construction.

Citons le passage concerné de Julien Machot:

611 *Et, en après, Esope commanda aux faulconniers de prendre quatre poussins de aigles.* 612 *Et, quant ilz eurent prins, Esope les acoustuma a donner a menger hault et bas. Et, ung chascun d'eulx avoyent atachés en leurs piedz deux enfans.* 613 *Et, ainsi que les enfans levoyent ou descendoyent leur viande, ainsi les aigles volloyent hault et bas pour prendre leur viande.* 614 *Et, ces choses appareilleez et que l'iver fut passé, Esope print congïé du roy Licure et s'en alla en Egypte. (. . .)* 622 *Et, le roy se despaartit de son palays et le mena en ung beau champt en lui disant; "Vecy le lieu ou je veulx edifier ma tour."* 623 *Et, adoncques, Esope a ung chascun quatre du champ mist ung aygle avecques deux enfans. Et, les enfans vont lever la pasture en l'air et, après, les aigles de voller.* 624 *Et, les enfans haultement commencerent a crier en disant; "Aportés nous du mortier et des carrons, du boys et es treulles pour edifier la dicte tourr" . . .*⁹

La.rriiii. histoire laq̃lle fait mētion cōmēt esope rendit la solutiō
au roy de egypte de la q̃stion q̃l auoit enuoyee au roy de babilonne.



Nous remarquons de menues différences de détails: aigles pour griffons, le nombre d'enfants qui va jusqu'à huit, etc. La *Vie d'Esope* est complètement légendaire et Maxime Planude n'en est pas l'auteur.

Malgré l'existence d'un fragment du manuscrit grec du deuxième siècle, cette *Vie d'Esopé* est une compilation anonyme que Maxime Planude a fait connaître en Occident au 13^e siècle. A l'entour de 1450 Ranutio d'Arezzo l'a traduite en latin. A part des éléments grecs, beaucoup a été emprunté à l'histoire des aventures d'Ahicar.¹⁰

Cependant l'ascension à l'aide d'oiseaux de proie est en Occident plus intimement rattachée au roi Alexandre le Grand. Dans *Le Roman d'Alexandre* de Lambert li Tors et Alexandre de Bernay, le jeune Alexandre arrive dans le pays de Sixte où vivent les gryffons, qui sont d "*orible forme, hisdous comme dragon*" et qui mangent à chaque repas "*un grand mouton*". En regardant les gryffons, il vient à l'envie d'Alexandre d'explorer le ciel. Il pense qu'une vingtaine de griffons pourrait l'enlever au ciel: "*S'il puet xx. avoir o lui, en sa prison, Que porter le peusent au ciel, sans doutison.*"¹¹ Il veut monter au ciel voir le firmament et "*voir voel les montagnes, en haut le conblement, Le ciel et les planetes et tout l'etellement Et tous les XV (sic) signes u li solaus descent, Et comment par le mont corent li ii. vent, Et voir voel le ciel si com li cius porprent.*"¹² Il commande aux charpentiers de construire une légère cabine en bois enveloppée de cuir pour protéger contre la chaleur du soleil. A l'aide d'une lance au bout de laquelle est attachée un morceau de viande, le roi réussit à se faire monter au ciel.¹³



Après avoir traversé les quatre vents, la cabine s'approche du soleil et le cuir commence à brûler. Il décide de regagner la terre. Ainsi

après avoir exploré le fond de la mer et voyagé jusqu'au Paradis, il a conquis le dernier domaine de l'univers.

M. George Cary, dans sa monographie sur l'Alexandre médiéval,¹⁴ traite des représentations du voyage céleste d'Alexandre dans les églises européennes et fait remarquer que le chariot d'Alexandre est soulevé par "deux gryffons et plus", que dans le cadre germanique le voyage céleste est considéré plutôt comme une acte d'outrecuidance. Cary montre une illustration de l'édition en 1506 de Michel Noir montrant cette scène d'ascension. Les quatre gryphons sont attachés à la cage.



Une des dernières éditions japonaises de l'*Esope* du 18^e siècle est illustrée; on voit la scène où Esope présente au roi Necténabo trois enfants partant dans trois cages. Presque à la même époque, Julien Machot, suivant Maxime Planude, met quatre garçons (ou huit) dans quatre cages. Dans le foisonnement des traditions ésopiques et alexandrines, nous voudrions démêler grâce à une documentation plus fournie l'origine de cette augmentation de voyageurs aériens et de la diminution du nombre de voyageurs.

Notes

1. *Shinmura Izuru Zenshû*, 15 vols. 1971-1973. Chikuma Shobô.
2. Léopold Hervieux: *Les Fabulistes latins depuis le siècle d'Auguste jusqu'à la fin du Moyen Age*, 5 vols., 1884.
3. Théodor Benfey: *Pantcha-Tantra*.
4. Joseph Jacobs: (ed.) *Caxton's Fables of Aesop*, 2 vols. N.Y. 1889.
5. *Shinmura Izuru Zenshû*, Tome 7, pp. 491-514.
6. *Recueil général des Isopet*, Tome III, publié par Pierre Ruelle (S. A. T. F.) 1982, *Les Fables d'Esope, le Livre de subtilles hystoires et Fables d'Esope*, 1955-1956 (Collection des Fermiers Généraux), Claude Dalbanne: *Livres à gravures imprimés à Lyon au XV^e siècle: Les Subtilles fables d'Esope*, notice par Julia Baastin, Lyon 1926.
7. Nouvelle impression sur la demande du public en 1997.
8. H. Steinhöwel, *Aesop*, éd. H. Cæsterley, Tübingen, 1873
9. *Recueil général des Isopets*, Tome troisième: *l'Esope* de Julien Macho, publié par Pierre Ruelle (S. A. T. F.) 1982, pp. 62, 64
10. François Nau: *Histoire et Sagesse d'Ahikar l'Aszsyrien (fils d'Anael, neveu de Tobie)* traduction des versions syriaques avec les principales différences des versions arabes, arménienne, grecques, néo-syriaque, slave et roumaine. Paris, 1909.
11. *Li Romans d'Alexandre par Lambert li Tors et Alexandre de Bernay*, herausgegeben von Henri Michelant, Stuttgart, 1846, p. 385.
12. *ibid.* pp. 385-386.
13. *ibid.* pp. 387-389.
14. George Cary: *The Medieval Alexander*, Cambridge, 1956, pp. 134-135.

III

Structured Analysis and Methodological Possibilities

*Ibn 'Arabi's Conception of
God's Universal Mercy:
The Chapter on Zakariyya' in the
Fusus al-Hikam**
Ronald L. Nettler

Zakariyya', father of John the Baptist, was a rather minor personality in the Qur'an and in later Islamic thought.¹ But he was a righteous figure who was touched by God in a remarkable and poignant manner.² Zakariyya's Qur'anic story is to be found mainly in *Surah III* and *Surah XIX*.³ In both these chapters the tale of Zakariyya' is essentially the same: Very old, weak, childless, and with a barren wife, Zakariyya' supplicates God, asking for a child. God responds positively, granting the request in the form of a son, Yahya, who is to be born to Zakariyya' and his wife.⁴ Astonished and overwhelmed, Zakariyya' asks how this can be, ". . . when my wife is barren and I am so advanced in years?"⁵ God answers, saying this is easy for Him. Zakariyya' then asks God for a "sign" which might, presumably, explain His great efficacy. God grants this favour. The sign is that Zakariyya' will not speak to other people for three nights. Zakariyya' emerges from this solitude certain of God's favour and power, and telling his people: "Glorify God, morning and night".⁶

The figure of Mary, mother of Jesus, is important as an associated motif in the Qur'anic story of Zakariyya'. Where Zakariyya' appears, Mary is often present—not necessarily as an integral part of Zakariyya's story, but rather as a figure linked in a certain way with Zakariyya', and seemingly representing a principle which appears in

the Qur'an to characterise the lives of both Zakariyya' and Mary.⁷ The immediate personal link between these two individuals in the Qur'an lies in Zakariyya's role as the protector and helper of Mary. The common dominant principle in both their (Qur'anic) life-stories is that of God's efficacy, mercy and beneficence bestowed upon a most worthy and needy servant. For both of these figures, the divine favour is a son who is a prophet. In both cases, there is a sort of miraculous conception. With Mary this is an explicit immaculate conception;⁸ for Zakariyya' and his wife there is a divinely aided conception.⁹

The Qur'anic story of Zakariyya' is, then, a tale of God's power and mercy, His mercy being the main expression of His power. As the second verse of *surah Maryam*, introducing Zakariyya', says: "This is an account of your Lord's mercy to His servant, Zakariyya'".¹⁰ This Qur'anic theme of God's mercy is Ibn 'Arabi's foundation in his own discussion of God's power and mercy. And it is his own discussion which for him reveals the true meaning of the Qur'anic story.¹¹

The chapter on Zakariyya' in the *Fusus al-Hikam* is titled "The Wisdom of Divine Sovereignty (*hikmah malikiyyah*) in The Word of Zakariyya'".¹² This *hikmah malikiyyah* of the title refers to God's absolute power and dominion over all, while within the body of the chapter the theme of God's mercy is the main focus, appearing prominently as the universal metaphysical manifestation and agent of His dominion. These are the essential features of the Qur'anic Zakariyya' in Ibn 'Arabi's view, set out for elaboration and transformation in his particular understanding of the subject.

In developing his interpretation, Ibn 'Arabi organises his discussion according to three themes: (1) the metaphysics of God's mercy (2) the ethical implications of the divine metaphysical mercy (3) names and attributes, divine and otherwise, in the expression and manifestation of God's mercy.¹³ A highly original explication and integration of these themes provides the fabric of Ibn 'Arabi's exegesis of the story of Zakariyya'.¹⁴

The metaphysics of God's mercy is formulated through a transformation of the idea of God's mercy found in the Qur'an. In Ibn 'Arabi's construction, *rahmah's* Qur'anic connotation of the mercy which a personal God bestows upon those among His creatures whom He

chooses acquires a metaphysical face.¹⁵ Through this metaphysical transformation Ibn 'Arabi universalises divine mercy in a unique and original way, thereby making it a cornerstone of his *sufi* thought.

All have received God's mercy. This is Ibn 'Arabi's claim. It is a claim which is in part deeply Qur'anic, in spirit and in letter.¹⁶ Indeed, Ibn 'Arabi's opening words in this chapter are a paraphrase of a main Qur'anic statement of God's universal application of His mercy. Ibn 'Arabi says: "Know that the Mercy of God encompasses everything".¹⁷ The Qur'an—in a close analogue—says in a first-person divine assertion: "My mercy encompasses everything".¹⁸ Except for Ibn 'Arabi's formulation "God's mercy" (*rahmah Allah*) in place of the Qur'anic "My mercy" (*rahmati*), the words used are exactly the same: "*wasi'at kull shay*" ("encompasses everything").

But this universalist conception of God's mercy is in fact drawn from a Qur'anic context which is a mix of mercy's universal application with a more restrictive notion, making God's mercy available only to those who obey Him. Thus in a further statement from VII: 156: "He (God) said: My punishment I mete out to those whom I will, and my mercy encompasses everything. Thus will I prescribe mercy for those who fear God, who pay alms and who believe in Our signs".

Ibn 'Arabi has referred only to God's universal mercy and not to any notion of mercy's restrictive application. Without entering into a discussion of the Qur'an's "true meaning" here, it is clear that for Ibn 'Arabi the restrictive and conditioned giving of divine mercy is here irrelevant, though perhaps not untrue. This seeming disregard of the Qur'anic notion that receiving God's mercy may be conditional upon human compliance with God's injunctions was for Ibn 'Arabi not simply part of his *sufi* predilection for a merciful God, but it was necessary in making the profound transformation of God's mercy effected here. For the metaphysical mercy is nothing if not universal and this for Ibn 'Arabi as well reflected a deep Qur'anic truth.

Ibn 'Arabi next adds two words to his statement of God's universal mercy. These words are the true beginning of his *sufi* metaphysical rendering of God's mercy, in his understanding of *Zakariyya* in the Qur'an. Grammatically adverbial, the two words carry a whole universe of meaning. The first word, "*wujudan*", may be rendered as

“in its existence-giving nature”, while the second, “*hukman*”, means “in its ontological governance”.¹⁹ These two words thus adverbially qualify God’s mercy, suggesting that the mercy in its universal application is both the agent of existence-giving (*wujudan*) and the process whereby existence-giving is governed (*hukman*).²⁰ In Ibn ‘Arabi’s redefinition, then, all receive mercy *because they exist*, while God’s mercy is itself “existence” or “being” (*wujud*). Thus as mercy is God’s overarching attribute for Ibn ‘Arabi (exoterically and esoterically), and God *is* totally identified with it, Ibn ‘Arabi later will say “God is mercy”.²¹

Comprised of nine words in the Arabic original, Ibn ‘Arabi’s opening statement is his *sufi* metaphysical gloss on the Qur’anic idea of God’s mercy. From these words, Qur’anic and metaphysical as one, Ibn ‘Arabi develops his particular conception of the universal expression and application of God’s mercy. In this development of an idea, Ibn ‘Arabi introduces a discussion of God’s mercy being prior and superior to His wrath²²—through the ontological process which is the new meaning of his redefined mercy.²³ Following his opening statement, then, Ibn ‘Arabi says: “. . . and (likewise know) that the existence of (His) wrath derives from God’s mercy to His wrath”.²⁴

God’s mercy being prior to and dominant over His wrath means here that wrath, like all else, gains its existence from the mercy. God as Mercy, rather than wrath, is further transformed from the personal discourse of conventional meaning to Ibn ‘Arabi’s *sufi* metaphysical realm. Ibn ‘Arabi makes this clear, saying, “Thus the mercy (of God) precedes His wrath; that is, the connection (*nisbah*) of mercy to Him precedes the connection of wrath to Him”.²⁵ The *nisbah* terminology exemplifies the metaphysical dimension of the discussion. The term *nisbah* is itself drawn from Ibn ‘Arabi’s metaphysical vocabulary, as were the qualifiers *wujudan* and *hukman* in his opening statement. It is this “cushion” of his *sufi* metaphysical discourse which indicates that Ibn ‘Arabi’s discussion of God’s mercy is different from more “ordinary” treatment of the *subject*. “Ordinary” here might mean the language of Qur’an, *hadith*, *tafsir*, *kalam* and non-metaphysical, pietistic, sufism, where God’s mercy essentially means a personal beneficence from Creator to creature.²⁶

Ibn 'Arabi then introduces his general metaphysical notion of the "essences in potentia" (*a'yan thabitah*)²⁷ which are things in pure forms awaiting their descent into the phenomenal world. These essences "seek" and "desire" their phenomenal existence; and the mercy then fulfils that desire.²⁸ As there is an essence (*'ayn*) for every thing (*shay'*), the mercy, as "existentiating force", of necessity touches everything. In Ibn 'Arabi's words: "Since for every essence there is an existence which it seeks from God, consequently God's mercy encompasses every essence. Thus God, through His mercy, by which He is merciful to an essence, receives that essence's desire for its (phenomenal) existence. Then He creates it. We say, therefore, that God's mercy encompasses everything, in its existence-giving nature and in its ontological governance (*wujudan wa hukman*)."²⁹ This explains, among other things, how God's mercy, as agent of being, is, by virtue of that characteristic, more important than and prior to God's wrath, since the wrath, like all other things, is brought into being by the mercy, and consequently depends on it.

At first glance a binary structure seems implied here: Mercy as metaphysics *or* mercy as personal favour; God as the personal, Qur'anic God, *or* God as Principle of Being. Which God and which mercy now takes pride of place? The personal or the metaphysical? As elsewhere, Ibn 'Arabi's formulations leave no doubt as to the answer: The distinction between the two becomes a moot point.³⁰ They are as One—and this One must now be seen from a perspective provided by the metaphysical. For the "addition" of the metaphysical to the personal irrevocably changes the personal, and establishes a new realm of meaning and a new mode of discourse. Once the transcendent core of a Qur'anic or traditional concept has been thus determined and invoked one cannot again completely restore its full exoteric meaning. The shift in perspective must remain.³¹ Ibn 'Arabi will next explore the meaning of this shift in its ethical implications and, later, in the perspective of God's (and other) names and attributes. Thus will his initial thesis be brought to fruition and its full message made explicit.

Islam as an "ethical religion" is, in its own view, a system expressed in a divine order and organisation for human life on this

earth, individual and communal, linked to the disposition of individuals in the next world. From the Qur'an onwards, the *raison d'être* of human existence in this world (*al-dunya*) is as preparation for life in the next (*al-akhirah*). The whole rationale of the revealed principles and law of human life, individual and collective, is to be found in the scheme of the Day of Judgment (*al-sa'ah*, *yaum al-qiyamah*, *yaum al-din*), punishment and reward.³² With this central theme in Islamic thought, the question whether God was more merciful than wrathful was, then, of great import.³³

Sufism in general took a pronounced stand in favour of God as essentially merciful.³⁴ Prior to Ibn 'Arabi, however, in this as in so many other matters, the God-Man relationship was understood by most *sufis* in more personal and pietistic terms. Mercy, God's most prominent characteristic for them, was the gift of a loving God to His beloved creatures. The depth of mystical experience often both confirmed and made possible this truth. And the mystical meaning of God's mercy often swelled into a monolith of divine merciful comportment: the God of mercy totally negating and effacing the God of wrath. In order to make the point, sufism sometimes even drew it out to a paradoxical—if not antinomian—extreme. Abu Yazid al-Bistami, for example, whose *shatahat*, or “theopathic utterances”, pushed the conventions of Islamic doctrine to their outer limit, was reported to have chastised God for presuming to punish any of His creatures, and claimed for himself the power to intercede for all of mankind on Judgement Day. In this way only would God close the gates of Hell and ensure that all would be saved.³⁵

Although not all of sufism traded in such formulations, the theme of the overarching divine mercy was central. Divine forgiveness and love outweighed all. One day all would receive God's mercy and all would be saved.³⁶ Though by no means *automatic*, because of conventional doctrinal stipulations to the contrary, God's bestowing of mercy was still in this view somehow *universal*. For though still within the conventional referential context of trial, punishment and reward, the *sufi* perspective on these matters usually saw God's mercy somehow as overcoming all, including His wrath. With Ibn 'Arabi, convention was disrupted even further, as the shift to the

metaphysical realm was effected. Here, the usual *sufi* universalisation of God's mercy was extended beyond the realm of the individual and personal, becoming synonymous with existence itself and, thereby, in Ibn 'Arabi's terms, with God, Himself.

Ibn 'Arabi raised the ethical issue by way of extending his explication of God's mercy as metaphysical process. He carried his logic here to its conclusion, in asserting that the mercy touches *all* things, including even God's wrath and His names.³⁷ Having achieved this, Ibn 'Arabi then says that ". . . within the mercy's application there is no consideration of achieving any goal; nor is there consideration of what is 'suitable by nature'. Rather, the 'suitable' and the 'unsuitable', all of it, is touched by divine mercy, in mercy's giving of existence. . . . Thus everything the mercy has remembered is 'happy'—and there is nothing it has not remembered. Every existing thing, has, then, been touched by mercy".³⁸

With this ontological universalisation of mercy's function, Ibn 'Arabi has provided a foundation in ethics for his next move in the transformation of mercy from the personal to the metaphysical realm. For God's mercy has now been shown to be structurally and ineluctably related to the ethical. Thus: "Oh friend, do not shrink from understanding what we have said concerning your thoughts on those who are suffering and what you believe concerning the pains (of hell) in the world to come—pains which (seemingly) provide no respite from suffering to those on whom they are inflicted. Know first, then, that mercy is universal in its mode of bringing (things) into being. Through mercy to the pains (of those suffering) the pains (themselves) are brought into being".³⁹

Even the afflictions of those punished in hell, then, are the object of God's mercy—*because the afflictions exist*. Thus if *existence, being (wujud)* is the main criterion in divine mercy's nature and application, and if the application of mercy as being is of necessity universal, then what indeed are we to think of the torments of those in hell? And how are we to see the conventional standards and systems of commands and prohibitions, rewards and punishments, with their resolution in the world to come, in heaven and in hell?

Perhaps hell is *real* but *irrelevant* from the new perspective. For

even if one is there and suffering, one is still the recipient of God's mercy. Suffering and punishment have been *redefined*, so that the sting has been taken out of them. Ibn 'Arabi has not mentioned paradise and reward, for although his understanding of them would also not be a wholly conventional one, the ethical crux for him is in the issue of punishment in hell. A certain conventional *sufi* notion of God's mercy can certainly take the force out of the fear of hell, but Ibn 'Arabi's transformed metaphysical mercy virtually neutralises it. Heaven and hell have been made "equal", both in a more conventional mystical sense, with a usual *sufi* notion of God's universal (personal) mercy, as well as, more theoretically, with Ibn 'Arabi's great shift in mercy's ontological meaning.⁴⁰

Heaven and hell are now both aspects of God's (ontological) mercy—like all created beings. And—to make the point more sharply—even the afflictions felt by the denizens of hell are themselves acts of divine mercy (ontologically). We have come full circle here in Ibn 'Arabi's transformation of God's mercy—and thereby of His wrath. *Mercy is wrath and wrath mercy*. This transformation of mercy creates a superficial exoteric paradox of the first order: The "sameness" of His mercy and His wrath. How can the seeming intrinsic and natural opposition of God's mercy and His wrath be reduced to the sameness implied in Ibn 'Arabi's claim that the sufferings in hell are the application and expression of divine mercy? The mercy as ontological principle resolves and reveals the inconsequential and putative nature of the "paradox". To those who "know"—the gnostic adepts—this is what they imagine when they ask God for mercy; for others, the matter remains in its superficial, literal formulation.⁴¹

Ibn 'Arabi claims the "twofold" nature of God's mercy—the personal (conventional) and the metaphysical—has its correlative in a corresponding "two-tier" human understanding of mercy. Thus the deep metaphysical mercy ("the essential", *bi al-dhat*)⁴² is known to be the true mercy by the *Ahl al-kashf*⁴³ (gnostics), while the conventional, personal mercy is that which the unenlightened, still veiled people, *al-Mahjubuna*,⁴⁴ think is the true mercy. The veiled folk, then, simply, ". . . ask God (*al-Haqq*) to be merciful to them in their belief. . . ." But *Ahl al-kashf* ". . . ask the mercy to inhere in

them. . . ."⁴⁵

Thus the veiled folk in their darkness seek the personal mercy of a personal God; and this, while natural for them, is beside the deeper truth of their pleas and imprecations. For there is a difference between asking the mercy to inhere in one and asking God to be merciful to one. In the former case one is (rhetorically, in the formulation here) seeking (or acknowledging) the occurrence of a metaphysical process. Ibn 'Arabi's language clearly indicates this: the enlightened folk want mercy to *inhere in them* (*an taquma bihim*). In other Islamic intellectual contexts, forms of the verb *qama bi* were commonly used to denote the metaphysical process of an attribute inhering in a substance.⁴⁶ A conventional pious cry for divine mercy would, of course, not normally be couched in such metaphysical language. It would, rather, be done in exactly the manner which Ibn 'Arabi characterised as the way of the veiled folk: asking God to be merciful to them. Here the language of pious plea is the usual one. But its very formulation is a sign of the epistemological incompleteness and inadequacy of the one who voices it. Such pleas, though a profound spiritual act and part of the fabric of tradition, bespeak also an ignorance of the reality one is presumably addressing. For though people may say, "Oh God, be merciful to us", in reality, says Ibn 'Arabi, ". . . nothing is merciful to them except the mercy's inhering in them (*wa la yarhamuhum illa qiyam al-rahmah bihim*)".⁴⁷ Those who know this may indeed even beseech God for His mercy, and this is not at all misplaced; for they know the reality behind their words. But for the veiled folk, their words and the pious emotion which gave rise to them are the full reality. Whatever the feelings and phrases of the veiled folk, however, the truth is that (metaphysical) mercy already inheres in them, as it does in everything else. Not knowing this, their spirituality is stunted and their ethical understanding, in particular, rendered shallow.

Although the metaphysical mercy makes inadequate the conventional notion of God's mercy and wrath and the whole ethical framework surrounding them, it does not necessarily follow from this that there is an implicit true antinomianism here. For Ibn 'Arabi is not in any sense rejecting the traditional ethics, in behaviour or in concep-

tion, but he is, rather, placing it in a perspective which must radically alter one's understanding of it. Doing the good and avoiding doing the bad, as the Law dictates, remains central and constant for Ibn 'Arabi; but his understanding of this is subsumed in the truth of universal divine mercy. In the baldest formulation, then, whatever their behaviour, all will be "saved". Here the intertwining of the traditional ethical and Ibn 'Arabi's *sufi* metaphysical outlooks is total. Each appears entangled with and reflecting the other; the focal point is in the Qur'anic term *rahmah* itself, which in its metaphysical transformation still resonates with traditional meanings. Ibn 'Arabi puts a final gloss on the issue at the end of his discussion of the third aspect of mercy: names and attributes.

Names and attributes, naming and attributing, figure prominently in Ibn 'Arabi's discussion of God's mercy. As elsewhere in Ibn 'Arabi's thought in general, and in the *Fusus*, in particular, the issue of names and attributes is intrinsically related to the overarching theme of the remote God and the manifested God. And as in other discussions of this issue, here also Ibn 'Arabi's purpose is to reveal the ultimate identity of God and man in the universal principle of absolute being (*al-wujud al-mutlaq*). But because of *rahmah*'s unique position in the traditional Islamic system of values and concepts, especially in its ethical significance, its metaphysical role here is correspondingly great. Explicating *rahmah* in the realm of the names and attributes provides Ibn 'Arabi another focus for conveying this significance; and here we shall find Ibn 'Arabi's ultimate answer to the ethical question which arose above from his metaphysical rendering of God's mercy.

Having established this metaphysical redefining of *rahmah* at the outset, as well as raising the derivative ethical questions, Ibn 'Arabi embarks on a long, sometimes obscurantist, and often disjointed treatment of names and attributes, in connection with God's mercy. His argument utilises concepts, terms, and doctrine from the Islamic theological tradition. The main thrust of Ibn 'Arabi's thought here concerns the ways in which names (*al-asma'*) and attributes (*al-sifat*) are related to the beings and things which are defined by them. Although his obvious focus is on the mode of God's (and man's) condition in their relationship to God's mercy, and particularly God's

designation as Merciful and Compassionate (*al-Rahman, al-Rahim*), Ibn 'Arabi first explores more general approaches to the issue. Echoing the theories of certain Mu'tazili theologians, in particular in their discussion of the divine attributes (*sifat Allah*), Ibn 'Arabi argues that names and attributes do not exist as discrete entities attached to the things characterised by them; rather they are "relational" (*nisab*), and the fact of something's being described as, for example, "knowing", because of the inhering of knowledge in it, is really a "condition" or "state" (*hal*) of that thing.⁴⁸

If this be the general case, and on this example, then Ibn 'Arabi can say that *rahmah* possesses a "determinative force" (*hukm*).⁴⁹ This means *rahmah*, by inhering in something, renders that thing merciful (*rāhim*) as well as making it the recipient of mercy (*marhum*), just as having knowledge (*'ilm*) inhere in one, makes one knowledgeable (*'ālim*).⁵⁰ Thus mercy's inhering in something means that thing is "merciful" as well as "mercy-full", i.e., it evinces the active (giving) characteristic of mercy as well as being the object or (passive) recipient of mercy. Also, the "mechanism" of mercy's, or any other attribute's, inhering in something (i.e., in God or in man) is (through the *hal*) again "modal" rather than "positional". For in the case of God, it is clear ". . . He is not a locus for created things" (*laysa bi mahall li al-hawadith*).⁵¹ Nor is God ". . . a locus for the creation of mercy (in the recipient of it)" (*fa laysa bi mahall li ijad al-rahmah fih*).⁵² This sort of language, says Ibn 'Arabi, is characteristic of those discursive theologians who see the naming-attributing phenomenon as one in which some kind of entity—the attribute—is "placed" in a substance (locus, *mahall*). This cannot be true of God, either in His mercy-giving or in His being intrinsically merciful; nor could it be true for man as "mercy-full", for the attributing process works here as it does universally.⁵³ Thus "God is compassionate (*Rahim*) by virtue of the mercy's inhering in Him. It may, consequently, be affirmed that God is Mercy (*annah* *'ayn al-rahmah*)".⁵⁴ For the attribute and its locus, then, are *as one*, the locus reflecting the attribute—indeed being the attribute, as an aspect of its nature.⁵⁵

These are the bare bones of Ibn 'Arabi's highly complex argument here concerning names and attributes. What does it mean for his

central thesis on *rahmah* as *al-wujud al-mutlaq*? First, it means that if God is mercy, and mercy, redefined as absolute existence, is all creation, then creation is identified with God. Ibn ‘Arabi, in a slightly different formulation earlier, alluded to this where he says “Everyone whom the Mercy has remembered has thereby become *merciful* (*rāhim*)”.⁵⁶ This is striking. For not only is Mercy’s recipient *marhum*—the object of Mercy—but it is *merciful* as well—like God, who is merciful because mercy is an attribute of His. God’s creation is, then, truly in His own image. For if having mercy means one is merciful, then all creatures are merciful—not just God. And if mercy is now transformed absolute being, then being merciful (i.e., having mercy) is to be part of that absolute being. And if God is mercy, i.e., absolute being, then all the merciful (all creation) are God. God is all, and all are God. And here the question of the remote (essential) God and the manifest God of the names would seem to have been resolved, in their reduction to absolute being.⁵⁷ Ibn ‘Arabi elaborates more on this point towards the end of the chapter, in his final clarification of the ethical issue.

With respect to the whole range of God’s names and attributes, Ibn ‘Arabi voices agreement with the *sufi* thinker Abu al-Qasim b. Qissi.⁵⁸ For in addition to the determinative force of names and attributes (*hukm*) being expressed modally in their relation to the thing which they define, Ibn ‘Arabi transmits from al-Qissi the notion that “. . . all the names indicate one essence”.⁵⁹ Here Ibn ‘Arabi resolves the ONE/MANY conundrum with respect to God, by reducing the MANY to the ONE. Mercy plays a special role here as well; for the notion that each name is formally distinguished by some special quality (of God) which sets it apart from all the others would seem to imply some difficulty in reducing the MANY to the ONE. But in Ibn ‘Arabi’s view, mercy, having its special status, may be sought and addressed through *any* divine name, even those which on the face of it would appear to have meanings opposed to or radically different from mercy. For example, if one seeks mercy from God as “*al-Muntaqim*”, the Retributive, this is quite in order, because God’s attribute of retribution is subsumed under mercy (like all things) and is thereby ultimately reducible to mercy—at least to mercy as abso-

lute being.⁶⁰ And here the reduction of the names to one essence is most profoundly expressed in its ontological meaning. Mercy represents, subsumes and absorbs all the other attributes, just as all being (God Himself included) is reduced to mercy. Thus in the same manner as God's mercy in its metaphysical mode is absolute being, so too are all the other divine names and attributes absolute being in their reduction to the one divine essence which is coterminous with mercy.

From this special treatment of the issue of names and attributes, Ibn 'Arabi concludes the chapter on Zakariyya's exemplification of mercy with a return to the ethical aspect. This return to the ethical here is not arbitrary on Ibn 'Arabi's part. Indeed, in making this shift his language itself is indicative of that: the return is indicated by the word "*thumma*", "*thus*".⁶¹ And the message does indeed affirm the ineluctable nature of the ethical conclusion to be drawn from Ibn 'Arabi's metaphysical transformation of mercy and its use as another side of the God/Man unity.

The final form of Ibn 'Arabi's ethical discussion here recapitulates his earlier version of it as a twofold nature for mercy: the personal, conventional mercy of a personal God and mercy as *al-wujud al-mutlaq*, absolute being and the process by which that being brings all things into existence. In the earlier discussion, Ibn 'Arabi indicated that for those (*al-'arifun, ahl al-kashf*) who "know", the torments of hell may not be exactly as exoteric hearsay would have it. For mercy, as the process of being, is universal, touching even the pains of hell themselves. It is the unenlightened who are ignorant of this truth. But the real (though implicit) problem here is left unresolved: If God's mercy is in truth universal being, and if in the nature of things all are touched by that being—even the "damned"—then what of the requirements of the Law? If all are ultimately reduced to a total identity with God, and He is redefined as absolute being, and His mercy—amongst all His other attributes—is rendered in the same way (creating an identity of God and mercy), then what place, if any, is left for the importance of what one does? This was, after all, the main concern in the traditional religious/legal schemata.

Ibn 'Arabi explicitly—though without giving all away—thus ad-

addresses the issue: Mercy may be attained in two ways, (1) that of meeting the divinely enjoined ethical/legal obligations, *tariq al-wujub*, and (2) that of divine grace, *tariq al-imtinan al-ilahi*, “. . . which is not connected with any action”.⁶² And here we have the same personal and metaphysical mercy as earlier, called respectively there, mercy through asking (*bi al-su'al*) and essential mercy (*bi al-dhat*). But here Ibn 'Arabi goes beyond his earlier formulation by putting the two types of mercy in a specific Qur'anic and *hadith* context. This both validates Ibn 'Arabi's dichotomy of mercy Qur'anically and proposes an answer to the ethical question. And the ethical answer in the *hadith* is supported by way of the Qur'anic validation of the twofold mercy.

In order properly to formulate this resolution, Ibn 'Arabi cites two Qur'anic passages from VII: 156 as well as a passage from XLVIII: 2. He then concludes with a well-known *hadith* which, as Ibn 'Arabi's last word here, makes for a clear statement of his views.

The human attainment of God's mercy through good acts which bring mercy as reward (*tariq al-wujub*) is exemplified, says Ibn 'Arabi, in the passage in VII: 156 where God says, “. . . I will give mercy to those who are God-fearing and who give the *zakat*”.⁶³ This is a conception of a personal God bestowing a personal boon of mercy on those of His creatures who obey Him through proper comportment. Human acts have pride of place here; one's destiny is to a great extent in one's own hands. This is a foundation of the conventional exoteric Islamic worldview and provides a basic rationale for behavioural demands which Islam makes on its faithful.

The universalisation of God's mercy (*tariq al-imtinan al-ilahi*), which for Ibn 'Arabi means the metaphysical mercy as absolute being, he finds also in VII: 156 from which he cites the passage, “. . . my mercy encompasses everything”.⁶⁴ This way of attaining God's mercy “. . . is not connected with any human action. . . .” says Ibn 'Arabi (. . . *la yaqtarinu bihi 'amal*).⁶⁵ This is also exemplified in another Qur'anic passage, XLVIII: 2, which Ibn 'Arabi cites for this purpose: “. . . In order that God might forgive you your sins, past and future”.⁶⁶ I said above that Ibn 'Arabi's initial distinction between mercy which is effectual (*laha athr*) through supplication or human

entreaty (*bi al-su'al*) and that which works "essentially" (*bi al-dhat*) as metaphysical process, is reflected here in his final formulation of mercy which is attained (*tunal*) either by way of "obligation" (required acts, *wujub*) or "divine grace" (metaphysically, *al-imtinan al-ilahi*). These are obviously in effect the "same" categories. But there is one striking difference: Earlier, Ibn 'Arabi explained, as it were, how these worked and what they meant, thereby raising the ethical issue but not attempting in any way to resolve it. Also, though the Qur'anic and traditional issues obviously loomed large, Ibn 'Arabi did not at that point provide explicit textual connections. Here it is different. The new formulation asserts, in Qur'anic words, first that those who behave as commanded will reap the reward of God's mercy. This is mercy attained through obligation, whereas its original counterpart, mercy having its influence through supplication, was portrayed as the (mistaken) way of the ignorant, unenlightened folk who do not understand that in any case God's mercy (metaphysical) has already visited them. The position here is thus refined. For the unenlightened now do receive God's mercy *for their meritorious acts*. This way—enjoined in Qur'an—does yield results, albeit in a conventional manner. And by implication this "ordinary" mercy does exist. But so does the metaphysical mercy, on the other hand, which Ibn 'Arabi sees in VII: 156: "My mercy encompasses everything". And unlike the rather stark contrast drawn initially between the two types of mercy and their recipients, Ibn 'Arabi's formulation here seems to provide a link which softens. For although the conventional mercy is attained by the morally (ritually) upright, the context of VII: 155, where Moses alleges God's hand to be present in the acts of the wrongdoers, does imply that perhaps mercy is indeed deserved by all, "good" and "bad".⁶⁷ Although the Qur'an is not a systematic treatise—being rather a text expressing a range of interwoven layered motifs—implicit intellectual frameworks are present. And one which is certainly present in VII: 155 is the "opposition" between God's ability to determine his servants' acts and His just nature which (logically) must preclude His punishing of those servants who do wrong at His direction. For here, VII: 156, "My mercy encompasses everything", may well resolve the "contradiction" without (in sys-

tematic fashion) explaining exactly how this may occur. The Qur'anic motifs are so layered here that they could provide such a resolution if it is sought. Ibn 'Arabi would, then, seem to have found a specific Qur'anic "proof-text" (and context) for his main assertion of the universal giving of divine mercy, whether seen exoterically or esoterically. Indeed, in Ibn 'Arabi's eyes that line may now have been effaced. For if God's mercy may be shown to have universal presence according to the Qur'an, then its esoteric—metaphysical—universal dimension, as argued here, may then be seen as being on a Qur'anic continuum; the metaphysical is in this instance the deeper truth lying within the exoteric. And the connection between these "two truths" is integral and organic—indeed, ideally, as mentioned earlier, there *is* only one truth, certainly for the spiritually adept and even the most literalistic reading of the Qur'an in those verses which Ibn 'Arabi adduces here reveals a creative ambiguity between God's strict and narrow giving of mercy to those who "deserve" it and His universal bestowal of mercy. Ibn 'Arabi conveys this so well in adducing two additional "proof-texts" as his concluding words. The first is Qur'anic, from XLVIII: 2: ". . . In order that God might forgive you your sins, past and present", and the second, even more directly to the point, the well-known *hadith qudsi*, "Do what you will, God has already forgiven you".⁶⁸ For what is quite clear now is that God's mercy, as Zakariyya' and Maryam knew it, and as it is expressed universally through God's dominion over all, is universal because of its metaphysical meaning. Here all possible understanding of God's mercy comes together in ontological unity.

Notes

* This paper is one of a series of studies of the *Fusus al-Hikam*. My main purpose in these studies is to show the intertwining of the Qur'an and Ibn 'Arabi's *sufi* metaphysics in the prophetic wisdom and truths which constitute the core of the *Fusus*.

1. For a general discussion of Zakariyya' in Islam see: T.P. Hughes, *A Dictionary of Islam*. London, 1985, p. 699; and *E.I.* (old edition), art. "Zakariyya'", p. 1202.

2. In popular stories Zakariyya' is an exemplar of the efficacy of God's mercy.
3. These are the two most extensive versions of the Qur'anic story of Zakariyya'. The framework story in both accounts is much the same, with variations in some details. Zakariyya' is also mentioned briefly in two other chapters of the Qur'an: VI: 85, where Zakariyya' is put in the company of John, Jesus and Elias who, according to the verse, were all "just persons"; XXI: 89-91, where there is a more concise version of the longer story.
4. Qur'an: III: 39.
5. Qur'an: III: 40.
6. Qur'an: III: 41.
7. Qur'an: III: 37.
8. Qur'an: III: 47; XIX: 20.
9. Qur'an: III: 39; XIX: 9.
10. Qur'an: XIX: 2.
11. Although Ibn 'Arabi's *sufi* metaphysics is considered his most distinctive creation—and rightly so—one must recognise that the Qur'an was usually the main object of his attention in formulating his metaphysics. For Ibn 'Arabi believed absolutely in a one-to-one correspondence between his thought and the Qur'an.
12. Ibn 'Arabi, *Fusus al-Hikam*, ed. Affifi, Cairo, n.d., p. 188. All references to and quotations from the *Fusus al-Hikam* here will be from this edition, hereafter referred to as "*Fusus*".
13. Although Ibn 'Arabi does not explicitly acknowledge this organisation of the text, he does in fact do it in this way.
14. I use the word "exegesis" advisedly here. For although Ibn 'Arabi in the *Fusus* did not intend an "exegesis" in the conventional *tafsir* sense, his intention was clearly explication of a Qur'anic truth through its integration with his own thought; and again, the latter was for Ibn 'Arabi the complete truth of the former.
15. The transformation of divine *rahmah* which Ibn 'Arabi effects here is a major theme in his thought. On this see T. Izutsu, *Sufism and Taoism*. London, 1984, pp. 116-140; and Ronald Nettler, "Ibn 'Arabi's Notion of Allah's Mercy" in *Israel Oriental Studies*, VIII. 1978. The latter is concerned specifically with certain semantic features of this transformation.
16. But as we shall see, for Ibn 'Arabi this was the only *relevant* meaning of God's mercy in the Qur'an.
17. *Fusus*, p. 177.
18. Qur'an VII: 156.
19. These words in their nominal forms, *wujud* (existence, being) and *hukm* (determinative or governing force in the ontological process), are key terms in Ibn 'Arabi's thought.
20. It is through these two words that Ibn 'Arabi's transformation of God's mercy is effected.
21. *Fusus*, p. 179.
22. *Fusus*, p. 177.

23. *ibid.*

24. *ibid.*

25. *ibid.*

26. This is by no means to imply that these various forms of discourse necessarily have more in common in their conception of *rahmah* than what is stated here. They may not. But essential to all of them is *rahmah* as something personal. For a detailed discussion of this, see R. Nettler, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

27. *Fusus*, p. 177.

28. *ibid.*

29. *ibid.*

30. As with most issues of religious thought, here too for Ibn 'Arabi the "either/or" formulation serves as a basis for its own resolution in some formulation that transcends the "contradiction".

31. The new perspective in fact becomes the criterion of thought for other issues.

32. For a discussion of these issues see: T. Izutsu, *The Structure of the Ethical Terms in the Qur'an*. Tokyo, 1959, *passim*.

33. Although many different opinions were expressed on this issue, the central view—if one can speak in such terms—was that God's mercy and wrath co-existed in a sort of "balance"; and that God's mercy was related to the servant's obedient behaviour for which mercy was given. See Da'ud Rahbar, *God of Justice: A Study in the Ethical Doctrine of the Qur'an*. Leiden, 1960, p. 226; and T. Izutsu, *op. cit.*

34. See, e.g., A. Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions of Islam*. Chapel Hill, 1975, *passim*.

35. See, M. Abdur Rabb, *The Life, Thought and Historical importance of Abu Yazid al-Bistami*. Dacca, 1971, pp. 160-163.

36. See, e.g., R. Nicholson, *Studies in Islamic Mysticism*. Cambridge, 1921, pp. 1-149.

37. *Fusus*, pp. 177-178.

38. *Fusus*, p. 177.

39. *Fusus*, p. 178.

40. Sometimes Ibn 'Arabi virtually denies the literal existence of hell and views it as a metaphor for the state of spiritual impoverishment. See, e.g., the chapter on Hud in the *Fusus*, where Ibn 'Arabi refers to hell as "distance" (from God. *Fusus*, p. 107).

41. *Fusus*, p. 178.

42. *ibid.*

43. *ibid.*

44. *ibid.*

45. *ibid.*

46. As is often the case with Ibn 'Arabi, here too his "borrowing" of ideas and methods from other Islamic science renders the borrowed item "suggestive" in its former sense while at the same time being integrated in Ibn 'Arabi's own "system".

47. *Fusus*, p. 178.
48. *Fusus*, p. 179. For a good history and discussion of the general issue see: R.M. Frank, *Beings and their Attributes: The Teachings of the Basrian School of the Mu'tazila in the Classical Period*. Albany, 1978.
49. For various aspects of Ibn 'Arabi's use of *hukm*, see W. Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Knowledge*. Albany 1989, pp. 8, 39, 48.
50. *Fusus*, pp. 178-180.
51. *Fusus*, p. 179.
52. *ibid.*
53. *ibid.*
54. *ibid.*
55. *ibid.*
56. *ibid.*
57. *ibid.*
58. *Fusus*, p. 180. Abu al-Qasim b. Qissi, a twelfth-century *sufi*.
59. *ibid.*
60. *Fusus*, pp. 179-180.
61. *Fusus*, p. 180.
62. *ibid.*
63. *ibid.*
64. *ibid.*
65. *ibid.*
66. *ibid.*
67. In VII: 155 we have the story of Moses and his followers who in their disobedience provoked God. God, in turn, in His mercy, withheld from them the punishment of destruction. This passage is thick with themes of theodicy. Perhaps most important for our concerns in this context is Moses' peroration before God: ". . . Will you annihilate us because of what the impudent among us have done? But certainly this is only Your trial through which You lead astray those whom You will and guide those whom You will. You are our friend. Forgive us and be merciful to us. You are the best of the forgiving. Ordain for us good in this world and the next. We turn toward You".
- Moses, then, affirms God's power to exercise mercy or wrath, and asks Him for mercy. At the same time, Moses says that the misbehaviour of his companions was only God's trial ". . . through which you lead astray those whom you will". The logic of Moses' statements is that God may hold men responsible for their acts, and thereby reward or punish them as the case may be, while He also, in some way, determines those acts.
68. Hanbal, II: 492.

*The Unique Arabic Manuscript of
Aristotle's Ars Rhetorica and
its two Editions published to date
by 'Abdurrahmān Badawī and
by M[alcolm] C. Lyons**
Estiphan Panoussi

In the year 1959 A. Badawi edited the text of the Arabic Version of Aristotle's Rhetoric¹ (here abbreviated as AVAR) from the sole extant manuscript, which is currently located in the Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris (Ms. n°. 2346 [a. f. 882]). This manuscript furthermore contains other translations of some of Aristotle's works in the following order: *Analytica Priora*, *Poetica*, *Isagogia Porphyrii*, *Categoriae*, *De Interpretatione*, *Analytica Posteriora*, *Topica* and *Sophistici Elenchi*.

Many scholars have already dealt with the description of the Paris manuscript, notably D. S. Margoliouth,² J. Tkatsch,³ Kh. Georr,⁴ A. Badawi,⁵ S. M. Stern,⁶ W. Heinrichs⁷ and M. C. Lyons.⁸ It is not my intention here to recapitulate the results of those studies, for if one desires to determine the dates of all the collations and to know the number of all the copyists leading to the final copy in Paris, one must not be content only with an investigation of the marginal notes and types of variants which are occasionally contained in the manuscript, but one must also attempt the kind of examination which Stern suggests as a possibility with regard to the colophon of the manuscript. As Stern says: "Perhaps an examination of the page in the laboratory and a specially prepared photograph could solve some of the remaining problems".⁹ Heinrichs hopes that it will be possible,

with all the technical means available in these modern times, to publish the whole Paris manuscript in facsimile and thus enable the scholars to have direct access to the AVAR. Heinrichs states: "Berichten zufolge ist die Hds. in der Tatschon nicht mehr öffentlich zugänglich; potentielle Benutzer werden mit großen Photographien vertröstet, auf denen aber die wichtigen Randbemerkungen der Hds. nicht zu lesen sind (mündl. Mitteilung von Dr. Carl Ehrig-Eggert, Frankfurt). Bei solcher Lage der Dinge würde sich die BN ein großes Verdienst erwerben, wenn sie die Organon-Hds. unter Anwendung aller Mittel der modernen Technik im Faksimile veröffentlichen würde".¹⁰ This attempt suggested by Stern and Heinrichs seems to be more than necessary, because the quotations from, for example, the colophon page differ widely, as do the conclusions based on readings which are largely guesswork. One need only compare the able attempts of the above-mentioned scholars to see a wide divergence in their conclusions. Georr¹¹ and Stern¹² for example, have read one of the dates cited in the colophon and concerning the copy made by Abu 'l-'Abbās as the year 320 A.H., which corresponds to 932 A.D. Badawi¹³ reads the same year as 610 A.H./1213 A.D. Furthermore, Georr, Stern and Badawi have overlooked or disregarded certain other notes on the colophon-page altogether.

The author or the authors of the AVAR remain anonymous. The date of the translation is also unknown; but the failure to translate many Syriac words into Arabic, as well as many other traces of Syriac in this work, lead to the conclusion that it was translated at least in part from a Syriac translation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, which has not been transmitted to us. The almost word-for-word translation vis-à-vis the Greek original in the AVAR indicates that this was the case in the hypothetical Syriac original too:

Here I give some examples of words which must have come through the Syriac intermediary into the AVAR:

1. *σχοπός* 'aim' 1360 b 4; Ms. ܐܠܡܢ **alaman**, 'pain', undoubtedly from a Syriac form which could be read both as ܡܝܨܐ **mīšā**, 'aim' to match the Greek original and as ܡܝܨܐ **haššā**, 'pain' to match the Arabic version.¹⁴
2. *ἐργοίς* 'to the works' 1388 a 1; Ms. ܐܒܝܕ **'abid**, 'slave'. Here, too, a

Syriac form with the consonants ܐܒܕܐܐܐ is responsible for this inadequacy. It could then be read both as ܐܒܕܐܐܐ *‘ebādā*, ‘work’ to match the Greek and ܐܒܕܐܐܐ *‘abdā*, ‘slave’ to match the Arabic.¹⁵

3. ἀτελής ‘not finished, not filled out’ 1409 a 18; Ms. لايس كلاماً *laisa kalāman*, ‘it is not a speech’. The meaning divergent from the Greek can only be explained by recourse to a reconstruction of the Syriac intermediary form as a word the consonants of which are ܕܠܐܡܠܐܐ, which could be read both as ܕܠܐܡܠܐܐ *d-lā mellê*, ‘without speech’ to match the Arabic version and as ܕܠܐܡܠܐܐ *d-lā mlê*, ‘not filled out’ to cover the Greek. Hermannus Alemannus’ Latin translation has ‘sermo’¹⁶ here, which indicates that in this case the Latin remains in the tradition of the Paris manuscript.

4. τοῖς τυχοῦσι 67 b σ; Lat. contingentibus; Bad. النساء *an-nisā*, ‘women’; Ms. الناس *an-nās* (sic!), ‘people’. This is probably a misreading of a Syriac form supposed here which could be read both as ܓܕܫܐܐ *gedšā*, ‘contingent’, and ܢܐܫܐܐ (*’*) *nāšā*, ‘mankind’. Lyons didn’t emend this term.

5. δίκαιον 74 a 9; Lat. iustum; Bad. om.; Ms. واجبة *wāğiba*, ‘necessary’. If we ask ourselves how would we translate δίκαιον into Syriac, we think of the word زاديقة *zaddiqā*, and this can mean both ‘just’ and ‘necessary’; the Arabic has chosen the second meaning without considering the context. Both Badawi and Lyons have failed to restore this item.

Ibn al-Samḥ and the manuscript of Paris

All we know about Ibn al-Samḥ, from whose copying and collation is our Paris copy descendent, is that he was a famous logician and a Christian of Iraq. He was one of the pupils of Yaḥyā b. ‘Adī who played an important role in the history of Aristotelian studies in Islam. He was a teacher of Abu ‘l-Ḥusain (or Abu ‘l-Ḥasan) al-Baṣrī who died in 436/1044. He was mentioned by Avicenna (978-1037) as one of those scholars who were better than some of the Bagdadian scholars. He interpreted Aristotle’s *Physics* and he copied and collated Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. He died, as stated by Ibn al-Qiftī and reported by Stern (p. 43) in the year 418/1027 (= 1339 of Alexander). Differing from this dating, Margoliouth sets Ibn al-Samḥ about 300/900 (p. 31,

note 2; Stern, p. 41, note 1).

Georr postulates three different collations for the manuscript in Paris; the first must have been effected by Ibn al-Samḥ before 209/824, the second was that of Abu 'l-'Abbās ca. 320/932, and the third was that of the year 418/1027 effected by Ẓafar (or Ẓāfir) b. al-Manṣūr.

Judging from the information given in the margins of the Arabic manuscript and in the concluding colophon, which is unfortunately in very bad shape, one of the copyists of the Arabic Rhetoric was Ibn al-Samḥ (d. 418 A.H./1027 A.D.), who, as he states in the colophon, had used for his collation of the text two earlier Arabic translations and one Syriac translation of the same work. Thus, according to this information, there were two Arabic copies (one very faulty, as Ibn al-Samḥ says, and the other less faulty) from which he copied the text and collated it with a Syriac exemplar.

Here I quote Ibn al-Samḥ in Arabic, as he is quoted in the colophon page, and I give the translation of it:

هذه النسخة منقولة من خط ابن السمع فكان في آخر الجزء بخطه ايضا ما حكايته

Hādihi 'n-nusxatu manqūlatun min xaṭṭi Ibn as-Samḥi fa-kāna fi āxiri hāda 'l-ğuz'i bixaṭṭihī aiḍan mā ḥikāyatuhū:

'This copy was transcribed from the handwriting of Ibn al-Samḥ, and the following note, also in his handwriting, was at the end of the section'.

هذا الكتاب لم يبلغ كثير من قر اصناعة المنطق الى درسه ولم
ينتظر فيه ايضا نظرا شافيا

Hāda 'l-kitābu lam yabluğ kaṭiru man qara'a šinā'ata 'l-manṭiqi ilā darsihi wa-lam yanẓur fihi aiḍan naẓaran šāfiyan:

'Not many of those who have studied the art of logic have come to study this book or have come to investigate it satisfactorily'.

فلذلك ليس يوجد له نسخة صحيحة او معنى مصحح ما

Fa-li-dālika laisa yūğad lahū nusxatun ṣaḥiḥatun au ma 'nan muṣaḥḥaḥun mā:

'Therefore, there cannot be found any sound copy or any corrected comment on it'.

و وجدت له نسخة بالعربية سقيمة جدا جدا

Wa-wağadtu lahū nusxatan bi-'l-'arabīyati saqīmatan ġiddan ġiddan:
'And I found in Arabic an extremely defective copy of it'.

ثم وجدت له نسخة اخرى بالعربية اقل سقما من تلك

Tumma wağattu lahū nusxatan uxrā bi-'l-'arabīyati aqalla suqman
min tilka:

'And I found another Arabic copy which was less defective than the
other one'.

فعلت على نسخ هذه النسخة من هذه النسخة الثانية

Fa-'awwaltu 'alā nasxi hādīhi 'n-nusxati min hādīhi 'n-nusxati 't-
tānīyati:

'In this present copy I relied upon the second of these copies'.

و مهما وجدته في النسخة الثانية من غلط كنت ارجع فيه الى تلك النسخة

Wa-mahmā wağadtuhū fi 'n-nusxati 't-tānīyati min ġalaṭin kuntu
arġī'u fihi ilā tilka 'n-nusxati:

'And if I found any mistake in this second copy, I took recourse to the
other copy'.

فان وجدته صحيحا اثبت ما اجدته فيها على الصلحة

Fa-in wağadtuhū ṣaḥīḥan atbattu mā aġiduhū fihā 'alā 'ṣ-ṣiḥḥati:
'Consequently, if I found the correct form for it, I copied down what
I found in that copy in its correct form'.

وان وجدته سقيما ايضا رجعت فيه الى نسخة سريانية

Wa-in wağadtuhū saqīman aiḍan raġa 'tu fihi ilā nusxatin
suryānīyatin:

'But if I found that it was defective there, too, I would check back at
that point to a Syriac manuscript'.

فاذا وجدته صحيحا اثبته عربيا بحسبها

Fa-idā wağadtuhū ṣaḥīḥan atbattuhū 'arabīyan bi-ḥasabihā:

'Then, if I found it to be sound there, I would establish a correspond-

ing Arabic form of it’.

و ان وجدته سقيما اثبتته على سقمه وعلمت على السطر الذي فيه علامة هي هذه

Wa-in wağadtuhū saqīman atbattuhū ‘alā suqmihī wa-‘allamtu ‘alā ‘s-saṭri alladī fihi ‘alāmatan hiya hādīhī’:

‘But if I found it defective, I let it stand defective as it was and marked the line in which it occurred with a sign like the following’.

و قابلت على هذه النسخة و اجتهدت ان لا يقع فى المقابلة بها شئ من الغفل

Wa-qābaltu ‘alā hādīhī ‘n-nusxati wa-iğtahadtū an lā yaqa‘a fi ‘l-muqābalati bihā šai‘un mina ‘l-ğafali:

‘I have checked this copy and done my best to see that there were no mistakes caused by carelessness when comparing’.

فيلعلم جميع ذلك ان شاء الله وله الحمد حق حمده

Fa-li-yu‘lam ġami‘u dālika in šā’a ‘l-lāh wa-lahū ‘l-ḥamdu ḥaqqā ḥamduhū:

‘Let all this be known, God willing, and to Him be His due praise’.

Despite Ibn al-Samḥ’s effort, the manuscript still contains inexplicable irregularities, compared to the Greek original, for example it is not clear why there are so many mistakes in the transcription of personal names, which appear so often in a corrupt form,¹⁷ e.g.:

Ῥρόδικος 1361 b 5; Ms. فريقوس Friqūs

Μυσων 1372 b 27; Ms. منجون Mingūn

and so on!

Badawi’s edition

The followings are the kinds of errors found in Badawi’s edition:

1. Errors which are attributable to Badawi’s misreading and misunderstanding of the manuscript.
2. Deletions of words or phrases without indication in the apparatus.
3. Additions without indication in the apparatus.
4. Transpositions without any explanations.
5. Inclusion of marginal and/or interlinear variants in the text without the appropriate indication.
6. typographical errors (?).

I now present here some examples of errors in Badawi's edition and hope that errors such as those that I have discovered in Badawi's edition will not be repeated in future editions¹⁸ of this very important Paris manuscript which could throw light on both the tradition of Greek Rhetoric manuscripts, on the one hand, and of Latin Rhetoric manuscripts, on the other.

In this investigation, I will juxtapose the Greek word or passage followed by its Latin translation and Badawi's reading as well as its English equivalent and finally the reading of the manuscript itself and its English translation. The words reported will be given in their grammatical and syntactical status as they appear in the context, and they will not have their lexical forms. The Greek text is that of Ross' edition. The Latin translation is that of Schneider's edition.¹⁹

Badawi's misreadings and misunderstandings:

1. *διαβολή* 54 a 16; Lat. Accusatio, disputatio, criminatio, impetus, commotio; Bad. خوف

xauf, 'fear'; Ms. خوف **xauf**, 'fear'; The Arabic word خوف **xauf**, meaning 'fear', does not render the expected meaning of the Greek word, which means 'accusation'. In the other passages of the book, the same Greek word has been translated as: النيمة **al-namima** 82 a 2, 'slander, defamation, calumny'; التهمة **al-tuhma** 00 a 27, 'accusation, charge, suspicion, insinuation'; 38 الجواب في الشكاية **al-ḡawāb fi 'š-šikāya** 15 a 27, 'the answer in the accusation'; الشكاية **aš-šikāya** 14 a 21 and 32, 'accusation, complaint, grievance'; الرشاية **al-wiṣāya** 16 a 4, 23, 25 and 34, 'defamation, slander'. Among these equivalents of the Greek concept, only الجواب **al-ḡawāb** in الجواب في الشكاية **alḡawāb fi 'š-šikāya** approaches to the corrupt word الجواب **al-xauf** (* الجواب: **al-ḡaw[ā]b** < الجواب * **al-ḡaub** > الجواب **al-xauf**). This is what I previously assumed. But a more probable solution could be the following: the Syriac **qenṭā** means 'timor, metus, periculum, timiditas' and is cognate with the Arabic root **QNT** **نط** meaning 'to despair' and with the Aramaic and Hebrew root **QNT** **נָתַן** meaning 'to loathe, to vex'. It is thus possible that the Greek term was translated into Syriac by means of a word derived from the root **QNT** **نط** with the meaning of both 'timor' and 'accusatio'.²⁰ The anonymous translator into

Arabic then took the meaning 'timor' and translated it with خوف **xauf**, 'fear'. Lyons didn't restore this entry, but simply gives this information: "διαβολή 'fear' -δελλία (Kassel, φόβος reddit Ar.)"

2. ἀναγκαῖον 59 b 38; Lat. necesse; Bad. وقد يحتاج الى **wa-qad yaḥtāḡ ilā**, 'and one need that'; Ms. وقد ينبغي **wa-qad yanbagī**, 'it is necessary'.

3. φυλακῆς 60 a 6; Lat. custodia; Bad. فقط **faqat**, 'only'; Ms. حفظ **ḥifz** 'custody'.

4. τέχνη 62 a 6; Lat. ars; Bad. الصحة **al-ṣiḥḥa**, 'the health', Ms. الصناعة **al-ṣinā'a**, 'the skill, the science'.

5. ἀποτρέποντα 62 a 16; Lat. dissuadentes; Bad. مواقع **mawāqi'**, 'topics'; Ms. موانع **mawāni'**, 'obstacles'.

6. [τὸ δ'οὐ ἔνεκα τὸ τέλος ἐστίν] 63 b 16; Lat. cuius vero gratia finis est; Bad. من اجل وقته تكون العناية **min aḡli waqtihi takūn al-'ināya**, 'because of its time it concerns'; Ms. من اجله وفيه تكون الغاية **min aḡlihi wa-fihi takūn al-gāya**, 'for its sake and in it is the goal'.

7. ὀλυμπιονίκη 65 a 25; Lat. Olympionico; Bad. العتق بنفس **al-mu'taq bi-nafs**, 'freed by a soul'; Ms. الميوييس (sic!) for الميونيقيس **Ulumfiyūniqis**, 'Olympic'.

8. ἄψυχα 66 a 30; Lat. inanimatum; Bad. القديمة بالانفس **al-qadima bi 'l-anfus**, 'eternal by the souls', Ms. العديمة بالانفس **al-'adima bi 'l-anfus**, 'deprived of soul'.

9. ἐκόντα 68 b 6; Lat. unumquodque, voluntarius; Bad. بالسنة **bi 'l-sunna**, 'in the tradition'; Ms. بالمشيئة **bi 'l-maṣi'a**, 'willingly'.

10. ἐναντίοις 87 a 12; Lat. in contrariis; Bad. في اضواء **fi aḍwā**, 'under lights'; Ms. في اضداد **fi aḍḍād**, 'in opposites' (=in opposition).

11. ὅσα τοιαῦτα 87 a 15; Lat. quaecumque talia; Bad. وما اشبه ذلك **wa-mā ašbaha dālika**, 'and similar to that'; Ms. ومهما كان من هذا النحو **wa-mahmā kāna min hādā 'l-naḥw**, 'be that as it may in this manner'.

Badawi's deletions of words or phrases which do exist in the manuscript:

Here I give only some examples:

1. ὅσα μὴ 54 a 29; Lat. quaecumque...non; Bad. om.; Ms. ما لم **mā lam**, 'what not'.

2. μὴ δικαίως 55 a 32-33; Lat. non iuste; Bad. om.; Ms. بغير عدل **bi-gair**

'adl, 'without justice'.

3. καθ' 56 b 30; Lat. secundum; Bad. من قبل min qibali, 'from, by'; Ms. من قبل ان min qibali anna, 'by the fact that'.

4. ποιητικὰ 62 b 23; Lat. factiva; Bad. om.; Ms. فعل fi'l, 'fact'.

5. ποιητικὸν 62 b 18-19; Lat. factivum; Bad. om.; Ms. فعلاً fa "ālan, 'active'.

6. οὐ πάντα προαιρουμένοι 68 b 11; Lat. non coacti; Bad. عن تقدم ليس laisa 'an taqaddum al-ixtiyār, 'not from the anticipated will'; Ms. لا عن تقدم الاختيار laisa kulluhū 'an taqaddum al-ixtiyār, 'all of it is not out of the anticipated will'; Bad. om. كله kulluhū which is covered with πάντα.

7. οὗ μέμνηται ἢ ἐλπίζει 70 a 30; Lat. cuius reminiscitur aut quod sperat; Bad. عدم الذكر التاميل 'adam al-dikr al-ta'mil, 'without commemoration, holding out hopes'; Ms. عدم الذكر وعدم التاميل 'adam al-dikr wa-'adam al-ta'mil, 'without commemoration and without hopes'. It seems that the translator from the Greek has taken here οὗ ('adam) instead of οὗ (cuius).

8. φαίνεται 73 a 15-16; Lat. videtur; Bad. om.; Ms. ترى turā, 'it appears'.

9. ποιεῖν 76 a 15; Lat. facere; Bad. om.; Ms. فعل fi'l, 'act'.

Badawi's transposition of phrases:

If one refers to the line 98 b 27, one will notice that in Badawi's edition it is Autocles who is speaking to Maximenides, while the opposite is the case in the manuscript. In other similar passages where the manuscript text is poor, Badawi may have correctly read a few words. Still, he fails to give us any indication of the criteria which he uses in combining these words with the other phrases.

1. ἔστιν γὰρ τὸ μὲν παράδειγμα ἐπαγωγή, τὸ δ' ἐνδύμημα συλλογισμός 56 b 1-2; Lat. hoc quidem inductio est, hoc vero syllogismus, aliud autem apparens syllogismus; Bad. وبهذه الحال فان البرهان شئ من الاعتبار والتفكير شئ من السليسة يوجد هاهنا ايضاً wa-bi-hādihi 'l-ḥāl fa-inna 'l-burhān šay' min al-i'tibār, wa-'l-tafkīr šay' min al-salḡasa yūḡad hāhunā aiḡan, 'and in this way the demonstration is part of induction; and the enthymem is part of syllogism; it is found here'; Ms. وبهذه الحال يوجد هاهنا ايضاً wa-bi-hādihi 'l-ḥāl yūḡad hāhunā

aidan (the rest is like Badawi's edition), 'and it is found also here in this way'.

Inclusion of marginal and/or interlinear variants in the text established by Badawi:

One can see some examples of this kind of error in the following examples:

1. *καὶ ᾧ τὸ ἐναντίον μείζον* 64 a 31; Lat. cui contrarium maius; Bad. *tumma allati didduhā a'zam hiya afḏal*, 'then the things the opposite of which is greater are preferable'. The Ms. has the word اعظم 90 **a'zam** in the margin.
2. *ἀδύνατον γάρ* 80 a 33; Lat. impossibile; Bad. *لانه لا يمكن ان يكون المرء* **li-annahū lā yumkin an yakūn al-mar**, 'it is not possible that one is'; Ms. *ان يكون* **an yakūn**, 'that it be' is in the margin.
3. *ὅσοι μὴ* 80 b 25; Lat. quicumque non; Bad. *من كان لا* **man kāna lā**, 'whoever not'; Ms. *كان لا* **kāna lā** is in the margin.

Badawi's typographical errors?

1. *ὁ δ' ἐκκλησιαστής* 54 b 7; Lat. prefectus; Bad. *رئيس الجميع* **ra'is al-ḡamī**; Ms. *رئيس الجمع* **ra'is al-ḡam**.
2. *ὀρισάμενοι* 55 b 24; Lat. determinantes; Bad. *ف نجد* **fa-naḡid**, 'we find'; Ms. 98 *ف نجد* **naḡudd**, 'we determine'.
3. *ποιοῦντα* 60 b 12; Lat. operari; Bad. *يضيعون* **yaḏī'ūna**, 'they lose'; Ms. *يصنعون* **yaṣna'ūna**, 'they do'.
4. *ἀσφαλείας* 61 a 19; Lat. firmitatis; Bad. and Lyons *التحرز* **al-taḡarruz**, 'to be on one's guard'; Ms. *التحرر* **al-taḡarrur**, 'to be freed'.
5. *διοριστέον* 62 a 14; Lat. determinabitur; Bad. *ينبغي ان نجدها* **yanbaḡī an naḡidahā**, 'it is necessary that we find it'; Ms. *ينبغي ان نحددها* **yanbaḡī an naḡuddahā**, 'it is necessary that we define it'.
6. *τὰ κακὰ καὶ τὰ γαθὰ* 78 b 12; Lat. mala et bona; Bad. *السورور والخيرات* **al-surūr wa-'l-ḡairāt**, 'the joy and the good'; Ms. *الشورور والخيرات* **al-ṣurūr wa-'l-ḡairāt**, 'the evil and the good'.
7. *οἱ πλοῦσιοι* 78 b 28; Lat. divites; Bad. *الاغنياء* **al-aḡbiyā**, 'the ignorant'; Ms. *الاغنياء* **al-aḡniyā**, 'the rich'.

My contributions to Rudolf Kassel's new edition of the Greek text and to M. C. Lyons' new edition of the Arabic manuscript:

When Prof. R. Kassel was preparing his new edition of the Greek *Rhetoric* in Berlin, he asked me to translate for him the first book and many passages from the other two books of the AVAR into German, which I did.²¹ In order to provide him with accurate information, I compared Badawi's edition with a photocopy of the manuscript and checked my readings against the original in Paris.

Since Badawi claimed to have used the Greek original²² for his reconstructions of the Arabic text, I attempted to make use of my meagre knowledge of Greek to compare Badawi's reconstructions with the Greek text, edited by Ross.²³ By comparing Badawi's edition with the original in Paris on the one hand, and, with the Greek text on the other hand, I discovered as I have shown above that Badawi's edition was very poor. I ultimately published a critique on his edition in 35 pages in Persian.²⁴

About four years later, in 1979, M. Lyons (Cambridge) wrote to me to say that he was planning a new edition of the Arabic manuscript. In response to his inquiry, I provided him with the text of my critique in Persian and with further unpublished material that I had at my disposal. My material also contained additions and omissions in the Arabic version as against the Greek original. M. Lyons seems to have forgotten to mention in his apparatus the items which I had emended in Badawi's edition as partly listed above and those which I had sent to him as not yet published material. Thus he did not give due credit to my contribution to his edition, even though he included P (indicating Panoussi) in his sigla and added there "I am particularly grateful to Dr. Estiphan Panoussi for sending me a number of his comments on Badawi's text, together with suggested emendations".²⁵

Lyons' edition of the AVAR is thus a correction of Badawi's edition. His reading of the AVAR goes back to the year 1959,²⁶ but he published the text in 1982. His publication was also helped by the edition of Averroes' commentary on Aristotle's *Ars Rhetorica*.²⁷

Lyons' edition is divided into two volumes. Volume one contains the edition of the text and a commentary. The second volume, approx. 300 pages, is a Greek-Arabic and Arabic-Greek glossary.

Yet Lyons' edition is far from being perfect. It still contains many errors. But many of these mistakes are in the manuscript, too, and they must be emended by recourse to the Greek original and to the hypothetical Syriac reconstruction. Here are some examples of these mistakes:

1. *ἢ μέγας ἢ μικρός* 69 a 26; Lat. aut magnus aut parvus; Bad. او شبحاً او ضخماً **au šabiḥan au ḡaximan**, 'either a phantom, or a big one'; Lyons didn't emend Badawi's reading and reads it himself as او نحيفاً **au šaiḥan au ḡaḡi'an**, 'thin or huge'; او شيخاً او ضجماً **au šaiḥan au ḡaḡi'an**, 'either an old man, or a bed-fellow'.
2. *πρέπει* 90 a 12; Lat. convenit; Bad. فمثل **fa-mitl**, 'for it is like'; Lyons reads it as فيجمل **fa-yuḡmal**, 'and it will be summarized'; Ms. فمحتمل **fa-muḥtamal**, 'for it is probable'.
3. [*δικαίως ἐπόνθεν*] *ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐχ ὑπὸ σοῦ* 97 a 29; Lat. iuste passus est, sed forsitan non a te; Bad. om.; Ms. ان فعلت لى ما لى ولكن عسى ان يكون عدلاً مثله **fa-bi-'adl laqā, mā laqā wa-lākin 'asā an yakūna 'adlan mitlahū**, 'he justly suffered what he did suffer; however it might not be a similar justice'. The word مثله **mitlahu**, 'similar, like it' should be emended in منك **minka**, 'from you'. Lyons didn't read مثله **mitlahū** but read directly as منك **minka** to match the Greek *ὑπὸ σοῦ*.
4. *πῶλος* 'donkey' 1400 b 21; Ms. ابيض **abyaḡ**, 'white', neither Badawi nor Lyons have recognized that a Syriac word which could be read both as همارة **hemārā**, 'donkey' and هواره **hewārā**, 'white' had confused the Arabic translator. The words همارة **hemārā** and هواره **hewārā** look nearly alike in Syriac writing. Lyons however suggests λευκός for πῶλος!²⁸
5. *εἰρήνης* 59 b 22; Lat. de pace; Bad. الشر **al-šarr**, 'the evil'; Ms. الشين **al-šain** (sic!). It seems that here a reconstructed Syriac سعين **šainā**, 'peace', has been transliterated into Arabic instead of being translated! Hermannus Alemannus' Latin translation here has 'paci'²⁹ which attests either the existence of another version of the AVAR, or a Hermannus' taking recourse to a better reading among the commentaries.³⁰ Lyons reads السر **as-sar** and emends it into السلم **as-salam** to give the meaning 'peace'.
6. *ἀτεχνότερον* 1404 a 15-16; Ms. هو بزيادة غير طباعى **huwa bi-ziyāda ḡair ṭibā'i**, 'in addition, it is unnatural' (sic!). The Greek comparative

suffix is mostly translated as بزيادة **bi-ziyāda**, ‘in addition’, and τέχνη, being a loanword محصر in Syriac, looks in its written shape like محصر **‘ṭab’ā** which has been translated into Arabic as طباعى **ṭibā’ī**, ‘natural’. The negativ prefix *ā-* has been translated as غير **gair**, ‘not’. Neither Badawi nor Lyons have emended this item according to the reconstructed Syriac intermediary.

7. *εὐλόγως* 68 a 23; Lat. *rationaliter*; Bad. *الشرورية* **al-šarrūriya**, ‘the iniquity, the evil’; Ms. *الشرورية* **al-šarrūriya** (sic!). The Syriac form here may be supposed to have been *[ܒܝܫܪܝܬܐ]* **[be-]šarrirūtā**, ‘truly, assuredly, certainly’. The Arabic has transliterated the word instead of translating it. Here Hermannus Alemannus has ‘cum augmento’; therefore, Lyons emends the item here *تتميته* **tanmiyatuhū**, ‘with his increase’.

8. *ὅλον εἴ τις εἴπειεν σημεῖον ὅτι νοσεῖ, πυρεττεῖ γὰρ* 1357 b 14-15;
 Lat. ut si quis dicat signum quoniam egrotat, febricitat enim; Bad.
 والحمى فَنَقُولُ الْقَائِلَ (هو مريض، لانه) في الكد والحمى **fa-ka-qaul al-qā'il** <huwa marīḍ,
 li-annahū> fi 'l-kadd wa-'l-ḥummā, 'as if someone states <he is ill,
 because> he is in pain and fever'; Lyons فَنَقُولُ الْقَائِلَ فِي الْكَدِ وَالْحُمَى **fa-ka-**
qaul al-qā'il fi 'l-kadd wa-l-ḥummā, 'as if someone states he is in
 pain and fever'; Ms. والحمى فَنَقُولُ الْقَائِلَ فِي الْكَدِ وَالْحُمَى **fa-ka-qaul al-qā'il** fi
 'l-kadd wa-[read fa-]'l-ḥumma فالحمى 'as if someone states that
 there is illness, [it is because] there is fever'. Badawi has additions
 according to the French translation and Lyons didn't emend the
 والحمى **wa-'l-ḥummā** in فالحمى **fa-'l-ḥummā**.

9. ἡ ἐπεργάσασθαι μὲν ἀλλ' οὐ δημοσίαν, ἡ διειλέχθαι μὲν τοῖς πολέμοις ἀλλ' οὐ προδοῦναι 74 a 5-6; Lat. aut exercere sed non publicatione, aut disputavimus quidem cum bellis sed non prodere; Bad. بانه فعل <الاعتداء على ارض الجار لا على الدولة> و بانه فعل <الامر سرّاً> لكن ليس جهراً أو. bi-annahū fa'ala <al-i'tidā> 'alā arḍ al-ḡār lā 'alā al-daula>wa-bi-annahū fa'ala <al-amr sirran> lākin laisa ḡahran, au bi-annahū kallama al-'adūwa lākin laisa li-yuslima al-madīna, 'that he infringed <upon the land of the neighbor but not upon the land of the state> and that he did <so in secret> but not publicly, or that he talked to the enemy but not for the purpose of surrendering the city'; Ms. بانه فعل لكن ليس جهراً أو بانه كلّم العدو لكن ليس ليسلم المدينة bi-annahū fa'ala lākin laisa ḡahran, au bi-annahū kallama

al-‘adūwa lākin laisa li-yuslima al-madina, ‘that he trespassed but not publicly, or that he talked to the enemy but not to surrender the city’. Badawi’s additions here do not stem from a lacuna in the manuscript but from the following French translation: “avoir empiété sur le terrain du voisin, mais non sur les terres de l’état; avoir eu des entretiens avec l’ennemi, mais non avoir trahi”.³¹ The verb **نعل** **fa’ala**, ‘he did’, here stands for Greek *ἐπεργάσασθαι* which seems to have been translated into Syriac as **حب** **‘ebar**, ‘trespassed’. This word **حب** **‘ebar** looks like the word **حب** **‘ebad** in Syriac writing, and the latter means exactly ‘he did’ which is the option given in the Manuscript. There is also no need for any addition. Lyons however adds after **نعل** **fa’ala** a word like **نمار** **fa-‘āra** ‘caused injury’ to fit his reading to the Hermannus translation as ‘inique’. But given the fact that there is no space in the Ms. for any lacuna or any reconstruction, one is not allowed to force the text, but one must deduce that there probably either existed another AVAR-tradition known to Hermannus, other than that of Paris AVAR, or Hermannus had, as Lyons assumes, recourse to the lectiones meliores in the commentaries of Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes.³² Lyons himself is aware of the fact that Hermannus in some cases does not adopt so-called copyist’s errors of the AVAR, in some other cases he avoids difficulties in translating, for example, concepts as proper names and in some other cases it seems that he chose other variants. However, Lyons has deduced that these facts may reflect “the development of the manuscript tradition of the commentary rather than that of its original”.³³

10. *τὸ ἐναντίον κακόν, τοῦτ’ ἀγαθόν* 62 b 30-31; Lat. cui contrarium malum, hoc bonum; Bad. **anna ‘l-muḏādd li-‘l-šarr ḥair**, ‘the opposite of the evil is good’; Lyons **في ان الشر المضاد خير** **fi anna ‘l-šarr al-muḏādd ḥairun**, ‘the opposite evil is good’; Ms. **ان الشر للمضاد خير** **anna ‘l-šarr li-‘l-muḏādd ḥairun**, ‘the bad for its opposite is good’.

11. *ὀλιγαρχίας δὲ πλοῦτος* 66 a 5; Lat. oligarchie autem (finis) divitie; Bad. **و غاية الخساسة الرياسة باليسار** **wa-gāyat al-xasāsa al-riyāsa bi-‘l-yasār**, ‘governing through wealth is the worst of worst things’; Lyons **و غاية الخساسة الرياسة اليسار** **wa-gāyat al-xasāsa al-riyāsa al-yasār** (sic!)?; Ms. **و غاية رياسة الخساسة باليسار** **wa-gāyat riyāsat al-xasāsa bi-‘**

yasār, 'and the goal of oligarchy consists in wealth'. The Ms. has the word رياسة **riyāsa**, covering -αρχία in the margin and it belongs to الخساسة **al-xasāsa**, covering ὀλιγ-, rendering oligarchy.

12. πεντεσυρίγγω νόσῳ 1411 a 22; Ms. سورينغو نوس **sūringū nūs**; Lyons didn't emend this.

13. ἄιδον Bad. and Lyons have الابوان **al-abawān**, 'the parents', which covers the word πατρός; Ms. الايدار **al-idār** is to be emended to [الايـدا] **al-idā[w]** to cover ἄιδον.

14. πατρός 1417 a 32; Bad. suggests الى **ilā**, 'to, till, toward'; Lyons reads هبطا **habaṭṭā** 'they both fell headlong'; Ms. ميـطا **miṭā**, to be emended to بيـطا **biṭā** to match the first part of πατρός. The final -ā in بيـطا **biṭā** corresponds to the letter R in πατρ-. In Syriac the final -ā can nearly have the same shape as the normal R in west Syriac manuscript writing.

15. ἀντιλέγοντας 1415 b 36; Bad. and Lyons have يقيسون الكلام **yaqīsūna 'l-kalām**, 'they measure the speech'; Hermannus Alemannus has 'examinant'; Lyons says "the Arabic indicates ἀναλέγοντας".³⁴ Ms. has سون الكلام ... يا **ya'...sūna 'l-kalām**; there is a lacuna for only one consonant which must be restored as -k- so that we get the word يع[ك]سون الكلام **ya'kisūna 'l-kalām** which adequately covers the sense of the Greek word since the Greek prefix ἀντι- has very often been translated as the Arabic verb عكس '-k-s.

Conclusion:

It is, first of all, regrettable that we do not yet have a critical edition of the AVAR's Latin translation³⁵ by Hermannus Alemannus which would undoubtedly have helped both editors of the unique Paris manuscript of the AVAR.

Nevertheless, both the editions of Badawi and Lyons merit great praise. However, the numerous errors in Badawi's edition and the fewer errors in Lyons' edition cannot merely be considered to have been caused by the very poor state of the manuscript, but there are many other factors in this connection, for example, the almost homographic words in the Syriac writing.

Only a documented glossary, not only of rhetorical and some basic terms like Lyons', but of all the words in the AVAR, could serve as

a preliminary work to a new edition with reconstruction of so many lacunas and inadequacies in the AVAR. Not only such a documented glossary as a concordance containing all kinds of words in the AVAR, is necessary for a better edition of this text, but also because of the fact that in spite of centuries of cultural contacts between the Orient and the Occident and in spite of so many centers and institutions for the study of classical languages, on the one hand, and of the oriental languages, on the other hand, there is still no adequate Greek-Arabic dictionary to use in our studies of the first translations done from Greek into Arabic during the very first centuries of Islamic culture.

To remain an optimist in this matter, I wish to announce here that I have already prepared a complete glossary of the AVAR in manuscript form, and I am seeking an opportunity to work on it in collaboration with some scholars in classical linguistics who are interested in interdisciplinary study.

Students of Arabic linguistics should be encouraged to pursue not only modern synchronic studies of the language for purposes of concern in modern times, but also historical and comparative linguistics. In consequence, they would become familiar with other Semitic languages, too, like Syriac, which played a great role in transmitting Greek cultural heritage to the rise of Islam.

I hope that students of oriental languages will also find interest in learning Greek and that young scholars in classical linguistics will find interest in learning some of the oriental languages such as Syriac and Arabic in order to enable fruitful collaboration between the two fields of scholarship in research in those areas which have unfortunately become no-man's land between the different academic disciplines.

Notes

* This article will be presented here as it was read on the 7th of February 1992 as a trial lecture prior to the author's appointment as the new senior lecturer at

the Department of Oriental Studies, Gothenburg University. Thereafter it has been in part published as "The Arabic Version of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (AVAR) and its Edition by 'Abdurrahmān Badawī", in: *Semitica. Serta philologica Constantino Tsereteli dicata*, curaverunt Riccardo Contini, Fabrizio A. Pennacchietti [et] Mauro Tosco. Torino 1993, 201-211.

1. *Aristūṭālīs, Al-ḫiṭāba. Al-tarǧuma al-'arabiya al-qadīma*, ed. 'Abdurrahmān Badawī, Cairo 1959.
2. D. S. Margoliouth, "On the Arabic Version of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*", in *Semitic Studies in Memory of Rev. Dr. Alexander Kohut*, Berlin 1897, pp. 376-387.
3. J. Tkatsch, *Die Arabische Übersetzung der Poetik des Aristoteles und die Grundlage der Kritik des Griechischen Textes*, 2 Bde, Wien-Leipzig 1928-32, I, S. 141 ff.
4. Kh. Georr, *Les Catégories d'Aristote dans leurs versions Syro-Arabes, Edition de textes précédée d'une étude historique et critique et suivie d'un vocabulaire technique*, Beirouth 1948, 183 ff.
5. Cf. *op. cit.*, vi-xxx.
6. S. M. Stern, "Ibn al-Samḥ", in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1956, pp. 31-44.
7. W. Heinrichs, *Arabische Dichtung und Griechische Poetik*, Beirut 1969, 114 ff.
8. M. C. Lyons, *Aristotle's Ars Rhetorica, The Arabic Version, A new Edition, with Commentary and Glossary*, 2 vols., Cambridge 1982. Reviewed by Wolfhart Heinrichs, in *Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften*, hrsg. von Fuat Sezgin, Bd. I, Frankfurt a. M. 1984, pp. 312-316.
9. *op. cit.*, p. 44.
10. His book review of Lyons' edition: M. C. Lyons, *Aristotle's Ars Rhetorica*, p. 313.
11. Cf. *op. cit.*, p. 189.
12. Cf. *op. cit.*, p. 43-44.
13. Cf. *op. cit.*, p. 255.
14. Cf. E. Panoussi, "Some annotations relating to the Arabic Version of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (AVAR), in *Studia Semitica Necnon Iranica, Rudolpho Macuch Septuagenario ab Amicis et Discipulis Dedicata*, ediderunt Maria Macuch/Christa Müller-Kessler/Bert G. Fragner, Wiesbaden, 1989, pp. 195-196.
15. Cf. E. Panoussi, *loc. cit.* in *Studia Semitica...*, p. 196.
16. Cf. M. C. Lyons, *op. cit.*, I., his commentary to 1409 a 18.
17. Cf. E. Panoussi, *loc. cit.* in *Studia Semitica...*, pp. 195-200.
18. Even Lyons' edition doesn't lack mistakes.
19. *Rhetorica, Translatio anonyma sive Vetus et Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka*, ed. Bernhardus Schneider, Leiden 1978.
20. Syriac qauṭūtā (<QNT>) e.g., is translated as xauf 'fear', faz^c 'consternation'

and xaṭar 'danger, menace'. Cf. J. Eugène Manna, *Vocabulaire Chaldéen-Arabe*, Mossoul 1900 s.v.

21. Cf. R. Kassel, *Der Text der Aristotelischen Rhetorik, Prolegomena zu einer Kritischen Ausgabe*, Berlin 1972, 88 ff.

22. Cf. *op. cit.*, p. xxx.

23. *Aristoteleis Ars Rhetorica*, Oxford 1959.

24. Estifān Pānūsī, "Dar bāra-yi nārasā'ihā-yi čāp-i xiṭāba-yi Aristū bi 'Arabī az ṭaraf-i 'Abdurrahīmān-i Badawī", in *Revue de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines de l'Université de Téhéran*, Téhéran 1975, II-III, 145-180. Cf. Wolfhart Heinrichs' book review of Lyons' edition, p. 312.

25. *op. cit.*, I, p. xxxv.

26. Cf. *op. cit.*, p. xiii.

27. *Ibn Rušd, Talxīṣ al-xiṭāba*, ed. Muḥammad Salim Sālim, Cairo 1967.

28. Cf. *op. cit.*, I, commentary to 1400 b 21.

29. Cf. *loc. cit.*, commentary to 1409 a 18.

30. See *infra*, note 33.

31. J. Voilquin-J. Capelle, *Aristote, Art Rhétorique et Art Poétique*, Paris 1944, p. 125.

32. Lyons states: "Information derived from Hermannus about the manuscript tradition of the Arabic can be supplemented from the works of the commentators and in particular the commentary of Ibn Rušd. It must, of course, be apparent that Ibn Rušd's readings have to be treated cautiously. Unlike the works of Ibn Sinā and al-Fārābī, his commentary is largely dependent on paraphrasing or omitting what he found obscure, he can also be credited with emendations". *Op. cit.*, I, p. xxi.

33. *ibid.*

34. Cf. *op. cit.*, his commentary to 1415 b 36.

35. Parisinus 16673 and Toletanus 4715.

On the Originality of “IZUTSU”
Oriental Philosophy
MAKINO Shinya

As is well known by those interested in philosophy, the collected works of the late Professor IZUTSU Toshihiko were published several years ago. From just a glance at these volumes, we come to know how wide the scope of his research activities was. The first volume, *Philosophy of Mysticism, a study on Greek philosophy*, written in the days of his youth, the second volume, *Islamic Culture*, the third volume, *Russian Humanity*, the fourth volume, *Structure of Meaning, a semantic study of the Qur'anic world-view*, the fifth volume, *Islamic Philosophy*, the sixth volume, *Consciousness and Essence*, the seventh volume, *Translation of the Holy Qur'an*, the eighth volume, *A Study on the Qur'an*, the ninth volume, *Oriental Philosophy*, and so on. In this way, the scope of his research extends from Greek philosophy and the philosophy of the European Middle Ages to Islamic thought, Judaic thought, Ancient Indian philosophy, Chinese philosophy of Lao-tzu, Buddhist philosophy of Yuishiki and Kegon, and the philosophy of Zen Buddhism, so that his research activities find no place to stop at any moment.

Furthermore, the writings which are contained in the collected works are all those written in Japanese. In addition to these there are ten and several bulky volumes of monographs written in English, which are considered to be far more important as his academic

works. Because of this, only about half of his scholarly achievements are available to the public, therefore a total picture of IZUTSU's philosophy is not rightly grasped except by very few people.

Meanwhile, it is related that Professor IZUTSU's outstanding ability allowed him to master more than twenty foreign languages and after that he investigated many cultures of the world and elucidated especially the essence of religions and philosophical systems of various peoples by making free use of these languages. Of course, such a matter is certainly observed in Professor IZUTSU's work, but it cannot be said that the true nature of Professor IZUTSU's research works is rightly valued here.

Accordingly, I intend to state in the following a part of what I consider as the real focus of Professor IZUTSU's research. As I mentioned above, much has been written about the extensive scope of his research activities. In these days, when learning tends to be specialized and subdivided increasingly, it is certainly surprising that the sphere of his research activities contains within it the principal cultures of the world, such as Europe, Arabia, Persia, India, China and Japan, and develops really on a global scale. However, the true trait of his research works does not consist only in such vastness, but it must be noticed that his research is extremely deep as well as peerlessly original in each sphere of his research activities.

Here I have first of all expressed the peculiarity of IZUTSU's philosophy by the key words "depth" and "originality", which are somewhat abstract. So, I mean to explain it more concretely from the standpoint of subject matter and method respectively in IZUTSU's philosophy.

Making a general survey of all his works, we find diverse themes and topics appearing successively. If we, however, observe more carefully, we come to realize that there exists among the themes a strikingly important subject matter, namely a fundamental subject which is the very starting-point of IZUTSU's philosophy. And this basic subject does not always appear externally, but it resounds penetrating through the basis of all his works, like "basso continuo" in the Western Baroque music.

Now, what is this basic subject matter? Stated concisely, it is a

basic subject of "Relationship between philosophical thinking and mysticism" which arises from an awareness of problem of "Contemplative experience lying latent in the depth of philosophical thinking". And it is to be noticed here that IZUTSU did not think out the basic subject by a mere philosophical thinking, but it originated in the depth of his peculiar existential experience. In order to explain this fact, I must mention his unique spiritual development in the days of his youth.

As stated in the preface of his early voluminous work, *Philosophy of Mysticism*, he was born and brought up in a Japanese Buddhist home, which was filled with the atmosphere of Oriental Nothingness, and was taught a method of introspection, namely a kind of Zen practice, by his own father, who was himself a Zen master. The method was performed in the following way: his father, having written a word "kokoro" which means mind, on a piece of paper, gave it to him in order to let him gaze at the written word for a definite time every day. Then, after having seen that the time was ripe, his father bade him to annul the written word and commanded that he should look at the word written in his mind, not the word written on the paper, concentrating his attention on it ceaselessly. After a while, his father bade him to obliterate completely the word written in his mind, and to gaze at the living mind behind the written word. And furthermore, he bade him not to see even his mind, but he should banish all sorts of confusion of inside as well as outside, and give himself up entirely to no-mindedness. And it was strictly admonished that he should not make any intellectual inquiry into the method of Zen practice even after accomplishment in the practice, let alone in the middle of the practice.

So, at that time, he himself did believe firmly that this method of Zen contemplation was nothing but a way of practice completely and that it was neither permitted to think reflectively about it, nor on the basis of it. Much less did he imagine that philosophy and metaphysics, which are recognized to be typical thinking activities of human beings, could be brought into existence on the basis of such contemplative experience.

But, when he later read works written by Western mystics, he

came to know a quite opposite state of affairs. Namely, repelling the above-mentioned strict discipline of his parent's home which was filled with the Oriental spiritualism, he came to feel afterwards for a time, more attraction for the Occident than for the Orient and devoted himself to the study of Greek philosophy as the origin of the Western culture. Through the process of this research he found that which he had never supposed hitherto. That is to say, in the Greek philosophers, such as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and Plotinos that very contemplative experience, namely a kind of mysticism, is found as the source of their philosophical thinking, and exists at the very depth of their philosophy.

Incidentally, concerning mysticism it is often misunderstood as something mysterious or occult, but it has nothing to do with such kind of things. The mysticism, as it is stated here, is a scholarly well-recognized concept, which is defined as man, opening the depths of his consciousness, becomes directly aware of the real state of his own self and grasps by doing that the ultimate whole situation of the existence including the subject and the object.

The discovery of mystical experience as the source of philosophical thinking became the starting-point for the subsequent whole of IZUTSU's philosophy. Namely, it was not merely a discovery within the sphere of Greek philosophy, but also it became the origin of thinking, when IZUTSU extended the scope of his research activities to Islamic philosophy, Judaic thought, Indian philosophy, the Chinese philosophy of Lao-tzu, the Yuishiki and Kego philosophy of Buddhism, the philosophy of Zen and so on. Therefore, when he conducts research into any of these diverse spheres, the basic theme of the "Relationship between philosophical thinking and mysticism" runs through his study consistently.

Furthermore, I intend to examine the originality of IZUTSU's philosophy from the standpoint of its methodology. Concerning the method it can be stated first of all that IZUTSU's philosophy is through and through linguistically or semantically oriented. Namely, when any of the above-mentioned Oriental and Occidental philosophical systems is investigated in IZUTSU's philosophy, it is not researched merely by speculation, but the essence of thought is ex-

plicated through an analysis of the text which expresses the thought and especially analyzing thoroughly the meaning of key-terms in the text. As the basis of the method for analyzing the thought, IZUTSU's philosophy, being not satisfied merely with the semantics developed in the West, is founded on "depth semantics" which it developed originally absorbing much from the philosophical traditions of the East such as Islamic philosophy, Buddhistic philosophy and Chinese philosophy of Lao-tzu. And the core of this depth semantics consists in the idea of Araya-consciousness of meaning and the theory of semantic articulation.

Generally speaking, it is exceedingly difficult to grasp meaning. When we examine meaning, we usually see language itself restricting it to the level where language functions as a codified and systematized social custom. So, the meaning as it is described in dictionary, or conventional meaning, as it is understood in common sense terms, merely such meaning becomes subject of examination. In brief, even if we talk about meaning, nothing but the superficial meaning becomes the subject of discussion.

However, language has its latent deep structure below the superficial layer, which is fixed as social system, and in this deep layer the meaning of words is not fixed, but flowing and floating, so that it exists merely as latent potential energy of meaning which awaits to be apparent and active. This latent potential energy of meaning is called "shūji" i.e., "seed" in the Buddhistic Yuishiki philosophy, and a subconscious stratum called Araya-subconsciousness is postulated as the place where the "shūji" arises, accumulates and perishes.

In this connection, Yuishiki philosophy sets a model of three-layered structure of consciousness. (1) Superficial stratum as a field of sensation, perception, thinking, imagination, feeling and volition. (2) Intermediate stratum of ego-consciousness as existential centre of all experiences. (3) Deep stratum, which is called unconsciousness or subconsciousness in modern psychology. This third stratum of deep consciousness is nothing but the above-mentioned Araya-consciousness.

IZUTSU's philosophy develops this concept of Araya-consciousness in the direction of semantics and calls it the Araya-

consciousness of meaning. Namely, the afore-said third deep stratum of consciousness is made the image for the store place of “shūji”, the potential energy of meaning, which has not yet appeared as fixed meaning or has not been put in the code of language as social system.

The Araya-consciousness of meaning is not merely the store place of half-made, unsettled and indefinite meaning, but also the place, from which something looking like meaning arises in its vague and unarticulated state, for the first time. In short, it is the subconscious sphere, where all that which is called meaning is born and grows up.

Whatever man experiences, be it speech or action of body or working of the mind, does never fade away without throwing its shadow on the subconscious depth. Even a trivial matter inevitably leaves its trace behind it. All the traces of that which man experiences innerly and outerly make Araya-consciousness to be store place for “karma”. And the “karma” traces are transformed into the “shūji” i.e., the seed of meaning immediately or gradually. Thus the Araya-consciousness is conceived as the subconscious sphere, where the “karma” traces of man’s mental and physical actions are accumulated. However, strictly speaking, each “shūji” arises and perishes at every moment, therefore it is not so that the same “shūji” is stored up continuously.

In this way, it is in the consciousness of each individual that the “shūji” of meaning is realized concretely, but the Araya-consciousness itself goes beyond the bounds of the individual’s mind. Namely, it extends horizontally going beyond the experience of each individual, while it is represented vertically as a sphere of collective subconsciousness containing the whole life experiences which all people have ever undergone. Therefore, it is conceived that the whole “karma” traces of all the people, which have changed into “shūji” are contained in the Araya-consciousness.

The Araya-consciousness, as it is conceived here, is inner language or depth language. Numerous potential energies of meaning, which have not yet become fixed as the meaning recorded in dictionaries are flowing and floating in the darkness of the subconsciousness. These potential energies of meaning, which appear then vanish, vanish then appear, form a total picture of dynamic relation of meaning, getting

united with, melted and undone from each other. And the totality of this relation of meaning acting in the deep subconsciousness supports the meaning structure of outer language which functions on the superficial level of consciousness. In other words, in the depths below our empirical reality the potential energies of meaning are always at work in the Araya-consciousness.

Next, we turn to the theory of semantic articulation which forms another core of the depth semantics as the methodological basis of IZUTSU's philosophy. Concerning the relationship between matter and language it is considered in common sense way, namely that first of all the world exists and there are in the world various and diverse matters, being divided or classified from the beginning, while language follows these matters and traces them. On the contrary, the theory of semantic articulation holds conversely that in the beginning there is neither division nor classification, but there exists merely undivided and unarticulated chaos of primordial experience. Then, the human consciousness, upon which is deeply imprinted the mesh-structure of meaning, divides and articulates the undivided chaotic raw materials. And each of these divisions, being fixed by "name", becomes meaningful congelation points of existence, appears on the opposite side of human consciousness, with objectivity, as if it were existing by itself from the beginning.

Not merely matters, but also complicated, multi-layered mutual relation of various matters to each other, are all defined basically by meaning and the meaning relationship which are latent behind them. And we experience the world as a cosmos, i.e., as a meaningful existence, because the above-mentioned potential energies of meaning which are being accumulated in Araya-consciousness are vitalized and become active in the sphere of our superficial consciousness. Namely, something like spirit, which arises from the potential energies of meaning accumulated in Araya-consciousness, works on perception mechanism of our superficial consciousness, divides and articulates the chaotic totality of our primordial experience. And each of these divisions yields the image of existence as a definite, articulated matter.

It is extremely difficult to grasp the essence of IZUTSU's philoso-

phy. This time, however, I have tried to show how it is peerlessly original and deeply rooted in Professor IZUTSU's own existence, both from the standpoint of its subject matter and method respectively.

*Le Soufisme entre Louis Massignon
et Henry Corbin**

Christian Jambet

Le Professeur T. Izutsu a symbolisé, par son œuvre et par son enseignement, l'esprit le plus authentique de la philosophie comparée du fait religieux. C'est qu'il pouvait, d'un égal savoir, faire correspondre les systèmes de pensée appartenant aux grandes aires de civilisation, et je me souviens, avec émotion, de sa présence à Londres, auprès des étudiants de l'Institute of Ismaili Studies, que dirigeait alors le Dr. Landolt. Le Professeur Izutsu leur enseignait les arcanes de la pensée indienne, puis, aussi librement, il en venait à Birûnî. De l'Inde à l'Iran et à l'islam, de la Chine au Coran, il savait provoquer de tels voyages spirituels que l'on en revenait enrichi de la plus précieuse et de la plus rare substance: celle qui délivre des frontières étroites de l'esprit et rend l'esprit à sa vraie dimension: l'infini et l'universel. Cela sans la moindre abstraction, sans généralités. L'infini concret des vraies relations.

En philosophie islamique, lire les auteurs d'Ispahan, des grands penseurs de l'époque Safavide, c'était, ipso facto, rencontrer le nom de l'un de leurs meilleurs interprètes, le Professeur Izutsu. C'est à Téhéran, en compagnie du Professeur Corbin, que la première fois j'eus la joie de l'entendre et ce souvenir m'est aujourd'hui un bien vif encouragement. Cela, comme l'amitié bien connue qui liait le Professeur Izutsu et le Professeur Corbin, justifiera peut-être qu'en hom-

mage au premier je présente ici cette communication où il est si fortement question du second de ces maîtres.

Parler des relations qui unirent Louis Massignon et Henry Corbin, comme de leurs recherches respectives consacrées au soufisme, plus particulièrement au soufisme iranien, c'est rappeler d'abord un lien de filiation et de transmission.

«Il faut dire, écrit H. Corbin, que le philosophe, devenu étudiant d'arabe égaré chez les linguistes, pensa périr d'inanition en n'ayant pour toute nourriture que grammaires et dictionnaires. Plus d'une fois, au souvenir des nourritures substantielles que dispensait la philosophie, il se demanda; que fais-je ici? où me suis-je égaré? il y avait cependant un refuge. Ce refuge s'appelait Louis Massignon. . . .»¹

Ce fut plus qu'un refuge contre l'ennui philologique, qu'il fallait accepter au titre de la rigueur, qu'il convenait de surmonter en ne cédant jamais sur le primat de la philosophie, du désir de philosophie. Assez étrangement, Louis Massignon devint, en études orientales, ce que É. Gilson devait être en philosophie chrétienne, et ce que Heidegger serait pour la métaphysique et son destin: il renforça chez Henry Corbin quelques certitudes initiales, l'évidence de quelques vérités fondatrices. C'est dire quel événement majeur, dans la vie de H. Corbin, fut le don que lui fit, un jour, Massignon, d'un exemplaire lithographié du *Livre de la Sagesse orientale* (*Kitâb Hikmat al-Ishrâq*) de Sohrevardî. Cette édition contenait les commentaires de Qotboddîn Shîrâzî et les Gloses de Mollâ Sadrâ Shîrâzî. Elle dévoilait la lignée transhistorique des *Ishrâqîyûn*, et leur ultime éclosion dans les controverses philosophiques de la Renaissance safavide.² Il convient sans doute au chercheur en spiritualité islamique de faire semblable rencontre. Il lui faut la chance d'un dialogue de toute une vie avec le maître spirituel dont il tentera de restituer l'intuition première et qui sera pour lui un intercesseur et un guide dans le continent qu'il explore. Et il paraîtra plus tard que la rencontre était prédestinée par la vérité qu'elle seule pouvait aider à exprimer. Hallâj fut pour Massignon ce maître invisible et Sohrevardî le fut pour Corbin. À partir du centre incandescent occupé par la person-

nalité exemplaire du *Shaykh al-Ishrâq*, Henry Corbin vit irradier les cercles de la philosophie iranienne islamique. Si la critique radicale opérée par Ghazâlî pouvait frapper une philosophie de l'entendement, elle restait inopérante devant la synthèse systématique réalisée par l'avicennisme illuminatif. L'on comprenait mieux, dès lors, pourquoi la philosophie avait perduré en Iran, dans l'Orient du monde islamique, résistant aux offensives des pieux ascètes comme à celles des littéralistes: elle était devenue apte à s'élever à la hauteur des sciences spirituelles tout en conservant sa puissance démonstrative. Elle était un moment de l'histoire supra-sensible de l'esprit. Le développement de l'histoire de la philosophie islamique par Henry Corbin est l'illustration de cette simple thèse, telle que le prologue de la *Sagesse orientale* de Sohrevardî l'énonce:

«S'il se rencontre à une époque donnée un sage qui ait à la fois profondément pénétré en l'expérience mystique et en la connaissance philosophique, c'est à lui que revient l'autorité terrestre, et c'est lui le khalife de Dieu.»³

La pratique philosophique n'est plus étrangère au mode de vie du spirituel, et le soufisme n'est plus l'adversaire de la philosophie, mais discours et expérience, concept et sensation ne conjoignent. Telle est la situation de la métaphysique en terre d'Iran: elle rend vaine l'opposition abstraite du poème et de la prose démonstrative, parce qu'elle surmonte cette opposition avant même qu'elle ne se fige, et qu'elle est l'union indissoluble de la raison et de la présence, du désir et du mouvement spéculatif, du travail des concepts et des problèmes, d'une part, de la vision suréminente immédiate d'autre part.

Louis Massignon identifie, le plus souvent, la philosophie islamique et les *falâsifa*. Il adopte ainsi le point de vue qui était celui de Renan, annonçant la mort de la philosophie en terre d'Islam après Averroès, à la condition d'entendre par là l'épuisement de la *Falsafa* et d'elle seule. En effet, Renan ajoutait à ce jugement célèbre celui-ci qui l'est bien moins: l'avenir de la métaphysique, après Averroès, appartenait aux courants de pensée spéculatifs et mystiques, singulièrement ismaéliens et extrémistes. Du moins, la philosophie proprement dite, identifiée au rationalisme hellénique, passait-elle pour déclinante, en voie de lente extinction. C'est cela même que retient Massignon. Il

considère les philosophes de l'islam comme de simples "rationalistes", incapables de s'élever à la hauteur requise par le témoignage d'amour envers Dieu et la compréhension de l'amour de Dieu envers l'homme. Hallâj, selon Massignon, identifia le Désir et l'Essence divine, «alors qu'à l'imitation des "premiers" philosophes helléniques, les *falâsifa* musulmans ne faisaient de l'Amour qu'un Démonurge.»⁴ La supériorité du soufisme hallâgien sur la philosophie néoplatonisante tiendrait à ceci: les philosophes, tout en faisant de l'Amour une propriété native de l'existant, situeraient son règne au niveau de l'Âme du monde, et ne parviendraient pas à le percevoir au sein même de l'Unité divine, qu'ils jugeraient immobile et impassible. Les spirituels du soufisme, après Hallâj, disposeraient d'une théorie bien plus audacieuse de l'Amour, identique à l'Essence divine elle-même, travaillée par une inquiétude sans remède, celle de l'essentiel Désir. Voilà pourquoi Massignon privilégie les hérauts du témoignage sacrificiel et les situe bien plus près du vrai que les tenants de l'émanatisme platonisant. Dans une très belle page où il médite l'épreuve de Ibn Sab'în, Louis Massignon écrit:

«Il comprit que l'élément médiateur entre l'homme et l'Essence divine ne pouvait être une émanation angélique (teintée de matière) comme l'unité de l'Intellect passif d'Ibn Sinâ ou l'unité de l'Intellect actif d'Ibn Rushd. Il découvrit que toute l'humanité croyante pouvait être philosophiquement décrite comme en processus d'identification à Dieu par une *Forme* suprêmement enveloppante (*ihâta*), Parole créatrice (*kalima jâmi'a*) et Spiritualité personnalisante (*rûhânîya 'isâwîya*), constituant chaque Élu humain en *Muhaqqiq al-tawhîd*, c'est-à-dire en Témoin, dans le temps, de la Réalité divine.»⁵

Négligeons ici de vérifier l'exactitude factuelle de telle ou telle de ces assertions. Seule compte l'inspiration, la visée souveraine de Massignon. Aux "formes apparitionnelles" des philosophes, il préfère la forme divinisante du Témoin, qui communique à l'Élu ce destin: avérer, effectuer le *Tawhîd*, éprouver en soi, dans le dépouillement de soi, la puissance de l'Unité divine.

Quant aux shi'ites, Massignon les observait souvent au prisme du procès de Hallâj, sous les traits de cette bourgeoisie de Bagdad,

confortablement installée dans l'ordre du califat sunnite, organisée dans l'absence de son Imâm autour de ses enseignants et de ses financiers, hostile eux soulèvements populaires comme aux paradoxes des "Gens du Blâme". Mais il savait aussi déchiffrer l'ésotérisme subversif des Qarmates, le sens de la mission de Salmân, la puissance du legs de Fâtima l'Eclatante.

En offrant à Henry Corbin de se consacrer pleinement à Sohrevardî, penseur sunnite mis à mort par les Docteurs de Saladin, Louis Massignon rendait possible une réconciliation entre philosophie et soufisme, entre shî'isme spirituel et soufisme, entre shî'isme et philosophie. Dans l'esprit de Henry Corbin, la "philosophie illuminative" fut autre chose qu'un moment de l'histoire temporelle, empirique de la philosophie en islam. Elle acquit un rôle normatif et une fonction herméneutique. Elle permit de comprendre comment étaient surmontées les contradictions provisoires qui opposent le péripatétisme et la quête platonicienne de la Lumière, l'héritage des religions de l'ancien Iran et celui de l'islam. En suivant le fil du courant *ishrâqî*, sans négliger les vives controverses qu'il fit naître, Henry Corbin vit s'orienter le destin de l'avicennisme iranien loin des pratiques stériles d'une ratiocination dialectique (ce dernier terme, entendu au sens étroit de l'exercice logique des opinions probables est toujours péjoratif chez Corbin, influencé sur ce point par une certaine lecture des stoïciens). La raison la plus authentique était celle qui culminait en une préparation au pèlerinage spirituel, en un exode de l'âme. De là cette réinterprétation de l'édifice avicennien lui-même, —qui, aujourd'hui encore, ici ou là, scandalise quelques esprits simples, qui ne parviennent pas à concevoir ce qu'est au vrai un *symbole*, et préférèrent s'en remettre au dictionnaire usuel plutôt qu'à Leibniz, à Dilthey ou à Schelling.⁶ De là, aussi bien, la réinterprétation du sens originaire de l'ismaélisme et du shî'isme duodécimain, délivré du recouvrement opéré par les politiques étatiques et reconduit à sa source purement exégétique et mystique.

Cette transmission de Sohrevardî, qui fut décisive, ce geste en apparence anodin («Tenez, je crois qu'il y a dans ce livre quelque chose pour vous») et pourtant si riche d'avenir, ne doivent pas masquer un certain conflit d'interprétation. Des divergences réelles

existent, qui séparent ces deux maîtres, quand ils doivent se donner une conception générale du soufisme. Peut-être le nom qui symbolise le mieux le point où passe la ligne de fracture est-il celui de Ibn 'Arabî. On sait que Henry Corbin consacra à celui qu'il considéra toujours comme «le plus grand théosophe de l'Islam» un livre qui fait époque, et l'on sait aussi qu'il mit en valeur l'impact singulier du Maître andalou en Iran. Il s'agit bien de plus que d'une quelconque influence; il s'avère, à la lecture de H. Corbin, que la gnose de Ibn 'Arabî a configuré le soufisme iranien spéculatif, qu'elle lui a permis de vaincre les difficultés qu'il connaissait. Ces obstacles théoriques et pratiques, le soufisme iranien les tenait de la radicalité même de l'expérience hallâgienne, tout spécialement de l'épreuve de "l'anéantissement" en Dieu. D'autre part, H. Corbin montra que la résistance du shî'isme à sa propre dégradation en politique cléricale se fit, dans l'œuvre imposante de Haydar Amolî, autour d'une incorporation de la méditation du Shaykh al-Akbar à la théorie shî'ite de la *walâya*. Enfin il souligna l'importance de la dimension proprement philosophique de l'œuvre de Ibn 'Arabî pour les penseurs d'Ispahan et de Qom, importance si grande qu'Ibn 'Arabî peut être considéré, à l'égal de Plotin, *et lu comme lui*, comme la source prévalente de la métaphysique d'un Mollâ Sadrâ. En condensant, en exhibant les traits épars au long de l'œuvre immense que composent les *Conquêtes spirituelles de la Mecque*, formant le puzzle d'une théorie compacte de l'Imagination créatrice, Henry Corbin fondait sa propre conception du *mundus imaginalis*, qui lui permettrait de comprendre la cohésion de l'architecture réelle des univers spirituels en métaphysique iranienne.

À l'inverse, Louis Massignon ne manifesta jamais de sympathie pour l'édifice des *Conquêtes spirituelles de la Mecque*. La thématique de l'imagination visionnaire lui était foncièrement étrangère. La question des questions était celle du rapport paradoxal, impossible et nécessaire à la fois, entre l'Un indicible de la divinité, le Réel créateur et la réalité créaturelle de l'amant. Comment accéder à ce Réel, ou mieux dit, si tout "accès" est interdit, comment témoigner de l'unicité du Réel, du *tawhîd* authentique? comment congédier toute multiplicité, toute altération de l'Un? Les faces imaginales, les multiplications de l'Unité dans les heccités éternelles semblent à Louis

Massignon disperser l'unité divine et faire participer les créatures à la dignité de leur Seigneur. La distinction de degré, qui s'impose entre le *Deus Absconditus*, le mystère insondable de la divinité cachée (*al-ghayb*) et les niveaux hiérarchisés de la manifestation seigneuriale ne saurait avoir pour Louis Massignon l'importance qu'elle aura pour Henry Corbin. Celui-ci verra dans les mondes médians et médiateurs du néoplatonisme la ressource offerte par la métaphysique à la quête du mystère divin, tandis que Massignon valorise, dans l'expérience hallâgienne, l'épreuve de ce qui se refuse à toute médiation. Comment pouvait-il admettre, dès lors, la doctrine des manifestations théophaniques et l'angélologie de Ibn 'Arabi? La multiplication du divin était, à ses yeux, perte de Dieu. L'immanence néoplatonicienne de l'Un au multiple de ses apparitions, mal contredite par l'excès de signification de l'Un eu égard à ces mêmes multiplicités, n'était plus que panthéisme ou «monisme existentiel». Selon Henry Corbin, la perte de Dieu et son congédiement résultent du *ta'tîl* comme du *tashbîh*, l'une de ces deux erreurs de jugement étant toujours solidaire de l'autre. La vision théophanique épargne au théosophe mystique l'une et l'autre, en offrant une manifestation de l'invisible, une profération de l'indicible, qui n'est pas une multiplication de l'Un mais de sa révélation. Ce n'est pas Dieu qui est en toute créature, mais toute créature qui est en Dieu, qui exprime Dieu.

Pour comprendre ce qui engendre une divergence radicale entre Louis Massignon et Henry Corbin, le mieux est de comparer leurs interprétations des paroles de Hallâj. C'est l'expérience de Hallâj qui condense, pour Louis Massignon, les leçons achevées du soufisme. C'est en se détachant de ces leçons, ou en les entendant autrement, que Henry Corbin soutient sa propre vision du soufisme.

Nous partirons d'une brève citation, que Sohrawardi fait de Hallâj en son *Symbole de foi des philosophes*: «*hasbu'l-wâhid ifrâdu'l-wâhid la-hu*». ⁷ Ces mots nous sont conservés dans le récit que Shibli fit de la passion de son maître, qui les prononce, crucifié, dans sa réponse au disciple. Louis Massignon en donne deux versions:

«Ce qui compte pour l'extatique, c'est que l'Unique le réduise à l'unité,» ⁸

et

«Ce qui compte, pour l'extatique, c'est que son Unique le réduise à Son unité.»⁹

Cette dernière interprétation exprime parfaitement le sens que déchiffre Massignon: l'objet du désir est l'extinction en l'Unique, la réduction de toute dualitude, de toute multiplicité ou séparation apparentes, par l'opération divine. Le terme de l'opération ne saurait être que la disparition de l'identité provisoire et de la singularité illusoire du disciple d'amour. Voici la version que propose Henry Corbin et le commentaire qu'il en donne:

«Ce qui suffit à l'Unique, c'est que l'unique le fasse un»; «L'Un se constitue comme Un, et c'est cela l'être. L'être se constitue chaque fois en constituant *un* être. *Monadam monadare*, disait Leibniz.»¹⁰

Le premier *wâhid* ne désigne plus, ici, l'extatique, mais bien l'Unique, soit ce qui se constitue comme Un. Pour cette constitution dont il est sujet, il requiert de l'Un qu'il le fasse un, qu'il monadise. La phrase de Hallâj désignerait l'activité constituante de l'Un, qui n'est autre que sa multiplication en monades, en unités, par où son Unité authentique se déploie et s'établit dans l'être. Lecture néoplatonisante de Hallâj, toute empreinte de Proclus, et sans nul doute cohérente avec les schèmes sohravardiens; dans un premier temps, H. Corbin avait assigné au premier *wâhid* une signification proche de celle que Massignon lui donnait:

«Ce que désire l'unique, c'est que l'unique le fasse un».¹¹

Traduction de transaction, de consensus, pourrait-on dire, cette interprétation ménage pour une part celle de L. Massignon. Le sujet de «ce qui suffit», du *hasb*, ou du désir, c'est encore l'unique (chez Massignon l'extatique, celui qui est sorti hors de son propre être par le fait qu'il s'est desquamé de toute multiplicité) et l'unique attend de l'Un d'être par lui *fait un*. Ici, déjà, les deux lectures divergent, puisque l'objet, le but recherché par le désir, selon Massignon est disparition, selon Corbin surexistence et assumption de l'unité singulière. De la lecture par Massignon à l'ultime lecture par Corbin, en passant par la

première interprétation de celui-ci, nous obtenons le périple herméneutique suivant:

Massignon: le mystique tient pour essentiel, pour son "compte", d'être "réduit" à l'unité (divine).

Corbin (première version): le mystique désire que l'Un (divin) lui communique son unité et le fonde *comme un*.

Corbin (deuxième version): l'Un (le Réel divin) se constitue comme être en étant fait *un* (monade expressive) par l'Un: auto-opération de l'Un sur l'Un qui monadise les monades, les singularités. Distinction de l'Un constituant et de l'Un constitué.

Cette dernière interprétation est bien fidèle à la situation de Hallâj, tel qu'il est évoqué par Sohrevardî, en compagnie d'autres maîtres, comme Abû Yazîd Bastâmî, l'Imâm 'Alî ou même le Christ, dans le *Livre des Tablettes*.¹² Citant à nouveau la phrase de Hallâj, Sohrevardî en fait le témoignage du rattachement de l'âme pensante à la condition seigneuriale divine. Faite une par l'action de l'Un, l'âme devient «semblable à son Père céleste» comme le veut le commandement de l'Évangile selon St. Matthieu (5/48). Ainsi, Henry Corbin lit-il Hallâj dans le miroir de Sohrevardî, en fonction de la doctrine de l'illumination, qui fonde chaque singularité de lumière (chaque âme ou Lumière régente) dans la procession des Lumières advenantes et dans le retour vers les Lumières archangéliques et la Lumière des Lumières. L'interprétation platonisante est renforcée encore par le commentaire de *Wadûd Tabrizî*, qui conçoit l'esseulement de l'Unique à la façon dont Socrate enseigne la libération de l'âme à l'égard de son enveloppe matérielle et son retour au monde immatériel.¹³

Le souci de Henry Corbin aura été de réhabiliter, entre la déité insondable de Dieu, la pure transcendance du Dieu caché, et la personne du fidèle, du spirituel, la médiation du Dieu révélé en une Face qui s'adresse singulièrement à ce fidèle et qui le guide vers son unification. L'unité du Maître et du fidèle, du Seigneur et du vassal d'amour n'est possible que si le Seigneur est le maître *personnel* du fidèle, son *alter ego*, et non pas s'il est le néant surexistant de la déité originelle. C'est ainsi que Corbin réhabilite la fonction théophanique

des expressions de la divinité, des manifestations des Noms et des Opérations. Le terme de l'expérience mystique ne saurait être, selon lui, l'anéantissement ou la consommation, mais plutôt ce qui vient rédimer cet anéantissement et supprimer la consommation et l'intégrant en une surexistence. La mystique selon H. Corbin est une mystique du *baqâ'*.

C'est pourquoi la figure de Hallâj typifie très souvent la tragédie d'un soufisme qui ne parvient pas à surmonter la damnation volontaire et la tentation du néant. Hallâj, d'abord entendu avec l'oreille néoplatonicienne de Sohrevardî, devient la victime de l'*hybris*.¹⁴ Le shî'isme, grâce à l'imâmocentrisme, évite le *Anâ'l-Haqq*, et le soufisme d'un Rûzbehân l'évite aussi, grâce à la célébration de l'amour humain, miroir de l'amour divin. Voici ce qu'écrit Henry Corbin, commentant Semnânî:

« Dans un rapprochement saisissant, Semnânî établit une connexion entre la séduction à laquelle cède le dogme chrétien de l'Incarnation en proclamant l'homéousie et en affirmant que 'Isâ ibn Maryam est Dieu et l'ivresse mystique dans laquelle un Hallâj s'écrit: "Je suis Dieu" (*Anâ'l-Haqq*). Il y a une symétrie des périls: d'un côté le soufi en éprouvant le *fanâ' fî'llâh*, le confond avec une résorption actuelle et matérielle de la réalité humaine dans la divinité; d'un autre côté, le chrétien opère un *fanâ'* de Dieu dans la réalité humaine. »¹⁵

Le refus du dogme de l'Incarnation est fondé sur celui de l'absorption de la divinité en l'humanité, la rejonction de l'une et de l'autre en une seule et même réalité étant la ruine de la métahistoire et de la puissance événementielle, transhistorique de la Croix de Lumière. Le decétisme de Semnânî, qui est l'expression de son islam, mais qui aussi bien, devient celle de la gnose, répugne au *fanâ'* de l'homme en Dieu, parce que celui-ci prépare le *fanâ'* de Dieu en l'homme. Si Henry Corbin relève cette position de thèse, c'est qu'il est lui-même hanté par le désir de contrarier le destin hégélien du christianisme, enraciné dans la théologie conciliaire. Au soufisme de Hallâj, qui correspond fort bien au christianisme fidèle à l'incarnation du Verbe, au paulinisme, H. Corbin préfère la théologie des univers médians, qui réserve éternellement la distance où la syzygie du Seigneur et du

Fidèle se sauve de ce monde et de son histoire. Que l'on mette en regard des lignes que nous venons de citer, celles-ci de Massignon:

«Le *holâl*, clef de voûte de la dogmatique hallâjiyenne, —c'est l'*information divine* dans le cœur du saint, qui se trouve alors transporté dans un état permanent d'Union essentielle où, — après la transformation de ses *sifât*, il se trouve "transsubstantié" en essence divine, —sans confusion ni destruction, —et acquiert ainsi sa personnalité définitive, suprême, *Anâ*.»¹⁶

Ici, l'union est *information*, donation de la forme divine, de la forme de l'essence divine. Mais qu'est-ce que la forme de l'essence? dans la perspective de Louis Massignon, cette forme n'est pas l'émanation de l'essence, elle n'est pas la forme du premier émané, Intelligence, Verbe. Elle n'est pas épiphanie, distincte du secret fondement indicible, mais l'indicible même. Quant au témoignage de l'homme, il est transsubstantiation, le mystère de l'Eucharistie n'étant rien d'autre que le mystère de la destination de l'homme:

«Associé ainsi à la vie divine, le saint devient en ce monde le *hûwa hôwa*, c'est-à-dire le "Témoin actuel", chargé de proclamer Dieu à la face de la création, —l'Homme par excellence, —où s'incarne par l'opération de l'Esprit ce *nâsut* divin, qui brilla chez ses prédécesseurs les Prophètes, chez Adam, chez Jésus.»¹⁷

L'ipséité divine peut, sans doute, résister à toute confusion avec la nature de l'homme, et la distinction des deux natures ne pas être détruite, Louis Massignon n'en met pas moins en rapport très étroit la fonction du *témoignage*, qui suppose l'extinction en Dieu, et la manifestation d'une humanité divine, descente incompréhensible de la Face humaine de Dieu dans l'homme.

Tout ce qui appartiendrait à des mondes médians, entre ipséité divine et humanité ne serait que strates multiples de la *réalité* et non Réel créateur. Nous avons dit la répugnance de Massignon à l'égard du théophanisme d'Ibn 'Arabî. L'angélologie est idolâtrie:

«Les natures angéliques, que l'idolâtrie des Qurayshites vénère comme maîtresses absolues des astres (*gharânîq*), ne sont que des *noms* stériles, impuissants à nous unir à l'essence divine inaccessible.»¹⁸

Cette essence est le seul Réel, et Massignon adopte la proposition de

Hallāj:

«Et le Réel est encore au-delà de la réalité; car la réalité n'implique pas le Réel.»¹⁹

La distinction du Réel indicible et de la réalité pleinement constituée des nominations de ce Réel est déterminante de toute spiritualité ordonnée à la *via negationis*. L'accent sera mis très différemment sur cette distinction, qu'on insiste sur l'aptitude de la réalité émanée du Réel à médiatiser l'accès à ce Réel, tout en préservant le secret de son retrait, —c'est l'orientation de Henry Corbin, ou bien qu'on insiste, dans la perspective hallâgienne et massignonienne sur la *non-implication* du Réel dans et par la réalité, sur le devoir de rejeter la réalité pour s'unir, dans la consommation de soi, au Réel:

«Or la réalité est réalité et la nature créée. Rejette donc loin de toi la nature créée, pour que toi, tu deviennes Lui, et Lui, toi, dans la réalité!»²⁰

Ce rejet prend la forme de la damnation volontaire, de l'épreuve subie d'un anéantissement sans rémission ni consolation créaturelle, où la passion de l'Un contredit et subit la Loi, expression de la volonté et de l'Impératif auquel l'amour veut s'unir, auquel il ne peut s'unir qu'au prix de la perte. Parlant des hallâgiens, L. Massignon écrit:

«Pour cette secte, la mort ignominieuse de son maître—condamné en ce monde, et dammé dans l'autre, —était la vérification suprême de sa doctrine: choisir la damnation par pur amour. Il avait prouvé la loi islamique, il s'en était constitué le témoin, — *shahîd*, —en se faisant condamner en ce monde par la communauté islamique, et exclure dans l'autre des élus, en acceptant d'avance sa sentence et son dam, par amour.»²¹

L'expérience spirituelle authentique est celle du Réel, et elle ne saurait atteindre son terme sans consommation. Il s'agit de se consumer, de s'amenuiser, de se volatiliser, comme il est dit dans ces lignes des *Tawâsîn*:

«La lueur de la chandelle, c'est la "science de la réalité"; la chaleur de la chandelle, c'est la, "réalité de la réalité"; rejoindre la chandelle (brûlante), c'est le Réel de la réalité.»

Et:

«Il ne se satisfait pas de sa lueur, ni de sa chaleur, il se précipite tout entier en elle. . . . Mais lui-même, à ce moment, se consume, s'amenuise, se volatilise (dans la flamme, y) demeure sans traits, sans corps, sans nom, sans masque reconnaissable. Et puis, dans quelle intention s'en retournerait-il vers ses pareils, et dans quel état, maintenant qu'il *possède!*»²²

Évanouissement, anonymat, évanescence de toute singularité, diminution (et non perfectionnement, l'idéal philosophique), tout cela afin de ruiner l'édifice substantiel.

Tel est précisément le vertige qui doit être conjuré, selon Henry Corbin, si l'union transformante doit être salut et non pas damnation. Il ne s'agit certes pas d'une sorte de "recul" devant l'expérience extrême, ni de quelque refus du Réel, mais d'un jugement qui porte sur l'accès même au Réel. La voie hallâgienne accède au Réel, mais au point d'anéantissement qui est l'aboutissement du pèlerinage, ce Réel se renverse en réalité, puisque nul "espace" n'existe plus entre réalité et Réel. De même, dira souvent H. Corbin, si le *zâhir* disparaît, le *bâtin* et la *haqîqa* se transforment en *zâhir*, en apparence exotérique. L'accès au Réel doit préserver l'abscondité du Réel, et c'est pourquoi il faut maintenir que l'union a lieu avec *son Seigneur* personnel, le *rabb* dont le fidèle est le *marbûb*. L'union atteste de l'accès à l'Un et vérifie que seul l'Un est, tout en réservant, en amont de cet Un qui est, la place du *ghayb*, de l'Inconnaissable, l'Un qui n'est pas. Le "vertige" qui résorbe l'Un dans l'être est ainsi conjuré.

«C'est, écrit Henry Corbin, ce qu'Ibn 'Arabî dénomme le *sirr al-robûbiya*, le secret qui fait du Seigneur un Seigneur, et qui permet de dire non pas avec Hallâj: «Je suis Dieu» (*Anâ'l-Haqq*), mais avec Ibn 'Arabî, «Je suis le secret de Dieu» (*Anâ sirr al-Haqq*).»²³

Entre *fanâ'* et *baqâ'*, extinction et surexistence, le soufisme trouve ainsi deux approches dont les noms emblématiques de Louis Massignon et de Henry Corbin sont les symboles.

Notes

- * Communication faite à la journée d'études consacrée à Louis Massignon, par l'Institut d'Études iraniennes, sous la direction du Pr. Yann Richard, à l'Université de Paris III (Sorbonne Nouvelle) en Octobre 1994.
1. «Post-scriptum biographique à un entretien philosophique», in *Henry Corbin* ("Cahier de l'Herne", Ch. Jambet éd., Paris, 1981) p. 40.
 2. Il s'agit de l'édition lithographiée à Téhéran, datée de 1315 h.l. Louis Massignon en offrit un exemplaire à H. Corbin en 1928. À preuve de ce que l'ouvrage ne quitta plus celui-ci, cette inscription, p. 544 de la lithographie (qui servit à l'édition de Sohrevardi dans la Bibliothèque iranienne et aux cours ultérieurs sur Mollâ Sadrâ aux Hautes-Études): «Finis d'imprimer mon édition le 12 janvier 1952».
 3. Sohrevardi, *Le Livre de la Sagesse orientale*, trad. H. Corbin, Lagrasse, Verdier, 1986, p. 90.
 4. L. Massignon, *La Passion de Hallâj*, 2e éd., Paris, Gallimard, 1975, I, p. 24.
 5. L. Massignon, *op. cit.*, II, p. 335.
 6. Ainsi qu'on est stupéfait de le voir dans l'ouvrage érudit de D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, Leiden, Brill, 1988.
 7. Cité par Sohrevardi, *Risâle fî i'tiqâd al-hokamâ*, *Œuvres philosophiques et mystiques*, II, Téhéran-Paris, Département d'iranologie, 1952, p. 267, l. 1. La phrase de Hallâj est publiée, dans le récit de Shibli, par L. Massignon et P. Kraus, *Akhbâr al-Hallâj*, Paris, 1936, p. 36. l. 7 du texte arabe.
 8. *Akhbâr al-Hallâj*, p. 71 du texte français.
 9. *Passion de Hallâj*, 2ème éd., Paris, 1975, I, p. 57.
 10. Sohrevardi, *L'Archange empourpré*, Paris, Fayard, 1976, p. 13.
 11. Sohrevardi, *Œuvres philosophiques et mystiques*, II, p. 85 du texte français.
 12. *Le Livre des Tablettes*, in *L'Archange empourpré*, p. 102.
 13. *L'Archange empourpré*, p. 118-119.
 14. H. Corbin, *Face de Dieu et face de l'homme*, Paris, Flammarion, 1983, p. 225.
 15. H. Corbin, *L'homme de lumière dans le soufisme iranien*, 2ème éd. Sideron, Présence, 1984, p. 138.
 16. L. Massignon, «Ana al-Haqq: Étude historique et critique . . .» (1912), in *Opera minora*, II (Y. Moubarac, ed.), Paris, PUF, 1969, p. 34.
 17. *Ibid.*, p. 35-36.
 18. *La Passion de Hallâj*, III, p. 313-314.
 19. *Tawâstn*, II, 1, *Passion*, III, p. 307.
 20. *Tawâstn*, III, 8.
 21. L. Massignon, «Al Hallaj: le phantasme crucifié des docètes . . .» (1911), in *Opera minora*, II, p. 22.
 22. *Tawâstn*, II, 4.
 23. H. Corbin, *La Philosophie iranienne islamique aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles*, Paris, Buchet Chastel, 1981, p. 322.

La Révélation coranique et la Gnose islamique

Mikio Kamiya

En compagnie de Hallaj-Massignon

Pour Hallaj (857-922), voici sa silhouette par G.C. Anawati:

«Attachante figure, à la vérité, que celle d'al-Hallaj, mystique musulman mort sur un gibet, à Bagdad pour avoir chanté l'amour de Dieu en des termes que l'Islam officiel jugea blasphématoires. Depuis que Massignon lui consacra, en 1922, son livre monumental, sa personne se profile, à la fois sublime et pathétique, derrière toutes les grandes études sur la mystique comparée. L'expérience fulgurante de ce "pèlerin de l'absolu", dont la rançon fut la mort sur la croix, est, incontestablement, un sommet, sinon le sommet de la mystique musulmane»¹

et en ce qui concerne Massignon (Louis, 1883-1962) son profil par Y. Moubarac:

«Homme de science adonné à l'islamologie, mais dépassant largement ce domaine et y déroutant quelque peu ses pairs; homme de foi et fils soumis de l'Église, mais brouillant les pistes de l'œcuménisme et posant, dans une ouverture incomparable à l'Islam, un mode d'existence religieuse et de coexistence interconfessionnelle où les uns et les autres semblent ne plus se reconnaître; homme d'action politique où la royauté du citoyen, voire de l'officier français, prétend déboucher dans l'universalisme non violent par le biais d'une politique musulmane de la

France: tels sont dans la vie et l'œuvre de Louis Massignon des aspects qui méritent de retenir l'attention du chercheur. Les réactions à l'égard de Massignon, respecté, aimé ou redouté au cours de sa vie, semblent se fondre depuis sa mort dans un concert d'éloges où quelques amis sincères se trouvent surpris entre ceux qui, de son vivant, paraissaient devoir être ses fossoyeurs et les collectionneurs habituels de palmes sur les charognes. C'est dire que la signification de la vie et de l'œuvre de Massignon ne se dégagera que le jour où ceux qui en ont été profondément choqués oseront le dire, islamologues notamment, théologiens et politiques. Or, il semble que les uns et les autres s'en prennent entre-temps à telle œuvre secondaire de "disciple" ou à tel aspect mineur de l'œuvre, quand c'est l'œuvre elle-même comme expression totale de l'homme qui les a heurtés.»²

Pour concevoir clairement le milieu intellectuel existentiel de Hallaj, précisons de plus la figure de Hallaj. Un traducteur, Sami-Ali, dit distinctement de la poétique de Hallaj:

«Fulgurante figure de la mystique en Islam, d'origine persane et de langue arabe, Hussein Mansour Al-Hallaj (857-922) appartient à cette rare pléiade de poètes pour qui la poésie fait un avec la pensée [. . .]»; «[. . .] puisque Hallaj est avant tout un mystique, un des plus grands de tous les temps, l'unité de la pensée et de la poésie chez lui trouve sa justification dans une expérience de la totalité qui sert à exprimer une relation unique à l'Unique. Expérience non mutilée, non mutilante, où l'âme coexiste avec le corps, la raison avec ce qui la nie, la finitude de la mort avec l'horizon de la résurrection³ [. . .].»

Ontologiquement, sous l'aspect d'une sémantique, les termes *Mort* et *Résurrection* ne sont pas distincts, car on ne peut, sans aucun doute, reconnaître la résurrection sans connaître ce qu'est la mort. La résurrection et la mort nous renvoient certainement à la même réalité ou au même Réel: elles nous reconduisent aux mêmes dimensions de l'Être, ou de l'Être en tant qu'être.

Il vaut mieux dire ici un mot de la sémantique ontologique, celle de Toshiko Izutsu.⁴ Dans le schéma de celle-ci, nous voyons qu'il n'y a pas de relation *unique* entre signifié et signifiant: par rapport au signifiant, un seul et unique, les signifiés correspondants, sont multi-

ples, équivoques mais *singulièrement*.

Cette singularité est un point constitutif, foncier et crucial. Pour la connaître d'emblée, symboliquement, l'image d'une pleine grappe de fruits est bien significative, ou même révélatrice. Il s'agit bien ici de l'articulation intérieure du signifié lui-même: la signification est l'espace de l'articulation intérieure du signifié en tant que sphère structurale organique. La totalité, dont il s'agit, nous apparaît donc comme différente selon l'élément sur lequel nous fixons notre attention, ou selon le côté d'où nous regardons la chose et son univers.⁵

Revenons à l'introduction claire du traducteur de *Poèmes mystiques*. Chez Hallaj, «la poésie est inséparable de la vie quand "*le chant est existence*" (Rilke), une vie tout entière tournée vers l'Unique, lequel unifie mais dans le déchirement, fait accéder au vrai mais dans le dépassement de tout.»⁶

Nous fixons notre attention sur les mots *déchirement*, *contradiction*, *dépassement*. Ces mots nous semblent des clés pour comprendre la pensée de Hallaj. Car il existe là, toujours, quelque chose de profond, quelque chose de "*subtil*" (Qorân 6, 103), de "*parfaitement informé*" (Qorân 6, 103) qui refuse de se figer, de se cailler, de se fixer. Ces termes sont en effet des paroles et en même temps des réalités. Pour cela, ils concernent toujours la totalité des êtres, visibles ou invisibles, c'est-à-dire les mondes intérieur et extérieur. Nous sommes toujours dans la perspective ontologique ainsi que sémantique.

Qu'est-ce que nous montrent-ils, au fond, ces termes *déchirement*, *contradiction*, *dépassement*? La Signification au-delà des significations antérieurement déterminées, fixées, l'Essence au-delà des essences *figées*. Cette Signification et cette Essence doivent être interprétées, car leur portée est cachée hors des déterminations et des définitions figées par la langue; elles transcendent, transgressent, les normes ordinaires et les sphères des significations auparavant établies. Elles renvoient à la nouvelle sphère, celle qui ne peut être conçue qu'au travers de la sémantique ontologique.

«La pensée n'est pas les idées—*des idées qui, au reste, n'existent pas chez Hallaj*—ni la poésie, la mise en forme didactique d'un savoir commun, c'est-à-dire d'une idée.»⁷

La différence, ou la distinction ontologiquement conçue, entre pensée et idée est un point tout à fait significatif chez Hallaj. *Des idées n'existent pas chez Hallaj.*

Pour cela, nous devons prendre les idées comme des gouttes de sang qui *se figent* et qui restent immobiles. On peut donc parler du mouvement de la pensée, mais non de celui des idées: les idées qui se figent sont des essences déterminées. Il peut parler de l'évolution de la pensée, mais non des idées. En d'autres termes, la pensée est mouvante. Elle est naissante et mourante à la fois: la pensée est une Parole qui naît et qui meurt en même temps. Sous l'aspect d'une sémantique ontologique, la poétique de Hallaj nous fait penser à l'articulation de l'Être, à l'articulation de la Singification.

L'historien n'admet pas, et ne veut pas admettre, cette différence foncière, fondamentale entre pensée et idée. En fin de compte, il n'arrivera pas à comprendre la pensée de Hallaj. Pour comprendre une pensée comme celle de Hallaj, il faut bien réaliser que quelqu'un pense, comme quelqu'un respire sous mes yeux, ou comme quelqu'un sort de la porte que je vois maintenant. En d'autres termes encore, la pensée est mouvante et «naissante» selon l'expression de Simone Pétrement.⁸

«La parole, chez Hallaj, quel que soit le “genre” auquel elle s'apparente, est ce trop plein qui *déborde*. [. . .] L'ailleurs, c'est ici, et c'est à la parole comme à l'ange de la Révélation qu'incombe la médiation. Car *la vérité n'est pas l'outrance*.»⁹

Le terme *débordement* nous fait penser implicitement aux termes *déchirement*, *contradiction*, *dépassement*. *La vérité n'est pas l'outrance*. On voit ici que le Réel, le Vrai agissent toujours en nous, avec nous mais secrètement.

Un hadith qodsî, *parole prophétique où Dieu parle à la première personne*, dit: «J'étais un trésor caché, j'ai aspiré à être connu; j'ai créé le monde afin d'être connu.» L'être et le connaître sont bien distincts, et en Dieu même.

Nous voyons ici la théorie hallajienne du Désir:

«Le Désir, dans la prééternité des prééternités, est l'Absolu, —en Lui, à Lui, de Lui, Il apparaît, en Lui, Il a paru^{9bis}.»

«C'est de celle pensée qu'il est question dans la poésie de

Hallaj, poésie où le visible est en même temps invisible et le différent identique.

“Plus caché que les pensées évidentes”, dit Hallaj. Et pourtant, il n’y a là aucune réduction mais plutôt un continuel dépassement, par le truchement de l’être qui indique avec tout son être, des catégories du “même” et de “l’autre”. C’est en cela que réside la difficulté de cette pensée qui est la pensée: ce qu’elle indique, par-delà l’affirmation et négation, aucun chemin n’y mène. Car seul l’anéantissement de soi dans l’Unique supprime toute distance, rend superfétatoire la distance:

“Nul éloignement pour moi après Ton éloignement, depuis que j’eus la certitude que proche et loin sont un”.

Une totalité est d’emblée visée, simultanément saisie en ses aspects contradictoires, et dite d’un seul souffle. Actes instantanés réitinérant l’*oscillation sémantique* des mots aux sens opposés.»¹⁰

Sans doute ne discerne-t-on ce qu’est la pensée de Hallaj qu’au fur et à mesure que l’on voit qui est substantiellement l’homme, qui s’appelle Hallaj.

Un mot sur Massignon. Il est vrai qu’il suit toujours Hallaj^{10bis}. Par conséquent, parler de Massignon est précisément parler de Hallaj: connaître Massignon est, en fin de compte, connaître Hallaj.

Massignon dit du *Coran*:

«[. . .] Le *Coran* est le premier texte arabe connu qui soit rédigé en prose et non pas en vers. Tant que les langues primitives restent *magiquement* captives du rythme poétique, elles ne peuvent faire concevoir purement l’idée, *elles ne peuvent devenir des langues de civilisation*. Ce n’est pas sans raison que le Prophète arabe dénonçait les poètes de son temps comme des “pos-sédés”. La rime et le mètre empêchent la libération de la pensée de la mnémotechnique. L’intention de la prose délivre la pensée des exigences métriques, des césures et des cadences. Évidemment, le *Coran* contient, surtout au début chronologique de sa notation, bien des passages en prose rimée, mais *la rime s’interrompt quand la pensée l’exige*, et ne la commande jamais. Telle est la première originalité du *Coran*.»¹¹

Voilà la pensée fondamentale de Massignon qui nous semble, au fond, un essai d'interprétation du *Coran*, comme toute la traduction du *Coran* l'est. Pour interpréter le *Coran*, il ne suffit pas d'être raisonnable, ni d'être cartésien, mais il faut être un qorân.

«La seconde originalité du *Coran*», dit aussi Massignon, «c'est son caractère d'avertissement insinué, pour faire réfléchir, entre les lignes, à une intention maîtresse, au-delà de la voix du messenger transmetteur, un texte "inspiré", j'emploie ce mot ici tout comme on dit d'un article de journal qu'il est inspiré: entendez qu'à travers la personnalité du signataire notre pensée est attirée vers le véritable auteur de l'article, il y a là une technique très particulière de la phrase.»¹²

Massignon écrit, après avoir donné d'abord la traduction de la sourate *al-Fâtiha*, et par laquelle «s'ouvre» le *Coran*, et ensuite le texte arabe, psalmodié, en mettant en relief cette double originalité du *Coran*:

«C'est bien là cette présentation discontinue et saccadée de la pensée que l'on trouvait déjà dans les Psaumes hébraïques et qui atteint ici à une densité encore plus forte.»¹³ Texte psalmodié mais présentation discontinue et saccadée de la pensée, tel est le *Coran*. Voilà une «forme parfaite de la Parole divine».¹⁴ Voilà une «dictée surnaturelle, enregistrée par le prophète inspiré».¹⁵ Massignon ajoute: «Si la chrétienté est, fondamentalement, l'acceptation et l'imitation du Christ, avant l'acceptation de la Bible, en revanche l'Islam est l'acceptation du *Coran* avant l'imitation du Prophète.»¹⁶

Massignon dit, en effet, dans une conférence du 20 mai 1949 à l'Université d'Alger: «Hallaj est le seul à avoir osé écrire qu'en Dieu même, l'essence est le Désir (*'ishq* . . .).»¹⁷

Comment peut-on relire cette parole? «En Dieu même, l'essence est le Désir.» Voilà un point final, l'origine des origines, la Lumière des lumières. C'est peut-être pour cette raison que Hallaj a été tué.

Dans la même conférence: «Dieu est . . . un pur Désir»; «Dieu est l'essence du vœu»¹⁸ (c'est le mot de Gandhi).

C'est le dernier mot de Massignon et en même temps celui de Hallaj. Mais quel est le rapport, au fond, entre ce terme et la sentence célèbre hallajienne: *Ana al-Haqq*, «Je suis la Vérité»?

«Suhrawardî d'Alep (1154-1191) . . . a admirablement montré, dit Massignon, qu'en le [*Ana al-Haqq*] criant, Hallaj donnait volontairement à autrui "dispense plénière de verser son sang"; et que ce cri attestait que Dieu avait exaucé sa fameuse prière: "Entre moi et Toi, il traîne un *c'est moi* qui me tourmente—ah, enlève, par Ton *c'est Moi*, mon *c'est moi* (*'inni*?) hors d'entre nous deux^{18bis}". »

La voix de Hallaj est une révélation (coranique) au sens plein du terme^{18ter}.

Relisons alors la parole de Hallaj. Méditons sur la vérité hallajienne. Maintenant nous la comprendrons un peu mieux, car nous venons de parvenir cette fois au mot ultime, au terme de nos recherches, de l'Être Lui-même.

S'il est vrai que nous ne pourrons jamais parvenir à la connaissance parfaite de l'homme, nous pouvons comprendre ce que l'homme a pensé, ce que l'homme a admiré, adoré, vénéré. Or l'homme *transcend* l'homme d'une part, et d'autre part l'homme *descend* sur l'homme, en son œuvre. Voilà une signification vraie et réelle d'*être homme*: la vérité et la réalité, qui sont deux axes principaux de la signification, ne font qu'un dans notre action et dans notre passion. Il n'y a pas de dualisme ici, entre vérité et réalité. Il est vrai que la parole de Hallaj est *subtile* à l'extrême: il faudrait penser toujours à l'oscillation sémantique pour comprendre la vérité hallajienne.

Selon Massignon, «la position originale de Hallaj en métaphysique» consiste à «identifier Le Désir, *'Ishq*, avec l'Essence Divine. Alors qu'à l'imitation des "premiers" philosophes helléniques, les *falsâfa* musulmans ne faisaient de l'Amour qu'un Démonstrateur¹⁹ [. . .]. »

Dieu créa l'homme à son image: le Désir le définit et le structure

La position d'identifier Le Désir à l'Essence Divine, pourra nous amener à une perspective qui se dessine au loin.

Relisons le verset biblique: «Dieu créa l'homme à son image: Il le créa à l'image de Dieu, Homme et femme [Litté.: *Mâle et femelle*] il les créa» (Genèse 1, 27),²⁰ et méditons-le. Car sa signification est, sans aucun doute, infiniment féconde. On ne peut connaître la sagesse de

Dieu dans son parfait accomplissement, mais on y accède par la simplicité et la pureté.

«Nous prêchons, dit Paul, la sagesse de Dieu mystérieuse [Litté.: *dans le mystère*] et cachée, que Dieu avait prédestinée avant les siècles, pour notre gloire» (1 Corinthiens 2, 7). Donc la sagesse de Dieu demeure par essence dans le mystère. En Dieu, la sagesse n'est pas séparée du mystère. On ne peut comprendre la sagesse de Dieu, car il y a quelque chose d'inconnaissable dans le mystère divin.

Pourquoi un homme *désire*-t-il une telle chose? Parce qu'il ne la possède point, et ne pourra jamais la posséder.²¹ On ne possède pas la personne *aimée*, on ne possède pas la chose *voulue*. Le désir, l'amour et la volonté manifestent bien la séparation ontologique entre «je» et «non-je», c'est-à-dire «lui». Pour effacer cette séparation, mon «je» doit mourir. Nous sommes, peut-être, très proche de la pensée de Hallaj. Dire que mon «je» meurt, c'est dire que «je» ne désire pas, que «je» ne veux pas. «Je» ne désire pas *être*.

Par conséquent, désirer au sens du plus profond du terme, dans son sens ontologique sémantique, c'est articuler l'Être, ou «essentialiser» l'Être.

«Ce qui fait, dit un religieux, qu'un homme est un homme, c'est, en lui, la soif de Dieu vivant. Le désir, mis en lui par Dieu même, le définit et le structure. [. . .] le Dieu que l'homme désire est un Dieu qui désire l'homme. . . . Dieu chercheur de l'homme fait de l'homme un chercheur de Dieu.»

L'Être nous étant inaccessible, nous ne pouvons parvenir à l'Essence; mais on voit les actes de Dieu, on comprend les œuvres divines qui sont réelles et dynamiques.

«Je réclamerai votre sang (c'est-à-dire) votre vie, je le réclamerai à tout animal, et je réclamerai à chaque homme la vie de l'homme qui est son père.

Celui qui verse le sang de l'homme

Par l'homme son sang sera versé [En hébr.: il y a assonance entre *sang* (*dam*) et *homme* (*adam*)]

Car Dieu a fait l'homme à son image» (Genèse 9, 5-7).

Ce cri: «Je réclamerai» fait jaillir, si l'on peut dire, le sang même de Dieu: le Désir divin d'un Dieu vivant. Ainsi, Dieu ne cesse de désirer.

Si l'on demande: «Pourquoi Dieu désire-t-il avec cette violence dévorante?», on pourra répondre: «N'est-ce pas parce que Dieu créa l'homme à son image?» Telle se dégage une signification réelle, dynamique, de «l'image de Dieu». Ici, la réalité ne se sépare pas de la signification, qui dans son dynamisme concentre et résorbe la dimension sémantique et la dimension ontologique de la manifestation.

Notes

1. *Encyclopaedia Universalis*, corpus 11, p. 179.
2. *Ibid.*, corpus 14, p. 691.
3. Hallaj, *Poèmes mystiques*, Calligraphie, traduction de l'arabe et présentation par Sami-Ali, p. 11. Sindbad, Paris, 1985.
4. Dans son *Introduction à la Sémantique ontologique*, in Akihiro Satake, *La Pensée du folklore (Minwa no Shisō 民話の思想)*, pp. 247-271. Chuôkôronsha, Tokyo, 1973.
5. Cf. en particulier *ibid.*, pp. 257-258.
6. Hallaj, *Poèmes mystiques*, p. 11.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.
8. Cf. «[. . .] la pensée est toujours *naissante*, comme l'Amour est toujours enfant; elle est cette eau dont parle Platon (*Rép.*, X, 621 a), qui ne pouvait se garder dans aucun vase» (Simone Pétrement, *Le Dualisme chez Platon, les Gnostiques et les Manichéens*, p. 337. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1947).
9. «La poétique de Hallaj» par Sami-Ali dans *Poèmes mystiques*, p. 12. Les mots soulignés par nous.
- 9bis. Husayn Mansûr Hallaj, *Dîwân*, Qasida VIII bis, trad. par Louis Massignon, p. 51. Les Éditions des Cahiers du Sud, Paris, 1995. Cf. son commentaire: «Husayn-b-Hallaj a dit: "Le Désir est le feu de la Lumière du Feu Primordial; comme la prééternité se colore de toute nuance, le Désir manifeste tout attribut; son essence s'enflamme à son essence, ses attributs scintillent de ses attributs [. . .]"; "[. . .] En cette théorie, Husayn-b-Mansûr s'est isolé de tous les autres maîtres en ce qu'il a montré que le Désir est un d'entre les attributs (divins) essentiels, de façon absolue. Tandis que tous les autres maîtres placent l'unification de l'amant et de l'aimé lorsque l'amour s'achève par l'extinction de l'amant dans l'aimé, sans recourir (comme Hallaj) au couple de termes *lâhut-nâsut* (nature divine, nature humaine) [. . .]» (*ibid.*, p. 51).
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17. Les mots soulignés par nous.
- 10bis. Pour Massignon, Hallaj est comme un prophète. Ici, je pense en même temps à ce qu'Alain a dit: «L'histoire [. . .] ne nous demande pas permission.

C'est ainsi que parle le prophète, qui est poète. Et j'aime le prophète. [. . .] Des êtres comme Vinci, Michel-Ange, Beethoven, Goethe, Hugo, je les aime; je les prends comme ils sont. Toute parcelle de leurs œuvres est à leur ressemblance. Je n'y vais pas choisir, ni gratter, ni effacer. [. . .] (entre Platon et Aristote) je ne veux point choisir, ni préférer; encore moins corriger. Je leur sais gré de leur être. Et par ce chemin j'essaie de savoir gré à tout homme de son propre être. Autant qu'un homme est lui-même, qu'il ne cède point, qu'il n'imité point, je le vois beau» (*Propos de politique*, pp. 141-142. Les Éditions Rieder, Paris, 1934). Un homme qui est lui-même, qui ne cède point, qui n'imité point. On le voit précisément dans la vie de Hallaj. Et aussi, en un sens, dans la vie de Massignon. (Un jour, Henri Gouthier m'a dit que la langue de Massignon était poétique. La langue de Hallaj est réellement poétique.)

11. Massignon, *Sur l'Islam* (Sept textes de Massignon, extraits des tomes I et II d'*Opera Minora*), pp. 14-15. Les Éditions de l'Herne, Paris, 1995. Les mots soulignés par nous.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 15. Les mots soulignés par nous.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 11. —La réflexion sur le Coran et la langue arabe, est constitutive, et même indispensable, pour comprendre la Gnose islamique: le Coran est dit de *révél*ation et d'*illumin*ation. «La Révélation s'exprimait», dit Jacques Berque distinctement, «dans une langue accessible, sans quoi elle n'aurait pas eu d'action escomptable sur les peuples. Accessible aux gens parmi lesquels elle s'opérerait. [. . .] l'immédiateté de sens et d'appréhension que requerrait cette transmission n'allait pas de soi. Elle exigeait aussi [. . .] un effort de réflexion et de raison, d'une part par son caractère allusif et symbolique, d'autre part par ses changements continuels de niveau. Les linguistes connotent ces derniers d'un mot anglais, *shifters*, à savoir les "embrayeurs", comme disent les sémioticiens. Ce sont de menus traits qui font passer le discours d'un plan à un autre» (*Relire le Coran*, p. 114. Les Éditions Albin Michel, Paris, 1993). Dans ces changements continuels de niveau, *shifters*, embrayeurs, nous lisons l'oscillation sémantique. — Et aussi dit J. Berque précisément: «[. . .] le Coran est dit d' "illumination", *mun*tr. La même supériorité tient sur le Coran autant à être *mun*tr, "illuminant", qu'à être *mub*tn, "clair, expressif". [. . .] Pour être signifiant, un langage doit exhaler la lumière qu'il recèle» (*ibid.*, p. 112). Partant d'une langue de Révélation et d'Illumination, où parviendrons-nous, en relisant le Coran? Précisément à l'*i*'jâz, «inimitabilité», «insupérabilité» (*ibid.*, p. 122). J. Berque dit en effet: «Quoi qu'il soit, le système d'entrée utilisé par la communication prophétique s'est cristallisé en système linguistique, exhalté au diapason de la transcendance. [. . .] Je reprends ici une distinction entre langue et parole dont l'idée première revient à Saussure, bien que lui-même n'en ait pas fait grand usage. Elle paraît pourtant expédiente. On entend par langue le système d'un parler: pragmatiquement, ce qui est parlé par une collectivité durant une longue période. Plus

profondément, l'diome, en tant qu'il repose sur des structures linguistiques, elles-mêmes liées aux longs cycles du social. Si l'hypothèse est juste, comme je le crois, on pourrait dire que, dans le Coran, ce qui procède effectivement du parler de Quraysh ou d'un style poétique convenu, ressortit à un état conjonctural de parole, tandis que les traits attachés à la langue coranique (suggestions polyvalentes, style spécifique) ressortissent d'un système auquel la foi reconnaît des valeurs transcendantes. La révélation, qui opère cette distorsion typologique, est ressentie et définie sur le moment même comme inaugurant un langage sans pareil. C'est-à-dire, proprement, l'*i'jâz* » (*ibid.*, pp. 130-131).

17. Daylamî, *atf*, ms. Tûb. 82; 28 b, 31 a, 48 b dans Massignon, *Sur l'Islam*, p. 34.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

18bis. Massignon, « Perspective transhistorique sur la vie de Hallaj » in *Diwân*, pp. XXXVII-XXXVIII.

18ter. Cf. « Ce qu'il y a de vraiment unique dans la moindre ligne de Simone Weil, c'est une brillante et totale sincérité. Le ton ne trompe pas. Ce qu'elle nous apporte, ce ne sont pas des notions, mais un approfondissement, une révélation. » (Jacques Madaule.) Il est vrai que cette remarque et cette estime s'appliquent à Hallaj en un sens certainement.

19. Louis Massignon, *La Passion de Hallaj, martyr mystique de l'Islam*, t. 1, p. 24. Gallimard, Paris, 1975 (deuxième édition). Cf. la conférence remarquable de Monsieur Christian Jambet lors de la Journée Louis Massignon à l'Institut d'études iraniennes (Censier-Sorbonne) en octobre 1994, sous le sujet « Le soufisme entre Louis Massignon et Henry Corbin ».

20. Cité d'après la nouvelle version seconde révisée.

21. Simone Weil, *Cahiers III*, p. 122: « Amour. Je voudrais que celui que j'aime m'aime. Mais s'il m'est totalement dévoué il n'existe plus. Je cesse de l'aimer. » Plon, Paris, 1975 (nouvelle édition revue et augmentée). Cf. « Chez ceux qui toujours subissent la force, il y a une soif irréductible de l'exercer » (p. 126); « Dieu m'a donné l'être pour que je lui rende. [. . .] Dieu me permet d'exister étant autre que lui » (pp. 112-113); « Croire que Dieu puisse être proche sans que cette proximité détruise le "je" est ignorer tout à fait qui il est. » (p. 15).

*Hallāj in the Sawānih
of Ahmad Ghazālī*

Nasrollah Pourjavady

SUMMARY

In his *Sawānih*, Ahmad Ghazālī quotes three times the famous saying of the Sufi martyr *al-Hallāj*: “I am the Truth”. He also quotes the answer that Hallāj gave to Ibrahim Khawwāṣ when they met in Kufa. Two verses from the Diwan of Hallāj are also quoted in the *Sawānih*. A. Ghazālī has quoted other poems and sayings from Hallāj in his Arabic writings. Unfortunately, all these have escaped the attention of Louis Massignon. What the French orientalist thought to be the *Sawānih* was in fact the *Lawāyeh* of Hamid al-Dīn Nāgūrī. Apparently, Massignon never saw the *Sawānih* nor any other work by Ahmad Ghazālī.

حلاج در «سوانح» احمد غزالی

پروفسور توشیهیکو ایزوتسو، که این کتاب به یاد و احترامش منتشر می‌شود، در میان آثار صوفیانه و عرفانی زبان فارسی به سوانح احمد غزالی علاقه خاصی داشت و هم او بود که نخستین بار به من پیشنهاد و توصیه کرد که این اثر کم‌حجم ولی پرمحتوی را به زبان انگلیسی برگردانم، و اگر اصرار او نبود، چه بسا من دست به این کار نمی‌زدم. در اینجا من به یاد آن شادروان سعی خواهم کرد به یک جنبه از اهمیت کتاب سوانح در تاریخ تصوف بپردازم و به تأثیری که حلاج در تصوف عاشقانه احمد غزالی داشته است اشاره کنم و اقوال و ابیاتی را که از وی در سوانح نقل شده است اجمالاً بررسی کنم.

با وجود این که احمد غزالی در سوانح مطالب و اشارات و تمثیلهایی از نویسندگان و صوفیان پیشین نقل کرده، نام آنان را ذکر نکرده است. در سراسر کتاب خود فقط از یک صوفی نام برده و آن هم بایزید بسطامی است. در فصل ۲۱، پس از این که غزالی دربارهٔ عشق عاشق به معشوق و عشق معشوق به عاشق سخن گفت، به آیه «يَحِبُّهُمْ وَيَحْبُوْنَهُ» (مائده، ۵۴) اشاره می‌کند و می‌گوید: «يَحِبُّهُمْ پيش از يَحْبُوْنَهُ بود»، یعنی اول محبت خداوند بود به انسان و سپس محبت انسان به خدا. در اینجا است که وی از صوفی بزرگ خراسان نام برده است: «بایزید گفت، رضی‌الله عنه: بچندین گاه پنداشتم که من او را می‌خواهم. خود اول او مرا خواسته بود.»^۱ غزالی سه بار هم سخن معروف بایزید را که گفت «سبحانی [ما اعظم شأنی]» در فصلهای ۱۳ و ۱۸ و ۵۸ نقل کرده است، در هر سه

(۱) احمد غزالی، سوانح، به تصحیح نصرالله پورجوادی، تهران، ۱۳۵۹، ص ۲۲.

مورد همراه با شطح معروف حسین بن منصور حلاج «انا الحق». علاوه بر «انا الحق»، مطالب دیگری نیز از قول حلاج نقل کرده است، باز هم بدون ذکر نام او. یکی از آنها پاسخی است که حلاج به ابراهیم خَواص داده و داستان آن را هم ابوالقاسم قشیری در رساله آورده است.^۱ و هم هجویری در کشف‌المحجوب. داستان بنا به روایت هجویری از این قرار است:

چون ابراهیم خَواص - رضی الله عنه - به کوفه به زیارت حسین بن منصور شد، وی را گفت: یا ابراهیم، روزگار خود اندر چه گذاشتی؟ گفت: خود را بر توکل درست کرده‌ام. گفت: ضیعت عمرک فی عمران باطنک، فاین الفناء فی التوحید - ضایع کردی عمر اندر آبادانی باطن، فناء تو اندر توحید کجاست؟^۲

در این داستان سخن از توحید و برتری آن از توکل است، و توحید نیز در نتیجه فنا متحقق می‌شود. احمد غزالی نیز در سوانح دقیقاً هنگام بحث دربارهٔ وصال عاشق به معشوق، که فقط با فنای او متحقق می‌شود، پاسخ حلاج به ابراهیم خَواص را بدین صورت نقل کرده است: «افنیت عمرک فی عمارۃ الباطن، فاین الفناء فی التوحید؟»^۳ غزالی این جمله را به دنبال تمثیل پروانه و طواف کردن او به دور آتش و سوختن و خاکستر شدنش نقل کرده است، و اتفاقاً این تمثیل را هم حلاج خود در «طاسین الفهم» به کار برده است.^۴

در داستان فوق مقام حلاج از مقام ابراهیم خَواص برتر دانسته شده است و احمد غزالی نیز وقتی پاسخ او را نقل می‌کند، در واقع نظر او را تأیید می‌کند. اساساً احمد غزالی جزو منتقدان حلاج نیست. بلکه برعکس، او کاملاً با حلاج موافق است. البته، احمد معتقد است که حلاج به حقیقت وصال که به قول خود او «فناء فی التوحید» باشد نرسیده بوده است. پاسخی هم که به ابراهیم خَواص داده است به این معنی نیست که خود او لزوماً به «فناء فی التوحید» رسیده بوده است. جایگاه حلاج، در مقامات باطنی، در جاهای دیگری از سوانح مشخص شده است، از جمله در جایی که غزالی ابیات معروف حلاج را نقل کرده است که گفت:

(۱) ابوالقاسم القشیری، الرسالة القشیریه، تحقیق عبدالحلیم محمود و محمود بن الشریف، قاهره، ۱۹۷۴.

ج ۱، ص ۴۶۸-۹.

(۲) علی بن عثمان هجویری، کشف‌المحجوب، تصحیح ژوکوفسکی، تهران (چاپ افست)، ۱۳۳۶، ص ۳۶۷. برای منابع دیگر این داستان بنگرید به: ابوحامد محمد غزالی، احیاء علوم‌الدین، ربع چهارم، کتاب التفکر، بیان مجاری الفکر؛ ابوالفضل میدی، کشف‌الاسرار، تهران، ۱۳۳۹، ج ۵، ص ۲۴۷؛ و

Louis Massignon, *La passion de Hallāj*, Éditions Gallimard, Paris, 1975, Tome. I, p.161-2.

(۳) سوانح، ص ۳۲.

(۴) Al Hallaj, *Kitab al-Tawâsin*, par Louis Massignon, Paris, 1913, p.16-17.

اَنَا مَن أَهْوَىٰ وَ مَن أَهْوَىٰ أَنَا نَحْنُ رُوحَانِ حَلَّلْنَا بَدَنًا
فَإِذَا أَبْصَرْتَنِي أَبْصَرْتَهُ وَ إِذَا أَبْصَرْتَهُ أَبْصَرْتَنَا^۱

این ابیات را غزالی در اوایل کتاب خود، در فصل دوم، نقل کرده است. به دنبال یکی از دقیقترین نکاتی که وی درباره نسبت روح با عشق مطرح کرده است. روح یا جان وقتی از همه کدورات پاک شد آینه‌ای می‌شود که پیکر معشوق یا نام یا صفتش در آن پیدا می‌شود و چون دیده روح بخواهد خود را ببیند نظرش به معشوق می‌افتد و به جای این که خود را ببیند معشوق را می‌بیند. در اینجا است که سالک مانند حلاج می‌گوید: «اَنَا مَن أَهْوَىٰ وَ مَن أَهْوَىٰ أَنَا.»

مقامی که غزالی در این جا وصف می‌کند مسلماً مقام بالایی است، و او البته گوینده ابیات فوق را کسی می‌داند که به چنین مقامی نایل شده بوده است. اما در عین حال احمد از حلاج انتقاد می‌کند، نه به موجب مصرع اول، بلکه به موجب مصرع دوم. این مصرع، به دلیل ذکر لفظ «حَلَّلْنَا»، برای بسیاری از خوانندگان یادآور مسئله حلول است و حلول نیز یکی از اتهامات حلاج بود. ظاهراً ابونصر سراج نیز به همین دلیل وقتی که خواسته است این ابیات را در کتاب اللمع نقل کند^۲ مصرعها را جابجا کرده و تغییری در آنها داده تا از

(۱) سوانح، ص ۵. در قدیم‌ترین نسخه‌ای که از سوانح موجود است و متعلق به کتابخانه ملی ایران است و در سال ۶۵۹ کتابت شده است به جای دو بیت فوق پنج بیت به ترتیب زیر آمده است:

اَنَا مَن أَهْوَىٰ وَ مَن أَهْوَىٰ أَنَا	نَحْنُ رُوحَانِ حَلَّلْنَا بَدَنًا
نَحْنُ مَذْكُورًا عَلَىٰ عَهْدِ الْهَوَىٰ	يُضْرَبُ الْأَمْثَالُ فِي النَّاسِ لَنَا
أَيُّهَا السَّائِلُ عَنْ قِصَّتِنَا	لَوْ تَرَاهُ لَمْ تَفْرُقْ بَيْنَنَا
فَإِذَا أَبْصَرْتَنِي أَبْصَرْتَهُ	وَ إِذَا أَبْصَرْتَهُ أَبْصَرْتَنَا
نَحْنُ فِي الْأَجَالِ سَيَّانَ إِذَا	ذَهَبَتْ مَهْجَتُهُ مَتَّ أَنَا

(بنگرید به سوانح فی العشق، به کوشش مهدی بیانی، تهران، ۱۳۲۲، ص ۳؛ مجموعه آثار فارسی احمد غزالی، به اهتمام احمد مجاهد، تهران، ۱۳۷۰، ص ۱۱۷-۸). ابوالحسن علی بن محمد الدیلمی در کتاب عطف الالاف المؤلف علی اللام المعطوف (حقیقه ج. ک. وادیه، قاهره، ۱۹۶۲، ص ۱۱۲) پنج بیت از قول حلاج نقل کرده که چهار بیت اول آن با چهار بیت اول قطعه فوق مشترک است و به جای بیت پنجم این بیت آمده است:

روحه روحی و روحی روحه من رأی روحین حلاً بدنا

در نسخه‌های دیگر سوانح سه بیت اضافی نیست. ماسینیون معتقد است که ابیات اضافی مربوط به اوایل قرن چهارم هجری است. ابیات ۳ و ۴ در کشف الاسرار ابوالفضل میبیدی (ج ۹، ص ۲۶۹) نیز آمده است. برای منابع دیگر این ابیات بنگرید به: دیوان الحلاج، ماسینیون، ژورنال آسیاتیک، ۱۹۳۱، ص ۳-۹۲؛ شرح دیوان الحلاج، مصطفی الشیبی، بیروت، ۱۹۷۴، ص ۸۵-۲۷۹.

(۲) ابونصر سراج طوسی، کتاب اللمع، به تصحیح نیکلسون، لیدن، ۱۹۱۴، ص ۳۸۴.

ذکر لفظ «حللنا» خودداری کرده باشد.^۱ ولی احمد غزالی کاری به این مسائل ندارد. انتقاد او از موضع دیگری است. او می‌گوید که حلاج وقتی گفته است «نحن روحان حللنا بدنا»، «قدم از یکی در دوئی نهاده است.» غزالی مصرع اول را به توحید نزدیکتر می‌داند، گرچه در خود آن مصرع نیز باز سخن از «أنا» و «مَنْ أهوى» است، یعنی هنوز عاشقی هست و معشوقی. توحید، چنانکه بعداً خواهیم دید، از نظر غزالی هنگامی متحقق می‌شود که عاشقی و معشوقی نماند و تنها عشق ماند و بس.

برای این که ما جایگاه حلاج را، در مراتب کمال عشق، از نظر احمد غزالی بشناسیم لازم است مراتب سه‌گانه‌ای را که وی در فصل ۶۵ سوانح ذکر کرده است در نظر بگیریم. اولین مرتبه همان است که در فصل دوم شرح داده است، و آن این است که جان یا روح عاشق صفا می‌یابد و آینه می‌شود و صورت معشوق در آن پیدا و ثابت می‌گردد. عشق بتحقیق آن بود که صورت معشوق پیکرِ جانِ عاشق آید. اکنون جان عاشق از آن صورت لازم قوتِ خود می‌خورد و برای این بود که اگر معشوق بهزار فرسنگ دور بود عاشق او را حاضر داند و أَقْرَبُ مِنْ كُلِّ قَرِيبٍ شمارد.^۲

صوفیه این مرتبه را با تمثیلهایی بیان کرده‌اند. یکی از آنها داستان مجنون است که وقتی او را «گفتند: لیلی آمد، گفت: من خود لیلی‌ام و سر به گریبان فرو برد، یعنی لیلی با من است و من لیلی.»^۳ حلاج نیز وقتی گفت «انا من اهوى و من اهوى انا» در همین مرتبه بود. بالاتر از مرتبه فوق آن است که روی معشوق آینه می‌شود و جان عاشق در آن منعکس می‌شود و این بار عاشق، یعنی روح، از آنچه نقد خودش است قوت می‌خورد. غزالی این قوت را قوت آگاهی یا خبر می‌خواند و شعر معروف ابونواس را نقل می‌کند که گفت: «الا فأسقنی خَمراً و قل لی هِیَ الخمر». این مرتبه را نیز «وصال معشوق» می‌خواند و می‌نویسد: «وصال معشوق قوت آگاهی خوردن است از نقد جان خود، نه یافتن.»^۴ مرتبه بالاتر که مرتبه سوم است در آخرین کلمه‌ای که از احمد نقل کردیم بیان شده است: کلمه «یافتن». در مرتبه‌های اول و دوم، هر چند که عاشق و معشوق با هم کاملاً نزدیک شده و حتی به وصال رسیده‌اند، ولی هنوز نوعی دویی وجود دارد، هنوز عاشقی هست و معشوقی. عاشق خود را مجنون می‌داند، ولو این که لیلی را در دل دارد. یا در

1) Massignon, *La Passion*, Tome. III, p. 50, n. 5.

۲) سوانح، ص ۴۸۹.

۳) عین القضاة همدانی، تمهیدات، تصحیح عفیف عسیران، تهران، ۱۳۴۱، ص ۳۵.

۴) سوانح، ص ۴۹.

مرتبه دوم، همین که روح یا جان از عکس تابش خود که در آینه جمال روی معشوق افتاده است قوت آگاهی می‌خورد، خود نشان نوعی دویی است. اساساً در آگاهی و خبر و علم دویی است. بالاتر از اینها، اتحاد است که در آنجا یافت است ولی به قول احمد از یافت خبر نیست، یعنی در آنجا علم نیست. این مرتبه را احمد «حقیقت وصال» می‌خواند. حقیقت وصال خود اتحاد است، و این نقطه از دیده علم متواری است. چون عشق به کمال رسد قوت هم از خود خورد، از بیرون کاری ندارد.^۱

با توجه به این مراتب سه‌گانه، برمی‌گردیم به حلاج. وی همین که می‌گوید «انا من اهو» دقیقاً جایگاه خود را معلوم کرده است. او هنوز در مرتبه اول است. چه میان «انا» (= من) و محبوب خود تمییز می‌دهد. اشکال مصرع دوم هم در لفظ «حللنا» نیست، بلکه در «روحان» (= دو روح یا دو جان) است. در اینجا همچنین ملاحظه می‌کنیم که غزالی لفظ «اتحاد» را نه در مورد تجربه حلاج، بلکه در مورد تجربه‌ای که وی بدان نرسیده است به کار برده است.

در «انا الحق» گفتن حلاج نیز، از نظر احمد غزالی، باز نوعی دویی وجود دارد، دویی عاشق و معشوق. همان‌طور که قبلاً گفتیم، احمد سه بار این کلام حلاج را نقل کرده است و در دو بار به دوری مرتبه حلاج از مرتبه «اتحاد» اشاره کرده است. در واقع «انا الحق» گفتن حلاج در همان مرتبه‌ای است که وی «انا من اهو» گفته است، مرتبه‌ای که وی معشوق را در آینه دل یا روح خود دیده است. غزالی در مجالس خود به این نکته تصریح کرده است. می‌گوید: «نظر الحلاج إلى جمال نفسه فوجد صورة المرئي في المرأة، فقال انا الحق».^۲ مراد از نفس در اینجا نفس ناطقه است و این چیزی است که احمد در فصل دوم سوانح روح و در فصل ۶۵ جان خوانده است^۳، و خود حلاج در این جمله قلب یا دل خوانده است: «قلب المؤمن كالمرآة اذا نظر فيها تجلى ربه».^۴

در جمله بالا کسی که به آینه دل می‌نگرد خود مؤمن است. در فصل دوم سوانح نیز دیده اشراق (در بعضی نسخه‌ها: اشراق) روح است که پیکر معشوق یا نام یا صفتش را در

(۱) همانجا.

(۲) فصول ملتقطه من المجالس، احمد غزالی، مجموعه خطی کتابخانه چستریتی، شماره ۳۶۸۲/۲.

برگ 41a.

(۳) در مورد نفس و قلب و روح، بنگرید به بحث ابوحامد غزالی در «الرسالة اللدنیة» مندرج در مجموعه رسائل الامام الغزالی، ج ۳، بیروت، ۱۹۸۶، ص ۹۱-۲ و نیز «روضة الطالبین»، در همان مجموعه، ج ۲، ص ۳۹ به بعد.

(۴) تمهیدات، ص ۲۶۰.

آینه می‌بیند. ولی در فصل سیزدهم سوانح دیده‌ معشوق است که کمال حسن خود را در آینه‌ عشق عاشق می‌بیند و از آن قوت می‌خورد. البته، این دیده همان دیده‌ روح است که در مرتبه‌ قرب به نور جمال معشوق در حسن و جمال او می‌نگرد. به هر تقدیر، در این مقام که پیکر معشوق در کمال حسن و جمال بر آینه‌ دل و جان عاشق تابیده است، بیوند عاشق و معشوق تا جایی است که عاشق می‌پندارد که معشوق خود اوست. در اینجا است که وی مانند حلاج و بایزید دم از «انا الحق» و «سبحانی» می‌زند.

اینجا که عاشق معشوق را از او اوتر بود عجایب علایق پیوند تمهید افتد بشرط بی‌پیوندی عاشق با خود. پیوند عشق تا به جایی رسد که اعتقاد کند عاشق که معشوق خود اوست. انا الحق و سبحانی این نقطه است و اگر در عین راندگی و فراق و ناخواست بود پندار که ناگزیران است و معشوق خود اوست.

بیت

چندان ناز است ز عشق تو در سر من تا در غلطم که عاشقی تو بر من
یا خیمه زند وصال تو بر در من یا در سر این غلط شود این سر من^۱

احمد غزالی در اینجا نیز «انا الحق» حلاج، و همچنین «سبحانی» بایزید، را پندار و غلط می‌خواند. در این مرتبه عاشق حقیقتاً به وصال معشوق نرسیده است. او هنوز هست. ولی می‌پندارد که معشوق است. و این پندار چه‌بسا برای عاشق خطرناک باشد. چنانکه برای حلاج بود. ظاهراً بیت دوم به عاقبت کار بایزید و حلاج اشاره می‌کند. بایزید از این پندار گذشت و به وصال رسید، ولی حلاج سر خود را در سر این غلط باخت.

تجربه حلاج و بایزید را احمد غزالی در فصل هجدهم از لحاظ دیگری در نظر گرفته است. در مرتبه‌ای که عاشق هنوز به حقیقت وصال نرسیده است قائم به خودی خود است. و این مرتبه‌ای است که عاشق هنوز خام است. و در این مرتبه است که می‌پندارد معشوق است و «انا الحق» یا «سبحانی» می‌گوید. و این تلوین است. اگر عاشق «مُحرم شود به طواف کعبه‌ قدس و پروانه‌وار از سر حدّ بقا به فنا پیوندد»، آنگاه از خامی بدایت عشق بیرون می‌آید و پخته می‌شود، و قائم به خودی معشوق می‌گردد. احمد غزالی تجربه حلاج و بایزید را با تجربه ابراهیم در دیدن ستاره و ماه و خورشید که در قرآن آمده است در مرحله‌ای می‌داند که عاشق هنوز در راه است و به مقصد نرسیده است، و لذا می‌نویسد: «هذا ربی و انا الحق و سبحانی همه بوقلمون این تلوین است و از تمکین دور است»^۲

(۱) سوانح، ص ۱۶.

(۲) همان، ص ۱۹.

سومین و آخرین باری که احمد در سوانح به گفتار حلاج و بایزید اشاره کرده است در فصل ۵۸ است، در جایی که عشق را به درختی مانند کرده است که اصل آن از قدّم روییده است. غزالی در اینجا آیه «يَحِبُّهُمْ وَيَحْبُوْنَهُ» را که در ابتدای فصل اول کتاب نقل کرده است در نظر می‌گیرد. او می‌خواهد بگوید که عشق یا محبت انسان به پروردگار که در «يَحْبُوْنَهُ» بدان اشاره شده است بازتاب محبت خداوند به انسان است. «اناالحق» حلاج و «سبحانی» بایزید نیز بیان عشق انسان بود با خدا، و این عشق ثمره محبت قدیم پروردگار است با انسان.

اصل عشق از قدّم روید. نقطه باء «يَحِبُّهُمْ» بتخمی در زمین «يَحْبُوْنَهُ» افکندند. لابل آن نقطه در «هم» افکندند تا «يَحْبُوْنَهُ» برآمد. چون عیبر عشق برآمد، تخمِ همرنگِ ثمره بود و ثمره همرنگ تخم. اگر سبحانی رفت یا اناالحق رفت، از این اصل رفت: یا نطق نقطه بود یا نطق خداوند نقطه، یا روی دعوی علاقه ثمره بود و ثمره عین تخم.^۱

در اینجا، چنانکه ملاحظه می‌شود، احمد غزالی «اناالحق» و «سبحانی» را فقط به منزله گفتار حلاج و بایزید تلقی نکرده است، بلکه از آنجا که ثمره عین تخم است، اناالحق حلاج و سبحانی بایزید خود می‌تواند عین کلام حق باشد که از زبان این دو اظهار شده است. سخنانی که احمد غزالی از حلاج در سوانح نقل کرده است همینهاست، ولی همان‌طور که قبلاً اشاره کردیم، تأثیر تصوف حلاج در احمد غزالی بیش از اینهاست و لازم است که فصول سوانح با دقت بیشتری با عقاید و سخنان حلاج مقایسه شود. مثلاً یکی از مواردی که احمد غزالی بی‌شک از حلاج متأثر بوده است عقیده به عاشقی ابلیس است. غزالی در فصل ۶۶ سوانح، با عنوان «فی همة العشق»، درباره عشق ابلیس به خدا و بلند همتی او سخن گفته است.^۲ البته مطلبی که او گفته است عیناً در کتاب الطواسین حلاج نیامده است، ولی به هر حال عقیده به عاشقی ابلیس عقیده‌ای است که حلاج مطرح کرده بوده است. در آثار دیگر احمد غزالی، بخصوص مجالس او، مطالب بیشتری درباره ابلیس آمده است. مثلاً در مجالس داستان ملاقات موسی با ابلیس آمده است که بسیار نزدیک به روایت حلاج از این داستان است. این داستان در کتاب بحرالمحبة نیز، به صورتی دیگر و از قول وَهَبِ بْنِ مُنْبِه، نقل شده است.^۳ موضوع دیگری که در خور مقایسه است تمثیلهایی است که حلاج و احمد غزالی به کار برده‌اند. یکی از آنها که قبلاً بدان اشاره کردیم تمثیل پروانه و

(۱) همان، ص ۴۴-۵.

(۲) همان، ص ۴۹.

(۳) احمد غزالی، بحر المحبة فی اسرار المودة، بمبئی، ۱۸۷۶، ص ۳۷.

آتش است که هم در سوانح آمده است و هم در کتاب التجرید فی کلمة التوحید.^۱ تمثیل دیگر پرواز مرغان و سفر آنان به سوی سیمرغ است که احمد آن را در رساله خاصی شرح داده^۲ و حلاج نیز در طواسین از تمثیل مرغ و پرواز او استفاده کرده است.^۳

تأثیر تصوف حلاج و نقد سخنان او در آثار احمد غزالی اقتضا می‌کرده است که لویی ماسینیون قبلاً به این موضوع پرداخته باشد. و البته ماسینیون هم به زعم خود این کار را کرده است. ظاهراً اولین محقق اروپایی که درباره احمد غزالی مطلبی نوشته است ماسینیون است که در سال ۱۹۲۵ مقاله‌ای منتشر کرده است با نام «سه عارف مسلمان: شوشتری، احمد غزالی، و نیازی مصری»،^۴ و در آن به زعم خود فصلی از سوانح را که در آن به حلاج اشاره شده بوده است به فرانسه ترجمه کرده است. ولی مطلبی که ماسینیون به فرانسه ترجمه کرده است از کتاب سوانح احمد غزالی نیست بلکه از لوائح منسوب به عین‌القضاة است.^۵ ماسینیون گمان می‌کرده است که سوانح به عربی است و لوائح نیز ترجمه فارسی آن است. وی عین عبارات فارسی را که در لوائح آمده است در مجموعه متون چاپ نشده درباره تاریخ تصوف نقل کرده است.^۶ همین فصل را ماسینیون بعداً در کتاب مصائب نقل کرده است.^۷ فصل دیگری از همین کتاب را هم در رساله در باب منشأ اصطلاحات صوفیه نقل کرده است.^۸ باز به اسم سوانح. حقیقت این است که ماسینیون نه با سوانح آشنا بوده و نه با هیچ یک از آثار دیگر احمد غزالی. دویستی که از حلاج در سوانح نقل شده است بسیار مهم است و محققانی که در مآخذ و منابع دیوان حلاج تحقیق می‌کنند باید بدان توجه کنند. در سه اثر دیگر احمد غزالی که به عربی است ابیات فراوانی نقل شده است که باید درباره گویندگان آنها نیز تحقیق شود و ابیات متعلق به حلاج شناسایی گردد.

(۱) احمد غزالی، التجرید فی کلمة التوحید، قاهره، ۱۹۰۷ (?)، فصل ۳۳، ص ۵۰.

(۲) احمد غزالی، داستان مرغان، به تصحیح نصرالله پورجوادی، تهران، ۱۳۵۵.

(۳) کتاب الطواسین، ص ۳۰.

(۴) این مقاله در جلد دوم آثار کوتاه ماسینیون (Opera Minora, II, paris 1969, pp.366-70) چاپ شده

است.

(۵) بنگرید به رساله لوائح، (به غلط منسوب به) عین‌القضاة همدانی، به تصحیح رحیم فرمیش، تهران،

۱۳۳۷، ص ۲-۶۱.

6) Louis Massignon, *Recueil de Textes Inédits concernant L'histoire de la Mystique en pays D'Islam*, Paris, 1929, p. 95-6.

7) *La Passion*, Tome II, p. 175.

8) Louis Massignon, *Essai sur les origines du lexique technique de la Mystique Musulmane*, Paris, 1968, p. 442

مقایسه کنید با لوائح، ص ۱۰۱-۱۰۰.

من خود ابیات زیر را که از حلاج است در التجرید یافته‌ام، در حالی که نه ماسینیون به این منبع توجه کرده است و نه مصطفی الشیبی در شرح دیوان حلاج. ابیات مزبور اینهاست:

إذا ذكرت كاد الشوق يقتلني (د: یقْلُنِي) و غفلت عنك احزان و اوجاع
فصار (د: وصار) كلّی قلوباً فيك واعية (د: داعية) للشّقم فيها و للآلام إسرائاً^۱

احمد غزالی سه بیت ذیل را هم در بحرالمحبة از قول حلاج نقل کرده که نه ماسینیون آنها را ثبت کرده است و نه مصطفی الشیبی:

سرى اذق من الصراط علوّ شأنی فی الخلاط
و فصاحتی و درایتی یلجانی فی سَمّ الخياط
و انا الذلیل بیابکم مثل المنقش فی البساط^۲

گذشته از اشعار و اقوال حلاج در آثار احمد غزالی، آراء صوفیانه و کلامی این دو است که هنوز دقیقاً با هم مقایسه نشده و تحقیقی درباره آنها صورت نگرفته است و مطالبی که ماسینیون در فصل مربوط به احمد غزالی در کتاب مصائب آورده است^۳ متعلق به آثار او نیست.

نصرالله پورجوادی

(۱) التجرید، ص ۲۴. این ابیات در دیوان حلاج، ماسینیون، ص ۷۲ و در شرح دیوان، مصطفی الشیبی، ص ۲۳۶ آمده است.

(۲) بحرالمحبة، ص ۷.

(3) *La Passion*, Tome. II, p.175.

IV

Being and Knowing

An Essay on "Creatio ex Nihilo"

Masao Matsumoto

I

If my memory is correct, D.T. Suzuki once said in his dialogue with Heinrich Dumoulin: "Christianity envisages God from the world, but Buddhism envisages the world from God." His words have made me think about the issue of religion. If a true religion stems from the divine revelation which tells us about "the truth of God" rather than "truths of the world," then Christianity also has to envisage the world from God, because it is truly a revealed religion. "The Logos became flesh and dwelled among us." Since our Christian religion stands on this passage, it follows that Christianity tells us about "the truth of God." And so I wonder why D.T. Suzuki made that comment. Is there, perhaps, a problem in the way that Christianity presents itself? Though Christianity has a rich self-understanding, which I can fully defend against Suzuki's remark, I would nevertheless like to consider this issue further, and do so quite frankly. Being a Scholastic philosopher who serves Christian theology, I would like to offer some reflections on the issue raised by Suzuki.

Scholasticism is founded on Aristotle's metaphysics. It is an intellectual construct which starts from material nature, proceeds through the vital natural order, and ends with spiritual nature. It deals with the whole world of beings as such, and it finally forms an

ontology. It is also a philosophy of causality and, as such, includes arguments for the existence of God as the cause of this whole world. Such a natural theology must be differentiated from revealed theology which relies upon the contents of revelation; instead, natural theology depends on demonstration by natural reason alone. This is a genuinely intellectual endeavor which "envisages God from the world." This is because natural theology attempts to ground its proofs for the objective existence of God in our prior assurance of the objective existence of the world. It must be immediately noted, however, that even if one could rationally prove the existence of the absolute by relying on the existence of the world as a totality of relative beings, it still could not truly be said that the absolute God has been completely proven. That is, because the world is relative and reason belongs to this relative world, it follows that the absolute, as inferred by our reason, would be a "final" being which nevertheless remains an inherent part of the world of relativity. Here the absolute is viewed as that cause by which the world exists but which, in the final analysis, is itself also relative.

The existence of the absolute, in the full sense, must be inferred as that ultimate cause which does not require any other cause. Therefore it is not possible for natural reason to recognize the essence of the absolute from its contingent attributes along with the fact of its existence. That is, it is an absurdity to say that natural reason which belongs to this world can, through its use of the law of causality, recognize the essence of an absolute that transcends the world. That would be to say that the finite can recognize the infinite. Even if natural theology or scholastic philosophy proved the existence of the absolute or demonstrated all its attributes, it still would not result in a complete knowledge of its essence.

If such partial knowledge were to claim to be perfect, that would only show its arrogance and therefore falseness. Yet, not everything partial need be false. A partial reason that is modest will not assert its completeness but will be content to speak a partial "truth about God." Complete perfection in "the truth about God" requires God's own self-revelation as rooted in his free will. Christianity claims to be that divine self-revelation! Yet it still allows philosophy, a discipline

of reason, to speak a partial "truth about God." This is because God reveals himself as all-good, and an all-good God would not give us natural reason to betray himself. To repeat: faith does not endorse any claim by reason, when speaking "the truth about God," to be perfect; but faith does grant that reason, even though partial, need not be false. When Christianity gave such a privileged position to philosophy, a discipline of reason, it thereby also gave science a great opportunity to develop our capacity to speak "truths about the world." At the same time, however, it had to be acknowledged that philosophy as natural theology is imperfect in its speech about "the truth of God" and therefore stands in need of supplementation by revealed theology, where revealed theology is the perfect communicator of "the truth of God."

"Self-evidence" as known by natural reason is not the same as "self-evidence" in relation to the existence of God. Natural reason infers the existence of God from the self-evident existence of the world. Thus, for philosophy the existence of the world is evident, but the existence of God is not. Therefore, proof of the existence of God is needed, and this in turn engenders the wide gap between "the God of the philosophers" and "the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob." For Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, God's existence, as a foundational element in the revealed faith, is self-evident. By this is meant that the self-evidence of God's existence is presupposed from the beginning, and this presupposition is accepted and admitted even in the darkness of our human act of believing. Religion is formed where God's existence is known directly and not inferred. In contrast, however, for philosophy as an act of natural reason, the existence of the world is directly given, but the existence of God must be inferred from that world. A passage from Scripture, "No one has ever seen God," means that the existence of God, as known in the concrete practice of religion, cannot be decided by human natural reason alone. It is, indeed, a super-natural reality that can only be accepted by faith. Natural reason, in contrast, can only infer the existence of God imperfectly and indirectly, as that natural reason moves from the experienced world to that which transcends all natural experiences.

In this way, the concept of God, as inferred by natural theology,

presupposes the experienced world. Thus there is always a danger of "eternalizing" that world from which God is conceptually inferred. Philosophical conceptions of God, without exception, pass through the world in "the order of cognition" or in "the process of inference." Nevertheless, the natural contents of the concept of God that have been reached through the world must be completely separated from the world itself. Natural theology's proofs for the existence of God depend completely on the world in *modus intelligendi*, but this dependence on the world does not necessarily extend to the *modus essendi*. That is, our dependence on the world for our knowledge of God must not be transformed into a claim that God himself depends upon the world. It is a fact, however, that some of God's attributes do depend on the world in "the mode of knowing." For example, concepts such as infinity and changelessness in negative theology cannot be free from a dependence on the finite and, thus, changeable world in "the mode of knowing." We will find two more examples of the same point in the concepts of transcendence and *das Umgreifende*, even as used in negative theology. Such concepts presuppose a positive *participatio* in the world or an *analogia proportionis* with the world. Accordingly, from the view of natural theology, even these concepts of God are not adequate. Both of them presuppose a natural¹ relation between God and the world and, thus, inevitably include the existence of the world. That is, when using these terms to describe God, we find that we cannot consider God without also considering the world, even in "the mode of being," let alone in "the mode of knowing." This is because when one refers to transcendence or *das Umgreifende*, one always presupposes that which is transcended or that which is "umgriffen." In other words, insofar as we use words such as transcendence and *das Umgreifende* to describe God, we will discover that the world's eternity becomes wrapped up with God's eternity, and, therefore, we will also discover that we cannot affirm God's eternity without also affirming the world's eternity. The proper position, however, is that the world is not a production of God's nature, but it is a contingent creation of God's free will. Therefore, it is not fully adequate for natural theology to describe God with such terms as transcendence or *das Umgreifende*.

From the standpoint of natural theology, it is only when we move to the proof of God "from accidental to necessary being"² that we can sort out the various senses in which God, precisely to be God, needs the world. That is, when we move to the proof "from accidental to necessary being," we can eliminate entirely the dependence of God on the world "in the mode of being" (whose form of dependence results in making the world's existence both eternal and necessary) while retaining an appropriate interdependence of God and the world in "the mode of knowing." In this context, it is important to note that the primary meaning of "to be absolute" is "to be self-dependent and self-caused." If the essence of "*Was ist?*" depends on another, then it is an attribute or an accidental essence. However, if it depends on itself, through, so to speak, its own relation with itself, such an essence is called a substance. Thus, when we experience an accidental, and thus, a contingent being, we do not experience something which is merely a phenomenal and accidental being; but in this sense, we experience a substance. Therefore, such an accidental (that is, contingent) being becomes and perishes in its essence even as it remains absolute (that is, even as its essence depends on itself). However, what is absolute in essence is not always absolute in existence. For even if "*Was ist?*" in essence is definite, nonetheless, inasmuch as it becomes and perishes, it can also be said to gain and lose its existence. As long as it can gain and lose its existence, its essence is not truly its existence. In other words, even if it is essentially absolute (that is, self-dependent in its essence), it is relative in its existence and can be related to other existences by standing in the relative series of cause and effect.

The issue becomes radically different when self-dependence applies not only to essence but to existence as well. In this case, the entity's absolute essence would be nothing other than its existence, making its essence and existence inseparable. The absolute in natural theology is, in fact, self-dependent precisely in this sense. It is, therefore, the perfect absolute admitting nothing that is in any way relative. We may call this the "necessary being." The world is a totality of accidental beings which are absolute in essence but relative in existence. This world cannot be anything other than relative in its exist-

ence. But God, as the cause of the world, is absolute, not only in essence, but also in existence. Thus, God is absolutely unconditioned and does not depend upon any other being whatsoever.

Scholasticism makes a precise terminological distinction between the accidental world and the absolute God. The world is absolute only in its essence; it remains accidental in its existence. Thus it is called "*ens in se et per se*." God is unconditional and absolute not only in his essence but also in his existence; and for that reason, he is called "*ens a se*." In this case, let us define the world as the totality³ of accidental beings, all of which in principle could either exist or not exist. In that case, the world itself is a mere accidental being which in principle could either exist or not exist. God, however, as the cause of this world-totality, cannot be an accidental being. If God were himself an accidental being, then God would be contained in the totality of the world and, as one item within that totality, could not be the cause of that totality. Therefore, the only cause of the totality of the world, that is, the totality of all accidental beings—which totality is itself an accidental being—must be the necessary being, where the non-existence of such a necessary being is impossible.

Even if our concept of God depends on an accidental being (i.e., the world) in "the mode of knowing," God in himself, by nature, is the necessary being. Therefore, in "the mode of being," God as such never presupposes the world. The world is an accidental being, while God is the absolute in existence. As we noted previously, there is a sense in which the world is an absolute being, but that applies only to its essence and not its existence; and therefore the world may lose or gain its existence. It does not matter for God whether the world exists or not. In other words, the concept of the world has nothing to do with defining the nature of God. This sets up a totally different dynamic than we found when we considered the concept of God as transcendent and as *das Umgreifende*. The dynamic of that previous concept of God tended to lead to a concept of the world that made the world eternal. The position we have now developed, however, allows us to say that God, by nature, does not need the world and that it does not matter to the nature of God whether the world exists or not, for the world is only an accidental being.

We explain as follows why the relation between God and the world may be understood as the distinction between eternity and time. We begin by noting that our concept of God as the unconditionally absolute (that is, as self-dependent in its existence as well as essence) does not depend on the concept of *participatio* or *proportio*. The concept of *participatio* or *proportio* presupposes that the items in the *proportio* share some common element in their natures or essences, where, to be sure, this sharing need not be univocal but may be only analogical. Our concept of God, however, depends on the items in question sharing only an objective reason (ratio) or an objective relation, where this is not, properly speaking, an element in their natures or essences. Here we have in mind the so-called *analogia proportionalitatis*.⁴ Substantial beings in the world which are self-dependent only in their essence possess equivocally substantial characters. Thus, on the one hand, they have not lost their material or relational character (where this claim applies to their substantial characters and where it applies not in virtue of a univocal relation between these substances but only an analogical one). But on the other hand, all material, analogical and relational connections perish when comparing God who is absolutely self-dependent in existence and essence with the world or with the beings in the world (where both the world and the beings in it are self-dependent in essence only). Thus from the standpoint of the *analogia proportionalitatis*, there remains only the parallel between a proportion of self-dependence within God (that is, between God's essence and his existence) and a proportion of self-dependence within the world (that is, between the essence and the existence of the world). That is, the *analogia proportionalitatis* asserts only a parallel between the proportion within God and the proportion within the world, a parallel which we may call a "character of reason (ratio)." This parallel, as employed in the *analogia proportionalitatis*, is not, in any sense of the word, an element which is common both to the essence/nature of God and to the essence/nature of the world. Since God and the world "share" nothing other than this parallel (or, if one prefers, this "character of reason"), it follows that God and the world remain radically distinct by nature.

Such a radical distinction by nature or in essence between God and

the world completely eliminates, in "the mode of being," God's dependence on the world such as we find in "the mode of knowing." Thus the concept of God in natural theology is completed. The divine nature, which in our concept of God was inferred from our cognition of the existence of the world, absolutely exists without any relation to whether the world exists or not. Thus there is a radical distinction by nature between God and the world. Whether understood univocally or equivocally, if God and the world share natural or material characteristics in common, then God's eternity entails the eternity of the creatures. Such a concept of God necessarily accompanies the concept of the world, not only in cognition, but in natural content. We can achieve a proper understanding of God only as we get rid of any such essential or natural proportion between God and the world, giving up any material factors in common, and finding the relation between God and the world only in reason (ratio), that is, in a parallel between the proportions as discussed above. Thus our concept of God allows us to see that the divine nature can be totally free from any restraint from the concept of the world, and it allows us to see that the concept of the world also can be totally free from any eternalization allegedly stemming from the divine nature.

I am suggesting that in the discipline of natural theology, the philosopher's task of defining the concept of God, at least so far as it concerns the relation between God and the world, was not completed until the development of Caetanús's *analogia proportionalitatis*. Even if we infer the absolute from those relative beings which we have experienced, we still cannot immediately conclude that God, in the full sense of the word, exists. If our inferences lead us to that which is absolute in essence only, we have not moved out of our experienced world. Only that which is also absolute in its existence is the absolute God, although we may also correctly speak of an absolute parallel relation (between the proportions mentioned above) that applies to God and the world. All that is in common between God and the world is this: the proportion of the existence of God to the substantial essence of the absolute God (i.e., the God who is absolute in essence and in existence), and the proportion of the existence of the world to the substantial essence of the absolute world (i.e., the world which is

absolute in essence only and not in existence). There is nothing else in common between God and the world. Any material nature between the two is excluded. Between God and the world, there is only reason (ratio) or a relation between the two proportions (i.e., a relation of proportionality). This is an entirely new aspect which the *analogia proportionis* or *participatio* did not possess. If we were to construct a relation of direct proportion or participation between God and the world, both would be related naturally and necessarily to one other, and the world would become more than an accidental being that God created by his free will. Furthermore, God would also become more than the participated subject which the world, as the participating subject, naturally requires. Lastly let us note that the sharing of some material nature, which is a "something," is always required between those items which are put directly into a proportion with each other. Likewise in the case of a participation between two items, the sharing of some material nature, which is a "something," is also required between the subject which participates and the subject which is participated. Thus a concept of God that presupposes a natural relation to this world inevitably requires and presupposes the concept of the world not only in "the mode of knowing" but also in "the mode of being."

To repeat, it is most certain that we cannot formulate the concept of God in cognition without the concept of the world. However, a concept of God that presupposes the concept of the world by nature is not yet complete. Any concept of God that presupposes, in the "mode of being," the existence of the world remains incomplete. This situation arises when we claim that God must be the cause of the world by his own nature. If, in contrast, God causes the world by his free will, then God exists whether or not the world exists.

We are now in a position to return to our explanation of how the distinction between God and the world is the distinction between eternity and time. We have shown that God can exist by nature without any relation to the world. Therefore the world may well have a beginning. But if God were the cause of the world by nature, it would follow that God in his very essence could exist only in relation to the world. From this, it would further follow that if God exists

eternally, then the world would also have to exist eternally (because the world's nature and God's nature would be mutually require each other). It is a fundamental teaching of Christian theology that a cognition or an act necessary by nature to God may be described as God's self-cognition or God's self-act. And, in fact, the doctrine of the Trinity is formulated in these terms. However, in the early Greeks' speculation about God, there was a tendency to regard the relation of the world to God as necessary by nature, because they thought that the existence of a world would be necessary if God were to recognize others or act upon others. Thus they tended to neglect the option that God created the world in the freedom of his will. We find this Greek point of view in the pantheism of Neo-Platonism and in the theory of world's eternity put forward by Aristotle and Averroes. In contrast to such positions, however, we hold that the unconditioned absolute does not naturally and necessarily cause the world, and thus the world is by no means eternal. Whether the world exists or not, God is by nature the unconditioned absolute; and if the world does exist, it is just because God has caused it by his voluntary and, thus, free will. And in this precise sense, the world is an accidental being which exists "in front of" God who is the necessary being. Therefore, God's causal action in this world is accidental,⁵ because the law of causality allows the affirmation of the existence of a cause (in this case God) without requiring the existence, or the non-existence, of an effect (in this case the world). As things in this world, thus caused, are by nature temporal, so the series of time also starts in this accidental manner. In other words, the beginning of the world itself is the beginning of the series of time. In this sense there is a beginning to this world.

There will be an inescapable pressure to make the world eternal, until natural theology makes full use of the "*analogia proportionalitatis*." The Platonists asserted a dualism in the sense that even if God had created the world, its matter at least is eternal. In contrast, Christianity strongly claims that matter also is caused by God—that is, that matter is nothing but an effect of God's voluntary causal act. Thus Christianity asserts "*creatio ex nihilo*." Because "matter" always implies "form," *creatio ex nihilo* is not formation

but creation. Because the world is caused by free will, *creatio ex nihilo* is not emanation but creation. Such a doctrine of creation clearly implies that the world has a beginning. However, the concept of God in natural theology remains incomplete and, thus, always includes many unsolvable problems.⁶

II

In the light of Suzuki's criticism that Christian theology "envisages God from the world," we are obliged to reflect on that natural theology towards which his criticism was directed. Based on this reflection, we will first take into consideration what is meant by "nothing" when speaking of "creation out of nothing." Then we will elucidate the close relation between the "analogy of being" and "nothing." And lastly we will point out how suggestive the Mahayanistic speculations in Buddhism are for revelatory Christianity which "envisages world from God." When we do so, we will no longer be satisfied with the traditional but jejune explanation that "nothing" in the phrase of "creation out of nothing" merely denies the prior existence of any material out of which God formed the world.

The patristic theologians preached that, when God in his divine nature cognizes himself and acts on himself *ad intra*, that is, "toward the inside," the Father eternally begets the Son, and the Holy Spirit eternally flows from the Father and the Son. When this Trinitarian God cognizes the other and acts on the other *ad extra*, that is, "toward the outside," the world comes into being and is, thus, created. But the divine nature is the unconditionally absolute, as mentioned above and stands in need of nothing other than itself. Therefore, while the Trinity, which is God's action *ad intra*, is necessary and natural, as the Fathers of the Church preached, God's cognition and action *ad extra*, that is, towards the other, is not necessary. In relation to God's nature as such, his acts *ad extra* are thoroughly voluntary, that is, the result of his free will. God as the unconditioned absolute is complete in his own nature and never needs the world as the other. God is God, whether the world exists or not; and if the world should exist, it exists only as the product of his free will.

God's recursive act *ad intra* is necessary for his nature. We explain

as follows. In any spiritual act of cognition or will, there is by nature an intention toward the greatest and highest. In the case of God, however, the intention toward the greatest and highest will be nothing other than an intention towards God himself. Therefore, since God is in himself the greatest, highest, and totally unconditioned, his act "toward the outside" can be neither necessary for nor basic to his nature. Such an act *ad extra* is wholly voluntary, optional, and secondary.⁷

Let us grant that the unconditioned absolute may be described as existence-itself and, thus, that its essence is to exist. Now let us ask the following question: when God acts "towards the outside," what is God's act really directed "toward?" To answer that question, we note first that God's act is directed to the "other;" but since God is existence-as-such, it follows that the "other" is none other than non-existence. Therefore, we can justly say that when God acts "toward the outside," he is acting towards nothing; that is, he is acting towards that which can only be described as non-existence. We have come to quite a surprising conclusion: we can truly say that the unconditioned absolute, when acting *ad extra*, faces "nothing" which is non-existence. Although an accidental being, considered as a substance, always remains absolute in its essence, it nevertheless also remains completely relative in its existence. Thus when a particular accidental being in the world acts *ad extra*, it merely faces another accidental being. When we move to the world itself, however, the situation becomes more complex. The world, considered as the totality of all particular, relative beings, is itself relative and, by its very nature, cannot help facing the ultimately unconditioned absolute. Finally this unconditioned absolute does not face anything at all because it is the absolute. In other words, the absolute faces nothingness, which is non-existence. Though the world as that which is relative should, by nature, face God who is absolute—and that is why the relation of the world to God can be called a *relatio realis*—nevertheless, because God is the absolute, the *absolutum*, he is not required by his nature to face the other. Nevertheless, God may choose to do so, in which case his act towards the other may be described as secondary and voluntary. This is what it means for the

unconditioned absolute to act "toward the outside." We may describe the resulting relation between God and the non-existent nothingness as a *relatio rationis* in contrast with the *relatio realis* mentioned above.

If there is a self-transcendence in the essence of that which is limited and relative, it must be directed towards some other existence. In other words, in the case of a finite and limited being whose very essence requires it to transcend itself (that is, to intend or to act "towards an other"), that finite being, to complete its act of transcendence, also requires the presence of an environment (that is, it also requires the existence of other beings). It is only when the self-transcendence (that is, the intention or action *ad extra*) occurs in the very essence of that which is unconditioned existence (that is, in God) that the self-surpassing to non-existent nothingness takes place. Indeed, only the absolute faces nothingness. Moreover, this unique case in which the absolute faces nothingness is not demanded by the nature of the absolute but is quite voluntary. God's creation of the world is said to be an act "toward the outside" *ad extra* and, thus, entirely a product of his free will, not a necessity of his nature. God's nature neither requires nor forbids his acting *ad extra*. We may conclude that God's intentional act towards nothingness as non-existence (which is his act "towards the outside") does not stem from his nature, *natura*, but only from his aptitude, *habitus*.⁸ The divine *habitus* is necessary, therefore, not for God himself but only for the creation derived from his free will.

The act of intending to create—as distinct from the act of creation as such—while "toward the outside," is, nevertheless not directed to an object. This is because it is directed to non-existence. At the same time, however, the act of intending to create is indeed a necessary premise for the divine absolute's causation of the other. It is important to note in this context that the act of creation is an object-oriented act in contrast with the intension to create which is not object-oriented. The intention has a certain fitness, *convenientia*,⁹ which is necessary before God can freely create or act upon the other. By his free intention towards nothingness, the divine absolute freely becomes nothing and sets up the "place of nothingness." This is an

intention to become, in a way, that which is intended. This does not, however, mean that God by his nature becomes what he intends; rather God becomes what he intends only in the sense that an intentionality or aptitude, a *habitus*, takes place. The intention towards nothingness merely makes nothingness the place where the causation of the other occurs. This is the location which the divine absolute chooses with complete freedom; it is nothing else than opening up the possibility of the free and optional creation of the other.

We would like to raise again our recurring question: Does the creative causation of the world as the other not make the unconditioned absolute into something relative? Does it not hurt God's existential unconditionedness? We begin our current answer by noting that even those entities we can describe as relative nonetheless possess their own particular essences, each of which is a "something." We have already mentioned that even substances, though absolute in each of their essences, still must relate to each other as existing beings. Therefore substances must also relate to each other in terms of their absolute essences each of which is a certain "something." Such relations between the essences of the various worldly substances are analogical. Even the "world" itself, as the totality of the relative beings, is "something," and this "something" can be expressed by the analogical concept of essence. By sharing this essence of the world, which is "something," the beings in the world are mutually related to each other by nature. But it is God's creation of the world that makes possible the coexistence of all those beings which are relative by nature with God himself, who as the unconditioned absolute possesses a nature that excludes all relativity. This is a serious matter. If both God and the world as truly existing realities are mediated by "something" in their essences, then there emerges a "World" that is higher than God, that subsumes both God and the world, and that mediates between them. This higher "World" would truly exist as a "something." The existence of such a higher "World" would not only relativize the created world—which in itself would not be a problem because, quite apart from the higher "World," the created world is already truly relative in its nature—but it would also

completely relativize the divine absolute who by nature excludes all relativity within himself. It is, therefore, quite unreasonable that there should be such a higher "World" capable of relativizing God who is the unconditioned absolute. We may conclude that the creation of the world as an other by an unconditioned absolute completely excludes the possibility of an inclusive essence as a certain "something" which mediates both God and the world. Rather our discussion of the place of "nothingness" clearly demonstrates the non-existence of any higher "World" that includes both God and the world.

In this context we wish to stress not just the non-existent "nothingness," but the "intention to nothingness" as non-existent. Only the divine absolute can have such an intension. Thus, the one who is naturally absolute becomes nothing in terms of his aptitude. Although God is existence-itself whose essence is to exist, in that act in which he diffuses himself, he provides a place of nothingness. This occurs when God in his act of existence transcends his essence as existence-itself and establishes an intention toward the "outer non-existences." Precisely as the absolute, God causes the relative world in the place where "existence occurs," that is, in a place that transcends any essence, transcends any whatness, and even transcends his own essence as existence-itself. This is the place of nothingness which in no sense whatsoever may be said to have an essence or a whatness. This place may be named "not to be anything," and in that sense, it transcends even the essence of the absolute—not to mention the essence of any relative being.

Within the Mahayana text of *Madhyamakakarika* (中論), we find the doctrine of the eightfold "non." It teaches non-arising and non-ceasing, non-disappearance and non-appearance, non-identity and non-difference, and non-annihilation and non-permanence. This idea simultaneously affirms and negates "to arise" and "to cease," affirms and negates "to appear" and "to disappear," affirms and negates "to be identical" and "to be different," and even affirms and negates "to be annihilated" and "to be permanent." In short, it negates not only whatever affirms but also whatever negates any essence, any whatness. And in its intention to negate any essential "whatness," it intends *śūnyatā* (empty-nothingness), which we can gloss as "not to

be anything.”¹⁰ Our position is that God, through his free and voluntary intention *ad extra*, provides the “place of nothingness,” which we have interpreted as “not, in any sense, to be something.” This is fully within God’s capacity because he is the absolute who transcends any essence—not only the essence of any relative being but even his own essence as the unconditioned absolute. This place is empty-nothingness in that it has nothing to do with any essence nor with any “thing.” But we must not confuse this with pure-and-simple non-existence. This place is an intention of the absolute toward non-existence, and is his *habitus* toward “non-existence,” toward “the outside.” It is an existential act of empty nothingness which is “non-essence” because of its transcendence of all essences. It is, so to speak, a self-diffusion, *diffusivum sui*,¹¹ of the absolute.

It is in such emptiness/nothingness that the unconditioned absolute causes the world as that which is relative. God, however, only causes that which is relative; he himself does not become relative. This is possible because the place of emptiness and nothingness is not “something” in any sense. That is, no essence and no element in any essence—either of which would be a “something—can function as a mediator between the absolute and the relative. In other words, there can be no “natural” sharing between the absolute and relative (by which is meant that the absolute and the relative cannot share any common element in their respective natures, whether this commonality be understood univocally or analogically). If we were to insist on talking about a mediator between the absolute and the relative, then we would have to point to the place of emptiness/nothingness as having that role, where such emptiness/nothingness is an existential act transcending all essences, and where, moreover, such emptiness/nothingness is none other than that which is appropriate to God’s freely willed intention for that location. This appropriateness of his intention does not belong to God by nature; rather it results from his free will. In this place of emptiness/nothingness, the divine absolute causes the world as something which is relative. In this place of emptiness/nothingness, God and the world can coexist, but not as mediated by any shared element in their essences; that is, they can coexist immediately, in the etymological meaning of “imme-

diately." In this place, and only in this place, both the absolute and the relative can exist together without any relativization of their essences, especially of God's. This existential coexistence, free from any essential subsumption, does not exercise any essential relativization over the absolute and yet allows him to relate existentially to the world of relative beings.

As mentioned above, each being in the world, though keeping its substantial character as absolute in its essence, can only exist in relation to others. These worldly substances can be unified into inclusive, essentially related groupings by the analogical mediation of their essences, without violating the absolute and univocal character possessed by each of these essences. The substances in the world persistently refuse to lose their self-dependent and univocal character while willingly permitting the relativization of themselves as parts of a whole which is analogical, inclusive, and essential. Thus any grouping that encompasses the world, does so by possessing, though analogically, an essence as a "something," and this essence of the whole, in turn, relativizes the substances in that domain where each essence has its own univocal meaning. Such an analogical mediation through the essences of the items being related, however, extends only as far as that totality we call the world. With the divine absolute, in contrast, such a mediation is wholly impossible. The reason can be made clear by what is mentioned above. There cannot be any essential mediation between God and the world which essentially requires their relative coexistence. At this point, the analogical generalization from their essences fails. From now on, if one wishes to use the term "mediation," it will be available only to the analogy of proportionality that proceeds from the existence of the items being "mediated." One could say that the relative beings in the world exist as relative by nature; but the unconditioned absolute could never exist as a relative entity by nature. It is only as God establishes the place of emptiness and nothingness, which he does as befitting his intention, that something can have its relative existence within the world relative beings.

The location we have called "emptiness" or "nothingness" is not only the place in which created beings exist—that is, beings whose

essence does not include existence—it is also the place in which existence separates from essence in the divine “self-diffusion.” It is this place, called “emptiness” or “nothingness,” that makes it possible for God to coexist with the world of relative beings while remaining absolute not only in essence but in existence as well. Here we find that the key to “creation out of nothing” is “empty-nothingness.” We can say that “empty-nothingness” is the place which opens up the possibility of the existential analogy, that is, the *analogia proportionalitatis*, which completely moves beyond the essential analogy, that is, the *analogia proportionis*. Here opens a world of *transcendental* relativism which we cannot imagine in the world of essence. Here, such a transcendental analogy, right from the beginning, deals only with the parallel between the proportions in God and in the world, and it may, therefore, be called a “word of relation.” The analogy of existence enables God, as the absolute, to escape any essential relativization, while at the same time enabling him to relate existentially to the world of relative beings. Here appears a unique relativism, a transcendental relativism. In contrast to any essential relativism in which the terms can be related only in the “place” of mediation (that is, through common elements in their essences), transcendental relativism implies that the terms can be related only in the “place” of immediate existence (that is, through the parallel involving their respective acts of existence). Transcendental relativism must be carefully distinguished from that popular relativism which relativizes and dissolves the absolute by means of some form of analogical mediation; rather, transcendental relativism alone, *while making the absolute truly what it is and making the relative truly what it is*, allows them both to relate to each other. We were able to recognize this in the “analogy of proportionality,”¹² which is a relative comparison of the proportion within the absolute with the proportion within the relative. It is important to note that, on the one hand, this analogy directly places the absolute and the relative beings into a proportionality, that is, a parallel between the proportion within God and within the world, and it even establishes a natural sharing relation between them, and yet, on the other hand, it does not relativize the nature of the absolute. To repeat: in the analogy of proportionality

between the absolute and the relative, there is only a common comparison, a parallel of the proportions within God and the world—that is, a sharing of the rational (ratio) relation between them, not the sharing of their natures or of common elements in their natures. The transcendental relativism, that is, the analogy of proportionality, while fully allowing for the discontinuity between the nature of God and the nature of the world, also establishes a relation between them based on their respective acts of existence. Since this relation requires no continuity between their natures, it follows that the absolute, whose essence is to exist, does not need the existence of relative beings whose essence is separable from their existence. In other words, if neither the world nor the particular relative beings in it has an essence that requires it to exist, then those relative beings can neither prevent nor ground the existence of God whose essence precisely is to exist.

We have inferred the divine absolute from the relative world, and we have claimed that the former causes the latter in the non-essential place of emptiness/nothingness. Normally, when one speaks of a causal connection, one would expect some natural or essential continuity between cause and effect. Lacking such a continuity based on an analogy between their essences. Such an analogy between the essences of two or more items could just as accurately be called a mediation between their natures, a continuity between items which can be put into a direct proportion, or a direct relation between the participated and the participator. Indeed, if one understands the relation between the divine absolute and the world of relative beings on the model of the patterns of causation among the beings in the world, then it would be impossible to express the divine absolute's causation of the world of relative beings as mediated by the place of empty-nothingness. This deeper understanding of divine causality accepts the analogy of proportionality mentioned above. The inadequate view of God's creation, based on an understanding of the patterns of causality within the world of relative beings is even inferior to the analogy of proportion and to the analogy of participation, and what is worse yet, it amounts to no more than the pantheistic emanation of Neo-Platonism. However, the causal connection

between the divine absolute and the relative world, as mediated by the non-essential empty-nothingness, is indeed that pure existential connection which the “analogy of proportionality” demands. Here there is a total rejection of any mediation by nature or essence.

This is certainly difficult to imagine because we have a connection that relates God and the world only in terms of their existences, while maintaining a perfect discontinuity between their natures by eliminating any essential analogy between them even though they are connected by cause and effect. Precisely because it is so difficult to imagine, however, we reserve the unique term *creatio* for this connection. This causal connection of *creatio* cannot be natural but only supernatural. Moreover, the unconditioned absolute can establish this supernatural, causal connection we call *creatio* only as mediated in the “place of nothingness.” “Creation out of nothing” is unique because it is the only causal connection that cannot be understood as a connection of natural cause-and-effect. Rather, “creation out of nothing” is a pure existential act as mediated in the place of emptiness/nothingness, and it can be established only by the unconditioned absolute. Therefore we must say that *creatio ex nihilo* is God’s supernatural act and that, properly speaking, it is an object of faith.

It is the very nature of things in the world of relativity to be relative, whereas it is not the nature of the absolute God to be relative. God, however, chose to relativize himself by the mediation of the existential act of empty-nothingness. Because God’s self-relativization does not flow by necessity from his essence, it is possible for God as the absolute and the world as the realm of relativity to relate existentially to each other, while both God and the world remain what they are to the end. To repeat: God’s act of self-relativization is truly a revelation and, as such, can only be accepted by faith. Thus creation should be taken as the self-revelation of God’s supernatural essential content—a self-revelation that cannot be understood on the model of natural causal connections. Surely, when we consider the nature of the unconditioned absolute, we have to say that God is the one and only “being-for-itself” and that, therefore, God does not have to allow any creature’s existence. When acting or intending *ad intra*, God is eternally the

Trinity, but when acting or intending *ad extra*, God freely intends "nothing," creates the "world" from this nothing, and thereby leads himself to an existential self-relativization that is fitting for God who remains by nature the unconditioned absolute. Only God can intend to establish the place of nothingness, and only in this place of nothingness can God cause the world. It is only in this existential empty-nothingness that God and the world can exist together as relative, mutually interdependent beings within the matrix of mutual causation, *hetu-pratyaya*.¹³ This situation is brought about by God's freely willed fitness for nothingness, where (A) the existence of both God and the world are relativized, where (B) there is the creation of a worldly free will that is like God's, and where (C) this created free will has a tendency towards the divine absolute, just as God's free will has an intendency towards the creature. That is, the logic of our discussion has returned us to that transcendental relativism, that place of emptiness, where that which is essentially and naturally absolute remains absolute and where that which is essentially and naturally relative is maintained as such, and where both God and the world are discontinuous naturally but related existentially. From start to finish, God is God, and the creature is the creature, and yet, within the field of emptiness there is established an relation of interdependency between them. When God totally gives himself to the creatures, he makes them fit to be "supernaturalized," which does not mean, however, that absolutization of their natures remain what they always were, namely, essentially relative. And when the creatures give God their total and sacrificial worship, his absolute nature remains absolute and is not thereby relativized. Rather, God simply cares for those creatures as is appropriate for his divine free will. That is, the existential relativism results in a "relativism of appropriateness," despite the natural discontinuity between the absolute and the relative.¹⁴

In the end, we must remember that when such an interdependent and interrelational relativism comes into being, the initiative lies in the divine absolute's "intention towards nothingness." This relativism is nothing but God in his divine love purposefully "giving himself."¹⁵ Because of this purposeful love, God who is absolute in nature

becomes that nothingness as befits his intention. God's "self-diffusion" stems not from his nature as such but from that which is appropriate to his intention (that is, from his aptitude). This of course is quite unlike the Neo-Platonist teaching. God's "self-diffusion" is nothing other than his act of self-emptying (that is, God's kenotic act) as rooted in his love. God who is a Trinity by nature, thus, created the world from nothing. Religion sometimes speaks of a "call-and-response" between God and man, but the foundation of this dialogue between God and man rests in the divine absolute's initiative. It is this initiative that makes possible the interdependence and an interrelation which is implied in the metaphor of "call-and-response." This initiative is nothing other than God's loving intention towards empty-nothingness, an intention which belongs to God alone.

In conclusion, our reflection on the difference between "envisages the world from God" and "envisages God from the world" has forced us to reconsider the meaning of "creation out of nothing" and has made certain ideas in the Mahayanistic form of Buddhism indispensable for Christianity which teaches that "God is love."¹⁶

I dedicate this paper to Father Dumoulin, my old master of theology.

Notes

1. We here define the term "*natura*" (nature) as a mode of being which is inherent in a substance; namely, that which is in "*essentia*" (essence). Normally, when the term "nature" is used, the aspect of substance or essence is emphasized rather than simple "*existentia*" (existence). In contrast, we emphasize its connection not merely with essence but also with substance or essence in existence. Therefore we may connect the term "nature" with such terms as "essential" and "necessary."
2. We refer, of course, to the Third Way of the *Quinque Viae* (The Five Ways of Proving the Existence of God). Ref. *Sonzairon no Sho-Mondai* (The Problems of Ontology) Part I. 4.: *A Theoretical and Critical Consideration of the Proof of God* (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1967) pp. 98-102. Here we consider "necessary being" to be *ens necessarium*, and accidental being to be *ens contingens*. Accidental, that is, contingent being must be distinguished from the so-called *accidentia*. *Accidentia* stands to *substantia* as a mode stands to a category. We must make it clear, therefore, that an accidental or contingent being is not itself a category, that is,

a mere form or pattern of being; rather it is a particular reality, a particular being which becomes and perishes.

3. Totality means an accumulated wholeness.

4. Any univocal sharing of nature between God and the world would result in pantheism and would endanger the *analogia inaequalitatis* between God and the world. We hold that if, in relation to *analogia proportionis* or *participatio* (which are commonly affirmed in scholastic circles), there is any natural and essential sharing between God and the world, even if analogical, the resulting concept of God would be imperfect. Therefore it is only Caetanús's *analogia proportionalitatis* that can avoid all such natural and essential mediation between God and the world. That is, Caetanús's *analogia proportionalitatis* avoids any direct relation between God and the world that would result from the use of proportion or participation. According to Caetanús, the proportion of God's essence *a* to his divine existence *b*, and the proportion of the world's essence *c* to its worldly existence *d* can be mutually related as $b/a \sim d/c$. The proportion of God's essence to his existence must be understood in light of the fact that God's essence is his existence, while the proportion of the world's essence to its existence must be understood in the light of the fact that its essence does not include its existence. A distinctive feature of Caetanús's *analogia proportionalitatis* is that neither "*a* to *c*" or "*b* to *d*" is directly proportionate. The concept of the absolute as being self-dependent (that is, the concept of that which is absolute in both existence and essence) does allow a parallel relation (a sharing relation) between God and the world, but only with *proportio* or *ratio*. Other concepts of God, however, which are based on other proportions, have no such distinctiveness.

5. The law of causality in metaphysics is a principle that the affirmation of an effect inevitably leads to the affirmation of its cause and the negation of a cause leads to the negation of its effect. (Being does not occur from nothingness.) However, the affirmation of a cause does not necessarily mean the affirmation of its effect, nor does the negation of an effect necessarily mean the negation of its cause. (This is quite different from the law of sufficient reason where the affirmation of the sufficient reason inevitably leads to the affirmation of its result and the negation of the result necessarily leads to the negation of the sufficient reason.) Therefore when we affirm that some cause has had a particular effect, the relation between that cause and that effect, may be accidental rather than necessary. Thus there is no inconsistency in using the law of causality to explain those accidental beings caused by free will.

6. Thomas Aquinas as well as Averroes argued that the question of whether or not the world has a beginning cannot be solved by reason alone. They claimed that the Christian doctrine which states the world has a beginning depends on the authority of faith. Kant, in his transcendental dialectic, regarded both the affirmation and the negation of the existence of God, as well as both the affirmation and the denial of the immortality of the soul, as antinomies which human reason can neither avoid nor resolve. Of course, Thomas would have repudiated those antinomies in their Kantian form, but both Thomas and

Averroes accepted the idea that one could rationally argue both for and against the claim that the world had a beginning. This led, ironically, to Kant's affirmation of his own far more destructive antinomies. In fact, I believe that only by completing the concept of God in natural theology can this antinomy be resolved.

7. See my "Jiyuu" ("Freedom") in *Sonzairon no Sho-Mondai (The Problems of Ontology)*, p. 437; "Sonzai no Ruihi no Keijijougakuteki Igi" ("The Metaphysical Significance of the Analogy of Being") in *ibid.*, p. 149 ff.

8. We may distinguish *natura* from *habitus*. *Habitus* means fitness for one's voluntary and contingent agency. See "Sonzai no Ruihi no Keijijougakuteki Igi" in *ibid.*, pp. 150–51, and note 10 of the third paragraph.

9. Aptitude, *habitus*, is also called fitness, *convenientia*. See Hidehiko Kashiwagi's "Sozo to Possible *Esse* Oboegaki" ("A Note on Creation and Possible *Esse*"), in *Tetsugaku* (Philosophy), vol. 49 (Tokyo: Keio University).

10. See Susumu Yamaguchi, *Hannya Shiso-shi (History of Panñā Thought)*, p. 34 and 45. See also Matsumoto, "Sonzai no Ruihi no Keijijougakuteki Igi," pp. 142–43.

11. A term that Thomas Aquinas uses in relation to "creation."

12. See note 4.

13. See Yamaguchi, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

14. The *noumenal* world of freedom never comes into being without the divine absolute's act of creation in emptiness/nothingness. Here we find an "aptitudinal relativism," that is, a relativism that is fitting to God's intention. This aptitudinal relativism refers to the interdependence and interrelations, not only among the relative beings themselves, but also between the absolute and the world. The religious realities of original sin, the fall, salvation, and bliss are, in our understanding, located in this aptitudinal relativism. The goal of the creative act includes the placement of free will in the creature; and in this sense, we can say that God *dares* to put himself into the relativistic interdependence of cause-and-occasion. To become aware of the *purposefulness* of this transcendental relativism may be understood as the realization or fulfillment or religion.

15. What is this purposeful love which belongs to "the absolute who gives himself?" From the standpoint of the world, this purposeful love, as found in "the intention to nothingness," is accidental; but to God, it is eternal because he is eternal. Its eternity, however, does not belong to the divine nature, but to the divine aptitude. It is "superfluous" and even an "unnecessary thing for thee," but that is precisely why it is so "precious." Thus a supernatural purposefulness lies hidden at the bottom of the world's nature, which is the standard both for common sense and for philosophy. In a "miracle," we perceive—we get a glimpse of, so to speak—this supernatural purposefulness that often remains hidden down in the roots of nature. In the final analysis, "creation out of nothing" is simply the affirmation of the presence of God's supernatural purpose throughout all of nature, without any exception. This affirmation can only be the work of the one who is Spirit, Son as he moves towards his Father.

16. Although this paper repeats many of the themes of my "Sonzai no Ruihi no Keijijougakuteki Igi," cited above, my new thrust here is the placement of God as understood in natural theology into a clearer relation with the Christian doctrine of creation. My emphasis on the accidental character of the created world need not lead to any slighting of the truth, the goodness, and the beauty of the natural world, as it was created by the divine logos. Sound philosophy must regard the created world, just as it is, as the standard for the construction and evaluation of any theory of causation. But if "the God of the philosophers" should contradict "the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob," then should we not admit that the methods of those philosophers are unsound, just as Pascal rejected the God of the deists as unsound?

Addendum.

This article was selected by Kojiro Nakayama and Akira Oide, and translated into English by Mitsuhiro Umezu, Stephen Franklin, Nancy Pierson, Emi Mase and Norichika Horie.

The Structure of Consciousness in Śaṅkara's Philosophy

Yoshitsugu Sawai

The works of the late Professor Toshihiko Izutsu on Islamic philosophy are widely recognized to constitute a major contribution to Islamic studies. Late in life Professor Izutsu intended to place his so-called 'Oriental philosophy' (*tōyō-tetsugaku*) in a comparative perspective in order to illuminate its structure. As one of the most significant components of 'Oriental philosophy,' Indian philosophy has had a wide and deep influence in other parts of Asia. This paper is an attempt to elucidate the structure of one strand in Indian philosophy, Śaṅkara's Vedānta view of the structure of consciousness.

The fundamental structure of religious commitment consists in human concern with the so-called 'transcendent.' In religious traditions which emphasize salvation or emancipation, the 'transcendent' may be the essential reality grasped at the dimension of depth—a reality which is beyond rational knowledge or ordinary experience. In religious cosmologies, the nature of human beings can be understood only in the context of their relation to the 'transcendent,' the concrete images and conceptions of which differ from religious tradition to the next. One could thus argue that the differences of religious thought, whether western or eastern, are based upon the different ways of articulation, by language, of the intuitive experience of the 'transcendent.'

For someone with the religious experience of the 'transcendent,' the ordinary world of everyday life is not the whole of the real world, but at best its surface. The nature of the world, which is possessed of a multi-layered structure of reality and whose fundamental being is regarded as 'transcendent,' cannot be completely cognized through human perception and reason, but can be rather intuitively experienced. At the depth of ordinary experience, the nature of the world and of human existence could be vertically understood.

Among the varieties of religious thought and philosophy which develop their own world views or perspectives on human existence, Indian thought is noteworthy for its recognition of profound dimensions of consciousness and reality. One of the most fundamental forms of such thought in India is Vedānta philosophy, which developed as a hermeneutic on the Upaniṣad scriptures. A classic presentation of Vedānta is found in the *advaita* or non-dualistic philosophy of Śaṅkara, who lived in about 700-750 C.E. Adopting a hermeneutical perspective, I attempt in this paper to clarify Śaṅkara's view of the structure of consciousness.

I

The 'transcendent,' or absolute reality is variously expressed in the religious discourse of different traditions; for example, as 'God' by Judeo-Christian thinkers, as 'Allāh' by Muslims and as 'śūnyatā' by Buddhists. In the Vedānta philosophy, the 'transcendent' is called *brahman* or *ātman*. It is in these terms that Indian philosophical tradition generally reflects on absolute reality.

The term '*brahman*' seems to have originally meant 'hymn, prayer, or magic formula' or the mystical power which is inherent in hymns, prayers and magic formulas. For the *brāhmaṇas* who preserved the Vedic rituals, *brahman* became the ultimate principle of the world. In the Vedānta religious tradition, *brahman* came to lose its original meaning, and began exclusively to designate the absolute reality which constitutes the essence of the phenomenal world. On the other hand, the term '*ātman*,' which originally meant 'soul,' came to mean the deepest underlying nature of individual beings. The core of the Vedānta philosophy, especially of the *advaita* Vedānta, is the essen-

tial identity of *brahman* with *ātman*, that is, in Śaṅkara's own terms, 'brahmātmatva, brahmātmatā, brahmātmabhāva, brahmātmakatva.'¹

The scriptures on which the Vedānta philosophy is based are the Vedas, called by the collective term *śruti*. Within *śruti*, it is the Upaniṣads, the concluding portions of the Vedas, which are regarded as the sole valid means of knowledge. Vedānta philosophy admits the authority of another class of traditional scriptures called *smṛti*, in so far as its teachings do not contradict those of *śruti*. The Vedānta philosophy has been traditionally regarded as a 'scriptural hermeneutic' intended to clarify the genuine purport of the Upaniṣads.

Upaniṣadic texts contain a variety of philosophical thoughts. These thoughts are based upon the immediate experience, through severe ascetic practice, of the identity of *brahman* with *ātman*. The Upaniṣadic texts are thus not merely philosophical, but also religious in that their eventual purpose is the attainment of emancipation from transmigration. The philosophical discussions of Śaṅkara, of Rāmānuja (traditionally accepted date: 1017-1137, the expounder of viśiṣṭādvaita [qualified non-dual] theory), and of Madhva (traditionally accepted date: 1197-1276, the advocate of dvaita [dual] theory) all take the traditional form of commentaries on such scriptures as the Upaniṣad texts. Their works, however, are not mere commentaries on the scriptural texts, but expound their own unique philosophical systems, which have been articulated on the basis of their own intuitive experience.

Though no doubt drawn from Upaniṣadic texts, the scriptural passages cited by these Vedāntic philosophers are variously interpreted according to their individual philosophical inclinations, and with implications different from those of the original Upaniṣad texts. For example, Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja sharply differ in their interpretation of the well-known *mahāvākya* 'Thou art That' (*tat tvam asi*).² In every Vedānta philosophical system, the threads of meaning of familiar Upaniṣad passages are interwoven into a complex fabric with individual patterns. The constituents, the threads, are the same, but the overall fabrics differ.

Regardless of their theoretical position, the Vedānta philosophers

single-heartedly follow an inward path in order to re-experience the intuitions of the Upaniṣad philosophers, who discovered the 'identity of *brahman* with *ātman*,' in their quest for emancipation. The 'essential intuition' (anubhava) of the metaphysical reality called *brahman* underlies the philosophical reflections of Vedānta. Accepting the Upaniṣad texts as absolute authority, these philosophers undertook severe ascetic practices, under the direction of their spiritual teachers, to deepen their own religious experiences.

Vedānta philosophers, especially advaitins like Śaṅkara, assert that emancipation is attainable by 'knowing' the reality of *brahman*, which is omnipresent in all beings and things of the world. 'Knowing' in this context does not signify acquisition of empirical or academic knowledge. According to Śaṅkara's interpretation, 'knowing' is the essential intuition of *brahman* as the reality of the world. To demonstrate the validity of his interpretation, he often quotes a well-known passage of *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* (III. ii. 9): 'One who indeed knows that supreme *brahman* becomes [that] very *brahman*' (sa yo ha vai tat paramaṃ brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati).³ In other words, 'knowing' is 'becoming'; the subjective consciousness or acknowledgment of *brahman* is regarded as coming to be the reality of *brahman* itself. It is beyond the ordinary distinction between subject and object; there is neither one who sees nor a thing which is seen. In 'knowing' *brahman*, all differentiation disappears and not even any trace of any differentiated thing or being remains. Such a state is the zero-point both of consciousness and of existence; there is no distinction between consciousness and existence.

The expressions used by the Upaniṣadic or Vedānta philosophers to describe the metaphysical experiences they obtained through their severe exercises all point to the ineffable absolute reality. Śaṅkara's so-called 'unqualified *brahman*' (nirguṇa-*brahman*) or 'the fourth' (turiya) is such an absolute reality. It is not a 'figurative combination' (saṃpad),⁴ which is merely theoretical hypothesis, but an *a-priori* 'truth' obtained through their own experiences of reality. It cannot be by nature entirely explained with words. The Vedānta philosophers dare to discourse on their experiences in the form of philosophical reflections. More precisely, their discourses describe not

reality itself but rather the mere traces of it. The advaita Vedānta tradition holds that since words are only traces of *brahman*, the reality of the world, disciples who seek to recognize *brahman* through exercises must get direct instruction about the deeper meanings of the Upaniṣad texts from their spiritual teachers, who have already recognized *brahman*.

Even though the language of the Upaniṣadic scriptures does not much differ from everyday Sanskrit speech, the semantic world of the Upaniṣads is considerably different from that of ordinary language. Behind the language of the Upaniṣad texts, there lies the depth of consciousness or reality intuitively understood by the Upaniṣad philosophers. While re-experiencing that depth of consciousness or reality in the Upaniṣad texts, the Vedānta philosophers hermeneutically express their reflection on the nature of consciousness or reality in their philosophical works, such as Upaniṣad commentaries. Such language is thus a philosophical meta-language of kind that cannot be fully understood within the semantic framework of everyday discourse.

II

In Śaṅkara's philosophical exposition, based upon his own experiences of the metaphysical reality, this reality is called *nirguṇa-brahman*: it is presented as unqualified and impersonal, as not fully describable through speech and not ultimately delimited by any qualifying factors in the world, either internal or external to it. As the Upaniṣad philosopher Yājñavalkya teaches, its nature can thus be expressed only negatively by affirming it is 'not this, or not that' (*neti neti*).

From the standpoint of this absolute reality, Śaṅkara regards *īśvara* (God) as a qualified reality or *īśvara-s* (gods) as qualified realities. The latter represent the lower level, the phenomenal and imaginary state of the unqualified and impersonal one. They are not the genuine, essential realities they may seem to be. On account of the illusion (*māyā*) of experiential consciousness, *nirguṇa-brahman* is misunderstood to be *saguṇa-brahman*, that is, personal and qualified *brahman*. Ultimately, however, *brahman* is never *saguṇa*.

By contrast, the viśiṣṭādvaita philosopher Rāmānuja regards *brahman* not as an unqualified and impersonal reality but as a qualified and personal one, namely, the 'Supreme personal [God]' (puruṣottama) called Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa and possessed of innumerable, ultimate auspicious attributes. Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja disagree in their philosophical reflections about the aspects of the ultimate reality, but they share a manner of referring to the essential nature of that reality. They may differ in calling absolute reality unqualified or qualified, impersonal or personal. They may hold divergent their world views, which are based upon their conception of the absolute reality. Their discourse nevertheless shares a common semantic articulation through language and common hermeneutical interpretations of reality.

Śaṅkara's view of *brahman*, thus differentiated into *nirguṇa-brahman* and *saguṇa-brahman*, presents a dual structure, with a 'higher' (para) and a 'lower' (apara) component. *Nirguṇa-brahman* is the 'higher' being, *saguṇa-brahman* the 'lower.' The latter is qualified by the different 'limiting adjuncts' (upādhi), which vary as different 'names and forms' (nāma-rūpa). In contrast, *nirguṇa-brahman* is never qualified by such limiting adjuncts. In the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, Śaṅkara says:

Though it is devoid of qualities, *brahman* is spoken of in those respective places [of scriptures] as a qualified being, possessed of the characteristics associated with names and forms, for the sake of meditation (upāsana).

nirguṇam api sad brahma nāmarūpagatair guṇaiḥ saguṇam upāsanārthaṃ tatra tatropadiśyata⁵

From the standpoint of the double structure of reality, *saguṇa-brahman* lies at the level of ignorance (avidyā); the phenomenal world is illusory, not real, since it is based upon superimposition (adhyāsa) on the reality of *nirguṇa-brahman*, which is 'only one, without the second' (ekam evādvitīyam). But *saguṇa-brahman* is regarded by Śaṅkara as being useful for the sake of meditation.

Like reality, human knowledge is also said to have a double structure: a 'higher' knowledge (jñāna or vidyā) and a 'lower' one, termed 'ignorance' (ajñāna) or 'nescience' (avidyā). In Śaṅkara's

philosophical structure, the ultimate goal of human beings is emancipation (*mokṣa*), which is characterized by the complete removal of the causes of transmigratory existence (*saṃsāra*). This transmigratory existence consists in the following continuously recurring cycles of actions and their results: *karman* (activity as the results of actions in a previous existence) → one's connection with the body → experience of pleasure and pain → passion and aversion → actions → merit and demerit.⁶ Transmigratory existence is ultimately caused by the 'lower' knowledge, that is, 'ignorance' (*ajñāna*) or 'nescience' (*avidyā*). Ignorance is 'the appearance of a thing, which has been previously perceived, in another thing in the form of memory' (*smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ*), that is, 'superimposition' (*adhyāsa*) in which one perceives the attributes of X upon non-X.⁷

Emancipation from the transmigratory existence arises from the knowledge of *brahman*, that is, from intuitive experience of the identity of *brahman* with *ātman*. Śaṅkara states:

The knowledge of *brahman* does not depend on human efforts, but rather depends on reality [itself], as in the case of the knowledge of those realities which are the objects of such valid means of knowledge as direct perception.

na puruṣavyāpāratāntrā brahmavidyā/kiṃ tarhi pratyakṣādi-
pramāṇaviśayaavastujñānavad vastutantrā/⁸

The knowledge of *brahman*, which 'depends on reality [itself],' is the recognition of the genuine reality of *brahman*. Its fundamental recognition as such is still prior to philosophical reflection. The nature of *brahman* is directly grasped through metaphysical experience of the deep dimension of reality, a dimension that transcends any verbal expression. It is when the intuitive experience is semantically articulated that philosophical reflection begins. Thus, the so-called 'knowledge' of Indian philosophy is 'experiential knowledge,' which relies on personal metaphysical experience. Through Śaṅkara's 'creative interpretation' of the Upaniṣad texts, the metaphysical and epistemological tenets of his advaita philosophy are constructed as discourses articulated and developed on the basis of intuitive experience.

In so far as the depth of one's consciousness is not explored, the

ultimate reality, that is, the 'higher' (para) *brahman*, can be never experienced. Only when the depth of consciousness gradually or suddenly becomes apparent, does that consciousness become aware of the depth of reality. In other words, at the superficial level of consciousness (Śaṅkara's so-called 'lower' [apara] knowledge), the shallow dimension of reality, characterized by the qualified *brahman* and the manifold phenomenal world, appears to be real; at the deep level of consciousness (Śaṅkara's 'higher' knowledge), the unqualified *brahman* alone can be real. The dichotomous distinction of a qualified and unqualified *brahman* is thus only apparent, superficially valid as long as the distinction itself is regarded as decisive and real. From the viewpoint of essential reality, the qualified *brahman* and the phenomenal world wholly subsist in the unqualified *brahman*.

As long as human perception and reason remain undeveloped, they cannot fathom the depth of consciousness. The Vedānta tradition has sought ultimate reality by expanding consciousness through severe exercises. In Śaṅkara's theory of consciousness, consciousness and reality constitute a double, mutually supportive structure.

III

According to Śaṅkara, knowledge of the absolute unqualified *brahman* can be obtained by controlling one's senses, by renouncing the actions that cause transmigratory existence, by abandoning the desires that cause actions, and by deepening one's consciousness to enable it fully to experience the identity of *brahman* with *ātman*. As a means of deepening one's consciousness, Śaṅkara strongly recommends 'world-renunciation' (karma-saṃnyāsa).

World-renunciation, as a way of life, is appropriate for people who can achieve detachment from worldly norms and values. Householders who cannot renounce the world must perform 'action' (karman) until they obtain knowledge by destroying ignorance. In any case, Śaṅkara's theory that knowledge of *brahman* is the only direct means to attain emancipation provides a theoretical basis for the way of life called *karma-saṃnyāsa*. But not everyone who wants to renounce the world can always do so, for no aspirant is eligible for world-renunciation unless he is accepted as qualified by a teacher who

is thought to have already obtained the knowledge of *brahman*.⁹

Śaṅkara enumerates four personal attitudes necessary for the aspirants to the knowledge of *brahman*.¹⁰ The first is the 'discrimination' (viveka) of things which are eternal and non-eternal. By understanding the importance of the eternal and unchangeable, the aspirant can rise above the worldly things which previously seemed important. The second attitude is 'non-attachment' (vairāgya) to the enjoyment of the mundane results of action. According to the Śaṅkaran tradition, every would-be ascetic is required previously to abandon such all worldly things as family and wealth. This abandonment implies rejection of any desire for the worldly. The third qualification consists in possession of the virtues of 'tranquility' (śama), 'self-control' (dama) and so on. An aspirant for the knowledge of *brahman* must be familiar with such practices as *yoga*. Finally, the fourth attitude required of an aspirant is 'a desire for emancipation' (mumukṣutva). In order to endure any severe exercise, a strong will for the quest of emancipation is required. Through the three stages of an exercise called 'hearing, reflection and meditation' (śravaṇa-manana-nididhyāsana), an aspirant possessed of the above-mentioned four prerequisites can single-mindedly explore the depths of consciousness.

In Śaṅkara's philosophy, the process of deepening consciousness is expressed in terms of 'sleep.' Śaṅkara identifies the four layers in the structure of consciousness. From its superficial level downwards, it consists in 'waking' (jāgrat), 'dreaming' (svapna), 'deep sleep' (suṣupti) and 'the fourth' (turiya). Through severe exercises, one descends from the 'waking' and 'dreaming' states through the state of 'deep sleep' into 'the fourth,' deepest level of consciousness. This fourth level represents a structural model of transcendental consciousness.

Śaṅkara's philosophical reflection about the four stages of consciousness is not wholly original. Long before the philosophical reflections of the later Vedānta tradition, Upaniṣad philosophers in ancient India had already reflected on these states of consciousness. A systemization and summation of these Upaniṣadic philosophical reflections is found in the text of the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*. While re-

experiencing (nach-erleben) the contents of the Upaniṣad texts, Śaṅkara at the same time develops a unique view of consciousness from his own perspective on scriptural interpretation. This perspective was semantically articulated in language on the basis of his intuitive experience of *brahman* (= *ātman*). It would be a mistake to conclude, from the fact that Śaṅkara composed commentaries on the *Brahmasūtras* and the Upaniṣads, that he was little more than a successor to a pre-existing Upaniṣadic philosophical tradition. Careful study of his work confirms his originality.¹¹ He created a new style of philosophical reflection on the basis of his own intuitive experience. For Śaṅkara, Upaniṣadic texts serve as threads for a philosophical fabric woven on the loom of his own intuitive experience of *brahman*. The various philosophical motifs in the Upaniṣadic texts are newly configured and interpreted within the semantic structure of Śaṅkara's philosophy. In short, Śaṅkara's theory of consciousness constitutes a uniquely organized perspective, backed by his own metaphysical experiences, which have been obtained through the Upaniṣadic scriptures.

IV

In the structure of consciousness elaborated in Śaṅkara's advaita philosophy, the 'waking' state, the superficial level of consciousness, lies furthest from deep consciousness. This waking state, which organizes the ordinary and common-sense world of communication, is characterized by a dualistic *Weltanschauung*, which distinguishes subjects and objects and is based upon the senses and the perception of objects. The *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* describes this 'waking' level as 'common to anyone' or 'universal' (*vaiśvānara*), for all 'waking' persons share a single world of ordinary experience, which can be understood and communicated through everyday language.

Since the 'waking' consciousness is the state of ordinary experiences, no one within it can see the unlimited, profound depth of reality lying in flux below. As suggested above, from Śaṅkara's perspective, only the *nirguṇa-brahman*, or *para-ātman* inherent in human existence is real. The *ātman* as the nature of an individual being is essentially eternal and unchanging, or 'pure consciousness.'

But in ordinary consciousness, numerous limiting adjuncts are superimposed, through ignorance, on *ātman*. Therefore, when *ātman* is qualitatively changed into an 'individual self' (jīvātman), quite different from the essential *ātman*, it completely loses the essential identity with the absolute reality of *brahman*. Nevertheless, in the ordinary state of consciousness, one conceives this 'individual self' to be one's true nature and one has no doubt in this regard.

This individual self is combined with a body in which five senses (buddhīndriya-s) and an internal organ (antaḥkāraṇa) function. Through the limitation of these organs, *ātman* as an individual self perceives external objects. The *ātman* in the 'waking' state of consciousness is thus characterized by what Śaṅkara refers to as the 'external' (bāhya).¹² In this consciousness, the capability of perception gets muddled, one comes under the domination of a variety of things and events in the phenomenal world and cannot recognize reality as it is. For such an individual self, the absolute unqualified *brahman* appears to be the manifold world. Moreover, in so far as one is conscious of this manifold world, one does not 'wake' in the true dimension of reality, while 'waking' in ordinary phenomenal world.

While consciousness descends from the 'waking' state, the mind slips into the 'dreaming' state. This state of consciousness entertains a world of images which can no longer be recognized within ordinary, 'waking' consciousness. While the words and their meanings of any ordinary language are inseparably conjoined like the two sides of a coin, in the 'dreaming' consciousness, the balance between word and image gradually begin to collapse. The *ātman* in the 'dreaming' state dreams with its own 'light' (tejas). Śaṅkara says:

Just as it is seen that a sword [shines] when it is drawn from its sheath, so the Knower, separated in the dreaming state from cause and effect, is seen to be self-effulgent.

kośād iva viniṣkṛṣṭaḥ kāryakāraṇavarjitah/
yathāsir dṛśyate svapne tadvad boddhā svayamprabhaḥ//¹³

The *Ātman*, which [in the dreaming state] sees the memory-impressions—which are caused by action due to nescience—manifested in the abode of the mind [and] illumined by the

self-effulgent One, is called *Taijasa*.

mānase tu gr̥he vyaktā avidyākarmavāsanāḥ/
paśyaṃs taijasa ātmoktaḥ svayaṃjyotiḥprakāśitāḥ//¹⁴

Free from such limiting adjuncts as body and sense organs, the *ātman* of the 'dreaming' state appears in a form purer than that of the *ātman* of the 'waking' state. Śaṅkara follows the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*, which describes the *ātman* of the 'dreaming' state as qualified by the modifier *taijasa* (brilliant). In this state of consciousness, the sense-organs which perceive objects in the external world temporarily cease to function. Only one's 'mind' (*manas*) continues to operate on the basis of the 'memory-impressions' (*vāsanā*) previously obtained through the sense organs. Thus, the object of perception in the 'dreaming' state is not external; as a result of the functioning of mind, the dreamer perceives the same things and events as are seen in the waking state of consciousness. To the extent that one sees the same things and events in both the 'dreaming' and 'waking' states, these states of consciousness are much the same.

While citing a passage of *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, Śaṅkara points out in his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* that the 'dreaming' state of consciousness serves as a 'joint' (*saṃdhyā*) between the condition of 'being in this world [while waking]' and of 'being in the other world [while being in deep sleep]'.¹⁵ The depth of reality, never evident in the waking state, thus comes to be at least vaguely suggested by the dreaming state. Yet since ignorance persistently obscures the depth of consciousness, the dreamer still remains unable to grasp the depth of reality. At the level of ordinary language, the meaning of words spoken in this 'dreaming' state of consciousness may lack coherence, for it eludes the common sense of ordinary experience.

V

As sleep deepens, consciousness shifts from the 'dreaming' state to 'deep sleep,' where all dreams cease. In 'deep sleep,' the distinction between subject and object no longer exists. The subjectivity of ordinary experience entirely disappears. Śaṅkara says:

When [in the state of deep sleep] neither [external] objects nor [their] memory-impressions are aroused by actions [to appear]

in the intellect, then *Ātman* should be known to be *Prājña*, which beholds nothing else.

viṣayā vāsanā vāpi codyante naiva karmabhiḥ/
yadā buddhau tadā jñeyāḥ prājña ātmā hy ananyadrk//¹⁶

All external things and events cease to be objects of consciousness and perception. Even the 'memory-impressions' which still existed in the 'dreaming' state no longer operate. Śaṅkara follows the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* in characterizing the *ātman* in this consciousness as *prājña*. The limiting adjuncts of an individual sleeping deeply in this state of consciousness are still, and the individual is temporarily absorbed into *brahman* (= *ātman*).

In interpreting *Brahmasūtra* I. i. 9, 'On account of [the individual soul] going to the Self' (*sva-apyayāt*), Śaṅkara quotes the words of Uddālaka Āruṇi who is well known with the Upaniṣad philosophy of 'Being' (*sat*). When a person sleeps, Uddālaka Āruṇi says, 'he has reached Being, he has gone (*apita*) to his own (*sva*). Therefore, they say of him 'he sleeps' (*svapiti*).'¹⁷ Here, a linguistic parallel illustrates absorption into a fundamental state of Being: *svapiti* (he sleeps) and *sva-apita* (he has gone to his own). In this explanation, by the recomposition of words possessed of polysemy, the ordinary world of meanings is gradually shifted into the depth of reality.

In holding that seeing is impossible in the consciousness of 'deep sleep,' Śaṅkara follows the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, which states:

That he (*puruṣa*) does not see[in the state of deep sleep], then it is that though he is really seeing, he does not see; for there is no cessation of the seeing of a seer, because a seer is imperishable. But there is not the second thing separated from him which he can see.

yad vai tan na paśyati paśyan vai tan na paśyati na hi draṣṭur
drṣṭer viparilopo vidyate 'vināśitvāt/ na tu tad dvitīyam asti tato
'nyad vibhaktam yat paśyet//¹⁸

In the consciousness of deep sleep, there is no distinction between the subject who sees and the object which is seen. But Śaṅkara maintains that the 'seeds' (*bīja*) of ignorance, which is characteristic of the waking and dreaming states, persist even in deep sleep. In other words, there is no activity of the mind in this stage, although the

connection of *ātman* with *buddhi* still exists as a 'potentiality' (śakti). Thus, in the state of deep sleep, the individual *ātman* comes to be temporarily absorbed into *brahman*, but when one wakes up out of deep sleep again, the *ātman* is immediately connected with *buddhi* and returns to the previous 'waking' state of consciousness. The consciousness of deep sleep, called 'darkness' (tamas), is said to be the 'seed' of the 'waking' and 'dreaming' states of consciousness.¹⁹ With the metaphor of the 'seed,' Śaṅkara implies that just as the seed of a plant, which has been scorched with fire, will no longer sprout, the 'seed' of ignorance, destroyed with the knowledge of *ātman*, will no longer give rise to ignorance.²⁰

In the consciousness of deep sleep, one can temporarily explore the depth of reality called 'identification of *brahman* with *ātman*,' but when sleep ends, one immediately returns to the 'waking' state. According to Śaṅkara, since the states of 'waking,' 'dreaming' and 'deep sleep' are merely 'verbal handles' (vācārambhaṇa),²¹ they do not represent the genuine totality of reality.

Perceiving that the depth of consciousness could not be explored as long as the ordinary consciousness operated freely, philosophers not only of the Upaniṣads but also of the later Vedānta attempted to attain the consciousness of 'deep sleep' through an intuitive experience acquired through severe exercises in a so-called 'fourth' state.²² The word 'fourth' (turiya, turya, caturtha) is often used in daily life, without any special meaning. In the Vedānta philosophical tradition, however, this word has the specific and unique connotation of a state of consciousness attained with intuitive experience. It is a fourth state of consciousness following the three previous states of 'waking,' 'dreaming' and 'deep sleep.' Only in this 'fourth' world of consciousness can one encounter ultimate reality, unlimited by any limiting adjunct. Śaṅkara explains:

Whether in the state of deep sleep or of waking or of dreaming,
no delusive perception appears to pertain to Me in this world. As
those [three states] have no existence, self-dependent or other-
dependent, I am always the Fourth, the Seeing and the non-dual.
suṣuptajāgratsvapataś ca darśanam
na me 'sti kiṃcit svam iveha mohanam/

svataś ca teṣāṃ parato 'py asattvatas
turiya evāsmi sadā dṛg advayaḥ//²³

The deep essential reality which is illuminated in the consciousness of 'the fourth' state differs markedly from the phenomenal existence perceived in ordinary experience. The 'fourth' is the world where all the things and events, losing their individual substance, become totally identified. In this world *brahman* and *ātman* cannot be differentiated. Individual distinctions of consciousness disappear, as does the external world as the object of ordinary experiences.

In verses describing the reality of *brahman* (= *ātman*) intuitively experienced in the deep consciousness, Śaṅkara says:

Like ether, though abiding in all beings, I am free from [all] the faults of beings; I am the Witness, the Observer, the pure, attributeless *Brahman*; so I am alone.
vyomavat sarvabhūtaśto bhūtaśair vivarjitaḥ/
sākṣi cetā 'guṇaḥ śuddho brahmaivāsmi kevalaḥ//²⁴

The *ātman* thus described is [the *ātman*] with adjuncts. [But] the *Ātman* without adjuncts is indescribable, without parts, attributeless and pure; neither mind nor speech reaches It.
sopādhiś caivam ātmokto nirupākhyo 'nupādhikaḥ/
niṣkalo nirguṇaḥ śuddhas taṃ mano vāk ca nāpnutaḥ//²⁵

In this real world, according to Śaṅkara, there is no reality other than *brahman* (= *ātman*). Quoting a passage of the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* (VI. ii. 1), Śaṅkara states that *brahman* is 'one only, without a second' (ekam evādvitīyam). Thus, *brahman* is never limited by time and space, is beyond conceptualization and is indescribable with ordinary language.

Daring to resort to ordinary language to characterize the *brahman* of 'fourth' state, Śaṅkara employs such positive adjectives as 'eternal' (nitya), 'pure' (śuddha) or 'omnipresent' (sarvaga). Moreover, he calls *brahman* a 'witness' (sākṣin).²⁶ In this context, the word 'witness' does not connote a perceiving subject, in contradistinction to objects, but rather 'the soul which is permanent in all beings, uniform, single and eternally unchanging' (sarvabhūtaśtaḥ sama ekaḥ kūṭasthanityaḥ puruṣo).²⁷ The absolute *brahman* alone is real in this

world; there are no subjects of perception, objects of perception and differences between them. The depth of meaning which Śaṅkara intends when he calls *brahman* a 'witness' cannot be fathomed by trying to understand this word in the context of ordinary experience. We must understand this term in a creative, cosmological context derived from Śaṅkara's own metaphysical experience.

The above-cited passages of Śaṅkara simultaneously use negative and positive adjectives to suggest the indescribable, absolute reality of *brahman*. With negative expressions, he implies the inadequacy of any discourse on the reality of *brahman*. Just as Yājñavalkya said 'it is not this; it is not that' (neti neti), he, too, implies the reality of *brahman* by describing it negatively with such adjectives as 'non-dual' (advaya), 'unborn' (aja), 'undecaying' (ajara) and 'immortal' (amṛta). Thus, in Śaṅkara's view, the consciousness of the 'fourth [state]' is the intuitive experience of the depth of its reality, totally different from the experiences of 'waking,' 'dreaming,' and 'deep sleep.'

Conclusion

Śaṅkara's view of consciousness is fundamentally characterized by his placing the absolute reality of *brahman* at the foundation of his ontological structure and by his intrinsic deconstruction of the reality of the ordinarily experienced world by incorporating the negative concept of 'illusion' (māyā) into its philosophical structure. On the basis of his intuitive experience, he reconstituted the ordinarily experienced world from the deep consciousness of the 'fourth [state]' and produced philosophical reflection as the result of his own semantic articulation of reality.

At the consciousness of the 'fourth [state],' all things and events of the existent world lose the solidity of their respective substances, and the distinctions between them completely disappear. At this level of consciousness, such states of consciousness as 'waking,' 'dreaming' and 'deep sleep' are totally reduced to the fundamental 'fourth [state].' From this 'genuine' dimension of consciousness, ordinary states of consciousness are re-articulated in his newly organized semantic structure of non-dualism: the 'waking' state is located at the

shallowest level of consciousness; the 'dreaming' state at the deeper level; the state of 'deep sleep' at a still further deeper level.

At the 'waking' and 'dreaming' states, one sees things and events of innumerable kinds. In so far as one sees them, they really exist in one's recognition. But as one's consciousness gradually deepens to the 'fourth [state],' one comes to recognize through one's own experience that all things and events are essentially identical with the absolute unarticulated reality of *brahman*. One sees only one reality, unqualified *brahman*. Śaṅkara's theory of consciousness thus constitutes a creative philosophy of language which semantically re-articulates the phenomena of consciousness as a whole from the experienced dimension of depth. In short, this philosophy is the structural representation of the vision of deep consciousness.

Notes

1. *Word Index of the Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya of Śaṅkara*, University of Madras, 1971, 1973, pp. 713-714.
2. Cf. Yoshitsugu Sawai, "Rāmānuja's Hermeneutics of the *Upaniṣads* in Comparison with Śaṅkara's Interpretation," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* No. 19, 1991, pp. 94-96.
3. Śaṅkara, *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980), I. i. 4, p. 78; I. iii. 19, p. 234. Cf. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* (III. ii. 9, p. 174) in *Īśādidāśopaniṣadaḥ Śaṅkara-bhāṣyasametah*, Works of Śaṅkarācārya in Original Sanskrit, vol. I (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1964; reprint ed., 1978).
4. Śaṅkara, *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, I. i. 4, pp. 77-78.
5. *ibid.*, I. ii. 14, p. 177.
6. Cf. Sengaku Mayeda, *A Thousand Teachings: The Upadeśasāhasrī of Śaṅkara* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1979), p. 71.
7. Śaṅkara, *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, I. i. upodghāta, pp. 10-13.
8. *ibid.*, I. i. 4, p. 78.
9. Cf. Yoshitsugu Sawai, *The Faith of Ascetics and Lay Smārtas: A Study of the Śaṅkaran Tradition of Śṛṅgeri* (Vienna: Sammlung de Nobili, University of Vienna, 1992), pp. 119-133.
10. Śaṅkara, *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, I. i. 1, pp. 36-37.
11. Cf. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, "The Study of Śaṅkarācārya," *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Vol. XXXIII, 1952, p. 3.
12. Śaṅkara, *Upadeśasāhasrī*, critically edited by Sengaku Mayeda (Tokyo: The

- Hokuseido Press, 1973), I. 17. 64, p. 141. Cf. *ibid.*, I. 15. 22, p. 112.
13. *ibid.*, I. 11. 11, p. 89; Sengaku Mayeda, *A Thousand Teachings, The Upadeśasāhasrī of Śaṅkara* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1979), p. 127. Cf. *Brhadāranyakopaniṣad*, IV. iii. 9, p. 877.
14. *ibid.*, I. 15. 24, p. 112; *A Thousand Teachings*, p. 144.
15. Śaṅkara, *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, III. ii. 1, p. 622. Cf. *Brhadāranyakopaniṣad*, IV. iii. 9, p. 877.
16. Śaṅkara, *Upadeśasāhasrī*, I. 15. 25, p. 113; *A Thousand Teachings*, p. 144.
17. Śaṅkara, *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, I. i. 9, pp. 113-114. Cf. *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, VI. viii. 1, p. 521.
18. *Brhadāranyakopaniṣad*, IV. iii. 23, p. 896.
19. Śaṅkara, *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, II. iii. 31, p. 541; III. ii. 9, pp. 635-637.
20. Śaṅkara, *Upadeśasāhasrī*, I. 17. 25, p. 135; *A Thousand Teachings*, p. 162.
21. *ibid.*, I. 17. 65, p. 141; *A Thousand Teachings*, p. 166. In his *Chāndogyopaniṣadbhāṣya*, Śaṅkara interprets this term in the sense of "the base of words" (vāg-ālabhāna). Cf. Śaṅkara, *Chāndogyopaniṣadbhāṣya*, VI. i. 4, p. 505.
22. The word *turīya* appears in *Brhadāranyakopaniṣad*, V. xiv. 3-7; *turya* in *Maitryupaniṣad*, VI. 19 and VII. xi. 7-8; *caturtha* in *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad* 7.
23. Śaṅkara, *Upadeśasāhasrī*, I. 10. 4, p. 85; *A Thousand Teachings*, p. 123.
24. *ibid.*, I. 11. 6, p. 88; *A Thousand Teachings*, p. 126.
25. *ibid.*, I. 15. 29, p. 113; *A Thousand Teachings*, p. 145.
26. Śaṅkara, *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, I. i. 4, p. 87; II. iii. 41, p. 552; *Upadeśasāhasrī*, I. 7. 2, p. 81; I. 11. 6, p. 88; I. 13. 19, p. 98; I. 15. 38, p. 115; I. 18. 26, p. 150; I. 18. 94, p. 161.
27. Śaṅkara, *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, I. i. 4, p. 87.

*On Sufi Psychology:
A Debate between
the Soul and the Spirit*

William C. Chittick

The writings of Professor Toshihiko Izutsu have long been savored by those convinced of the pertinence of Islamic thought to the social and spiritual crises of the contemporary world. The publication last year of his *Creation and the Timeless Order of Things* reminds us that his works, which occupy the intellectual tip of the iceberg that is interest in Sufism, have a wide and growing audience in North America. The current popularity of Sufism is part of the broader fascination with everything that breaks with the mechanistic and scientific world view that has brought modern civilization to its present impasse. All sorts of people are searching for solutions to the encroaching dissolution of personalities, social structures, and environments that are all too obvious in the modern world. The interest in Professor Izutsu's brilliant and broad-ranging works suggests that for many of them the intellectual roots of the present predicament need to be elucidated before lasting practical solutions can be found.

Although Professor Izutsu, in his search for what he has called a "metaphilosophy of oriental philosophies,"¹ focused on philosophical issues, he frequently reminded his readers that the Islamic and Oriental traditions have always kept in view the necessity of psychological and spiritual transformation. One cannot come to understand the nature of existence without transcending ordinary consciousness.

If people do not recognize the world for what it is, the problem lies in the subject, not the object. As Professor Izutsu remarks in a typical passage from his writings,

[M]etaphysics or ontology is inseparably connected with the subjective state of man, so that the self-same reality is said to be perceived differently in accordance with the different degrees of consciousness.²

In works on Sufism, the issue of degrees of consciousness is addressed far more often than questions of ontology or metaphysics. In what follows, I offer a glimpse of the types of issues that are addressed in Sufi studies of human consciousness by presenting the example of a single text, written probably in the seventeenth century by one ‘Abd al-Jalīl of Allahabad, who can be considered an intellectual follower of the school of Ibn al-‘Arabī. He is probably identical with ‘Abd al-Jalīl ibn Ṣadr al-Dīn Ilāhābādī, the author of a book called *Irshād al-sālikīn*, a collection of invocations (*adhkār*) of the Chishtis and others. In a manuscript copy of this book, he says that he was requested to write it because “I had written many treatises in the science of *tawḥīd* concerning the realities, the gnostic sciences, and the intricacies, but a treatise was needed...in the science of the wayfaring [*sulūk*], the invocations, and the disciplines that take the traveler in the direction of the divine gnostic sciences, a treatise that would be the key to gnosis as such in a manner that opens the lock of the hearts.”³ He may be identical with the Chishtī shaykh, ‘Abd al-Jalīl of Lucknow (d. 1043/1633–34), who, according to Saiyid Athar Abbas Rizvi, showed “great frankness in expressing his belief in the *Wahdat al-Wujūd* and little concern for the strict observance of the *Sharia*.”⁴

‘Abd al-Jalīl first attracted my attention when I came across a work by him listed as *Su’āl wa jawāb* in the library of the Institute of Islamic Studies in New Delhi.⁵ This short treatise (27 pages of 21 lines in length) describes a visionary conversation with Ibn al-‘Arabī. During the discussion, Ibn al-‘Arabī answers a number of questions connected with difficult passages in his works, mainly *al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyya*. Most of the questions have in view the long-standing current of criticisms directed by well-known Sufi teachers against

some of the technical terminology and phraseology of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s writings. This current had been set in motion by figures such as ‘Alā’ al-Dawla Simnānī (d. 737/1336) and it was continued by Gīṣū Darāz (d. 825/1422) and others. The last part of the work alludes briefly to the position of the most famous of these critics, the Naqshbandī shaykh, Aḥmad Sirhindī (d. 1034/1624).

Like many other works I saw in India, this treatise provides evidence that the importance of Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī’s criticisms of Ibn al-‘Arabī in the history of Sufism has been vastly overrated by modern scholars.⁶ Most of the later authorities who supported Ibn al-‘Arabī’s positions hardly even bothered to refer to Sirhindī, since they found his criticisms superficial and self-inflating. In *Su’āl wa jawāb*, ‘Abd al-Jalīl alludes to Sirhindī as “one of the recent Suls [who] have objected to your persuasion, saying that Oneness is in *shuhūd*, not in *wujūd*.” Ibn al-‘Arabī responds by pointing out quite rightly that in the *Futūḥāt*, he has already said everything such critics have said, because there he presents all valid points of view. The problem lies in the critics’ inability to see beyond their own limitations.

The manuscript that I want to discuss here, *Rūḥ wa nafs* or ‘*Ubūdat al-tazyīn*,⁷ is similar to the first in both length (22 pages of 21 lines) and the fact that it is presented as a visionary conversation, but in this treatise the two principles are the spirit (*rūḥ*) and the soul or self (*nafs*). On the one hand this work discusses many of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s ideas on existence or being (*wujūd*) and its levels, the nature of the “things” (*ashyā*) or the “immutable entities” (*al-a’yān al-thābita*), the unknowability of the Divine Essence, and the experiences that take place in the afterlife. On the other it provides an interesting example of spiritual psychology, since it analyses the forces at work in the human microcosm in terms that recall earlier currents of Sufi teachings and reflect the developments and debates going on in the subcontinent. It is the psychological theme that I wish to follow up on here.

Given the current dismal state of our knowledge of the development of Islamic thought in India, it would be impossible to trace the numerous Sufis, theologians, and philosophers whose views may be

reflected in the treatise. The best I can do is to point to the roots of some of the ideas in the writings of Ibn al-‘Arabî and other relatively early figures. It would be difficult to say to what extent ‘Abd al-Jalîl is influenced directly by Ibn al-‘Arabî in these two treatises, since he may have known Ibn al-‘Arabî’s works largely through the tradition of criticism and commentary. The one book that he almost certainly had read, though he refers neither to its title nor to its author, is *Naqd al-nuṣûṣ fî sharḥ naqsh al-fuṣûṣ* by ‘Abd al-Raḥmân Jâmî (d. 898/1492). In *Rûḥ wa nafs* this work is quoted or paraphrased at least twice, and a passage that is attributed to “one of them” is taken from *al-Fukûk* by Ṣadr al-Dîn Qûnawî, most likely through the intermediary of *Naqd al-nuṣûṣ*.⁸

Sufi Psychology

Much of Sufi theoretical teaching has to do with the invisible dimension of the human being, the ambiguous something that fills the vast “space” between the human body and the Essence of God, a something that we might today refer to as “consciousness.” In discussing this something, the earliest texts usually employ various terms derived from the Koran and the Hadith—such as soul (*nafs*), spirit (*rûḥ*), heart (*qalb*), intellect (‘*aql*), and mystery (*sirr*) without much elaboration or explanation. But already by the third/ninth century, Sufi authors like al-Ḥakîm al-Tirmidhî⁹—not to mention the early Muslim philosophers—employ such terms to describe a hierarchy of increasingly invisible levels, tendencies, or dimensions reaching as far as the divine realm. In the theoretical discussions provided by al-Tirmidhî, al-Ghazâlî (d. 505/1111),¹⁰ ‘Izz al-Dîn Kâshânî (d. 735/1335),¹¹ and many others, it is clear that the multiplicity of words does not imply a multiplicity of independent entities. Instead, the words are diverse names given to a single reality—the unseen dimension of the human being—in respect of its different attributes, dimensions, or stages.¹²

Since these aspects of human consciousness are by definition invisible and difficult to pinpoint, the terminology tends to be fluid. For example, the definitions some authors provide for *nafs* frequently correspond to what others refer to as *rûḥ*. This is seen most clearly

in the discussion initiated by the philosophical tradition concerning the three basic levels in which the inner dimension of things manifests itself outwardly, that is, the plant, animal, and human levels. Some texts speak of the plant, animal, and human “soul,” while others prefer the term “spirit.” Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawzi’s work *Kitāb al-rūḥ* devotes a good deal of space to the fact that the early sources do not clearly distinguish among the terms. Nevertheless, many authors do distinguish among them, and their descriptions of the differences provide us with detailed insights into the Muslim understanding of human consciousness.

The discussion of the different levels or dimensions of the human being was by no means simply theoretical, particularly for the Sufis. In other words, these unseen realities were defined and differentiated with a specific aim, which was for them to be experienced as distinct levels of consciousness by the traveler on the path to God. Without the theoretical and linguistic “embodiment” of the tendencies of the soul, it is impossible to come to grips with one’s own inner nature. The descriptions made it possible for spiritual travelers to picture, localize, and personify their own psychic and spiritual tendencies within the sea of consciousness, that unbounded imaginal universe that is sometimes called the “ocean of the soul” (*baḥr al-naḥs*). Once this was accomplished, it was possible to strengthen what needed strengthening or pass beyond what needed to be overcome.

One can recall here the distinctions among the ascending levels of the human reality made by Kubrawī authors, distinctions that have been studied in some detail by Henry Corbin and others. Thus, for example, the founder of the Kubrawī Order, Najm al-Dīn Kubrā (d. 618/1220), refers to five basic levels of the self—intellect, heart, spirit, mystery, and the hidden (*khafī*). A later Kubrawī authority, ‘Alā’ al-Dawla Simnānī, refers to seven levels—body or mold (*qālab*), soul, heart, mystery, spirit, the hidden, and the Real (*ḥaqq*).¹³ These authors clearly bring out the practical relevance of these classifications for the spiritual travelers, since they also discuss the vision of colored lights, or “photisms” as Corbin calls them, that signal the experience of the different levels.¹⁴

Ibn al-‘Arabī provides a vast amount of material on the different

levels of the self, but the six or seven ascending “subtle realities” (*latâ’if*), so important in the Kubrawî literature and much of the later tradition, are probably not discussed in his works in any systematic manner. In general, he speaks of three basic levels in both the macrocosm and the microcosm—spiritual, imaginal, and corporeal; or spirit, soul, and body. Inasmuch as these three levels are tied to the experiential side of the path to God, the traveler’s goal is to bring them into harmony, and this takes place through the “heart” (*qalb*), which is the spiritual organ par excellence in Ibn al-‘Arabî’s teachings.¹⁵ In the writings of Ibn al-‘Arabî’s followers, especially Şadr al-Dîn Qûnawî and his immediate disciples, emphasis is placed on the heart as the harmonious union of all the attributes of spirit and soul.¹⁶

Ibn al-‘Arabî also discusses the “mystery” (*sirr*) as a still higher stage of awareness, beyond the level of spirit. In his teachings, the mystery, or, more often, the “divine mystery” (*al-sirr al-ilâhî*), is the individual’s reality as known by God himself. It marks the furthest limit of what the gnostic can come to know, since ultimately no one can know anything but himself, while the Divine Essence remains forever unknowable. In other terms, the mystery is the “immutable entity,” the reality or quiddity of a thing fixed forever with God. It is also called the “specific face” (*al-wajh al-khâṣṣ*), that is, the face of God turned toward one individual rather than any other, thereby defining the reality of the individual.¹⁷ Not only human beings, but everything in existence has a specific face, different from the specific divine faces turned toward other things, since, if God “looked at” two things in exactly the same way, they would be the same thing. Here we have a corollary of one of Ibn al-‘Arabî’s most oft-repeated axioms: God never discloses himself in the same manner to two individuals. Or, “Self-disclosure never repeats itself.”¹⁸

The Setting

Although ‘Abd al-Jalîl’s treatise deals with two major dimensions of Sufi teachings—the psychological and the metaphysical—the narrative development emphasizes psychology. The text reaches a climax with an integration of diverse dimensions of human consciousness and a vision of the oneness of all things in God. The manner in which

this is achieved recalls both a Kubrawi-style hierarchy of levels and the specific teachings of Ibn al-ʿArabī and his followers concerning the soul, spirit, heart, and mystery.

The text is presented within the context of the long-standing debates in India over the status of the human being in relationship to God. More specifically, what are the practical results of the spiritual realization of the gnostic? Once the supreme union is achieved, can any distinction be drawn between God and the world? Granted that “All is He” (*hama āst*)—the slogan that was taken as typifying the position of those who believed in the “Oneness of Being” (*waḥdat al-wujūd*)¹⁹—of what relevance to the gnostic are the commands and prohibitions of the Shariah?

Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī’s criticisms of Ibn al-ʿArabī arose out of this background. Sirhindī is not in fact criticizing Ibn al-ʿArabī himself, but rather the position ascribed to Ibn al-ʿArabī by certain groups of Muslims who then used this position to justify their own neglect of the Law or of doctrinal teachings that Sirhindī considered essential. It is clear that ʿAbd al-Jalīl had this same background in view, since he goes to great lengths to disprove some of the important arguments of those who maintain the commonly accepted misconceptions concerning Ibn al-ʿArabī’s position, what one might call “popularized *waḥdat al-wujūd*” or the “religion of ‘All is He.’”

The treatise begins as follows: ʿAbd al-Jalīl is sitting in meditation when two forms appear to him, one luminous and one dark. The two forms greet each other and then introduce themselves. The dark form calls itself the governing power of the whole universe, a power so intermixed with the creatures that they refer to it as their own “self” or “soul” (*nafs*). The luminous form tells him that it is the power through which all things have life; it is called “spirit” (*rūḥ*), because within it all creatures find their “rest” (*rawḥ*) and “repose” (*rayḥūn*).

In the Sufi discussion of spirit and soul, the spirit is almost invariably conceived of as lying on a higher plane, as is clearly the case here, since light is higher than darkness. The spirit’s “luminous” appearance connects it with the divine name Light and the radiance of the world of the angels, who, according to the Prophet, are “made of light.” The soul is then connected to the opposite pole of manifesta-

tion, where light has lost its original intensity and become thoroughly mixed with darkness. ‘Abd al-Jalīl does not mean to imply here that the soul is absolutely dark, but rather relatively dark, as compared to the spirit. Absolute darkness would be absolutely nonexistent and therefore imperceptible in any mode. Moreover, the soul manifests certain positive dimensions of reality, as becomes obvious later in the text.

The two forms then speak about their respective religions. The soul says that it follows the great lover Iblīs, who is the locus of manifestation (*maẓhar*) for the divine name Misguider (*al-muḡill*). The spirit says that it follows him who carried God’s Trust (*amāna*) and became his vicegerent (*khalīfa*), the prophet Muhammad, who is the locus of manifestation for the names God (*allāh*) and Guide (*al-hādī*).

With the mention of the term *maẓhar* or “locus of manifestation” we are alerted to the fact that the text looks back to Ibn al-‘Arabī’s specific technical terms and his mode of discussing relationships. The general idea that the divine names are the roots or realities of the phenomena that appear in world and the soul, while the phenomena are the places where the names manifest their properties and effects, is of course found in a wide range of Sufi writings, not only in Ibn al-‘Arabī, and it is plainly prefigured in the Koran. But the term *maẓhar* in this meaning is one that Ibn al-‘Arabī claims as his own coinage and that typically occurs in discussions of his ideas.²⁰

A “locus of manifestation” for a divine name is a place where the name displays outwardly its properties (*aḥkām*), traces (*āthār*), or specific characteristics (*khawāṣṣ*). Each name has innumerable loci of manifestation, and an individual entity may act as the locus of manifestation for many different names. Thus the human being, for example, is made in “the form of God,” which is to say that he is the locus of manifestation for the specific name God. By the same token, a human being manifests the specific characteristics of every divine name, since God itself is the “all-comprehensive name” (*al-ism al-jāmi‘*), which embraces the properties of all the names.

Although all human beings manifest the name God—it is this, and this alone, according to Ibn al-‘Arabī which makes them human²¹—

only those who merit the title “perfect human being” manifest the name God in a mode that corresponds to God as he is in himself. Other human beings—whom Ibn al-‘Arabî refers to as “animal human beings” (*al-insân al-ḥayawân*)—fail to actualize the full potentiality of the human state. Hence they are dominated by characteristics that pertain to one or more of the lesser names embraced by the name God. In the case of the “friends of God” (*awliyâ’ allâh*) and the faithful, these lesser names are names of mercy and gentleness, while in the case of the unbelievers, these names project wrath and severity. As the *ḥadīth qudsī* tells us, God’s mercy takes precedence over his wrath, so mercy is closer than wrath to God’s essential reality. Hence the names of mercy and gentleness demand nearness to God and “felicity” (*sa’âda*) in the next world, while the names of wrath and severity demand distance from him and “wretchedness” (*shaqâwa*).

The gentle and merciful divine names bring about the actualization of the full human potential along with harmony and equilibrium among the loci of manifestation. In other words, a human being who is the object of God’s mercy in this sense²² manifests fully and appropriately all the individual divine names (including the wrathful names) embraced by the name God. That is why, in this passage, the spirit does not limit itself to saying that Muhammad is the locus of manifestation for the name God, since all human beings share in this particular characteristic, though clearly not in the same mode or degree. The spirit adds that the Prophet is also the locus of manifestation for the name Guide, the function of which is to spread God’s salvific mercy among the creatures and to open them up to ultimate felicity.

The opposite of the Guide is the Misguider, a divine name that is found in some of the traditional lists of the ninety-nine names and is implied by several passages in the Koran where God is the subject of the verb “to misguide.” The Koran attributes this name specifically to Satan in one verse (28: 15). That the soul or self is connected to satanic forces is suggested by a number of Koranic verses and made more explicit in the *ḥadīth* literature.²³ In short every human being has a tendency that is opposed to guidance and rejects the truth, and this is referred to as *nafs*—soul, self, or ego.²⁴

The fundamental tendencies or inclinations of the inner dimension of the human being are summarized in the well-known distinction, based on Koranic terminology, among three types of *nafs*, representing three main stages of human consciousness: the soul “commanding to evil” (*ammâra bi’l-sû’*), the soul “blaming” (*lawwâma*) itself for its own shortcomings, and the soul “at peace” (*mûṭma’inna*) with God. At the first stage, the soul dwells in the darkness of ignorance, forgetfulness, and misguidance, while in the third stage the soul has been transmuted into the light of knowledge, remembrance, and guidance. The middle stage represents a struggle between the opposing forces that are frequently, as in ‘Abd al-Jalîl’s treatise, ascribed respectively to “spirit” and “soul.” These are guidance and misguidance, knowledge and ignorance, remembrance and forgetfulness, light and darkness.

In short, ‘Abd al-Jalîl’s description of the spirit and soul reaffirms the well-known opposition between the ascending, luminous, and angelic tendency of the human being, and the descending, dark, and satanic tendency. We are prepared for a replay of the struggle between guidance and misguidance, the prophets and the satans. But we are also dealing here with Ibn al-‘Arabî’s intellectual universe, a fact that is announced at the beginning by some of the technical terminology and confirmed by many passages in the text itself, where Ibn al-‘Arabî’s terms are constantly employed and where he himself is quoted twice.

Since Ibn al-‘Arabî and *waḥdat al-wujûd* lie in the background, it is natural that both the Prophet and the Satan—the leaders of the two religions represented by spirit and soul—are represented as loci of manifestation for the divine names. The discussion cannot take an exclusively dualistic and oppositional form in the manner of the legalistic and polemical approach characteristic of both jurisprudence and Kalâm. Rather, what follows will have to show that opposition among the loci that manifest the divine names can be harmonized and made complementary through Unity, or in other words, through the fact that the name God is the coincidence of all opposites (*jam’ al-aḡdâd*).

The point of the debate is not so much that one side should win and

the other lose. Rather, the opposition between the two sides prepares the way for a stretching and expansion of comprehension and consciousness. Opposite positions necessarily have to manifest the same Reality, since God comprehends all things. The task is not to answer yes or no, but to discover the right relationship between two yes's. This does not imply that error has no reality, quite the contrary. But error arises not so much from the position itself as from one's standpoint when one claims the truth of the position. It is a mistake to affirm a truth related to one level when one is standing in another level. Error derives from the mixing of levels, and deliverance from error can only come through a transmutation of consciousness that situates every level in its proper place.

The Debate

The main part of the text, detailing the contents of the debate between spirit and soul, is interesting both for the topics covered and the intrinsic content of the arguments. At the same time it reflects 'Abd al-Jalil's perception of long-standing controversies over many important doctrinal issues in Sufism. Some of these issues are still relevant in the contemporary scene, where one often meets conflicting positions similar to those maintained by spirit and soul. But in the contemporary "New Age," the standpoint represented by the soul seems to have gained the upper hand, while the spirit's perspective appears to be increasingly unpopular, since it reaffirms the necessity of the practice of the Law as the *sine qua non* for the understanding and affirmation of Unity.

The soul is depicted as a rather clever and crafty fellow, skillful in the intricacies of debate and not afraid to change its position when it is opportune to do so. The spirit is much more stable and somewhat stolid, reflecting the far-seeing prophetic wisdom that it manifests. At the outset the soul mentions Iblis as its guide, so the spirit feels duty-bound to warn it of Iblis's shortcomings. The soul replies by having recourse to the esoteric knowledge of the spiritual path (*ṭarîqa*), which transcends the Shariah mentioned by the spirit, and by claiming—in the manner of the well-known Sufi defenses of Satan²⁵—that Iblis was the lover of God par excellence whose secret pact with

his Beloved would not allow him to bow to anyone else.

The soul appeals to a privileged, esoteric knowledge in several more passages in the ensuing debate, most of which focuses on the nature of oneness (*wahda*) and that of Being or existence (*wujūd*), though the famous expression *wahdat al-wujūd* is never mentioned. In brief, the soul wants to claim an absolute Oneness that obliterates distinctions within *wujūd* and at the same time to maintain its own privileged identity with *wujūd*. Thereby it wants to show that distinctions among things are sheer illusion, so the Shariah is a veil that misleads the stupid. Those who are truly enlightened follow their own inner light, which is God himself.

The spirit protests that this appeal to absolute Oneness is in fact an appeal to one of *wujūd*'s many levels, thereby distorting *wujūd*'s reality. It is contradictory to affirm the absolute Oneness of God's Essence and then to deny the relative manyness of his attributes. Both have to be affirmed, and then it will be seen that the divine attributes demand the reality—relative of course—of the cosmos. The Shariah's necessity follows from the relative reality of the cosmos and the real distinctions among the levels.

In the first part of the treatise the soul makes a rather good case for an individualistic type of spirituality shorn from traditional supports. In the second part, where the soul has taken another tack, the arguments attempt mainly to claim the independence of the material world from any first principle. In both cases, the practical result of the soul's argument is to declare the Law irrelevant and prophetic guidance useless if not positively harmful.

By the end of the debate, it is not completely clear who has won. Certainly anyone who inclines toward the religious universe of Islam will read the text as giving victory to the spirit, since all the soul's arguments have been neatly answered from within the perspective of the Shariah in general and Ibn al-'Arabi's school in particular. But much of what the soul has said would be quite convincing to those who incline toward a Sufi esotericism cut off from the Shariah and alien to scholastic philosophizing.

Although 'Abd al-Jalīl means to support the spirit's arguments over the soul, he also wants to acknowledge the relative validity of the

soul's positions. The soul is a locus of manifestation for a divine name, the Misguider, and this name has its rights. The Misguider cannot be negated, but must be harmonized with the higher names from which it derives. Although "God's mercy precedes His wrath," and therefore, by analogy, "God's guidance precedes His misguidance," both wrath and misguidance are divine attributes that have a positive, if limited, role to play in the total constellation of existence.

The beginning of the process whereby 'Abd al-Jalīl will harmonize the positions of soul and spirit is announced at the end of the debate proper, when the spirit realizes that its words have had no discernible effect on the soul. Hence the spirit proposes that they take their dispute to a third party to decide between them.

The Mystery's Judgment

The third party to whom the spirit and soul have recourse is the "mystery," the more inward dimension of the human reality that Ibn al-'Arabī identifies with the "specific face" or immutable entity. In this context, however, 'Abd al-Jalīl does not have in mind Ibn al-'Arabī's definition of the mystery, but rather the seven-part hierarchy of the human being which by this period had become a commonplace in Sufi writings—body, soul, spirit, heart, mystery, hidden (*khafī*), and most hidden (*akhfā*).

The mystery enters the discussion by addressing first the soul and then the spirit. It criticizes the soul for ruining the world of obedience and bringing Adam out from the Garden, but it praises the soul's grasp of the station of oneness and its description of God's self-disclosure (*tajallī*) in all things. Then the mystery says,

It is clear to me that oneness has become manifest to you in the station of nature. That is why your love is completely fixed upon the world of form. You love absorption in sensory passions and immersion in the illusory pleasures that darken the mirror of the heart and bring about punishment and disaster in the next world. If an appropriate love for form were to become established within you, you would undertake good acts and works, since forms in the next world will last forever, while the forms of this plane are obviously perishing and have no subsistence. You must

turn your attention toward the high level in order to reach the [divine] self-disclosure that is beyond the outside and inside worlds. In that self-disclosure, no name or description remains, no expression or allusion.

The mystery then compares the soul to a frog in a puddle of filthy water who thinks that it lives in the ocean. What the frog needs is for a stream of pure water to pass over the puddle and take it to the ocean. Although the soul's perception of oneness is true enough, no two people perceive the Essence in the same way, and hence there are diverse levels of consciousness. In explaining this the mystery refers to the basic degrees of *wujūd* through which God reveals himself, what in another context might be called the "Five Divine Presences" along with the level of Non-entification (*lā ta'ayyun*) standing beyond them:²⁶

O soul, although it is impossible to see the Essence without the veil of the attributes, there is much diversity in the veils. The veil of the World of the Visible is the densest of all veils. Then there is the veil of images [*mithāl*]. Within both these veils the Beloved wears the clothing of form, which is the most tremendous veil. After this, the veil of subtlety remains in the World of Spirits. Then there is a veil of subtlety in the World of Meanings which is the reality and immutable entity of the traveler and which is called the "smaller isthmus [*barzakh*]." All the gnostics see the Real in this veil. Greater than this is the veil of "the most subtle of the most subtle" in the Presence of the First Entification and the Muhammadan Reality. This is called the "greater isthmus." Our Prophet sees the Essence of the Real in this veil, which is the thinnest of veils. Some of the most elect of the friends of God who follow that leader of the prophets observe a flash there by tagging along with him. Finally there is the level of the Disengaged Essence, to which no one has access.

In concluding this address to the soul, the mystery focuses on the soul's particular problem, which is the affirmation of selfhood or "soulhood" (*nafsāniyya*). The only way to achieve the vision of the inward levels of Oneness is to negate one's selfhood, or to undergo "annihilation" (*fanā'*). "There is no remedy except becoming lost and obliterated: They buy nothing there but a thing's nonexistence and annihila-

tion".²⁷

The mystery then turns to the spirit and praises it for its obedience and its attentiveness to the good that can be gained in the next world. But it warns the spirit that it also is not yet free of love for form. The danger remains that it will be so entranced by the garden that it will forget the face of the Gardener. The mystery criticizes the spirit for perceiving the station of oneness from the standpoint of the rational faculty (*'aql*) and for not abandoning itself to love. The soul's emphasis upon self-identification with the Real is a valid one, and it can only be experienced through love. 'Abd al-Jalil then summarizes the rest of the mystery's advice to the soul and spirit:

The mystery made clear that the entity of the servant has two sides, one the side of nondelimitation [*itlâq*] and the other the side of delimitation [*taqyîd*]. Servanthood [*'ubûdiyya*] and lordship [*rubûbiyya*] must both be taken into account, since both are established in the servant's entity. The soul had taken lordship into account and had desired to embrace immediate joy and pleasures, while the spirit had taken servanthood into account and had chosen the ease of obedience in order to grasp endless and everlasting deferred ease. Although both were flying in the world of *tawhîd*, out of caprice [*hawâ*] the soul-vulture would in the end have stayed with the bones, while the spirit-nightingale would have inclined away from the rose garden of the Beloved's face toward the garden's fruit.

'Abd al-Jalil's assessment of the situation depends upon various teachings of Ibn al-'Arabi's school that have been touched on during the debate and are here harmonized and put into relationship. Since the meaning of the passage is far from self-evident, it calls for a few words of explanation:

The inner human reality has two basic dimensions, here symbolized by the terms spirit and soul. In one dimension, which stands opposite God's transcendence—or, in Ibn al-'Arabi's language, his incomparability (*tanzîh*), independence (*ghinâ*), and overwhelming power (*qahr*)—human beings are servants overcome by poverty, incapacity, and weakness. They possess nothing with which to affirm their own reality and are totally dependent for their existence and attributes

upon the Real (*al-ḥaqq*). This dimension is manifested more clearly in the lower levels of the human being, that is, in the soul and the body, which display relatively little of the divine light.

In another respect, human beings manifest nothing but God. They are created in God's form and worthy of being his vicegerents. To them "God has subjected," as the Koran puts it, "everything in the heavens and the earth" (31: 20, 45: 13), so they are "lords" over all other creatures. This dimension of the human reality corresponds to God's similarity (*tashbīḥ*) and immanence, whereby he discloses himself in all things and most clearly in his chosen vicegerents. In this respect humans are "nondelimited," since nothing limits the degree to which they can expand in knowledge and consciousness. In this context Ibn al-'Arabī speaks of "perfect man" as the full outward manifestation of the Real, or the human being who has assumed all the divine names as his own character traits (*al-takhalluq bi asmā' Allāh*).

Although servanthood and lordship appear at first sight to be contradictory and irreconcilable, in fact nothing but total and absolute servanthood allows a human being to be a true lord. Only the perfect servant can be God's vicegerent. Just as God is God because he is both incomparable and similar, nondelimited and delimited, Essence and attributes, so also human beings are fully human only by being both servant and vicegerent, nothing and everything. This is one of the secrets of Muhammad's title, '*abduhu wa rasūluhu*,' "His servant and His messenger."

The soul manifests servitude and weakness, since it is overcome by darkness or distance from God, while the spirit manifests vicegerency, theomorphism, and lordship, since it blazes with the divine light. In other terms, the spirit is connected intimately to nearness, mercy, and guidance, while the soul dwells naturally in the domain of distance, wrath, and misguidance.

One might expect that 'Abd al-Jalīl would follow these correspondences and connect lordship to the spirit and servanthood to the soul, instead of saying, "The soul had taken lordship into account, ...while the spirit had taken servanthood into account." But along with distance and darkness go ignorance and arrogance. The soul looks at

itself and does not see its own dark nature, but rather the luminosity that allows it to exist and be itself. Ignorant of its own darkness, it lays claim to a light that does not belong to it. In contrast the spirit possesses the luminosity of knowledge and sees itself in its proper relationship with the Real. It is, in Ibn al-‘Arabī’s terms, “god wary” (*muttaqī*), which means that it ascribes light, knowledge, and power to God and darkness, ignorance, and weakness to itself. Though it sees its own luminosity, it knows that next to the absolute light of God its own created light is nothing. Hence it acknowledges its servanthood.

Nonetheless, even in its claim to lordship, the soul manifests a positive dimension of the Real, for lordship is a divine attribute. The sin of the soul’s prophet, Iblis, is to have said, “I am better than he” (Koran 38: 76) and to have refused to prostrate himself before Adam. As the spirit says at the beginning of the debate, “According to the clear meaning of the verse, ‘I am better than he,’ the claim of betterness and selfhood—which negate the stage of love—became manifest from Iblis.”²⁸ Following Iblis, the soul claims selfhood and betterness for itself. In doing so, it manifests the characteristics of lordship. In other words, by affirming selfhood and I-ness, the soul claims for itself a prerogative of God, since none truly has a right to say “I” except God.²⁹ Just as “There is no real but the Real,” so also “There is no true I but the divine I.”

At the deepest level, the positive nature of the soul’s self-affirmation goes back to the fact that it finds *wujūd* in itself. *Wujūd* as such is the Divine Essence or Selfhood—the divine “I-ness”—and it manifests itself even in the darkest realms of the cosmos. And *wujūd*, it should be remembered, means not only “existence” or “being” but also and primarily “finding.” God’s “finding of himself” is known as *wujūd*, and so also the soul finds itself through *wujūd*’s light, but it does not notice that the light is not its own. The divine self-affirmation irradiates the darkness of nonexistence, and the soul in its darkness clings to the trace of light as its very self and survival. “Selfhood” and self-affirmation manifest God’s Essence.

In short, the spirit represents the human reality inasmuch as it sees itself and its own limitations objectively and effaces itself before God,

while the soul represents the human self inasmuch as it sees itself as central and affirms its own right to exist. The spirit rises beyond itself and affirms the Other, while the soul sinks within itself and affirms itself.

At this point in the text 'Abd al-Jalil once again acknowledges the soul's rights to its mode of manifesting the Real, while admitting his limited knowledge of the true situation: "O friend," he says, "I do not know which point of view God will take into account tomorrow." In other words, he does not know if God will treat the human being as a lord or a servant on the Day of Resurrection. However, one should exercise caution in one's dealings with God, and therefore one should observe the instructions brought by the prophets. The creature should actualize his servanthood here and wait to become a lord in the next world.

It strikes my mind that in this plane one should act by taking servanthood into account because of the sending of scriptures and angels, so that through their warning one can come out of the well of nature, remain protected from the disease of ignorance and atheism [*ta'fīl*], and reach the perfections of knowledge and works. Then, in the manifest abode of the next world, one will seal all this in the mode of lordship, in accordance with "My mercy precedes My wrath" and "My mercy embraces all things" [Koran 7: 156]. For in that place acts of obedience will be eliminated and all forbidden things will be allowed.

The Birth of the Heart

Having given advice separately to both spirit and soul, the mystery now addresses them together, telling them to become one. And, says 'Abd al-Jalil, who is observing the goings-on, "From the unification [*ittiḥād*] of the two, a marvelous state and wondrous shape appeared, called 'the heart,' which brings together the two sides and fluctuates between them."

The idea that the heart should be born from the marriage of spirit and soul goes back at least to Shihâb al-Dîn Suhrawardî (d. 632/1234) in *'Awârif al-ma'ârif*.³⁰ I have not come across this image in Ibn al-'Arabi's writings, but it is probably present somewhere, since his

chief disciple Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī expands on it in some detail, as does Qūnawī's disciple Sa'īd al-Dīn Farghānī.³¹ The connection between the heart (*qalb*) and fluctuation (*taqallub*) is an important element of Ibn al-'Arabī's teachings, but of course it has a long history in Islamic thought, being referred to in a number of hadiths, including mention of God as "He who makes hearts fluctuate" (*muqallib al-qulūb*).³²

Next 'Abd al-Jalīl says, "When the mystery found worthiness for the gathering of all meanings in the heart, it pulled the heart to itself and joined it with itself." Once the heart is born, the mystery sees that the heart has the power to gather within itself all meanings (*ma'ānī*). This point, so briefly stated here, is based on a rather complex exposition of the nature of the heart found in Ibn al-'Arabī's works. In short, he maintains that human beings perceive the Real in two fundamental modes, that of the afore-mentioned incomparability (*tanzīh*) and similarity (*tashbīh*). Incomparability is the point of view natural to the rational faculty (*'aql*), which innately desires to prove that "Nothing is like Him" (Koran 42: 11). Similarity is the point of view of imagination, which perceives the Real in his self-disclosure (*tajallī*), that is, in the forms and images that make up the cosmos or "everything other than God." Neither point of view is sufficient for a total view of God or of the things as they are in themselves.

The spirit personifies the rational dimension of human nature that can only understand "God" as being incomparable, while the soul represents the imaginal dimension that can only grasp God in images and symbols, or in the forms of his self-disclosure. That is why the mystery criticized the spirit for putting too much stock in reason, and the soul for perceiving the Real only at the level of self-disclosure in the forms of nature.

The heart, in Ibn al-'Arabī's perspective, is limited neither by reason nor by imagination, neither by rational thought nor by the perception of forms. The heart represents the dimension of the human reality that brings together both kinds of perception in harmony, and since these cannot be maintained simultaneously, the heart "fluctuates" from one vision to the next. But the heart never denies the Real, whether in his incomparable and unknowable Essence or in

his self-disclosure to imagination through the sensory forms of the cosmos.

The spirit's self-effacement is connected with reason and incomparability because the spirit grasps that "Nothing is like Him" and that all positive qualities belong to God; hence it sees that it is nothing in itself. In contrast, the soul's self-affirmation is connected to imagination and the vision of similarity, since it sees God manifesting himself within itself; hence it grasps that everything it possesses is similar to God and that all the divine attributes belong to it.

In short, by speaking of the heart's worthiness for "gathering all meanings," 'Abd al-Jalil means to say that the heart had integrated and harmonized the points of view of spirit and soul by combining nondelimitation with delimitation and incomparability with similarity. Hence the mystery saw that the heart's level of consciousness involves awareness of all meanings, not simply those that pertain to one standpoint or the other. The mystery understood that the heart was worthy for knowing the level of inwardness and integration represented by itself, so it drew the heart to itself and became united with it.

But this is not the end of the story. Beyond the mystery, in the typical classification of the degrees of human consciousness, lie the "hidden" (*khafī*) and the "most hidden" (*akhfā*). All differentiation must be eliminated before the vision of absolute Unity.

Final Union

'Abd al-Jalil now provides an explanation for the two terms "hidden" and "most hidden." They represent the innermost dimensions of the human being that can be discerned when the microcosm and macrocosm are viewed as possessing a number of levels. From this point of view, the mystery perceives the nondelimited light of the Real manifest both within itself and beyond itself.

In the beginning, when the light of Nondelimitation had shone upon the mystery, it had found a flash of that light evident in itself; it had seen a kind of "hidden" light outside itself, and a kind of "most hidden" light that its understanding and imagination could in no way reach but that it knew to be further away

from itself.

At the beginning, in other words, the mystery had perceived the hidden and most hidden lights beyond itself, just as it had perceived a light within itself and saw the spirit and soul as below itself. Hence it would seem that “mystery” signifies a middle point of human consciousness, suspended halfway between the darkness of the body and the infinite Light of God. Once the two lowest levels of consciousness, soul and spirit, join together and become the heart, the mystery is able to integrate them into itself. Now it can become integrated into the higher levels, the hidden and most hidden. It is able to accomplish this because it has been strengthened through the two powers represented by the spirit and soul within the heart. “Through joining with the all-comprehensive heart, a strengthening appeared within the mystery.”

The spirit and soul, as dimensions of the heart, now become the means for a two-fold experience of both the hidden and the most hidden lights. The spirit’s attribute is self-effacement before the One, since it tends toward annihilation (*fanâ*) in the Real. But the soul’s attribute is self-affirmation, since it tends to see the divine light as its own and to perceive itself as subsisting (*baqâ*) through the divine attributes. “Through the light pertaining to the spirit, the mystery dissolved into the hidden light, and through the strength of the I-ness pertaining to the soul it became identified with that hidden light.” In other words, the luminosity of the heart’s spirit-nature allows the mystery to become effaced and annihilated in that even greater light called the “hidden.” But the soul-nature demands self-affirmation, so in the midst of dissolution the mystery finds itself and sees that it is now identical with the hidden light.

Next ‘Abd al-Jalîl offers an explanation for the “words of ecstasy” (*shaḥīyyât*) of the Sufis. For now the mystery, like Ḥallâj and Bâyezîd, speaks from the viewpoint of “I am the Real”: “Here it became a stream joined to the ocean and called out, ‘Glory be to me, how tremendous is my rank!’” At the same time, this invisible core of the human reality experiences the “fluctuation” of the heart, so its gaze shifts from the point of view of the soul to that of the spirit,

from that of affirming itself to that of negating itself before the source of light.

When the mystery's gaze fell upon the infinity of the Ocean, it said, "My God, though I said, 'Glory be to me, how tremendous is my rank!,' now I repent. I cut off the belt of unbelief and say, 'There is no god but God,' so that through the blessing of these words I may be obliterated in the most hidden light."

Once again the mystery experiences annihilation, but the selfhood of the soul reasserts itself, and identity with the most hidden is established. "It lifted its head within the world of annihilation and began to say through the strength of the I-ness of the soul, 'I am the most hidden,' and it threw up the waves of claiming to be the ocean."

At each level—hidden and most hidden—a dual experience has occurred. Only after self-affirmation within the most hidden light can all trace of duality be erased so that the ultimate union may be experienced. Beyond the most hidden lies the infinite light of the Essence, also called the Unseen He-ness (*ghayb-i huwiyyat*), and at this point in the narrative, the Essence asserts its authority: "Just as this happened, the voice of the He-ness shouted out, 'and within the most hidden am I.'" Here 'Abd al-Jalil is alluding to what is ostensibly a *ḥadīth qudsī*, whose text I have seen recorded as follows: "Verily within the body of the son of Adam is a lump of flesh, within the lump of flesh a heart, within the heart a spirit, within the spirit a light, and within the light a mystery; and within the mystery am I."³³ With this re-assertion of God's ultimate authority, the right relationships are established, and all levels of the human reality experience a mode of identity with the One. Even the most hidden, which is the highest level, finds itself negated in the Real.

Through awe before that sound, the ocean of the most hidden became dry, such that none of the water of existence remained within it. In this state, all of them became one. The most manifest and the most hidden mixed together. All of itself cried out, "Whose is the kingdom today? God's, the One, the Overwhelming!" [Koran 40: 16].³⁴

In the supreme union, everything in the human being is negated as a self-subsistent reality only to be reaffirmed as God's self-disclosure.

As a result of this vision, 'Abd al-Jalil loses consciousness.

Here I had passed away from myself and become selfless. When I became slightly aware, the sound of "and within the most hidden am I" kept on falling into my ear from my own tongue. Out of the terror of this business I awoke. I said, "There is no power and no strength except in God, the High, the Tremendous."

This prophetic formula expresses once again the true reality of the servant—his nothingness before God.

Finally, 'Abd al-Jalil offers a comment that situates the whole episode firmly within the imaginal universe described by Ibn al-'Arabî. He tells us that everything that he had witnessed had been the imaginal embodiment of unseen realities.³⁵

I understood that all of this had been I; all of these were the forms of my own knowledge. These discussions had been my own imaginal concepts [*takhayyulât*] that had assumed form.

'Abd al-Jalil's concluding prayer reestablishes his feet firmly on the ground of servanthood, the right attitude to be maintained in the present world: "I ask forgiveness from God for everything that God dislikes and I repent to him, and I am the first of those who have faith."

In short, this brief treatise demonstrates a sophisticated grasp of the teachings of Ibn al-'Arabî's school and a profound awareness of the complexity of the human reality. 'Abd al-Jalil offers none of the simple-minded polemics that often occurs between supporters of *waḥdat al-wujūd* and *waḥdat al-shuhūd*, but instead demonstrates that he—like many other Indian Sufis—was completely aware that the only way to bring out the highly nuanced structure of the human reality and the subtle transmutations of consciousness experienced on the path to God is to acknowledge the validity of a wide variety of perspectives while recognizing the relativity of each of them, since absolute truth resides in God alone.

Notes

1. See his article, "An Analysis of Wahdat al-wujûd: Toward a Metaphilosophy of Oriental Philosophies," in Izutsu, *Creation and the Timeless Order of Things* (Ashland, Oregon: White Cloud Press, 1994).
2. Izutsu, *Creation*, p. 7.
3. Aligarh, Habibganj 21/365 Fârsî folio 2a.
4. *A History of Sufism in India* (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1978-1983), vol. II, pp. 289-90. Rizvi also refers to one 'Abd al-Jalîl Ilâhâbâdî as a famous Chishtî shaykh, without any further elaboration (vol. II, p. 97).
5. Institute of Islamic Studies, ms. no. 2139.
6. For information on other relevant Indian Sufi texts, see Chittick "Notes on Ibn al-'Arabî's Influence in India," *Muslim World* 72 (1992), pp. 218-41.
7. Lucknow, Nadwat al-'Ulamâ' Maj. 31/2; a second manuscript, of which I do not have a copy, is found in Aligarh (Subhanullah 297. 7/46 [4]).
8. Jâmi quotes the passage twice (cf. *Naqd al-nuṣṣ fî sharḥ naqsh al-fuṣṣ*, ed. W. C. Chittick [Tehran: Imperial Iranian Academy of Philosophy, 1977], pp. 28 and 201). One passage of *Rûḥ wa nafs* seems to be paraphrased from Jâmi's *Lawâ'ih*.
9. *Bayân al-farq bayn al-ṣadr wa'l-qalb wa'l-fu'âd wa'l-lubb*, ed. N. Heer (Cairo: Dâr al-Iḥyâ' al-Kutub al-'Arabiyya, 1958); translated idem, "A Sufi Psychological Treatise," *Moslem World* 51 (1961), pp. 25-36, 83-91, 163-72, 244-58.
10. See, for example, the section of al-Ghazâlî's *Iḥyâ' 'ulûm al-dîn* (Book 3, Section 1) on the "wonders of the heart." Al-Ghazâlî rewrote this passage in Persian at the beginning of *Kîmiyâ-yi sa'âdat*, an extremely influential work in the subcontinent ('Unwân 1, Faṣl 1 et seq.; ed. A. Ârâm [Tehran: Markazî 1319/1940], pp. 9 ff.).
11. *Miṣbâḥ al-hidâya*, ed. Jalâl al-Dîn Humâ'î (Tehran: Majlis, 1325/1946), Bâb 3 (pp. 80 ff.).
12. For a detailed discussion of some of the nuanced terminology employed in Islamic psychology, see Sachiko Murata, *The Tao of Islam: A Sourcebook on Gender Relationships in Islamic Thought* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), chapters 8-10.
13. *The Man of Light in Iranian Sufism* (Boulder & London: Shambhala, 1978), pp. 109-10, 124-25. For other relevant Kubrawî texts, cf. H. Landolt, "Deux opuscules de Semnânî sur le moi théophanique," in S. H. Nasr (ed.), *Mélanges offerts à Henry Corbin* (Tehran: McGill University Institute of Islamic Studies, 1977), pp. 279-319; Landolt, *Nuruddin Isfarayini: Le Révêlateur des Mystères* (Lagrasse: Verdier, 1986), pp. 54-66 et passim; H. Algar (trans.), *The Path of God's Bondsmen from Origin to Return: A Sufi Compendium by Najm al-Dîn Râzî* (Delmar, N. Y.: Caravan, 1982), esp. pp. 134-35.
14. The idea that a human being is composed of several levels, whether three, four, seven, or some other number, is deeply rooted in Sufi thought, and is therefore a commonplace in the texts. A well-known Iranian scholar (Jalâl al-Dîn Humâ'î, in a footnote to his edition of Kâshânî's *Miṣbâḥ al-hidâya*, p. 82) remarks

that the hierarchy "in general use among the gnostics" is nature (*ṭab'*), soul, heart, spirit, mystery, the hidden (*khafī*), and the most hidden (*akhfā*). In discussing the general view of the later tradition in the subcontinent, Mir Valiuddin distinguishes self (*nafs*), heart, *sirr*, and spirit as the main levels (*Contemplative Disciplines in Sufism* [London: East-West Publications, 1980]).

15. On various aspects of the heart in Ibn al-'Arabī's thought, cf. Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-'Arabī's Metaphysics of Imagination* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), index. Also S. al-Ḥakīm, *al-Mujam al-ṣūfī* (Beirut: Dandara, 1981), pp. 916-20.

16. Cf. for example, al-Qūnawī *Tahrīr al-bayān fī taqrīr shu'ab al-īmān* (Istanbul mss. Carullah 1001/4, 2054/9; Fatih 1394/2, 2630/1; Feyzullah 2163/13; Halet Efendi ilavesi, 66/6; şehid Ali Paşa 1340/2, 1382/7; Topkapı E. H. 546/3). Detailed elaborations of these teachings can be found in both the Persian and Arabic versions of Sa'īd al-Dīn Farghānī's recension of al-Qūnawī's lectures on Ibn al-Fāriḍ's *Naẓm al-sultūk: Mashāriq al-darār* (ed. S. J. Āshtiyānī, Mashhad: Anjuman-i Islāmī-yi Hikmat wa Falsafa-yi Īrān, 1398/1978) and *Muntahā'l-madārik* (Cairo: 1293/1876).

17. On the specific face, cf. Ibn al-'Arabī, *al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyya*, I 46. 12; II 304. 21, 434. 17, 647. 15; III 32. 13, 30. 31, 385. 17; also Chittick, *The Self-Disclosure of God* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997), chapter 4.

18. Cf. Chittick, *Sufi Path of Knowledge*, especially chapter 6.

19. In fact, this slogan is highly misleading if it is taken to represent the position of Ibn al-'Arabī and his more sophisticated followers, just as it is misleading to attribute the expression *wahdat al-wujūd* itself to Ibn al-'Arabī. Professor Izutsu provides us with brilliant analyses of how *wahdat al-wujūd* was understood by certain of Ibn al-'Arabī's followers (e.g. *Creation*, chapter 3), but when he tells us that the concept goes back to Ibn 'Arabī (p. 66), he fails to point out the rather tortuous route. See Chittick, "Rumi and *wahdat al-wujūd*," in *The Heritage of Rumi*, ed. A. Banani and G. Sabagh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 70-111.

20. For a detailed explanation of the role of the divine names in Ibn al-'Arabī's teachings, cf. Chittick, *Sufi Path of Knowledge*, Chapters 2-4. For the term *māẓhar*, see *ibid.*, pp. 89-91.

21. Cf. Chittick, *Sufi Path of Knowledge*, p. 276.

22. This is the specific, "compassionate mercy" ("the mercy of obligation"), not the general, "merciful mercy" ("the mercy of gratuitous gift"). See Izutsu, *Sufism and Taoism*, pp. 121 ff.

23. See P. Awn, *Satan's Tragedy and Redemption: Iblis in Sufi Psychology* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1983), pp. 60-69.

24. For a wide selection of texts from the great Sufi Rūmī on the *nafs* and its negative qualities, see Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Love: The Spiritual Teachings of Rumi* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1983), pp. 33-35 and index, under "ego".

25. Cf. Awn, *Satan's Tragedy*, Part III.

26. See Izutsu, *Sufism and Taoism*, pp. 11 ff.; Chittick, "The Five Divine Pres-

ences: From al-Qûnawî to al-Qayşarî," *The Muslim World* 72 (1982), pp. 107-128; also Chittick and P. L. Wilson, *Fakhruddin Iraqi: Divine Flashes* (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), introduction.

27. On the importance of annihilation for establishing a true perspective on the nature of things, see Izutsu, *Creation and the Timeless Order*, pp. 11-20 and *passim*.

28. On this claim as a characteristic of Iblis in Sufi psychology, cf. Awn, *Satan's Tragedy*, p. 34.

29. Ibn al-'Arabî points out that any "claim" (*da'wâ* or *iddi'â*) contradicts the fundamental ontological poverty of creatures and therefore displays ignorance of the true situation (cf. Chittick, *Sufi Path of Knowledge*, p. 152 and index under "claim"). See also Awn, *Satan's Tragedy*, pp. 90-96; and Rûmî, as quoted in Chittick, *Sufi Path of Love*, pp. 191-93.

30. In Chapter 56, "Fî ma'rifat al-insân nafsahu wa mukâshafât al-şûfiyya min dhâlik" (Beirut: Dâr al-Kitâb al-'Arabî, 1966, p. 450). These passages are amplified on in Persian by 'Izz al-Dîn Kâshânî in *Mişbâh al-hidâya*, pp. 97 ff. English translations of both Suhrawardî's and Kâshânî's discussions are found in Murata, *Tao of Islam*, chapter 10.

31. Cf. for example *Tahrîr al-bayân fî taqrîr shu'ab al-îmân*; Farghânî discusses the idea in the introduction to his *Muntaha'l-madârik*. For details, see Murata, *Tao of Islam*, chapter 10.

32. Cf. Chittick, *Sufi Path of Knowledge*, pp. 106 ff.

33. Muḥyî al-Dîn Pâdishâh Qâdirî, *Miftâḥ al-ḥaqâ'iq fî kashf al-daqâ'iq* (Hyderabad: Maṭba'î Sarkâr-i Âşafiyya, 1293), p. 57.

34. Ibn al-'Arabî and his followers frequently quote this verse as asserting the point of view of the overwhelming authority of God's Unity, which erases all difference and otherness. Cf. Chittick, *Sufi Path of Knowledge*, p. 314 (note 6).

35. In Ibn al-'Arabî's perspective, human beings perceive only through the veil of imagination, so they never worship anyone but the god of their own beliefs (see Izutsu, *Sufism and Taoism*, pp. 83 ff.; Chittick, *Sufi Path of Knowledge*, chapter 19; *idem*, *Imaginal Worlds* [Albany: SUNY Press, 1994], chapter 9).

Unity of Ontology and Epistemology in Qayṣarī's Philosophy

Akiro Matsumoto

This paper aims at clarifying the logical relationship of the theory of “the unity of being” (*waḥdah al-wujūd*) with two key Sufi concepts, namely “prophethood” (*nubūwah*) and “closeness to God” (*walāyah*). Both concepts of “prophethood” and “closeness to God” have Qur’anic origin, but they were elaborated and enriched as the Sufi theory on world understanding developed. These two concepts have worked as mainstays in the philosophic construction of the “Unity of Being” ever since Ibn ‘Arabī (1165-1240) established its foundation.

In the school of the Unity of Being, God is the unique, eternal and absolute being, and nothing has real existence except God. If anything is said to have existence, it has it in a metaphorical sense and not in a real sense. In addition, the world is understood as a manifestation of God, the absolute being. So, the philosophy of the Unity of Being is a theory for a holistic understanding between the eternal and the finite.

Yet in the tradition of Ash‘arite theology (which is the dominant theological school in the Sunnite world), the eternal-finite relationship is usually explained from the viewpoint of a personal relationship between God and his creatures. In this school, the creation and destruction of things are explained by making use of the concept of “preponderation” (*tarjih*), which means that God shifts the centre of

gravity towards existence or non-existence. In other words, in God's creation of a thing, He shifts the centre of existential gravity towards real existence. So, before its coming into existence, that thing is regarded to have been in the middle state between existence and non-existence. Its existence or non-existence is decided by divine will. Yet divine will is beyond human understanding and therefore the purpose of a thing's existence cannot be grasped by humans. So beings are created by God but the purpose of their existence is unclear. Their existence is "absurd." However, God shows human beings what to do and what not to do through revelation. Through revelation, God shows His plan of salvation, not the existential purpose of each one of the beings. Yet to live or not to live according to divine commandment depends upon human choice. This means that the relation between God and man is established through man's choice. Man can live *avec Dieu* or *sans Dieu* through his or her decision.

In the theological world view, man's decision in the God-man relationship has a special importance. Yet the philosophical argument of the ontological relationship between God and His creatures did not develop so much in this theological school.

Contrary to this, in the school of the Unity of Being, the inquiry into the ontological relationship between the eternal and the finite is one of the most important of all philosophical subjects. Knowing the ontological relationship between the eternal and the finite is directly related to knowing the Divine Essence, that is, God. So epistemology and ontology are combined and united in the school of Unity of Being. The unification of ontology and epistemology is one of the main philosophical features of this school. Of course, in later Ash'arite theology, studies on knowledge (*'ilm*) developed well, but they were discussed independently from ontology. This is quite a remarkable contrast between the Ash'arite theology and the school of Unity of Being. The question of why complete unity is maintained between epistemology and ontology in the school of Unity of Being may be answered from various viewpoints. Yet, the specific linguistic character of the Arabic word "*wujūd*" which is usually translated into English as "existence" may be one of the answers. "*Wujūd*" does not

basically mean “is-ness” and it does not work as a copulative verb unlike the equivalent words in Indo-European languages, which are derived from the verb related to being. “*Wujūd*” (existence) is derived from an infinitive which denotes the meaning “to find” as well as “to be found.” So “*wujūd*” is related to perception, therefore one of the key ontological terms has an epistemological sense in Islamic thought. This linguistic character of the word “*wujūd*” might be one of the causes of the unity of ontology and epistemology.

In addition, the unity of ontology and epistemology in the school of Unity of Being seems to be mainly supported by the two concepts of “prophethood” and “closeness to God” which are discussed and enriched in this school. So in this paper, the present writer will analyse ontology and the theories of prophethood and closeness to God in the school of Unity of Being in order to highlight the relationship between them. Of course each one of these three subjects has a historical theoretical development, but a historical investigation of these subjects is beyond the scope of this paper.

Ibn ‘Arabī has indisputably made a great contribution to the discussion of these three subjects, particularly in his master work “Meccan Openings” (*al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīyah*).¹ Aside from this work, he has written extensively on these subjects to such an extent that an ordering of his views requires great effort. Fortunately, Dāwūd b. Maḥmūd al-Qayṣarī (d. 1350), who is one of the direct spiritual descendants of Ibn ‘Arabī, has left us a short tract, which has the title “Oneness, prophethood and closeness to God” (*Tawḥīd wa al-Nubūwah wa al-Walāyah*).² In this short tract, he summarises these three philosophical concepts. So the present writer will discuss these three concepts based upon Qayṣarī’s compendium.

Knowing Existence

Quote: The way of reaching God is divided into two, that is, the way of knowledge (*‘ilmī*) and the practical way (*‘amali*). Yet the practical way is stipulated with the way of knowledge, so that an actual practitioner might be aware of the knowledge of his action.³

According to the idea that knowledge is a precondition of an act,

Qayṣarī gives priority to knowledge rather than to act. So he tries to clarify a scientific system for the way of knowledge for reaching God. He argues that “the subject of this science is the absolutely Unique Essence (*al-dhāt al-aḥadīyah*) as well as Its eternal characteristics (*al-nu‘ūt al-azalīyah*) and infinite attributes (*al-ṣifāt al-sarmadīyah*).”⁴

This science also has its related issues, such as “the way plurality comes out from the Unique Essence as well as the way plurality returns to It; the elucidation of the manifestations of the divine names as well as the attributes; the elucidation of the way Godly people (*ahl Allāh*) return to It as well as the way of their wayfaring and their religious endeavours and austerities and the elucidation of each one of their acts, deeds and thoughts in this world as well as in the next world, in the manner firmly rooted in the essence of the matter.”⁵

Now, one of the fundamentals of this science is knowledge of its definition. Regarding the definition of this science Qayṣarī says that:

the final goal of this science is the knowledge of God, praised be He! in terms of His names and attributes and the states of the source of everything and the place to which everything returns. Again, its final goal is the knowledge of the realities of the world and the way of their returning to the Unique Reality, which is the Absolutely Unique Essence (*al-dhāt al-aḥadīyah*), and the recognition of the way of wayfaring as well as the religious efforts for the liberation of the soul from the yoke of trifling limitations, as well as for the unification of the soul with her source and the characterisation of the soul with absolute particulars and universality.⁶

After clarifying and defining the subject of this science, Qayṣarī explains the fundamental concepts employed in this science. According to Qayṣarī, the Divine Essence (*al-dhāt al-ilāhīyah*) is “beyond the matter of being described with an attribute or not” whenever it is conceived “as it is (*min ḥayth hiya hiya*).”⁷ So, “it is named ipseity (*Hūwīyah*) as well as the reality of realities (*ḥaqīqah al-ḥaqā‘iq*)”⁸ in the school of Unity of Being. And “whenever it is conceived to be absolute from the attributes added to it, it is named ‘Absolute Oneness’ (*al-aḥadīyah*) and also ‘the Cloud’ (*al-‘amā’*).”⁹

And “whenever it [the Divine Essence] is conceived to be or-

namented with all the perfect attributes, it is named 'Divine Unity' (*al-wāḥidīyah al-ilāhīyah*) including those attributes."¹⁰

God's attributes are divided into two groups in this school. The first ones which are called "the attributes of beauty" (*al-ṣifāt al-jamāliyah*), are related to divine mercy and grace, while the second ones which are called "the attributes of majesty" (*al-ṣifāt al-jalāliyah*), are related to force and fear.¹¹ However, the attributes of beauty are not distinguished from the attributes of majesty. In other words, these two kinds of divine attributes are inter-mixed. This means that the attributes of beauty may become attributes of majesty, and the attributes of majesty may become attributes of beauty. They are inter-penetrating. Thus the relationship between the Divine Essence and Its attributes has been grasped, as we have seen above in Qayṣarī's comments.

Regarding the relationship between God and His creatures, Qayṣarī offers an epistemological explanation. He says "when the manifestations of Godly creation (*al-maẓāhir al-khalqīyah*) are conceived to vanish in the lights of the Divine Essence (*anwār al-dhāt*), they are regarded as existing in the level called 'the all-comprehensive station' (*maqām al-jam'*)."¹² The all-comprehensive station is an epistemological state as well as an ontological state. Qayṣarī further argues that "when the essence and manifestations of Godly creation are conceived as not vanishing in the light of the Divine Essence, they are regarded as existing in the level called 'the station of diffusion' (*maqām al-farq*)."¹³ However, the station of diffusion is divided into two by Qayṣarī. One is the station of diffusion before the wayfarer's achieving mystical unification and the other is the station of diffusion after the wayfarer's achieving mystical unification. The first one is owned by people remote from the light of the Truth, and the second is owned by people called "perfect men among the perfected" (*kāmil al-mukammalīn*). The second diffusion is also called "diffusion after all-comprehensiveness" (*al-farq ba'da al-jam'*) or "recovery of consciousness after obliteration of consciousness" (*al-ṣaḥw ba'da al-maḥw*) or "subsistence after annihilation" (*al-baqā' ba'da al-fanā'*), etc.¹⁴ This second diffusion is a spiritual stage or station in which "God casts light upon a wayfarer liberating him from his 'is-ness'

(*annīyah*) and destroying the mountain of his self-entification (*jabal ta'ayyuni-hi*) while the peak of his ego (*tūr anānīyah*) is perishing, and then He gives a second existence to him again.”¹⁵

In explaining his theosophy and its key terms, Qayṣarī provides a good sketch of the philosophical system of the Unity of Being. From his discussion we can say that everything in the universe is understood as a manifestation of the Divine Essence and that this Divine Essence is the one, unique source for all beings. The universe is an assembly of various beings which have appeared as a result of the diversification of the Divine Essence. This diversification is believed to be caused by the variety of divine names and attributes which are dependent upon the Divine Essence. Therefore the true cause of all beings in the universe is the Divine Essence itself.

According to this theory, knowing God and knowing being is united. God is the ultimate cause of the universe and He is self-existent and has the cause of His being in Himself. In other words, His existence is identical with His existence. Knowing His existence leads to knowing God. Therefore knowing existence becomes a major subject of philosophical discussion in Islamic theology.

Now, as long as existence is regarded as the “object” of knowing, we have to say that knowing existence remains impossible for us. From the viewpoint of the characteristics of the concept of “existence,” existence always escapes definition. In addition, existence is not separate from knowing. So existence cannot become the object of knowing, rather, existence is the ground of knowing. Or it might be just as well to say that existence itself is only grasped through intuition. Existence is not the object of theoretical judgement. For example, we can say that such and such a thing exists or does not exist, but we cannot say that existence does or does not exist. So existence is not the direct object of knowing. Existence is usually recognised in the forms of concrete beings such as flowers or stones and we can judge whether or not a stone or flower exists. From this kind of judgement, we can take the position that existence is a secondary matter to objects such as flowers and stones. But the situation is different in the case that existence is the ground of knowing. In this position, we cannot say that a flower exists or a

stone exists. We should say that existence becomes a flower or a stone. In other words, a flower does not exist, but existence is recognised sometimes as a flower and sometimes as a stone. For this reason, Qaysarī uses the phrase “the manifestations of Godly creation” (*al-maẓāhir al-khalqīyah*) for things in general.

When existence is recognised as a particular thing, it could be regarded as an existence specified with essence. In other words, it is an existence conditioned with a thing (*bi sharṭ shay'*). This existence conditioned with a thing is the first step to knowing existence because, in the world of our daily experience, we recognise existence as conditioned existence, that is, as existence of a thing.

However, the question of why existence is recognised as existence of a thing is raised here. In other words, this is a question concerning the reason why existence in general becomes determined with essence.

For God, existence is identical with essence, that is, His existence is not determined with essence. The fundamental difference between God and other beings lies here. Yet beings in general whose essences are different from their existence are created by God, whose existence is identical with His essence. Here another question is raised concerning why undetermined existence produces determined existences. That is to say, why the finite arises from the Infinite. Philosophers of the school of the Unity of Being made great efforts to solve this problem. According to their world view, each one of the individual beings is the result of self-individualisation, or the self-determination of being. So the world is an aggregate of self-individualised things. On the basis of this, they subtract the differences of individuality from daily life. At this moment, things change into “a thing in general” without any difference. This is a kind of mental experiment. In this way, “the being” of the “thing in general” is conceptually posited. A state is posited prior to that in which the determined or individual beings come into actual existence. Actually this is an important task in knowing the process of God's creation. The world could be considered to be an aggregate of the determined individual beings. After their determinations have been removed, there remains the expanse of undetermined being. This

undetermined existence (mentally posited in this fashion) is called “existence” as conditioned by being-something (*bi sharṭ shayʿ*). Since this “existence” is the existence of the thing in general, in actual fact there is no difference in it. So it is “existence” without determinations and individualities. Yet individualities and differences are included within it potentially. It is “existence” unifying plurality and the beings in it. Therefore “existence” in this level is called “existence” in the level of unity (*wāḥidiyah*) among the philosophers of the school of the Unity of Being. This “existence,” in the level of unity, designates Divine Unity (*al-wāḥidiyah al-ilāhiyah*) in Qayṣarī’s exposition of the Divine Essence. That is to say, “existence” in this level potentially includes in itself all the causes for the diversity and plurality of the sensible world. So existence of the empirical beings is basically one with the existence of the “thing in general.” Both are regarded as “existence as conditioned by being-something” (*bi sharṭ shayʿ*). In other words, when all beings are considered as one united being without articulation, there appears the vast expanse of one united existence. When they are considered as separated from each other, there arise an innumerable number of individual beings which seem independent from one another. However, individual being is not different from the united being. The difference between the existence of the empirical beings and that of the united being originates from the point of view of the observers. When Qayṣarī comments that “when the manifestations of Godly creation are conceived to vanish in the light of the Divine Essence (*anwār al-dhāt*) they are called the “all-comprehensive station” (*maqām al-jamʿ*),” he is referring to the point of view of the observers who regard all being as inarticulate and united existence. When he says that “essence and the manifestations of Godly creation are conceived not to vanish in the lights of the Divine Essence, they are called the station of diffusion (*maqām al-farq*)” he refers to the point of view of the observers who regard all beings as articulated individuals separated from each other.

In other words, if existence “as conditioned by being-something” (*bi sharṭ shayʿ*) is considered from the viewpoint of the station of all-comprehensiveness (*maqām al-jamʿ*), it appears as existence in the level of unity (*wāḥidiyah*). If it is considered from the viewpoint

of the station of diffusion (*maqām al-farq*), it appears as existence in the level of multiplicity (*kathrah*). So it is possible to say that “existence in the level of unity” or “existence as conditioned by being-something” has two aspects, that is, the aspect of unity and the aspect of multiplicity.

From the viewpoint of knowing existence, the primary level of knowing existence is “knowing existence as conditioned by being-something” whether the existence is in the level of unity or in the level of multiplicity. In this case, existence is always considered as having a relationship with “something,” whether this “something” be the thing in general or individual things. So this level of knowing existence is not yet complete and pure because knowledge of existence in this level is knowledge in relation to something. Philosophers in the school of the Unity of Being argue that there is a still more complete and pure knowledge of existence beyond the level of knowing existence in the level of unity. It is the level of knowing existence as non-conditioned (*bi shart lā*) which means considering existence without paying attention to any other thing whether it is a particular thing or a thing in general. This is knowledge of existence as it is. It is pure existence from which all relations or conditions are removed. The notion of existence which is obtained in this way of mental experiment is called existence in the level of Absolute Oneness (*aḥadiyyah*) or the Cloud (*amāʾ*) by Qayṣarī. From the viewpoint of perfection in knowing existence as it is, the notion of existence in the level of Absolute Oneness is more complete than the notion of existence in the level of Unity (*wāḥidiyyah*). However, knowing existence in the level of Absolute Oneness is considered by the philosophers of the school of the Unity of Being to be still imperfect compared to knowing existence as it is. As long as existence in the level of Absolute Oneness is considered with a condition of being non-conditioned, it should be regarded as a conditioned form of existence. In other words, it is a knowledge of negatively conditioned existence. It is a notion of existence grasped in terms of negation, that is, existence determined with negation. As long as existence is determined with something, it is not pure existence in the strict sense of the word. So knowing existence in the level of Absolute Oneness

is not a perfect knowledge of existence as it is. Thus the philosophers of this school posit “being absolutely non-conditioned” as the most perfect knowledge of existence. It is knowledge about existence which is not conditioned in any sense. Existence posited in this way is called *Hūwīyah*, or *ḥaqīqah al-ḥaqā’iq* by Qayṣarī. In this level, existence is called “existence of being absolutely non-conditioned” (*lā bi sharṭ maqsamī*).¹⁶

We have seen the developing process of knowing existence which commenced from existence in the level of diffusion (existence as conditioned being-something) and finally existence in the level of “being absolutely non-conditioned” after passing through the level of unity as well as the level of Absolute Oneness. This developing process from the level of diffusion to the level of “being absolutely non-conditioned” (*hūwīyah*) is the process of the completion of knowing existence, which is also to be regarded as the ascending course in knowing existence. Reversibly, the level of “being absolutely non-conditioned” to the level of diffusion is identical with the process of creation by God. Therefore, through the completion of knowing existence, we can know the process of creation by God.

The process of God’s creation is explained by Qayṣarī in another way:

The first thing which God revealed with his self-disclosure to Himself and made His existence manifest is the universal matter (*al-hāyūlā al-kullīyah*) which is called the merciful breath (*al-naḥas al-raḥmānī*). It is the intellectual form from which the universal soul comes out as God says: “The first thing which God created is the intellect.” And then, forms of the non-material intellects as well as forms of the nonmaterial souls and elemental natures came out of it. And then forms of the imprinted souls as well as the universal matter which belonged to the ideal, elemental luminous bodies came out of it. And then, two forms, that is, those of the Throne and the Pedestal came out. And then, forms of the heavenly elemental bodies and other things came out. And then, forms of the composites ranging from mineral, plants and animals to man—at whom the existential movement (*al-ḥarakah al-wujūdīyah*) ends—came out. Therefore he is the last stage of the descent. And then he starts to ascend the stages of the

existential descent which was from Him and in Him. This ascent takes place gradually tracing the existential stages so that it ascends to reach the First Source, that is the Cause of causes from which it started primordially. Now, the first of the worlds of external existence is the world of the intellects and non-material souls which are the world of spiritual realities (*'ālam al-jabarūt*). And then comes the world of absolute archetypes in which there are archetypal forms understood with the inner senses of all the existents including the material and non-material, which is called the world of supra-sensibles (*'ālam al-malakūt*). And then comes the material world (*'ālam al-mulk*) which is the world of the Throne and the Pedestal, that is, the world of the heavenly beings and the elements and things which are composed of elements. These three worlds are forms of what is included in divine knowledge, that is, permanent archetypes (*al-a'yān al-thābitah*) which are called possible quiddities as well as realities and beings of this sort. It is a world of the absolute secret because it comprises everything in the universe.¹⁷

In the process of God's creation as explained by Qayṣarī, we can recognise four stages: the first stage is before God's self-disclosure to Himself; the second stage, which is momentary and God makes a self-disclosure to Himself; the third stage is when the merciful breath is manifested together with the heavenly beings after God's self-disclosure to Himself; the fourth stage is when the material world appears. The first stage in this creation process corresponds to the level of *Hūwīyah* in the theory of knowing existence as explained by the school of the Unity of Being which we have already examined. The second stage corresponds to the level of *aḥadīyah*, the third stage corresponds to the level of *wāḥidīyah* and the fourth stage is the level of the empirical world. In this way, the theory of knowing existence corresponds exactly to the theory of the creation of the universe in the school of the Unity of Being.

Prophethood¹⁸

The theory of knowing existence as well as the theory of the process of creation can be viewed as a guide-map for wayfarers in the path to attaining to God. With the help of this guide-map, the wayfarer

may be able to find the right path to God, but a guide-map alone is insufficient for ordinary people to reach God.

Qayṣarī says “attaining to God is possible for creatures only by following prophets and saints.”¹⁹ Not only Qayṣarī, but almost all the Muslims thinkers do not believe that theoretical inference based on human reason is sufficient for attaining to God. According to Qayṣarī,

One who makes this kind of rational demonstration is compared to one who sees a shadow of a man standing in the sun while he is inside a house, not seeing [directly] the person and confidently believing that there is a man standing up, but he does not know who he is, how his shape and appearance are, and what his quality and characteristics are because he does not witness the person.²⁰

This kind of approach is expressed in the Qur’ān as “They are those who call from a distance.”²¹ Yet, as the Qur’ān says, God is so close to each one of us.²² This proximity (*qurb*) in Qayṣarī’s view is “different from the meaning of proximity between two bodies, but it means the proximity between a reality and a particular thing materialised through it.”²³ In fact this concept of God’s proximity is one of the key concepts in understanding the theory of existence in the school of the Unity of Being.

Qayṣarī believes that theoretical inference is insufficient for a wayfarer to reach God even though He is in immediate proximity to every creature. “To be led to God” is, in Qayṣarī’s opinion, to be realised “either through His information about His essence, His attributes and His names or through His testifying Himself to them.”²⁴ And the persons who are able to inform others about God’s essence are the prophets. So it is incumbent on wayfarers in the path to God to follow them. Therefore, according to the degree of man’s submission to the prophets, “divine lights and lordly secrets become clear to him.”²⁵

Now, the determinant factor which distinguishes prophets from other people is prophethood (*nubūwah*). As for this prophethood, Qayṣarī says:

Prophethood is a word derived from the word *naba’* (information) which means *khavar* (notification). As a technical term, it

means the dispatching of a messenger to inform about God and to lead and guide people to the way of self-consistency. Yet there are “general prophethood” and “special prophethood.” By “general prophethood,” we mean what is not accompanied by messengership (*risālah*) and law (*sharī‘ah*). It is called “general prophethood” because it includes prophets in general. But as regards “special prophethood,” it is not like this.²⁶

One example of a prophet with “special prophethood” is Moses, who was dispatched with messengership and law. Other prophets of Moses’s age, like Aaron and Joshua, were under Moses’s leadership and although they themselves did not bring the divine law to their followers, they were able to speak about the Truth and His secrets as well as talk of the Mystery and Its lights while guiding people to the right path.

So, “special prophethood” can be divided into two kinds. The first kind includes prophets like Aaron and Joshua who were submissive to the commandments of Moses. On the other hand, the “second kind of special prophethood is that of owners of authority among messengers who appear with messengership, holy law and heavenly books.”²⁷

According to Qaysārī, “prophethood is a circle which includes points on a circumference, and each of these points is the centre of the circle by itself. And Muḥammad, the seal of the dispatched prophets, is owner of this general circle. Therefore it is related in a tradition that Muḥammad was a prophet while Adam was in a state between clay and water. So, other prophets except him are like points on the circumference.”²⁸

The idea that prophethood was sealed at Muḥammad and that he had existed as a prophet before the creation of Adam, the primordial man, contributed greatly to the development of the concept of “prophethood” in the history of Islamic spirituality. The Prophet Muḥammad, who existed before the creation of Adam, must be regarded as a prophet who goes beyond history. This prophet is sometimes called “the Muḥammadan Light” (*al-nūr al-Muḥammadī*) or “the Muḥammadan Reality” (*al-ḥaqīqah al-Muḥammadīyah*) or sometimes called “the Perfect Man” (*al-insān al-kāmil*).

The term “Muḥammadan Reality” means “the Reality of Realities”

which we have seen in Qayṣarī's explanation of the levels of existence. In his theory of existence, "the Reality of Realities" is synonymous with "*Hūwīyah*" which means pure existence in the level of "being absolutely non-conditioned." In the expression "Reality of Realities," the first word "reality" (*ḥaqīqah*) governs the second "realities" (*ḥaqā'iq*) in terms of semantics, while "reality" is governed grammatically by the word "realities." That is to say, grammatically speaking, in this construct state the word "reality" is the object of the genitive case of the word "realities," but semantically the word "reality" possesses the word "realities" because "realities" come out of "reality" in the theory of existence in the school of the Unity of Being. So ontologically, "reality" has primacy over "realities."

In other words, pure existence in the sense of "being absolutely non-conditioned," which also means *Hūwīyah*, is synonymous with "Reality" in the "Reality of Realities." This "Reality" is beyond our comprehension and inference. It is synonymous with "nothing" or the dimension of "darkness" to which the light of the intellect can hardly attain. However, just before this dimension of darkness, there is a level of existence which the light of human intellect can slightly reach. This is the ultimate dimension of knowing, which is called the level of "*aḥadīyah*" (Absolute Oneness) or the "Cloud" (*al-'amā'*).

This level of existence is synonymous with the "realities" in the "reality of realities," and this level of *aḥadīyah* potentially includes the level of *wāḥidīyah* in which there are various forms of various beings in a united manner. In other words, the "realities" means *aḥadīyah* as well as *wāḥidīyah*. When "realities" is considered from the viewpoint of "*bi shart' shay'*" (as conditioned by something) it appears as *wāḥidīyah* and when it is considered from the viewpoint of "*bi shart' lā*" (as negatively conditioned), it appears as *aḥadīyah*. So, it is possible to say that the "realities" (in the sense of the "Muḥammadan reality") has an interior and exterior side. The interior side is the level of *aḥadīyah* while the exterior side is the level of *wāḥidīyah*.

The idea that "realities" took a concrete shape as the Prophet Muḥammad on earth implies that the Prophet Muḥammad was well aware of the existential dimension of *aḥadīyah* as well as that of

wāḥidiyah. In other words, the Prophet Muḥammad had perfect knowledge about the Divine Essence and could inform people about it. Thus the concept “prophethood” as applied to the Prophet Muḥammad has the meaning of “knowing the Divine Essence and informing people of it.”

So, the Prophet Muḥammad who existed before the creation of Adam, is considered as identical with the “Muḥammadan reality” (which is the Divine Essence in the level of *wāḥidiyah* which has a state of multiplicity in unity). In addition to prophethood in the form of the ahistoric Prophet Muḥammad, it also appears in the historic Muḥammad. With the advent of the Prophet Muḥammad in history, the chain of prophets was sealed; the chain forming a circle in which the starting point meets the point of termination. From this perspective, the historic and ahistoric prophethood of Muḥammad are identical. So, the historic Prophet Muḥammad reaches the divine essence in the level of *wāḥidiyah*, as Qayṣarī comments:

Prophethood is a divine gift of which there is no room for empirical acquisition. So a prophet is dispatched from God to lead creatures and to guide them while announcing His essence, His attributes, His acts as well as aspects of the life after death, like the Day of Congregation, the Day of Resurrection, reward and punishment.²⁹

So, prophets are those individuals who are well-informed about God and notify people of various matters concerning Him. This means that they enjoy greater proximity with Him than ordinary people. In addition, a prophet with prophethood in the sense of the Muḥammadan reality is regarded as having greater proximity to the level of *aḥadiyah* than ordinary prophets. In other words, Muḥammad’s knowledge of God was of a higher level than other prophets’ and for this reason, his prophethood is called “special prophethood.” The prophethood of other prophets such as Aaron and Joshua was an ability of knowing God and notifying people of Him without bringing a divine law. They knew the divine essence in the level of *wāḥidiyah*, not in the level of *aḥadiyah*. Because of this difference, the prophethood of Muḥammad is called a “special prophethood” while the prophethood of minor prophets is called a “general prophethood.”

Thus the concept of prophethood includes the meaning of knowing the Divine Essence. In addition, prophethood is linked with the theory of existence in the school of the Unity of Being since ordinary people can be informed of the Divine Essence only through the prophet's knowledge of It.

Walāyah

In the course of Qayṣarī's discussion on prophethood, he comments:

There is an interior for prophethood, which is proximity to God (*walāyah*). So a prophet with proximity to God takes from God—or the Sovereign—the things with which the perfection of his status in proximity-to-God and prophethood will be realised.³⁰

On the basis of this explanation concerning *walāyah* (closeness to God, or, proximity-to-God), prophethood is considered as perfect only through *walāyah*. In other words, a prophet can become familiar with God and the mysteries of the universe through *walāyah*. The difference between prophethood (*nubūwah*) and proximity-to-God (*walāyah*) can be viewed in terms of prophethood being a state of being informed of God and proximity-to-God being the cause of this state of being informed of God. So prophethood is the effect brought about by proximity-to-God and proximity-to-God is the cause of this effect.

In other words proximity-to-God is behind prophethood, or it is the interior of prophethood. Qayṣarī also offers an etymological explanation of proximity-to-God:

the word *walāyah* is derived from the word “*walī*” which means closeness. Therefore the beloved (*ḥabīb*) is called “*walī*” because of his being close to his lover. Yet in Sufi terminology, it means closeness to the Truth (God).³¹

So, the word *walāyah* basically denotes a state of something being close to something else. There is an intimate relationship between them, as between the lover and the beloved, for the lover must love and be familiar with the beloved and the beloved must love and be familiar with the lover. Of course *walāyah* includes these concepts of love and familiarity but it is not a physical, spatial closeness between two things.

According to Qayṣarī, *walāyah* is divided into two kinds, that is “general *walāyah*” and “special *walāyah*.”³²

“General *walāyah*” appears in those who believe in God and perform righteous deeds. But “special *walāyah*” means the wayfarer’s disappearance (*fanā*) into God from the viewpoint of his essence, attributes and acts. So the *walī* (one who is close to God) means the person who disappears into God and subsists in Him and displays the divine names and attributes.³³

“Special *walāyah*” means a state in which the distance between God and the wayfarer has almost disappeared because God and the wayfarer have become close to each other. Yet this does not mean that the wayfarer becomes one with God because God is the Lord and the wayfarer is His slave. As long as this Lord-slave relationship remains, man will not be completely one with God.

This “special *walāyah*” is divided again into two kinds on the basis of its manifestation. Qayṣarī says that one of the two is the “gifted one” and the other is the “obtained one.”³⁴ The “gifted one” is “attained by means of attraction to the Merciful Being before the wayfarer’s performance of spiritual exercise.”³⁵ On the other hand, the “obtained” one is acquired by wayfarers “by means of attraction to Him and after having performed spiritual exercise.”³⁶ The wayfarer whose attraction to God occurs prior to spiritual exercise is called “the beloved” (*maḥbūb*) because “God has brought him near to Himself.”³⁷ The reason why he is called so is that the “Truth has attracted him towards Himself.”³⁸ On the other hand, those who hold the “special *walāyah*” is called “the lover of God” (*muḥibb*) because “he firstly approaches the Truth, and then secondly the attraction of God befalls him.”³⁹ In Qayṣarī’s opinion, the beloved by God (*maḥbūb*) who holds the God-gifted *walāyah*, is higher in the ranking of perfection than the lover of God (*muḥibb*).

The word *walāyah* implies etymologically “something being close to something,” but in the school of the Unity of Being this word means not only closeness in time as well as in distance, but closeness between God and creatures. Therefore it also implies metaphysical closeness. This metaphysical closeness which lies between God and His creatures is alluded to the holy Qur’ān with the well known verse

“We [God] are nearer to him than the jugular vein.”⁴⁰

To believe in God is above all to accept God's revelations in the tradition of monotheism. In this case acceptance of the fact of God's closeness to man as revealed in the holy Qur'ān is incumbent upon believers. Therefore, believers in general know God's closeness to creatures or the *walāyah*. Believers who know God's closeness should be considered to hold proximity-to-God, or *walāyah*. They themselves are close to God because they know of their being close to God as well as God's being close to them through Qur'ānic revelation. But this closeness to God or *walāyah* is a kind of universal principle. Believers are those who are aware of it and those who are unaware of it. As we have already seen in Qayṣarī's text that “general *walāyah*” appears in those who believe in God and perform righteous acts, and also in those who are aware of *walāyah* as the universal principle. So those who obtain “general *walāyah*” are aware of universal *walāyah* and act according to the divine prescriptions. However, the Divine Essence is not reached through “general *walāyah*,” but through “special *walāyah*” which is obtained by a wayfarer through his disappearance into God from the viewpoint of his essence and his attributes as well as his acts. In other words, by entering the divine realm, the wayfarer can reach the state of utmost closeness to God. This utmost closeness to God is “special *walāyah*” by which the wayfarer is informed of the Divine Essence.

Man's closeness to God in the sense of the “general *walāyah*” presupposes a distance and distinction between God and man, even though God is believed to be immediately close to man and other creatures. But in this God-man relationship, man's ontological subject is distinctively different from the divine subject.

Yet man's immediate closeness to God in the sense of “special *walāyah*” makes a vague boundary between God and man. However, possessors of “special *walāyah*” who disappear into God do not become one with God. They exist together with the existence of God as Qayṣarī indicates in the previously quoted remarks, that is, “after God casts light upon man liberating him from his ‘is-ness’ (*annīyah*) and destroying the ‘mountain of his self entification’ (*jabal ta'ayyuni-hi*), while the mountain of his ego (*tūr anānīyah*) is perishing. He

gives a second existence to him and bestows reason as well as the right control over his soul to him again." This state described by Qayṣarī is realised by attaining the "special *walāyah*." Man becomes informed of the innermost essence of God by reaching this "special *walāyah*." So, prophets with "special prophethood" can inform people of God's innermost essence, for they hold the "special *walāyah*." Thus, "special *walāyah*" is a necessary condition for "special prophethood." In other words, "special *walāyah*" is a source of knowledge of God's innermost essence, which is the pinnacle of the ontological hierarchy in the theory of the Unity of Being.

Thus, in the philosophical system of the school of the Unity of Being, the theory of *walāyah* contributes an important role in unifying the theories of prophethood and being. In other words, *walāyah* unites the theory of being and the theory of knowing the Divine Essence. Although the theory of being in the school of the Unity of Being includes the self-manifestation theory of the Divine Essence, its relationship with the theory of knowing is strengthened and fortified with the theory of prophethood, which is also a theory concerned with knowing the Divine Essence. In Qayṣarī's philosophy, we see a completely unified form of ontology and epistemology which was initiated by Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī, who is at present believed to have introduced Avicennian ontology into Ibn 'Arabī's monistic world view.

Notes

1. Ibn 'Arabī, *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyah*, vol. 2, pp. 256 ff., Beirut, Dār Ṣādir, undated.
2. This article is found in pp. 5-42 of *Rasā'il Qayṣarī*, edited S.J. Ashtiyānī, (Mashhad: Chāpkhāna-yi Dānishgāh-i Mashhad, H.S. 1357). An abridged version of the same article is found in an appendices of al-Tirmidhi's *Kitāb Khatm al-Awliyā'*, ed. U. Yaḥyā (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1965). In the present article, the text edited by Prof. Ashtiyānī is used.
3. *Ibid*, p. 5.
4. *Ibid*, p. 6.
5. *Ibid*, p. 6.
6. *Ibid*, p. 7.
7. *Ibid*, p. 8.

8. *Ibid*, p. 8.
9. *Ibid*, p. 8.
10. *Ibid*, p. 8.
11. *Ibid*, p. 8.
12. *Ibid*, p. 8.
13. *Ibid*, p. 8.
14. *Ibid*, p. 8-9.
15. *Ibid*, p. 9.
16. See Toshihiko Izutsu, *The Concept and Reality of Existence* (Tokyo: Keio Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies, 1971), pp. 48-55.
17. Qayṣarī, *al-tawḥīd wa al-nubūwah wa al-walāyah*, *op. cit*, p. 14-15.
18. In the sūfī tradition, the word “nubūwah” is used to denote the concept “prophethood” instead of the word “nubū’ah,” which may be a more appropriate word for the concept “prophethood” in Qayṣarī’s interpretation of the word.
19. *Ibid*, p. 19.
20. *Ibid*, p. 20.
21. Qur’ān, 41: 44.
22. For example, Qur’ān 50: 14.
23. Qayṣarī, *al-tawḥīd wa al-nubūwah wa al-walāyah*, *op. cit*, p. 20-21.
24. *Ibid*, p. 21.
25. *Ibid*, p. 21.
26. *Ibid*, p. 21.
27. *Ibid*, p. 21-22.
28. *Ibid*, p. 22.
29. *Ibid*, p. 22.
30. *Ibid*, p. 22.
31. *Ibid*, p. 22.
32. *Ibid*, p. 26.
33. *Ibid*, p. 26.
34. *Ibid*, p. 26.
35. *Ibid*, p. 26.
36. *Ibid*, p. 26.
37. *Ibid*, p. 26.
38. *Ibid*, p. 26.
39. *Ibid*, p. 26.
40. Qur’ān, 50: 14.

‘*Azīz-i Nasafī*
and the Essence-Existence Debate
 Hermann Landolt

Ibn Sīnā's famous distinction between essence and existence was probably one of the most crucial events in the history of medieval philosophy both Christian and Islamic. As is well-known, various interpretations and criticisms of this distinction, particularly those offered by Ibn Rushd (Averroes) and his Eastern contemporary, Suhrawardī, strongly influenced the further development of philosophy both in the Christian West and the Islamic East.

It is probably no longer necessary in our day to insist on the fact that the Islamic philosophical tradition, far from having received a deadly blow from the attacks of al-Ghazālī as an earlier generation of scholars had taken for granted, has on the contrary not only survived, mainly thanks to Suhrawardī, but experienced a rich and culturally significant development of its own, particularly in Iran and the Shī'ite world. The seminal works of Henry Corbin sufficiently demonstrate this fact, as do those of Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Fazlur Rahman and Toshihiko Izutsu; and a surprisingly great number of more recent studies, theses and dissertations on Suhrawardī, Mullā Ṣadrā and other important thinkers of the later periods prove that their efforts were not in vain.

One of the major concerns of Professor Izutsu's analysis of Islamic philosophy was to suggest that it belongs essentially to a type of

"Eastern" philosophy which is ultimately based on a mystical perception of existence rather than on the distinction of essences. For Suhrawardī's *ishrāqī* or "oriental" philosophy, this would seem to imply that the traditional view which labels it as "essentialist" rather than "existentialist" in nature can be questioned. Of course, Izutsu himself readily admits that Suhrawardī's sharp criticism of the distinction *in concreto* between essence and existence he mistakenly attributes to Ibn Sīnā has actually forced him into the "essentialist" position for which he was later criticised by Mullā Ṣadrā. Yet as a mystic, Suhrawardī in fact prepared the ground precisely for Mullā Ṣadrā's "existentialist revolution." Indeed, as Professor Izutsu argues, his dynamic reality of "Light" is hardly anything but Mullā Ṣadrā's "analogically graded existence."¹ In this respect, it may also be worth noting that even in his so-called Peripatetic works, Suhrawardī himself occasionally uses the term "existence" (*wujūd*) not in the sense of a secondary intelligible, but exactly in the same way in which he speaks as an *ishrāqī* about the Reality of "Light."²

The present paper is not concerned directly with either Suhrawardī or Mullā Ṣadrā but aims to make a similar argument for another creative thinker who lived during the 13th century in Transoxiana and Iran, and who has recently been singled out as a typical representative of the "Philosophy of Essence,"³ namely, 'Azīz-i Nasafī. Nasafī, who wrote exclusively in Persian, and in a very simple style at that, is of course much less well-known among students of Islamic philosophy than either Suhrawardī or Mullā Ṣadrā. Students of Islamic mysticism, on the other hand, tend to regard him simply as a popularizer of Ibn 'Arabī's "monism"—a perception which needs qualification, as I have tried to show elsewhere,⁴ not only because Ibn 'Arabī's supposed "monism" is itself debatable, but also because Nasafī himself was actually the first to systematically distinguish between various *kinds* of "monism," none of which is exactly consistent with Ibn 'Arabī's doctrine. Although Nasafī placed his own knowledge humbly under the "shadow" of his Ṣūfī master Sa'duddin-i Ḥamūya, who was indeed an acquaintance of Ibn 'Arabī and Ṣadrūddīn-i Qūnyawī, he was in fact an independent thinker and a scholar familiar with various intellectual traditions including medi-

cine and philosophy. Moreover, it is certainly worth mentioning that Nasafī shows outspoken sympathies for only marginally Islamic and even frankly non-Islamic doctrines, such as certain Indian forms of "monism," although he never leaves the magic circle of the catholicity of his own Islamic-Iranian consciousness. Not unlike the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā or Ghazālī in the *Mishkāṭ al-Anwār*, he may also be seen as a kind of phenomenologist of religious and philosophical doctrines, as he attempts in several of his works to give a systematic description of all conceivable world-views, and to classify them according to their essential characteristics. Thus, in his as yet unpublished *Kitāb-i Tanzīl*,⁵ he presents the world-views of six anonymous "migrators" (*sālik*) ranging from extreme creationism to extreme monism. Each of these, says Nasafī, represents one among the "stations" of the *awliyā'*, but none of them possesses the full truth by himself. In a somewhat similar way, he discusses in his major work, the *Kashf ul-Ḥaqāyiq*,⁶ the views of three different groups: the *ahl-i shari'at* (or those adhering to the traditional body of religious Islamic knowledge), the *ahl-i hikmat* (or the Philosophers) and the *ahl-i wahdat* (or the "monists"), each of these three groups being themselves sub-divided into two. The first group consists of the Sunnis and the Shī'is, the second is divided into the traditional (i.e., Avicennian) philosophers and the dissident ones, termed *ahl-i tanāsukh* or "transmigrationists," whereas the two sub-groups belonging to the third group seem to correspond to two kinds of Sufis—probably the same two kinds which are sharply distinguished from each other by a much later writer studied by Professor Izutsu⁷ as the "ignorant" ones and the "great" ones among those Sufis who believe in "oneness of both existence and existents." Nasafī calls them the "People of Fire" (*aṣḥāb-i nār*) and the "People of Light" (*aṣḥāb-i nūr*), respectively. Both these kinds of "monists" recognize "existence" (*wujūd*) itself as the only Reality; but the "People of Fire" are, in fact, rather a sort of pseudo-monists since they make a fundamental distinction between this unique Reality of Existence and the World, which does not *really* exist according to them: it has only the appearance of existence, like a *fata morgana*, due precisely to the unique property (*khāṣṣiyyat*) of true Existence which is to make appear as existent whatever is not

Itself. One might therefore say that these pseudo-monists are still thinking in a way in essentialist terms, since they are making of existence itself a kind of super-essence having a property, which distinguishes it from everything else. By contrast, Nasafī's "People of Light" do not make this difference between God and the World, Reality and Appearance, Existence and Non-existence at all. For them, the individual existents (*afrād-i mawjūdāt*) as a *whole* are, simply by virtue of being existent, the Reality of Existence itself. One could hardly take a more radically "existentialist" position!

Yet in some of his writings, Nasafī indeed appears as if he wished to advocate an "essentialist" position. This is notably the case in the collection of treatises known under the (probably spurious) title *Kitāb al-Insān al-Kāmil*—a collection which, in the edition of Marijan Molé,⁸ consists of 22 treatises plus a number of variant versions. Like most writings of Nasafī, it is arranged in a pedagogical order leading through several levels of understanding from the exoteric to the most esoteric knowledge; and it should be noted that the "essentialist" passages in question are found in treatises 11, 12 and 13 corresponding to Variants 3, 4 and 5, all of these forming part of "Volume II" of the original collection.⁹ We may therefore safely assume that they are concerned with an advanced but not the most advanced level of knowledge. The common subject matter of these treatises is cosmology, that is to say, the relationship between the traditional "worlds" or domains of Jabarūt, Malakūt and Mulk, which Nasafī explains here in a way that reveals indeed a Neoplatonic outlook, although it is not Neoplatonism pure and simple. What is relevant for our discussion here is that Nasafī identifies the highest of these three "worlds," Jabarūt, with the domain of pure potentiality and essence (*māhiyyat, dhāt*), whereas both Malakūt and Mulk, that is to say, both the intelligible (*ma'qūl*) and the sensible (*maḥsūs*) "worlds," together make up the domain of "existence" or, more precisely, "external existence" (*wujūd-i khārijī*).¹⁰ In relation to this double world of "external" or "actual" existence, the superior world of essences and potentialities is said to be a world of "non-existence" (*adam*), although these entities are still "true realities" (*ḥaqāyiq*) and "things" (*ashyā*). As a matter of fact, Nasafī in this context

sometimes prefers the term "realities," sometimes "things."¹¹ He also makes it clear that the term "thing" is preferable because it is in accordance with Qur'anic and traditional religious language, e.g., 15: 21: "There is not one *thing* whose treasures would not be with Us, and We only make it descend in a well-known measure."¹² Moreover, he explains that "thing" is a more comprehensive notion than "existent," since a "thing" may be either "existent" or "non-existent"¹³—a point which reveals that these entities have in reality at least as much to do with the Mu'tazilî *Kalām* notion of "non-existent stable entity" (*al-shay' al-thābit al-ma'dūm*) as they do with Avicennian "essences."¹⁴ The same thing has been said, as is well known, about Ibn 'Arabî's "immutable entities" or "archetypes" (*al-a'yān al-thābita*),¹⁵ with which Nasafî in fact identifies his super-entities explicitly.¹⁶ Thus, Nasafî's "essentialism" should be qualified, first of all, for this reason alone.

Now, as was indicated above, the doctrine just summarized does not in fact correspond to the most advanced level in Nasafî's teaching. In the *Kashf ul-Ḥaqāyiq*, he makes this quite clear by pointing out that it is only the *ahl-i ḥikmat*, i.e., the second of the three major groups, who consider essence to be "prior" (*sābiq*) to existence,¹⁷ or as a "link" (*wāsiṭa*) comprehensive of both existence and non-existence,¹⁸ whereas for the *ahl-i waḥdat*, there can be no such link because existence itself has no real contrary or opposite¹⁹ and is, therefore, itself the most comprehensive entity.²⁰ Moreover, even in those treatises of the *Insān* collection where Nasafî ostensibly advocates the primacy of essence over existence, he also hints at the very opposite. Right from the beginning, for example, he declares that the three realms to be discussed are actually levels of one and the same existence (*marātib-i wujūd*),²¹ and at the end, we learn that their relationship can only be one of "togetherness" or "withness" (*ma'īyyat*),²² not emanation. The first level is simply the implicit order of things (*'ālam-i ijmal*), whereas the second and third, i.e., the intelligible and sensible worlds, are the explicit order (*'ālam-i tafṣil*). Also, the changing nature of concrete existents in the lowest of all worlds does not, paradoxically, give them any lower status in reality. Quite to the contrary, while it must be man's aim to see things "as

they truly are” (*kamā hiya*), that is, in their *essential* nature, God sees them as they actually *exist*, that is, evidently, as they develop over time; and it is this divine “vision” of things in their *existence* which constitutes God’s own supreme certitude (*‘ayn al-yaqīn; ihāṭat-i ‘aynī*), as opposed to the lower kind of certitude (*‘ilm al-yaqīn; ihāṭat-i ‘ilmī*) which He has of the world of “essences.”²³ This latter hint, to which several others could be added, actually involves what appears to be the most characteristic doctrine of Nasafī himself: the idea that Existence itself is permanently involved in a process of self-deployment or self-disclosure, “growing” like plants from seed to flower—except that Existence as opposed to things does not actually have such a “seed” or “essence” (*dhāt*): it is, rather, pure unfolding (*inbisāṭ*) and manifestation, and present to itself in the fully developed state of things, which is also called the “Day of Resurrection,” or “the Face of God”, or the “Perfect Man.”

This dynamic doctrine of “existence”—which in some ways seems even more radical than Mullā Ṣadrā’s—evidently corresponds to the most esoteric level of Nasafī’s teaching. In the *Kitāb al-Insān al-Kāmil*, it has its place in the second-last treatise of the collection (nr. 21), just before the final treatise on “Heaven and Hell.” In the *Kashf ul-Ḥaqāyiq*, one version of it is said to be the doctrine of the “elite among the philosophers” (*khawāṣṣ-i ahl-i ḥikmat*), but this version concerns only the two poles essence and existence, potentiality and actuality, implicit and explicit order, seed and fruit—and therefore misses the main point, namely, the expansion or unfolding of Existence itself (*inbisāṭ-i wujūd*), which is called the “Soul” (*nafs*) of God or the “Lord” (*rabb*), and which is, of course, known only to the *ahl-i waḥdat*.

The following is a translation of the relevant passage from the *Kashf ul-Ḥaqāyiq*:

You must know that the monists say that everything existent in the world has three levels and two forms: the levels of ‘Essence’ (*dhāt*), ‘Face’ (*wajh*) and ‘Soul’ (*nafs*), plus the ‘generic’ (*jāmi‘a*) and the ‘differentiated’ (*mutafarriqa*) forms. This is so because everything, whatever it be, necessarily is either in a station in which everything that is possible to appear in that

thing is altogether existent *in potentia*, such as the egg or the seed. This station is called the level of Essence, and the form of this level is called the 'generic' form. Or it must be in a station in which everything that was possible to appear in that thing is altogether existent *in actu*, such as the perfect man or the perfect tree. This station is called the level of Face, and the form of this level is called the 'differentiated' form. And the expansion and unfolding of existence (*imtidād va inbisāṭ-i wujūd*) within these levels is called the level of Soul.

What is meant by 'expansion' is not (physical) growth, for the latter is called 'motion of bodies.' Rather, the meaning of 'unfolding' is the spreading out of existence. This is what is called the level of Soul; and the difference is great between physical growth and the spreading out of existence. . . . Expansion and unfolding of Soul within these levels is (nothing but) His (i.e., God's) taking possession of and placing Himself on the Throne (*'arsh*); for the levels of everything depend on the completeness (*tamāmī*) of the Throne. That is to say that the Throne is something of many kinds; and the more complete and perfect the levels, the greater and more magnificent is the Throne. This is the meaning of (the tradition that) 'The heart of the believer is the greatest throne of God.'

This Soul is what the Founder of Religion (*ṣāhib-i sharī'at*) calls 'the Lord,' for both terms have the same meaning, as is indicated by (the traditions) 'Whoever knows his soul knows his lord' and 'Whoever knows the Soul knows the Lord.' And this level of Soul, which the Founder of Religion calls 'Lord,' is above all levels. It is pure and free from opposition and confrontation, and it transcends shapes and forms. Surely the sensualists and those bound to mere imagination have no access to this level!

O Darvīsh! The meaning of 'Lord' and 'Soul' is not what the Religionists and the Philosophers thought it to be. Nor is the (correct) interpretation of the (Qur'anic terms) 'Soul' and 'Lord' the one made by the grammarians and linguists. 'Soul' and 'Lord' are to be interpreted as the expansion and unfolding of Existence within its own levels. And the meaning of 'Throne' is not what the Religionists and the Philosophers believed it to be; for 'Throne' is to be interpreted as the completeness of the levels. As for (God's) 'placing Himself' (on it, *istiwā*), it is of two kinds:

One is by way of knowledge—‘And God embraces everything in knowledge’ (65: 12)—, the other is by way of existence (*az rāh-i wujūd*)—for, ‘Are they not in doubt about meeting their Lord? Is He not embracing every thing?’ (41: 54). Again, His ‘placing Himself (on the Throne)’ by knowledge is of two kinds: implicit and explicit. But let us not extend our talking and miss the goal!²⁴

Notes

1. T. Izutsu, “The Fundamental Structure of Sabzawari’s Metaphysics” in M. Mohaghegh and T. Izutsu, eds., *Sharh-i Ghurar al-Fara’id or Sharh-i Manzumah*. Tehran, Wisdom of Persia Series I, 1969, 6 f. and *passim*. Reprinted in *The Concept and Reality of Existence*, Tokyo, 1971.
2. E.g., *Talwihāt* in Suhrawardī, *Opera Metaphysica et Mystica* ed. Henricus Corbin, I, Bibliotheca Islamica 16a, Istanbul 1945, 116.
3. Parviz Morewedge, *Essays in Islamic Philosophy, Theology, and Mysticism*, Department of Philosophy, SUNY at Oneonta, 1995, 92–98.
4. “Le paradoxe de la ‘face de dieu’: ‘Azīz-e Nasafi (VII/“XIII” siècle) et le ‘monisme ésotérique’ de l’Islam,” in *Studia Iranica* 25, 2 (1996) 163–192. References not supplied here may be found in this article.
5. An edition of this work is being prepared by the author.
6. Ed. A. Mahdavi Damghani, Tehran, 1344/1965.
7. “The Fundamental Structure,” 127 f./Arabic text 263 ff. See also Muḥammad Taqī al-Āmulī, *Durar al-Fawā’id* (= *al-Ta’līq ‘alā Sharḥ al-Manzūma*) ed. Ḥasan al-Muṣṭafawī, Tehran², 1377 h. l., I, 87 f.
8. Azizoddin Nasafi, *Le Livre de l’Homme Parfait* ed. Marijan Molé, Bibliothèque Iranienne 11, Tehran/Paris, 1962 (henceforth = *Insān*).
9. *Insān* 156–183 and 344–388.
10. E.g., *Insān* 157 f.
11. Cf. *Insān* 161 and 365.
12. *Insān* 355; cf. *ibid* 161; 348.
13. *Insān* 161; 172.
14. On this *Kalām* view, see the fundamental article by Richard M. Frank, “Al-ma’dūm wal-mawjūd” in *MIDEO* 14 (1980) 185–210. On arguments for and against its Stoic origin see especially Josef van Ess, *Die Erkenntnislehre des ‘Aḩudaddīn al-‘Icī*, Wiesbaden, 1966, 200. It should be pointed out in this context that Suhrawardī (*Opera* I, 200–203) strongly rejects this view, whereas Nasafi accepts it, but only as the point of view of the *ahl-i ḥikmat*, not as that of the *ahl-i waḩdat* (see also below).
15. For a convenient survey of the scholarly literature on this subject see Egbert

Meyer, "Ein kurzer Traktat Ibn ‘Arabi’s über die *A’yān at-tābī‘a*" in *Oriens* 27-28 (1981) 226-265, esp. 227 f.

16. *Insān* 364 f.

17. *Kashf* 39.

18. *Kashf* 33.

19. *Kashf* 34.

20. *Kashf* 30.

21. *Insān* 159.

22. *Insān* 376 ff. Note that Nasafī evidently takes the notion of *ma‘iyyat* from Maḥmūd-i Ushnuhī’s (or Shams-i Daylamī’s) quite unique theory of "subtle ontic space." On this, cf. my "Sakralraum und mystischer Raum im Islam" in *Eranos* 44 (1975) 231-265, esp. 261 ff.

23. *Insān* 368 (reading *‘aynī* for *ghaybī* on line 12).

24. *Kashf* 39 ff. The printed text has some lacunae, which have been supplied here from the MS. Tehran, Majlis 4136, 36 a-37 b.

*La Voie de Hallâj
et la voie d'Ibn 'Arabî*
Mokdad Arfa Mensia

*Il n'y a de voie que droite, parce qu'il n'y
a de voie qui ne mène à Dieu. . . . Il est le
terme de toute voie.¹*

En décrivant la postérité mystique de Hallâj et la réception de sa doctrine, Massignon oppose le monisme testimonial (*wahdat al-shuhûd*), fondé sur l'expérience de l'union mystique transformante et illustré par Hallâj, qui devient ainsi le témoin de Dieu, au monisme existentiel, de nature plus philosophique que mystique et qui affirme l'unité absolue de l'Être, tous les êtres étant considérés comme des manifestations (*mazâhir*) de cet Être unique: seul Dieu existe.² Cette tendance est illustrée, entre autres, par la figure d'Ibn 'Arabî. Pour Massignon il y a incompatibilité entre le monisme "abstrait et logique" d'Ibn 'Arabî et l'union divine prêchée par Hallâj avec tant d'enthousiasme,³ incompatibilité entre le statique et l'existentiel d'un côté, et le dynamique et le testimonial de l'autre.⁴ Par lui-même Massignon donne à Hallâj une place unique dans la mystique musulmane, son mérite consiste, selon lui, en ce qu'il "a posé le premier sur un terrain métaphysique: le Désir est, dans l'essence divine, lié à l'Illéité (*huwiya*) et à l'Heccéité (*annîya*) divines, Être (*Wujûd*) réel et Forme (*sûra*) intégralement parfaite. Il a, d'autre part, marqué que l'union mystique n'annihilait pas la personnalité du saint témoin (*shâhid*), parce que l'union était transnaturelle, entre deux natures, *lâhût* et *nâsût*".⁵ Cette interprétation a été critiquée dans ses bases par Max Horten.⁶ Et une monographie consacrée à Ibn 'Arabî pour-

rait lui reconnaître le même droit de représenter l'Islam mystique au même titre que Hallâj, mais selon une orientation différente. D'abord nous trouvons chez Ibn 'Arabî la fusion métaphysique du désir et de l'Essence divine, le désir devient le principe et la loi de tous les êtres, actes et pensées. Ensuite la substance de l'Islam réside, à ses yeux, dans son caractère totalisant et englobant des autres religions en tant qu'intentionnalité primordiale devançant l'histoire de l'humanité et en tant que récapitulation intégrale achevant cette histoire. L'intention ultime dans toute adoration, de n'importe quel dieu, vise en réalité le Dieu unique (d'où sa doctrine de l'unité de toutes les religions). Il y a unicité de la divinité parce qu'il y a unicité de l'Être. Ibn 'Arabî montre que la conscience de l'unicité divine (profession de foi) n'atteint son sens véritable que dans l'affirmation de l'unicité de l'Être. Tout au long des *Futûhât* le Coran est interprété profondément dans ce sens.

Enfin Massignon critique sévèrement l'expression qu'a prise l'évolution de la mystique dans l'école d'Ibn 'Arabî. Pour lui, le "syncrétisme théosophique" d'Ibn 'Arabî est une forme dégénérée de l'universalisme apostolique des premiers mystiques. Parlant d'Ibn 'Arabî il dit: "Il ne faut pas . . . réduire la mystique à son esthétique formelle, à l'exercice d'une imagination spéculative, raffinant sur la subtilité des termes. . . . L'importance démesurée donnée à l'emploi de termes volontairement obscurs et ésotériques est précisément un des signes de la décadence que marque l'école d'Ibn 'Arabî."⁷

Nous voyons à quel point le jugement de Massignon sur Ibn 'Arabî est sévère, nous nous proposons donc de voir ce que pense Ibn 'Arabî lui-même de la doctrine de Hallâj, tant défendue par Massignon, par rapport à sa propre théorie, tant critiquée par Massignon. Nous nous contenterons ici de faire quelques remarques relatives à la postérité de Hallâj dans l'école de *wahdat al-wujûd* (monisme ou unicité de l'être), telle qu'elle est représentée par Ibn 'Arabî, pour voir l'estimation par celui-ci de la doctrine de Hallâj.⁸ Nous ne pouvons prétendre à l'exhaustivité de l'analyse des références explicites ou les allusions indirectes aux textes de Hallâj, ni de l'analyse d'écrits qu'Ibn 'Arabî consacre à l'enseignement de ce dernier.⁹

L'on peut déceler, chez Ibn 'Arabî, deux attitudes vis-à-vis de

Hallâj: l'une critique et l'autre récupératrice. Essayons de repérer les griefs que formule Ibn 'Arabî à l'encontre de Hallâj, en nous occupant uniquement de l'aspect doctrinal.¹⁰

1. Les règles de conduite sur la Voie.

Ibn 'Arabî fait à Hallâj des reproches qui portent sur la conduite sur la Voie dans son rapport à la Loi. Il s'agit de règles de rectitude et de politesse vis-à-vis de Dieu (*al-adab ma'a-Allâh*). Ici Ibn 'Arabî prend position d'un problème classique, tant débattu par les Maîtres du Soufisme: celui du fameux *Shat'h*, expression scandaleuse (qu'on traduit parfois par locution extatique, théophanique ou théoathique) que le mystique prononce dans ses élans extatiques.¹¹ Voici comment Massignon explicite le *shat'h*: "Les mots assumant alors pour l'âme la plénitude spéciale de leur réalité momentanée, les locutions divines se font entendre en elle; puis l'âme réforme son vocabulaire à leur image; et, au seuil de l'union mystique, intervient le phénomène du *shat'h*, l'offre de l'échange, l'interversion amoureuse des rôles est proposée; l'âme soumise est invitée à vouloir, à exprimer, sans s'en douter, «à la première personne», le point de vue même de son Bienfaiteur; c'est l'épreuve suprême de son humilité, le sceau de son élection".¹² Or Ibn 'Arabî juge le *shat'h* comme incompatible avec *al-adab ma'a-Allâh* qui est l'un des thèmes majeurs de son œuvre: attitude de respect profond vis-à-vis de Dieu qui trouve son fondement dans les statuts de servitude (*'Ubûdiyya*) et de Seigneurie (*Rubûbiyya*), c'est donc une attitude pratique qui est fondée sur la saisie adéquate des réalités métaphysiques. Exposer la théorie akbarienne de l'homme en tant que servant (*abd*) et de Dieu en tant que Seigneur (*rabb*) dépasse notre propos; contentons-nous de donner une seule citation: "Dieu, dit-il, voulut apprendre à Ses Créatures comment se comporter correctement avec Lui . . . pour qu'elles soient polies et évitent le *shat'h*, car le *shat'h* est pour l'homme un vice dans lequel il (prétend) se rehausser au rang de la divinité (*al-rutba al-ilâhiyya*) et quitte ainsi sa réalité (*haqiqâ*). Le *shat'h* le rattache de la sorte à l'ignorance de Dieu et de soi-même. Il advint que certains des Plus Grands (*akâbir*) l'aient commis, mais je m'abstiens de les nommer parce que c'est un attribut d'infériorité (*sifatu nuqs*)".¹³ Ibn

'Arabî pense certainement à Bistâmî et Hallâj,¹⁴ dont il cite souvent les paroles. Le *shat'h*, dans lequel Massignon voit "le trait suprême de la mystique monothéiste en Islam"¹⁵ est considéré par Ibn 'Arabî non seulement comme étant en contradiction avec la Loi, mais aussi comme étant le produit d'une saisie inadéquate des réalités métaphysiques profondes qu'il place à la base même de son système.

Il y a, parmi les différents états (*ahwâl*) que traverse le mystique dans son voyage spirituel, deux qui sont bien connus: celui de veille (*sahw* ou sobriété) et celui d'ivresse (*sukr* ou ébriété).¹⁶ Aux yeux d'Ibn 'Arabî celui qui prononce une parole ou accomplit un acte alors qu'il est dans un état d'ivresse ne peut que commettre les pires confusions (*khabata* = agir en aveugle et *khalata* = confondre).¹⁷ Bien qu'Ibn 'Arabî situe le *maqâm* (demeure ou station)¹⁸ dans un rang plus haut que celui du *hâl* (état), nous pouvons nous inspirer, pour bien saisir ce jugement, de la manière dont il décrit la subjectivité du soufi lors de sa traversée de l'itinéraire spirituel: quelle appréciation le soufi a-t-il d'une demeure quelconque avant, pendant et après son séjour dans cette demeure? Celui qui réside dans une demeure spirituelle est épris de cette demeure et en est enthousiaste, c'est pourquoi il ne connaît véritablement la place d'une demeure dans ce voyage spirituel qu'après l'avoir quittée (il regarde alors par l'œil de l'étranger qui a quitté cette demeure). Avant d'accéder à cette demeure il en a une connaissance générale et, la regardant d'en-bas, la considère dans la hauteur de son rang. Quand il y accède, la demeure devient vécue pour lui: il y goûte (savoure) et il en boit (*dhawq* et *shurb*),¹⁹ mais le fait d'y être absorbé le prive de discernement (*tamyîz*). Une fois qu'il la dépasse pour une demeure supérieur et qu'il la regarde après l'avoir vécue, il a alors une appréciation juste du rang qu'elle occupe parmi les autres demeures. Ce que dira un tel soufi d'une telle demeure sera alors acceptable, parce qu'il en parlera par expérience, après l'avoir vécue (*dhawq*) et après l'avoir quittée: il sera alors dans un état éveillé (*sahw*). Son témoignage sur cette demeure sera recevable.²⁰ Si nous transposons cette comparaison aux *ahwâl*-s, elle nous montre comment Ibn 'Arabî s'oppose à Hallâj relativement au *sukr* et au *sahw*, en cela il reste en parfait accord avec al-Junayd, maître de Hallâj, qui a déjà reproché à celui-ci son absence de *sahw*.²¹

C'est de la justification que donne Ibn 'Arabî du fait qu'il accepte le témoignage de Shiblî sur Hallâj et qu'il rejette ce que dit Hallâj de lui-même et de Shiblî.²² "La raison est que Hallâj était dans un état d'ivresse et que Shiblî était dans un état de sobriété".²³ Ibn 'Arabî donne de cette histoire la version suivante: Shiblî dit: "Moi et Hallâj avons bu à la même coupe; moi, je repris l'état de veille et lui, il resta ivre; il fut turbulent et tapageur (*'arbada*), fut emprisonné jusqu'à ce qu'il fût mis à mort". Hallâj était alors sur le gibet, les membres coupés mais n'était pas encore mort. Mis au courant de la parole de Shiblî, il dit: "C'est ce que prétend Shiblî. S'il avait bu ce que j'ai bu, il lui serait arrivé ce qui m'est arrivé ou il aurait dit ce que j'ai dit".²⁴ Pour Ibn 'Arabî la science (*'ilm*) accompagne l'état de veille et non pas l'état d'ivresse.²⁵ Nous y reviendrons.

Bien entendu, il ne peut s'agir pour Ibn 'Arabî de nier cet état classique dans le soufisme, celui de l'ivresse. Mais, de retour à l'état de veille, le soufi est tenu de taire ce qui doit l'être et de divulguer ce qui doit l'être aussi.²⁶ Ce qu'il dit dans son état de sobriété est acceptable parce qu'il est un témoin juste (*shâhidun 'adlun*), alors que ce que dit celui qui est en état d'ivresse est rejeté s'il vient à contredire le premier, bien qu'il soit lui-même un témoin juste et que sa parole soit vraie. Car la vérité ne saurait être dite dans n'importe quelle circonstance; une vérité prononcée sans être à sa place est rejetée, elle peut causer la perte de celui qui la prononce, quand bien même c'est une vérité. "Toute parole vraie (*proférée*) n'est pas considérée comme louable par Dieu".²⁷ C'est la Loi de Dieu qui est le règlement en la matière.²⁸ Cela s'intègre dans la conception akbarienne beaucoup plus large et plus complexe; celle des deux aspects extérieur (*zâhir*) et intérieur (*bâtin*) de la Loi religieuse et de leurs rapports.²⁹ Contentons-nous de dire, relativement à notre propos, qu'Ibn 'Arabî préconise la nécessité d'appliquer les peines légales (*hudûd al-shar'*). Si le *waly* commet un acte qui appelle une peine légale établie chez le juge, il faut lui appliquer cette peine, même s'il est probable que, conformément à la réalité, il lui soit permis de faire ce que la Loi interdit au commun des gens. Dieu peut alors lui pardonner, mais dans l'au-delà. Cette attitude *murjite* (les Murjites considèrent que la religion est une affaire strictement entre le croyant

et Dieu et reportent donc le jugement du croyant à l'au-delà faisant l'objet exclusif de la décision de Dieu) n'est valable que pour le *fiqh bâtin* (jurisprudence intérieure et spirituelle), qui est parallèle au *fiqh zâhir* (ou '*ilm al-rusûm*', jurisprudence officielle des *Fuqahâ*') et qu'Ibn 'Arabî reconnaît aux soufis. Toute cette théorie s'applique parfaitement à Hallâj. Dans ce cas, celui qui applique la peine légale est rétribué par Dieu (*ma'jûr*),³⁰ même si Hallâj n'est pas fautif du point de vue du *fiqh bâtin*, *fiqh* conforme à la réalité des choses,³¹ *fiqh* qui serait donc conforme au jugement même de Dieu sur ces choses. Il faut dire qu'une telle appréciation était déjà faite par Hallâj.³²

2. Divinité et humanité.

L'on sait d'autre part l'importance, pour la pensée d'Ibn 'Arabî, de sa conception de la réalité divine et de la réalité humaine et de leur rapports complexes qui culminent dans sa théorie de l'Homme parfait (*al-insân al-kâmil*). A propos de ces rapports, il évoque souvent la prétention de certains humains à la divinité, comme Pharaon, tout en donnant une interprétation conforme à sa théorie de *wahdat al-wujûd* (unité ou unicité de l'Être).³³ Nous reviendrons sur cette théorie par un exposé partiel. Ibn 'Arabî distingue plusieurs types de prétention des humains au rang de la divinité, nous en retenons deux. Le premier est effectué par l'usage de son auteur de l'œil intérieur du cœur (*an basîra*), tout en gardant la sobriété et après s'être réalisé dans la gnose. Ibn 'Arabî ne condamne pas une telle prétention à la divinité faite dans certaines conditions particulières. Il est utile à ce niveau d'avoir présent à l'esprit l'un des *hadîth*-s les plus utilisés et les plus commentés par Ibn 'Arabî. Il s'agit du fameux *hadîth qudsî* dans lequel Dieu s'identifie aux organes extérieurs ou intérieurs du saint. Pour Ibn 'Arabî, ceux qui prétendent au rang de la divinité ne le font que parce qu'ils se s'aperçoivent que le Réel s'identifie à leurs puissances (*quwâhum*). Or ils ne sont ce qu'ils sont que par ces puissances; et c'est par ces mêmes puissances qu'ils ont prononcé leur prétention au rang de la divinité, si bien que ce sont leurs puissances qui parlent, ces mêmes puissances qui sont le Réel Lui-même. C'est ainsi qu'ils ont pu dire: "Je suis Dieu", "Je suis, moi, Dieu, nul autre Dieu que moi, adorez-moi donc!". Tel est bien le cas de Bistâmî à qui Ibn 'Arabî

reconnaît l'état de veille (*sahw*), la constance et la fermeté sur la voie (*thubût*) et la science (*'ilm*). Il est vrai que Bistâmî et Tustarî sont parmi les figures qui ont le plus impressionné Ibn 'Arabî,³⁴ il interprète souvent leurs dires conformément à sa doctrine.³⁵ Les paroles de Bistâmî viennent à signifier de la sorte que Dieu-Le-Réel (*al-Haqq*) est celui qui s'est manifesté par Ses actes dans les existences individuelles des êtres possibles (*al-zâhir bi'af'âlihi fîa'yân al-mumkinât*). Pour certaines de ces existences individuelles Bistâmî affirme expressément son identité avec elles; pour d'autres il ne le fait pas.³⁶

Le deuxième type d'humains à prétendre à la divinité l'a fait dans un état d'ivresse, tombant de la sorte dans la confusion la plus totale (*khabata wa khalata*). Tel fut bien le cas de Hallâj, qui a parlé sous l'emprise de l'ivresse. Ibn 'Arabî cite Hallâj:

J'ai essayé de prendre patience, mais mon cœur peut-il patienter privé de son centre?

Ton Esprit est mêlé à mon esprit, dans mon rapprochement et mon éloignement. Je suis Toi comme Tu es mon être et mon vouloir.³⁷

Il reconnaît pourtant que Hallâj a accédé à la félicité et au salut, conformément au *fiqh bâtin*; et même si cela a été pour d'autres la cause de leur perte, ce sont eux qui en portent la responsabilité et non pas Hallâj, justement à cause de cet état d'ivresse, donc il n'était pas dans son intention de causer leur perte.³⁸

3. La conception de l'amour.

Dans le chapitre 178 des *Futûhât*³⁹ Ibn 'Arabî traite de la demeure de l'amour (*maqâm al-mahabba*), il y distingue trois sortes d'amour: le physique (*tabî'î*), le spirituel (*rûhânî* et le divin (*ilâhî*), les deux premiers sont propres à l'homme, le dernier à Dieu.⁴⁰ Citons d'abord quelques versets qui intéressent notre propos.

Le terme de l'amour chez l'homme

Est de réaliser l'union:

L'union de deux esprits

Et l'union de deux corps.

Depuis que je suis investi des caractères divins
 Je me trouve ainsi Son lieu d'apparition
 Que je n'ai jamais cessé d'être
 Attachez-vous dès lors à moi,
 Car je suis le lien de Dieu dans votre création.

Ici réside un signe sans pareil et parfait
 Sous lequel se montre un vêtement d'apparat.
 Or je suis la livrée
 Sur celui qui le porte.
 C'est pourquoi celui-ci
 Restera inconnu!

Il n'y a sous la mante autre chose
 Que ce qu'un jour Hallâj a dit,
 Aussi, réjouissez-vous!

J'en jure par l'amour!
 Si je le contemplais,
 A cause de cette contemplation,
 Je serais frappé de mutisme.
 Ne saurait voir l'essence de l'être du Réel
 Celui dont l'origine est toujours néant.

Il nous est difficile de dégager une critique explicite qu'Ibn 'Arabî fait à l'encontre de Hallâj, relativement à sa conception de l'amour. Revenons aux trois sortes d'amour. Celui qui est propre à Dieu consiste en ce qu'il nous aime pour nous-mêmes et aussi pour Lui-même,⁴¹ alors que dans l'amour physique l'amant n'aime que pour lui-même, et dans l'amour spirituel l'amant aime l'aimé pour celui-ci et pour lui-même.⁴² Bien qu'il soit spirituel, cet amour prend pour objet la forme physique (*sûra tabî 'iyya*) et se fixe comme but l'union (*ittihâd*), c'est-à-dire que l'essence (*dhât*) de l'aimé devienne l'essence même de l'amant. C'est cela même qui est désigné par ceux qui prétendent que la nature divine s'incarne dans la nature humaine (*Hulâliyya*)⁴³ ignorants qu'ils sont de la réalité des choses. C'est ainsi qu'Ibn 'Arabî explique comment on a pu prétendre à l'union signifiée plus haut par le vers: "union de deux esprits et union de deux corps".

Celui qu'il vise en premier lieu ici est bien Hallâj, car il en cite le célèbre vers.⁴⁴

Je suis Celui que j'aime, et Celui que j'aime est moi.

Dans ses commentaires fréquents de ce vers de Hallâj, il est parfois difficile de dire s'il s'agit, de la part d'Ibn 'Arabî et en termes de sa doctrine, d'une explication qui montre une insuffisance ou bien d'une justification qui se montre compréhensive. Comme illustration contentons-nous de nous référer à trois passages des *Futûhât*. 1) Dans la description des états de l'amoureux, celui-ci cherche à plaire (*mudill*) par son amour, parce qu'il est dominé par lui, il se voit alors comme étant son bien-aimé même; il dit alors: "Je suis Celui que j'aime . . .".⁴⁵ 2) L'amoureux est décrit comme disant de lui-même qu'il est son bien-aimé en personne parce que, s'étant annihilé en lui (*istihlâkihi fîhi*), il ne voit pas en lui un autre que lui-même; si bien qu'il en vient à dire: "Je suis Celui que j'aime . . .".⁴⁶ Enfin l'amoureux contemple (*mushâhada*) son bien-aimé en toutes choses, il vit en une liaison continue avec lui aussi bien dans le monde sensible (*hiss*), que dans le monde de l'imagination (*khayâl*) que dans le monde des entités intelligibles (*ma'ânî*); c'est ce qui lui fait dire: "Je suis Celui que j'aime . . .".⁴⁷

4. L'état spirituel et la science (*al-hâl* et *al-'ilm*).

Revenons à cette distinction importante dans la théorie d'Ibn 'Arabî: celle entre la science (*'ilm*, connaissance des réalités ultimes telles qu'elles sont) et l'état spirituel (*hâl*) transitoire qui envahit le soufi.⁴⁸ Il ne cesse d'insister sur la supériorité de la science à l'état spirituel, comme il a été dit plus haut. Dans un passage dont la compréhension est difficile il approfondit ce problème relativement au *sirr*⁴⁹ (essence intime et secrète) dans lequel il distingue trois degrés: *sirr al-'ilm*, *sirr al-hâl* et *sirr al-haqîqa*, trois degrés du *sirr* relativement donc à la science, à l'état spirituel et à la réalité.⁵⁰ C'est en fonction de ces trois degrés qu'Ibn 'Arabî juge l'enseignement mystique de Hallâj. Comment définit-il chaque degré:

a) Le secret intime de la science est la vérité de ceux qui connaissent Dieu, c'est donc le secret intime de la connaissance de Dieu dont

la caractéristique qui revient le plus souvent dans les *Futūhāt* est qu'Il réunit les contraires, en tant justement qu'on Lui attribue un qualificatif qui a son contraire. L'on sait la fréquence avec laquelle Ibn 'Arabī commente le verset coranique où Dieu se qualifie de premier et de dernier, d'apparent et de caché.⁵¹ L'important est que cette science nous fasse entrevoir que l'essence de la divinité consiste en ce qu'en même temps "Il est et Il n'est pas" (*huwa lāhuwa*): c'est là, pensons-nous, une clé sans laquelle il est difficile d'intelliger la doctrine d'Ibn 'Arabī dans son aspect ontologique aussi bien que dans son aspect épistémologique. Il s'agit de comprendre comment l'essence une peut-être qualifiée par des attributs contraires.

b) Le secret intime de l'état spirituel (*sirr al-hāl*) se définit par le fait que Dieu s'identifie à l'ouïe, la vue et la science de son serviteur, conformément à l'interprétation du *ḥadīth qudsī* évoquée plus haut. Si Dieu s'identifie à la science que nous avons de Lui, c'est par Lui donc que nous Le connaissons et Il est ainsi le signe qui renvoie à lui-même.⁵² Il s'agit là aussi d'un choix opéré par Ibn 'Arabī relativement aux charismes (*kharq al-ʿādah*), choix conforme à sa doctrine de l'Être. Pour lui et pour d'autres, les grands hommes (*al-kibāru mina-r-rijāl*) ne font pas grand cas de cette rupture de la causalité physique, causalité instaurée par Dieu. Les gens des *ahwāl*-s ont bien la puissance de décider de ce cours de la causalité physique et par là ils accomplissent ces charismes, mais ils doivent savoir que le *hāl* n'a en réalité aucune efficence sur les actes produits, Dieu étant le véritable agent; une telle connaissance de la réalité intime des choses est donnée par le dévoilement (*kashf*).⁵³

c) Quant au secret intime de la réalité il correspond à un choix que fait Ibn 'Arabī dans le fameux débat théologique relatif à l'Essence divine et ses attributs. Il opte pour ce qui est devenu une des solutions classiques du Mu'tazilisme, celle du grand maître de Basra, Abū 'Alī al-Jubbā'i, selon laquelle l'Essence divine est savante par elle-même, et non pas par l'attribut de science, considéré comme entité réelle (*ma'nā*) qui s'ajouterait à l'Essence (*solution asharite*), ni par un état (*hāl*) dont le statut ontologique est intermédiaire entre l'être et le non-être (solution d'Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā'i, fils d'Abū 'Alī). Il est difficile, sinon impossible, de comprendre la doctrine d'Ibn 'Arabī

relative à la science de Dieu sans tenir compte de la solution d'Abû 'Alî al-Jubbâ'î. C'est ainsi qu'Ibn 'Arabî nous dit souvent et spécialement ici: "Le secret intime de la réalité est que tu sais que la science n'est pas quelque chose de plus que l'essence du savant et qu'il connaît les choses par son essence et non pas par quelque chose d'autre que son essence ou de plus que son essence"⁵⁴.

Quelle est maintenant la valeur de chaque degré: celui de la réalité, celui de la science et celui de l'état spirituel? Encore une fois Ibn 'Arabî affirme, au niveau de *sirr*, l'infériorité de l'état spirituel à la réalité et à la science: d'abord la science qualifie Dieu alors que le *hâl* ne peut qualifier que les créatures;⁵⁵ ensuite le *hâl* est l'un des objets de la science et à ce titre elle l'enveloppe (*ihâta*).⁵⁶ Le secret de la réalité donne que l'essence (*ayn*) est une alors que le statut (*hukm* ou jugement) change (il est donc multiple). Le secret de l'état spirituel donne la confusion, celui qui le vit dira alors: "Je suis Dieu", "Los à Moi" et "Je suis Celui que j'aime et Celui que j'aime est Moi".

Il y a d'une part ceux qui ont la science des réalités (*'arifân*), d'autre part le commun des gens (*'amma*) et ceux qui occupent un rang intermédiaire (*mutawassitân*): les gens des états spirituels. Ces derniers vivent dans une passivité à l'égard de leurs *ahwâl*-s puisqu'ils les subissent.⁵⁷ Seul le *'arif* peut maîtriser les *ahwâl*-s et les gérer (*tasrîf*).⁵⁸ D'ailleurs les hommes véritables ne recherchent pas les *ahwâl*-s, leur quête porte plutôt sur les sciences (*'ulûm*).⁵⁹ Le jugement d'Ibn 'Arabî sur Hallâj est ici très sévère, nous voyons clairement ainsi où il le situe: dans une situation intermédiaire entre le *'arif* et l'homme du commun.⁶⁰ Ibn 'Arabî prend ainsi position dans un débat très animé dans la mystique, critique sévèrement ceux qui affirment la supériorité du *hâl* au *'ilm* et met le *'ilm* bien au dessus du *hâl*.⁶¹ Relativement à cela Massignon semble faire une appréciation tout à fait contraire.

5. La théorie de l'Être.

Nous nous trouvons obligés en fin de compte de rechercher les fondements de cette attitude d'Ibn 'Arabî à l'égard de Hallâj dans sa théorie de l'Être. Nous ne pouvons le faire ici que d'une manière partielle et imparfaite, en choisissons un passage⁶² qui nous semble

significatif pour notre propos et où Ibn ‘Arabî explicite le statut ontologique des existences particulières et le mode selon lequel elles sont existenciées et qualifiées d’existence. Dieu investit d’existence les essences possibles (Ibn ‘Arabî utilise la belle métaphore de la robe d’honneur de l’existence par laquelle Dieu investit ces essences, *kasâhâkhil‘ata-al-wujûd*), sans qu’Il les arrache à leur être-possible. Elles sont qualifiées par l’existence après avoir été qualifiées par la non-existence (*‘adam*), pourtant c’est la même essence qui reste identique à elle-même dans les deux cas (*‘ayn thâbita*). Nous touchons là à l’un des secrets de *wahdat al-wujûd*: l’unité de l’être exige qu’une essence, même avec son passage à l’Être, ne quitte pas son statut de possible, l’Être reste le privilège d’Un seul. Ce qui pose problème c’est cet être par lequel le Réel investit l’essence possible qui ne quitte pas son être-possible: est-ce qu’il était non-existant puis il est venu à l’être? Or l’Être ne saurait être ni non-existant ni existant. Et aussi s’il était non-existant quelle serait alors sa “présence” (*hadratuhu*)? Serait-ce l’être-possible? Il n’y aurait alors aucune différence entre lui et cette essence qu’il a investie d’être, car dans cette “présence de l’être-possible”, l’être aurait besoin, en tant que non-existant, d’un être qui le fasse accéder à l’existence. On tomberait alors dans un enchaînement logique à l’infini, bien classique, qui mène à l’impossibilité suivante: cette essence individuelle ne viendrait jamais à exister. Or elle existe bel et bien sans pour autant avoir quitté l’être-possible (*hadratu-l-imkân*). Au bout de cette dialectique “éléatique” bien connue des grands *Falâsifa* et *Mutakallimân* classiques, nous nous trouvons dans l’impasse. Comment résoudre alors cette aporie?

Il est inutile de rappeler la fréquence avec laquelle Ibn ‘Arabî insiste sur l’insuffisance de la raison discursive (*fikr*, *nazar*). Ici il a recours à une analogie classique chez les mystiques, en faisant un usage original pour expliciter sa doctrine de *wahdat-al-wujûd*. L’Être est, pour cette essence possible, analogue à l’image de quelqu’un qui se voit dans un miroir, image reflétée par celui-ci. Elle n’est pas proprement identique à la personne, pas plus qu’elle n’est autre que cette personne. Mais elle ne peut être manifestée que par le lieu où la personne se voit (le miroir) et par cette même personne qui s’y

regarde et s'y manifeste. Le miroir est miroir de par lui-même, la personne qui s'y regarde est personne de par elle-même, et l'image qui se manifeste varie suivant les variations du miroir: ainsi si on le dispose longitudinalement, l'image prend aussi une forme longitudinale, alors que la personne qui s'y regarde n'est pas, sous un certain aspect, conforme à cette image, mais, sous un autre aspect, elle lui est conforme. Ayant considéré que le miroir définit, par lui-même, le statut de l'image (*lahâ hukmu-s-sûra bidhâtihâ*), et que la personne qui s'y regarde diffère (=est autre), sous un certain aspect, de l'image, nous savons alors que cette personne n'est pas affectée, en elle-même, par l'essence du miroir. Du moment qu'elle n'est pas affectée, et du moment que cette image n'est pas le miroir lui-même ni cette personne elle-même, et qu'elle ne s'est manifestée que par le statut de manifestation (*hukmu-t-tajallî*) propre au miroir, nous saisissons alors la différence qui existe entre la personne, le miroir et l'image manifestée dans le miroir. Celui-ci est caché dans l'image (*ghaybun fîhâ*). On pourrait alors imaginer l'image s'adresser à cette personne et lui dire: "Bien que je provienne de ta manifestation dans le miroir et que je sois conforme à ta forme, tu n'es pas moi, ni moi, je ne suis toi".

Quelle est la signification métaphysique de toute cette analogie symbolique? Transposé au rapport entre les statuts ontologiques de l'homme (et du monde) et du Réel (*al-Haqq*), ce symbolisme nous permet de répondre aux questions suivantes qui touchent à la métaphysique en général:

—Selon quel mode l'homme (ou toute autre existence individuelle) est-il qualifié d'être?

—Qui est l'existant?

—D'où lui vient la qualification de non-existant?

—Qui est le non-existant?

Cela permet aussi de définir les rapports plus particuliers entre le Réel et l'homme:

—Qui s'adresse aux autres? Qui entend? Qui agit? Qui impose les obligations?

—Qui es-tu? Qui est ton Seigneur?

Ibn 'Arabî nous explicite lui-même ce symbolisme: il n'y a dans

l'Être que Lui (*huwa*), l'existence ne peut être acquise que de Lui, aucune essence concrète (*ʿayn*) d'un étant ne peut paraître que par Sa manifestation. Le miroir symbolise l'enceinte du possible (*hadratu-l-imbân*), le Réel est celui qui s'y regarde, les images sont les créatures elles-mêmes selon la variété de leurs essences possibles (*imbânîyya* = disponibilité, *isti'dād*): ange, sphère ou homme. L'image, dans le miroir, varie aussi en fonction de la variation du miroir (disposition, longueur, largeur, rotondité, forme), bien qu'en son essence celui-ci reste identique à lui-même: c'est toujours un miroir. Les êtres possibles sont les différentes formes de l'Être-possible. La manifestation divine (*tajallî'ilâhî*) fait acquérir aux possibles l'être, l'Être-possible (symbolisé par le miroir) leur fait acquérir les formes différentes, sans que l'Être-possible (*imbân*) quitte sa réalité, c'est-à-dire sans que les êtres quittent leur nature de possible. En tout cela le Réel reste, en Son Essence (*dhât*), dans la suffisance totale vis-à-vis du monde et de l'homme, alors que ceux-ci sont dans l'indigence et le besoin essentiel à Dieu.

Nous avons eu recours à cette longue paraphrase pour voir comment Ibn 'Arabî situe Hallâj et interprète sa doctrine en fonction de *wahdat al-wujûd*. En effet, à la fin de ce passage, Ibn 'Arabî cite la célèbre parole de Hallâj: "il n'y a sous la mante que Dieu"; il la comprend de la manière suivante: "Il n'y a dans l'Être que Dieu". Pour Ibn 'Arabî ce n'est qu'ainsi qu'on dépasse l'attitude limitée de Hallâj, en la nuancant par le symbolisme du miroir qui rend explicite *wahdat al-wujûd*. On pourrait faire dire à Hallâj: "Il n'y a dans le miroir que ce qui se manifeste à lui", à condition qu'il soit conscient des données suivantes:

- qu'il n'y a rien de réel dans le miroir,
- que celui qui se regarde dans le miroir ne contient rien de ce miroir,
- que l'image varie et est affectée bien que celui qui se voit dans le miroir n'en soit pas affecté et reste identique à lui-même.

Ce sont là les réalités métaphysiques qui ont manqué à Hallâj et qui, si on en tient compte, rendront sa position acceptable. Pour Ibn 'Arabî l'insuffisance de la doctrine de Hallâj consiste en ce que celui-ci, en affirmant la divinité (*lâhût*) et l'humanité (*nâsût*), reste loin de celui qui affirme l'unicité de l'essence et nie l'attribut sup-

plémentaire.⁶³ Massignon formule “cette insuffisance” qui caractérise la doctrine hallagienne aux yeux d'Ibn 'Arabî en disant que quand bien même il y a union, celle-ci n'est pas exclusive d'une seule créature, elle ne peut être personnalisée. “«Créateur et création» étant deux termes unis par un rapport nécessaire, ce n'est pas la personne isolée d'un saint, mais la totalité de la création qui seule a le droit, en se *pensant* elle-même, de se proclamer identique à Dieu, puisque l'intégralité de son existence actuelle est l'essence nécessaire de l'existence de Dieu”.⁶⁴ Il est utile, à ce niveau, de revenir au *Kitâb al-tajalliyât* et son *Commentaire anonyme* mentionnés plus haut. L'on y voit alors que l'erreur de Hallâj est d'avoir isolé totalement (*tajrîd*) le Réel des autres réalités.⁶⁵ La position atteinte par lui ne pouvait lui faire saisir que cela. Pour Ibn 'Arabî, cela n'est vrai que partiellement, quand on considère l'Essence dans Son Unité absolue (*ahadiyyat al-dhât*), sans rapport au monde. Mais au niveau de la Divinité (*ulûhiya*) il n'est plus possible de la couper des créatures en tant qu'elles la rendent manifeste, manifestation qui s'effectue par les noms divins. Ceux-ci sont ainsi liés aux existences individuelles créées par ce rapport de manifestation. La saisie parfaite doit porter simultanément sur le Réel et les réalités (*al-Haqq wa-l-haqâ'iq*). De la sorte on saisit l'absolu (*mutlaq*) dans le déterminé (*muqayyad*), l'unité dans la multiplicité on donne à la servitude son dû (*haqq al-'ubûdiya*) et à la divinité son dû (*haqq al-'ulûhiya*) et, contrairement à Hallâj, on s'abstient de faire concurrence à la Seigneurie (*muzâhamatu-l-rubûbiya*) en proclamant “*Anâ-l-Haqq*”, et l'on est alors en mesure de préserver la demeure d'ici-bas (*bayt*=corps, constitution), chose que Hallâj n'a pas su faire.⁶⁶ En d'autres termes, Ibn 'Arabî montre l'impossibilité métaphysique de la position hallagienne si elle prétend se suffire à elle-même. Par contre, si on l'interprète en termes de *wahdat al-wujûd* en tenant compte des réalités métaphysiques, elle devient acceptable. Voici comment Ibn 'Arabî exprime poétiquement les rapports entre divinité et humanité. Dieu dit en s'adressant à l'homme:

Je t'ai fixé à Ma demeure pour que tu manifeste Mon image
 Ton *subhân* (ton “los à toi”) est lieu de manifestation (*majlâ*), et
 Mon *subhân* (Mon “los à Moi”) est “louange véritable” (*sub-*

hân).⁶⁷

Je me suis rendu apparent par l'image d'Adam,
Cela Je l'ai établi dans les Lois révélées et J'en ai fait un article
de foi.

Lorsqu'il s'est manifesté à Mes yeux dans Mon image, Je l'ai
nommé réel-vrai (*haqq*), bien qu'il soit homme.

Compare-toi à Mon existence, car l'opposition (*taqâbul*,
symétrie) existe!

Et mesure toi toi-même, car Je t'ai établi en tant que balance.

Tu es apparu en tant que Notre lieu de manifestation, J'ai alors
vu Mon image,

Et J'ai vu en toi le monde, symboliquement et explicitement.

Mais que tu sois Mon essence (*dhât*), non certes, Je ne suis pas
non plus ton essence;

Même si tu es, pour Moi, une existence individuelle (*'ayn*), ne le
montre pas maintenant.

Nous avons fait perdre celui qui divulgue son secret,
Et Nous avons fait gagner celui qui le cache et le tait.

Si tu es, pour Moi, une existence, Je deviens pour toi une main,
Et Je te rends manifeste par l'état (*hâl*) secrètement et publique-
ment.

Des noms de ton essence, Je t'ai fait don, O Mon serviteur,
D'habits de fêtes variées et bariolés.

Si tu es pour Moi par Moi, tu es toi; et ne dis point:

"Je suis Toi"; mais sois miséricordieux pour la créature.⁶⁸

L'on voit, dans ces vers, la critique implicite de Hallâj. Ce rapport
entre Divinité est Humanité ne peut donc être un rapport d'*union*,⁶⁹
mais de *manifestation* de la Réalité divine en l'homme, manifestation
qui trouve la plénitude dans la théorie akbarienne de l'Homme
parfait (*al-insân al-kâmil*). Nous nous contentons d'une citation des
Futûhât:⁷⁰ "L'Homme parfait, et non pas l'homme animal, possède la

constitution (*nash'a*) la plus parfaite des réalités selon lesquelles il a été formé: les réalités des Noms divins et les réalités du monde. C'est lui que Dieu forma conformément à l'Image (divine). Par son caractère totalisant (*jam'iyya*), il est entièrement Réalité (*haqqun kul-luhu*). La Réalité est son lieu de manifestation, car il a la perfection (*kamâl*); Il le voit alors à travers toute existence individuelle (*'ayn*) et le contemple dans toute image (*sûra*)".

Souvent Ibn 'Arabî nous dit qu'une fois nous saisissons la réalité intime des choses par le dévoilement et la science (*kashfan wa 'ilman*) peut importer ce que nous en dirons. Par contre, l'on est tenu d'observer les préceptes de la politesse envers Dieu, mis à notre portée par la Loi révélée, comme il a été dit plus haut. "Si tu découvres une vérité qu'on peut affirmer absolument (*itlâqi amrin*), dont l'affirmation absolue est exigée par la réalité, tu ne dois t'abstenir de l'affirmer absolument que du point de vue de la Loi religieuse (*shar'an*), par politesse avec Dieu, parce qu'Il lui appartient de t'interdire des choses (*tahjîr 'alayka*). Appuie-toi sur la politesse divine (*adab ilâhî*) et rapproche-toi de Dieu par ce qu'Il t'a ordonné jusqu'à ce qu'Il te dévoile à toi-même (*hattâ yakshifa laka 'anka*), tu te connaîtras alors toi-même, tu connaîtras ton Seigneur, et tu sauras qui tu es et qui Il est".⁷¹ Ce qui signifie donc que même si la doctrine de Hallâj peut être récupérée métaphysiquement, dans les termes même de *wahdat al-wujûd*, son attitude ne peut être admise du point de vue légal. "Tu es le Moi, et Moi je suis Moi, donc ne me cherche pas dedans toi, autrement tu connaîtrais la peine, ni du dehors, car tu ne connaîtrais pas la quiétude, n'abandonne pas ma quête, car tu serais malheureux. Cherche moi jusqu'à ce que tu me trouves, tu connaîtras alors l'élévation. Mais sois poli dans ta quête . . . et distingue bien entre Moi et toi, car tu ne peux me contempler, par contre tu peux te contempler toi-même (*'aynaka*). Arrête-toi à l'attribut commun (à nous deux), ou bien soit un (simple) serviteur (*abd*) et dis: l'impuissance à saisir la saisie est elle-même saisie".⁷²

Nous comprenons ainsi la deuxième attitude d'Ibn 'Arabî à l'égard de Hallâj, que nous avons appelée "récupératrice" et où il le considère comme précurseur de sa propre vision moniste et comme admettant que toute la création est l'expression divine. En tenant compte des

réalités métaphysiques exposées plus haut, les deux attitudes d'Ibn 'Arabî ne se montrent plus contradictoires. Quand il montre comment exprimer correctement la locution théophanique (*Anâl-Haqq*) de Hallâj⁷³ il fait parvenir l'unité testimoniale (*shuhûd*), où l'homme reste un aux autres, au degré suprême de l'Être, ou l'homme s'unit essentiellement à l'Être, Dieu. Cette continuité est rejetée par Massignon sur la base de l'altérité radicale entre monisme testimonial et monisme existentiel, mentionnée plus haut. Nous nous demandons si la rupture est aussi absolue. Le grand juriste hanbalite, Ibn Taymiyya, déceleur très perspicace de toute "déviation" et adversaire virulent du monisme d'Ibn 'Arabî considérerait Hallâj comme le précurseur de celui-ci, comme le rappelle justement Massignon,⁷⁴ les deux attitudes sont rejetées comme étant des hérésies. L'opposition ne semble donc pas toujours évidente. Une analyse des textes de Ghazâlî surnommé Le Garant de l'Islam (*Hujjat al-Islâm*), bon connaisseur et grand défenseur de la mystique, permet d'atténuer, comme Ibn Taymiyya, cette opposition établie par Massignon. Dans deux de ses livres (*Ihyâ'* et *Mishkât*)⁷⁵ au moins, utilisés par Massignon,⁷⁶ Ghazâlî établit une gradation de l'ascension du mystique vers Dieu, qui passe par l'unicité testimoniale à l'unicité de l'être. Ce classement est rejeté par Massignon qui le trouve "plus intellectualiste que mystique, par son refus radical de toute possibilité de visitation divine dans l'âme (déifiable pourtant par une forme actuante intelligible), par son exclusion de toute richesse dans l'Un transcendantal: deux points affirmés par Hallâj. . .".⁷⁷ Ghazâlî bien que favorable à Hallâj, n'admet pas l'union mystique: les deux personnes, humaine et divine ne peuvent guère se confondre. En cela il s'aligne philosophiquement sur l'attitude d'Ibn Sînâ.⁷⁸ La parole de Hallâj, "Je suis la Vérité", et celle de Bistâmî, "Los à Moi, que Ma gloire est grande!", restent de l'ordre de l'expression métaphorique, courante chez les poètes, paroles prononcées dans un moment d'ivresse dans l'amour du mystique pour Dieu; et qu'il faut donc taire et ne pas divulguer.⁷⁹ L'annihilation ou extinction (*fanâ'*) du mystique atteint les limites de l'union, puis l'unicité de l'agent où le mystique ne perçoit qu'un seul être, auteur de toute action attribuée en apparence aux créatures. C'est le premier degré véritable de l'affirmation de l'unicité divine: "Il

n'y a, dans l'être, que Dieu et ses actes, tout ce qui est autre que Dieu est l'acte de Dieu".⁸⁰ L'étape suivante, qu'il ne faut pas exprimer ni divulguer, est celle où le mystique, en continuant son ascension, ne saisit qu'un seul Etre, sans altérité ni multiplicité. Ghazâlî pense réellement, contrairement donc à Massignon, que Hallâj atteint cette étape ultime. Le soufi dira alors: "Seul Dieu existe, Il est le seul Etre réel".⁸¹ Il devient donc clair que Ghazâlî ne s'est pas arrêté à l'unité testimoniale comme le pense Massignon sans, au moins, évoquer l'unité de l'être, en établissant une hiérarchie et une continuité entre ces deux types d'unités. On peut d'ailleurs parvenir à la même conclusion par une analyse, parallèle à la hiérarchisation de l'être, de toute la symbolique de la lumière élaborée par Ghazâlî dans *Mishkât al-anwâr*,⁸² où il exploite des données inspirées aussi bien du Coran et de la Tradition que de la philosophie néoplatonicienne. Au bout de son ascension, qui traverse toutes les couches lumineuses, le mystique n'affirme que l'existence d'une seule et unique Lumière, qui épuise toute la réalité. Nous nous trouvons ainsi toujours en présence d'expressions multiples, mais nullement exclusives, du sentiment aigu de l'unicité de Dieu (*tawhîd*). "Le premier niveau du *tawhîd*, dit Ghazâlî, n'est d'aucun profit, quant au dernier niveau il n'est pas permis de le divulguer".⁸³ L'on se rend compte ainsi à quel point l'attitude d'Ibn 'Arabî est proche de celle de Ghazâlî.

Évoquons enfin l'analyse pénétrante et audacieuse d'un grand connaisseur et admirateur du soufisme. Il s'agit d'Ibn Khaldûn qui pose dans son livre *Shifâ'u-s-sâ'il*⁸⁴ le problème de savoir si le maître est ou n'est pas nécessaire sur la voie mystique. Il distingue, à cet effet, trois espèces de soufisme selon le type de l'effort intérieur (*mujâhada*) que fait le soufi: celui de la piété (*taqwâ*), celui de la rectitude (*istiqâma*) et celui du dévoilement et de la contemplation (*kashf wa mushâhada*). Hallâj et Ibn 'Arabî appartiennent, aux yeux d'Ibn Khaldûn, au troisième type. Tout en faisant allusion à l'attitude tolérante de Ghazâlî à l'égard de Hallâj, il confirme la condamnation de celui-ci aussi bien par les juristes (*Ahl al-Shari'a*) que par les soufis (*Ahl al-Haqîqa*) pour avoir dévoilé ce qui ne doit pas l'être. Ibn Khaldûn ne nie ni la réalité ni la validité de ce type de mystique en lui-même, mais il nie la possibilité d'exprimer une expérience à laquelle la langue

reste étrangère de par son essence. Massignon se contente de citer Ibn Khaldûn pour avoir condamné Hallâj, sans discuter sa typologie et son exposé du soufisme qui non seulement ne manquent pas de pertinence pour la mystique en général mais éclairent aussi le type de soufisme propre à Hallâj.

Nous voyons ainsi que la signification ultime de l'effort des grands mystiques musulmans comme Junayd, Shiblî Tustarî, Hallâj, Ghazâlî, etc . . . est de fournir une base métaphysique à l'affirmation de l'unicité de Dieu (*tawhîd*). Ibn 'Arabî s'insère dans cette orientation profonde et en sera le couronnement, en reposant avec vigueur et originalité le problème essentiel que toute pensée, quelle soit mystique, théologique ou philosophique, se doit de poser: l'unité (*wahda*) et la multiplicité (*kathra*), l'identité (*huwiyya*) et l'altérité (*ghayriyya*). Nous pensons que son mérite incontesté est d'avoir apporté une solution originale à ce problème fondamental, en faisant une refonte personnelle et unique du Soufisme, du *Kalâm* et de la *Falsafa*, refonte inaugurée par Ibn Sînâ, continuée par Ghazâlî⁸⁵ et parachevée par Ibn 'Arabî, refonte basée sur les réalités qui n'étaient pas disponibles à Hallâj et qui donna naissance à toute l'école de *wahdat al-wujûd*. En contraste avec la voie suivie par Hallâj, celle suivie par Ibn 'Arabî est enrichie par ces réalités, avec des rapports intimes entre Loi et Voie, avec une préférence pour la science (*'ilm* qui est connaissance de ces réalités) et des demeures (*maqâmât* par lesquelles le soufi expérimente ces réalités) sur les états (*ahwâl-s*).⁸⁶ Ce sont là deux expériences mystiques du même *tawhîd* islamique qui montre, par contraste, à quel point Massignon est tributaire d'une théorie exclusive de la voie mystique "authentique".

Faut-il pour autant admettre une multiplicité de voies? Ibn 'Arabî revendique sa conformité à une orthodoxie de la Voie partagée par toute la communauté des soufis (*tâ'ifa*). C'est ainsi qu'il tient à éviter qu'on dise de lui: "que nous avons emprunté une voie qui nous est particulière et que la communauté des soufis n'a pas empruntée. La Voie est plutôt une, bien que chaque individu ait la sienne propre, les voies qui mènent à Dieu étant au nombre des souffles des créatures . . . Et le terme de toute voie est Dieu".⁸⁷ Dans la Voie, il ne peut s'agir de différence et d'altérité réelles, chacun dit vrai. La différence

provient de ce que chacun indique une entité intelligible (*ma'nâ*) qu'il saisit dans son lieu de contemplation (*mash'had*). La différence est dans le degré de dévoilement (*kâshif wa akshaf*).⁸⁸ Cela nous permet peut-être de comprendre ce mot d'Ibn 'Arabî: "Que les voies diffèrent, cela n'infirme pas la science vraie".⁸⁹ Ibn 'Arabî lui-même nous fait saisir ainsi les rapports de continuité et de discontinuité qui existent entre Hallâj et lui.

Notes

1. *Al-Futûhât al-makkiya*, le Caire, 1329, II, 218, Ibn 'Arabî cite le *Coran* (42: 53) «Pour les choses le terme est Dieu».
2. *La Passion de Husayn Ibn Mansûr Hallâj*, 2^e édition en 4 tomes, Paris, Gallimard, 1975, II, 64-65; "L'alternative de la pensée mystique en Islam: monisme existentiel ou monisme testimonial", *Annuaire Collège de France*, 53^e année, 188-192.
3. *Passion* II, 46.
4. *Ibid.*, 65.
5. *Fut.* I, 414.
6. Voir son article "Philologische Nachprüfung von Übersetzungsversuchen mystischer Texte des Hallâj", *Z. D. M. G.*, Neue Folge Bd. VII (Bd. 82), 1928, 23-41. Voir aussi la critique de "la tentation de christianiser Hallâj" chez Massignon et R. Arnaldez (*Hallâj ou la religion de la croix*, Paris, 1964) dans M. Chodkiewicz, *Le Sceau des saints. Prophétie et sainteté dans la doctrine d'Ibn 'Arabî*, Gallimard, Paris, 1986, 102-4.
7. *Essai sur les origines du lexique technique de la mystique musulmane*, Paris, Vrin, 1968, 16, aussi 48, 79-80.
8. Michel Chodkiewicz (*Un océan sans rivage: Ibn Arabî le Livre et la Loi*, Seuil, Paris, 1992, 115-6) analyse brièvement une objection formulée par Ibn 'Arabî à l'encontre de Hallâj dans le chapitre "Tajallî al-'illa" dans *Al-tajalliyât al-ilâhiyya*, éd. Osman Yahia, Tehran, 1988, 382-7.
9. Mentionnons, à titre d'exemple, *Risâlatu-l-intisâr* (Hyderabad, 1367/1948) et *Al-tajalliyât al-ilâhiyya* mentionné dans la note précédente. Pour celui-ci voir Michel Chodkiewicz, *op. cit.*, 109-17; *Le Sceau des saints* . . . , 30 n. 4.
10. Nous laissons de côté des critiques comme celle qui concerne la foi de Hallâj où Ibn 'Arabî relate que 'Amr b. 'Uthmân al-Makkî en rendant visite un jour à Hallâj lui demanda ce qu'il était en train de faire. Hallâj lui répondit: "Voilà, j'imite le Coran". 'Amr le maudit. Pour les Maîtres de soufisme, une telle malédiction fut à l'origine de tous les maux de Hallâj (*Fut.*, III, 17 et 40). Pour

Amr al-Makkî, sa mystique et ses rapports avec Hallâj, cf. *Passion*, I, 113-5 et 155-7.

11. Ibn 'Arabî définit ainsi le *shat'h*: "Une parole qui porte la marque de la sottise et de la prétention. On la trouve rarement chez les soufis authentiques" (*Istilâh as-sûfiyya*, in *Rasâ'il*, Hyderabad, 1367/1948, 3 = éd. avec *Kitâb al-tarîfât* de Jurjâné par G. Flügel, Leipzig, 1845, 285). Voir le chapitre 195 des *Futûhât* (II, 287-8, et aussi 507) consacré au *shat'h* (sa définition et sa critique) = Ibn 'Arabî, *Les illuminations de La Mecque, Textes choisis* . . . , éd. Michel Chodkiewicz, Sindbad, Paris, 1988, 265-72. Pour une étude générale voir C. W. Ernst, *Words of Ecstasy in Sufism*, SUNY Press, Albany NY, 1985.

12. *Essai* . . . , 119. Telles les fameuses paroles de Bistâmî (L. Massignon, *Essai* . . . , pp. 276-284), ex: ". . . et j'étais, moi, Lui", Dieu dit en s'adressant à Bistâmî "Le monde entier est soumis à mon esclavage, *excepté toi*", Bistâmî dit en s'adressant à Dieu: "Tu m'obéis plus que je ne T'obéis!", ou encore, en entendant: "Allâh akbar!", "Je suis encore plus grand", en parlant à un novice: "Mieux vaut pour toi me voir une seule fois, que voir Dieu mille fois!" (on rapporte qu'à la vue de Bistâmî le novice est mort. Bistâmî en a donné l'explication suivante: "Il a vu ce qu'il ne peut supporter de voir. Dieu s'est manifesté à lui en tant que je suis . . . , car Dieu en tant que je suis son "lieu" de manifestation (*majlâhu*) est plus grand qu'il ne l'est dans le lieu où ce novice le contemplait"), ou encore, en reprenant le mot de Pharaon (*Coran* 79: 24): "Je suis mon Seigneur Suprême!", et le fameux "Los à Moi (subhânî! Los à Moi! Que Ma gloire est grande!" et, enfin, "C'est assez de Moi seul! C'est assez!". Voir *Les dits de Bistâmî (shatahât)*, trad. de l'arabe, présentation et notes par Abdelwahab Meddeb, Fayard, Paris, 1989; Ibn 'Arabî, *Kitâb al kutub*, in *Rasâ'il*, 5; cf aussi A. J. Arberry, "Bistamiana", in *B. S. O. A. S.*, vol. XXV, part 1 (1962), 28-37. Rappelons que Massignon voit dans le *shat'h* "le trait suprême de la mystique monothéiste en Islam, état positif d'intermittence mentale dialoguée, qui révèle soudain à l'âme esseulée la visitation surnaturelle d'un Interlocuteur transcendant" (*Essai* . . . , 95, et aussi 105-6).

13. *Fut.* II, 232. Le *shat'h* traduit une rudesse (*ru'ûna*) de l'âme qui se vante, il est étranger aux "gnostiques réalisés" (*muhaqqiqûn*) qui ne contemplent que Dieu, or on ne saurait se vanter devant Dieu; c'est-à-dire: puisqu'il ne contemple que Dieu, il ne voit aucun autre être, s'il venait à se vanter ce serait à l'égard de Dieu (*Ibid.*, 388). Voir aussi, pour la non-fiabilité du *shat'h* dans la Voie, *Risâla lâ yu'awwalu alahî*, in *Rasâ'il*, 12; *Kitâb al-isrâ*, in *Rasâ'il*, 47.

14. Cf. William C. Chittick, *Ibn al-'Arabî's Metaphysics of Imagination: The Sufi Path of Knowledge*, SUNY Press, Albany, New York, 1989, 319-20; Carl W. Ernst, "The Man Without Attributes: Ibn 'Arabî's Interpretation of Abu Yazid al-Bistami", in *Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabî Society*, vol. III (1993), 1-18.

15. *Essai* . . . , 95.

16. Voici les définitions que donne Ibn 'Arabî: 1-"La *ghayba* est quand le cœur perd la connaissance du déroulement des états de la créature, perte due à ce que la sensation est absorbée par ce qui l'envahit", 2-"Le *sukr* est une absence (*ghayba*, perte de conscience) due à un *wârid* (influx) puissant" et 3-"le *sahw* est

un retour à la sensation qui fait suite à cette absence dûe à un influx (*wārid*) puissant" (*Istilāhāt*, éd. Flügel, 288=éd. Hyderabad, 6). Voir, pour les conditions de validité des deux états de *sukr* et de *sahw*, *Risāla lā yu'awwalu 'alayhi*, in *Rasā'il*, 8.

17. *Fut.* III, 117.

18. Massignon, *Essai* . . . , 41.

19. Les manifestations divines sont dites *dhawq* à leur début, *shurb* à leur milieu et *maqām* à leur terme (Ibn 'Arabī, *Istilāhāt*, éd. Flügel, 228=éd. Hyderabad, 6).

20. *Fut.* II, 12.

21. Voir la discussion entre Junayd et Hallāj à ce propos dans *Passion* I, 167-8, et aussi cette opposition entre partisans de *sahw* et partisans de *sukr* dans *Les dits de Bistāmī*, 13-4. Bistāmī est le chef de file des partisans de *sukr* alors que Junayd est le chef de file des partisans de *sahw* (cf. Ali Abdelkader, "Al-Junayd's theory of *Fanā*", in *Islamic Quaterly*, vol. I, Nr. 4 (December 1954), 222-8).

22. Pour la mystique de Shiblī et ses rapports avec Hallāj, cf. *Passion* I, 123-9 et 660.

23. *Fut.* II, 12.

24. *Ibid.*, 546. Voir une autre version dans Louis Massignon, *Recueil de textes inédits concernant l'histoire de la mystique en pays d'Islam*, Paris, 1929, p. 62-63.

25. *Fut.* II, 546. Ibn 'Arabī distingue entre une parole vraie et une parole extatique prononcée sous la domination du *hāl* (*Ibid.*, 507). Voir, pour la supériorité de la science à l'état mystique, *Ibid.* I, 118, 473, 502; II, 260, 358, 574 etc

26. *Kitāb al-masā'il*, in *Rasā'il*, 7; *Kitāb al-isrā' ilā'l-maqām al-asrā'* in *Rasā'il*, 4 (avec la référence explicite à Hallāj et son "*Anāl-Haqq*"), et 10 (la méfiance à l'égard du *sukr*).

27. *Fut.* II, 546; Ibn 'Arabī, *Risāla ilā-i-imām al-Rāzī*, in *Rasā'il*, 10-11.

28. Voir une définition de la Voie en tant qu'elle est régie strictement par la Loi dans Ibn 'Arabī *Istilāhāt*, éd. Flügel, 284=éd. Hyderabad, 2.

29. Chittick, Ibn al-'Arabī's Metaphysics . . . , 258-63.

30. Voir dans la typologie des différentes exégèses de la locution de Hallāj "*Anāl'l-Haqq*" faite par Massignon l'exégèse n. C-a dans *Passion* I, 173.

31. *Fut.* II, 370.

32. Un disciple de Hallāj raconte: "Je lui (Hallāj) demandai: Où veux-tu en venir? Il répondit: Que l'on tue cette maudite! et il désigna sa propre personne. Alors je lui dis: Serait-ce permis d'inciter les gens au mal?—Non, dit-il, mais je les incite au bien. Car, je tiens pour un devoir que l'on tue cette maudite. Quant à eux, s'ils témoignent du zèle pour leur foi, ils en sont récompensés (L. Massignon, *Akhbār al-Hallāj*, Vrin, Paris 3, 139).

33. Voir, par exemple, *Kitāb al-jalāla*, in *Rasā'il*, 5; et aussi 'le secret de la Seigneurie' (*sirr al-siyāda*) dans *Manzil al-qutb*, in *Rasā'il*, 10. Cf. Chittick, Ibn al-'Arabī's Metaphysics . . . , 312-3 et 318-9.

34. Massignon rejette la filiation entre Bistāmī et Ibn 'Arabī, réclamée pourtant par celui-ci, et reconnaît la filiation entre Tustarī et Ibn 'Arabī par l'intermédiaire de la Sālīmiyya (*Essai* . . . , 276). Voir, pour l'exposé de la doctrine de Bistāmī

Massignon, *op. cit.*, 273-86, et, pour un exposé de la doctrine de Tustarî Gerhard Böwering, *The Mystical Vision of Existence in Classical Islam*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin-New York, 1980.

35. Voir comment Ibn 'Arabî reprend des éléments à la doctrine de Sahl dans G. Böwering, *op. cit.*, 39-40, 48, 53, 196-7.

36. *Fut.* III, 117. Dans ses locutions Bistâmî s'est identifié à divers sujets créés, par ex.: "Je suis le Trône de Dieu" (Massignon, *Essai* . . . , 279). Voir comment, dans quel sens et sous quelles conditions le 'Los à moi' de Bistâmî est recevable (*Kitâb al-tajalliyât*, in *Rasâ'il*, 9 = *al-Tajalliyât al-Ilâhiyya* et ses *Commentaires*, éd. Osmân Hahia, 223-4.

37. *Fut.* III, 117.

38. *Ibid.*, 118. Dans la typologie des différentes exégèses dressée par Massignon et mentionnée plus haut, celle d'Ibn 'Arabî est proche de celle de Ghazâlî et de Kîlânî (*Passion* I, 172-3, exégèse n. B-b).

39. II, pp. 320-62. Nous reprenons, à quelques détails près, la traduction française par Maurice Gloton, *Traité de l'amour*, Albin Michel, Paris, 1968.

40. *Fut.* II, 320, 329.

41. *Ibid.*, 327.

42. *Ibid.*, 332.

43. Pour les *Hulûliyya*, voir par exemple Al-Sarrâj al-Tûsî, *Kitâb al-luma'*, éd. R. A. Nicholson, Leyden/London, 1914, 426.

44. *Fut.* II, 334.

45. *Ibid.* 353.

46. *Ibid.*, 361. La référence explicite est faite ici à Bistâmî et non pas à Hallâj.

47. *Ibid.*, 390.

48. Ibn 'Arabî, *Istîlâhât*, éd. Flügel, 285 = éd. Hyderabad, 3. Voir aussi le chapitre 192 des *Futûhât* (II, 384-5) consacré au *Hâl*. Cf. Chittick, *Ibn al-'Arabî's Metaphysics* . . . , 263-70.

49. Il lui consacre le chapitre 199 des *Futûhât* (II, 478-9). S'inspirant certainement du fameux *sirr ar-rubûbiyya* (le secret de la Seigneurie) de Tustarî en donne la définition suivante: "C'est l'entité (*man'â*) qui, en devenant ma nifeste, fait que le statut (*hukm*) disparaisse et soit infirmé (*yabtulu*) (*Fut.* II, 279).

50. *Ibid.*, 478.

51. *Coran* 57: 3.

52. C'est grâce à ce secret de l'état spirituel que Jésus insuffla dans la forme d'oiseau faite d'argile et en fit un oiseau réel (*Fut.* II, 479). Voir une autre définition du *hâl* dans *ibid.* I, 190.

53. *Ibid.* II, 528.

54. *Ibid.*, 479. Voir les définitions de ces trois degrés dans *Istîlâhât* éd. Flügel, 289 = éd. Hyderabad, 8; Al-Tahânawî, *Kashshâf istîlâhât al-funûn*, Calcuta, 1862, 655.

55. Pour Dieu, ce qui correspond au *hâl* humain c'est le *sha'n* (ce à quoi Dieu vaque à chaque instant et qui est la source de tout changement dans le monde).

56. *Fut.* II, 479.

57. *Ibid.*, 38. Le soufi, qui vit sous l'emprise des *ahwâl*-s, ceux-ci décident de lui (*al-hukm li-l-ahwâl*), *Fut.* I, 657. D'ailleurs l'âme raisonnable vit sous l'emprise du *hâl* comme le corps vit sous l'emprise des humeurs (*mizâj*, *ibid.* I, 588).

58. *Ibid.*, 615.

59. Ces sciences sont acquises par le goût (*dhawq*). Le goût est pour les *ârifân* ce que la preuve est pour ceux qui spéculent (*ashâb al-nazar*) (*ibid.* II, 574).

60. *Ibid.*, 611. La description que fait Ibn 'Arabî de celui qui est sous l'emprise du *hâl* s'applique sans aucun doute à Hallâj: "L'homme du *hâl* qui a été annihilé par la Majesté (*jalâl*) ou rendu fou (*hayyamahu*) par la Beauté (*jamâl*) n'a plus sa raison, le Réel le prend alors en charge dans cette absence absorbante de sa sensation (*ghayba fihissihi*) et lui fait faire ce qu'Il veut" (*ibid.* I, 479). Cf. aussi *Risâla lâ yu'awwalu 'alâhi*, in *Rasâ'il*, 4.

61. "Le *hâl* est une maladie alors que le *maqâm* (station ou demeure) est une santé. Les ignorants qui appartiennent à notre Voie (=le soufisme) affirment l'excellence de *hâl* par rapport à 'ilm parce qu'ils ignorent ce qu'est le *hâl*. Les plus grands parmi les Hommes cherchent abri auprès de Dieu pour fuir les *ahwâl*-s dans la vie d'ici-bas. Les *ahwâl*-s sont parmi les plus grands voiles. C'est pour cette raison que la Communauté des soufis (*tâ'ifa*) ont fait des *ahwâl*-s des dons (*mawâhib*) et ont fait des *maqâmât* quelque chose d'acquis (*makâsib*). Or la vie d'ici-bas est, pour les plus grands, demeure d'acquisition (*kasb*, effort humain) et non de *hâl* (don de grâce). Le *kasb* te fait élever d'un grade et le *hâl* te fait perdre du temps et ne t'élève donc pas, il est plutôt l'un des fruits du *maqâm* . . . l'excellence du *hâl* est dans l'au-delà et non pas dans l'ici-bas, alors que l'excellence du 'ilm et du *maqâm* est dans l'ici-bas et dans l'au-delà (*Fut.* I, 473). Voir aussi (*ibid.*, 99) l'excellence du *maqâm* par rapport au *hâl*. "Le *hâl*, dit-il aussi, est l'un des plus grands voiles pour l'être humain, et il est le lieu des ruses divines par lesquelles Il met le *waly* à l'épreuve (*makr* et *istidrâj*)" (*Fut.* II, 528). Voir aussi *Risâlatu-l-qasam al-ilâhi*, in *Rasâ'il*, 17; *Kitâb al-tajalliyât*, in *Rasâ'il*, 27 = *al-Tajalliyât al-Ilâhiyya* et ses *Commentaires*, éd. Osman Yahia, 348-50.

62. *Fut.* III, 179-80.

63. *Ibid.*, IV, 332. Massignon explique cette critique de Hallâj par Ibn 'Arabî de la manière suivante: "Ibn 'Arabî, épris de logique formelle, élimine, en fait, toute intervention transcendante de la divinité, du domaine de la mystique. Tel est le fondement de sa critique des mystiques anciens, Yahya Râzî Jonayd et Hallâj, et de sa sympathie pour les *Sâlimiyya*" (*Essai* . . . , 315).

64. *Passion*, II, 414, note 3.

65. M. Chodkiewicz, *Un océan sans rivage* . . . , 115-6.

66. *Op. Cit.*, 382-7. Voir aussi sur la nécessité de voir la multiplicité dans l'unité *Risâla lâ yu'awwalu 'alâhi*, in *Rasâ'il*, 14; et pour le droit du corps et son importance *Kitâb al-Shâhid*, in *Rasâ'il*, 4; *Kitâb al-tarâjum*, in *Rasâ'il*, 26, 29, 30.

67. Critique implicite de Bistâmî. Voir une critique semblable dans Massignon, *Essai* . . . , 280-1. Mais Dieu, en faisant l'éloge de l'homme, lui dit: "Los à toi! Que ton pouvoir est grand!" (*Kitâb al-isrâ'*, in *Rasâ'il*, 69).

68. *Fut.* I, 640. Pour l'affirmation de 'Ané (moi) voir *Kitâb al-tarâjum*, in *Rasâ'il*,

22.

69. Voir la critique de Hallāj et son illusion d'avoir réalisé l'union (*ittihād*) par Ibn 'Arabī dans *Kitāb al-fanā*, in *Rasā'il*, 2-3; *Kitāb al-yā*, in *Rasā'il*, 5-6, 13; *Kitāb al-tarājum*, in *Rasā'il*, 7; *Kitāb al-masā'il*, in *Rasā'il*, 29-30 (les différentes significations de l'*ittihād*).

70. I, 640.

71. *Ibid.* III, 180.

72. *Ibid.* I, 51, suivant la célèbre parole attribuée à Abū Bakr as-siddīq et très commentée par Ibn 'Arabī.

73. *Ibid.*, 66-68.

74. *Ibid.*, 52, 251; *Essai* . . . , 80. Massignon rejette l'idée de Kremer que Hallāj est le précurseur du monisme d'Ibn 'Arabī (*Essai* . . . , 315).

75. *Ihyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn*, Caire, s.d. et *Mishkāt al-Anwār*, in *Al-Jawāhir al-Ghawālī*, Caire, 1343/1924.

76. *Passion*, II, 100-101.

77. *Id.*

78. Cité par Massignon dans son *Recueil de textes inédits concernant l'histoire de la mystique en pays d'Islam*, Paris, 1929, 189. Voir un exemple de ce refus de la conception hallagienne de l'union chez Ibn 'Arabī dans son *Kitāb al-alif*, in *Rasā'il*, 5.

79. *Mishkāt*, 114.

80. *Ihyā'*, 2486, 2487, 2490.

81. *Ibid.*, 2486, 2489.

82. *Mishkāt*, 111-12.

83. *Al-Imlā'* . . . , in *Ihyā'*, IV, 3028.

84. Ed. Khalifé, Beyrouth, 1959, 56; une traduction française est maintenant disponible: Ibn Khaldūn, *La Voie et la Loi ou le Maître et le Juriste. Shifā' al-sā'il li-tahdhīb al-masā'il*. Traduit de l'arabe, présenté et annoté par René Pérez, Sindbad, Paris, 1991.

85. Pour Massignon le soufisme après Hallāj a glissé vers "le libéralisme moniste des *Sālimiyah*" et la "synthèse de la dogmatique ash'arite avec des éléments mystiques . . . que Ghazālī avait tant méditée se trouve, à cause des nécessités de la lutte contre les Qarmates, faire de si graves concessions aux *Sālimiyah*, qu' elle ramène, comme à reculons, les théologiens vers les solutions monistes; le danger, visible chez Sohrawardī d'Alep, éclate enfin chez Ibn 'Arabī (*Essai* . . . , 315).

86. *Kitāb al-shāhid*, in *Rasā'il*, 14.

87. *Fut.* II, 317.

88. *Ibid.* I, 87; II, 110.

89. *Ibid.* I, 225.

Suhrawardi, Philosopher or Mystic?
Golden Triangle of his Worldview
 Shiva Kaviani

*If there were no love and no grief from love,
 who would have heard the many beautiful words spoken by you?
 If there were no breeze to snatch away the tresses,
 who would have shown the lover the beloved's cheeks?*
 —Saadi

To begin with Suhrawardi's worldview and to develop our idea, we have to offer a brief and short explanation about his life and works. The sage whose doctrines came to a large extent to replace, especially in Persia the Peripatetic philosophy which al-Ghazzālī had criticized so severely was Shihāb al-Din Yahyā ibn Habash ibn Amirak al-Suhrawardi, sometimes called shiakh-e Eshrāq or al-Maqtul. He was born in 549 A.H./1153 A.D. in the village of Suhraward near the modern Persian city of Zanjan. He received his early education with Majd al-Din al-Jili in Maraghah. The city that was to become world-famous a few years later when Hulaqu, the Mongol conqueror, built the well-known observatory near it and assembled the great astronomers of the day under the direction of Khwājah Nasir al-Din al Tusi in that city. Later, Suhrawardi went to Ispahan which was then a leading center of learning in Persia, in order to continue his studies. Suhrawardi completed his formal training in different subjects with Zahir al Din al-Qari.

Having completed his formal studies, Suhrawardi set out to travel throughout Persia, meeting various Sufi masters to some of whom he became strongly attracted. In fact, it was during this phase of his life that he entered upon the Sufi Path and spent long periods in spiritual retreats in invocation and meditation. Of course, we are not fully

aware of the type of his pilgrimage and Tariqā (Way) as well as his life, thought and spiritual development, so in this case, we are facing with a mystery. He made many journeys to Anatolia, Syria and Damascus. In Aleppo, he studied Malik Zāhir, the son of Salāh al-Dīn al-Ayyubi, but his outspoken manner, his lack of prudence in exposing esoteric doctrines before all opponents in debate, his mastery in both discursive philosophy and Mysticism made the doctors of the Law ('ulamā') to ask for his execution which ended in his death.

In different books and articles written about Suhrawardi, the authors have classified his works in different manners, but we choose one of them and mention as below:

1. The four large didactic and doctrinal works, all in Arabic: *Talwihāt* (The Book of Intimations), *Muqāwamāt* (The Book of Oppositions), and *Mutarabāt* (The Book of Conversations)—all three dealing with modifications of Aristotelian philosophy and finally his masterpiece *Hikmat al-ishrāq* (The Theosophy of the Orient of Light), which is concerned with Ishrāq doctrines.
2. Shorter treatises in both Arabic and Persian: *Hayākil al-nur* (The Temples of Light), *al-Alwāh al-'imādiyyah* (Tablets Dedicated to 'Imād al-Dīn), *Partawnāmah* (Treatise on Illumination), *Fī i tiqād alhukamā* (On the Faith of the philosophers), *al-Lamahāt* (The Flashes of Light), *Yazdān Shinākht* (The knowledge of God), and *Bustān alqulub* (The Garden of the Heart). The last two are attributed to 'Ain al-Qudāt al-Hamadāni and Sayyid Sharif al-Jurjani, but it is proved to be Suhrawardi's.
3. Symbolic and mystical narratives, or novels, depicting the journey of the soul across the cosmos to its ultimate deliverance and illumination.
4. Transcription: translations of and commentaries on earlier philosophic works as well as sacred and religious texts, such as the translation into Persian of Avicenna's *Risālat al-tair*; commentary upon his *Ishārāt*; composition of *Risālah fī haqiqat al-'ishq*, which is based on Avicenna's *Risālah fī'lishq*.¹

To study systematically philosophical and mystical or better to say, synthetical ideas of a brilliant and outstanding thinker and theoretician like Suhrawardi, it requires to have an illuminated


intellect and at the same time creative methodology. In other words, to flash the light on the dark points of his worldview and the lacuna of his personality, we should cling to his own light, like the youngest brother of lovers of Red Intellect, Sorrow,² to obtain the ability of knowing him as the resemblance of Absolute Beauty. It is here that we grasp the real meaning of the word "Philosopher" in regard to Suhrawardi's case. As we know, the Greek word for philosopher, *Philosophos* (*Philos*—loving+*Sophos*—wise) means lover of wisdom; And in Iran, opposite to the west, wisdom not reason, is what a philosopher in the full sense of the word is engaged with. So, we can attach the real meaning of philosopher to him, because he combines reason with love (wisdom) whose fruit will be "The Red Intellect".³

But why is it so difficult to know Suhrawardi and why are we facing a dilemma in respect to his intellectual system? These questions and the answers also, are the central ones if we are to compare him with other Iranian and Mediterranean Philosophers and Mystics and prove that he is unique. Unfortunately, most of the interpreters of Suhrawardi have recognized him as either a philosopher or a mystic and have discussed his ideas and works from one dimension. To answer the above-mentioned questions, we must acknowledge the fact that he is a special thinker whose corpus of ideas is trinal and if we look at his doctrines from any point of view, we will immediately realize that we are encountering a three-dimensional configuration.

Suhrawardi's view is very creative unlike any of the philosophers and mystics before him and this is what makes it difficult to know him, because he is at the same time a philosopher, a mystic, a sage, and a logician, but non of them by itself. In short, his thought constitutes neither a theology, nor a theosophy, instead it represents a systematic mystical philosophy. To ignore completely the logical and epistemological components of his works, does not sound rational and is not a plausible analysis. It is better to say, the configuration of his worldview is trinal, namely it is based on synthetical and dialectical methodology and even his character and his sources of knowledge has three dimensions. Suhrawardi's idea is characterised by lack of dogmatism, with a dynamic pattern that permits for change as the issues change. In fact, it consists of wisdom (*σοφία*) in definite

meaning; it is ultimately a philosophy that aims at experiencing the external world as well as the internal world to achieve a synthetical understanding of the cosmos.

To express the concept of the Golden Triangle of his worldview in this short article, we can start with his personality and the essence of his wisdom. As we understand from his words and his works the sources of his universal wisdom through the chain of ancient sages appears to be a triangle:



The Master of *Ishrāq* (Illumination) therefore considered himself as the central point at which the two traditions of knowledge that had long ago their roots in one base, were again unified. On one angle, we have the knowledge of his Persian predecessors, figured up in Zoroaster, and on the other angle of the triangle we are faced with his neighbouring civilization, the Greek tradition, which is summed up specially in Plato. Generally speaking, Suhrawardi's role as the synthesizer of Greek and Persian "wisdom" together with Islamic reflections, is not only important regarding his case, but simultaneously is a characteristic point in respect to unification of Western and Eastern philosophy Mysticism tradition. He writes himself in:

There was among the ancient Persians a community of men who were guides toward the Truth and were guided by Him in the Right Path. It is their high and illuminated wisdom, to which the spiritual experience of Plato and his predecessors are also witness, that we have again brought to life in our book called *Hikmat al-ishraq*.

Again he emphasizes his pre-Aristotelian wisdom, the period prior to the rationalization of philosophy.

Although before the composition of this book I composed several summary treatises on Aristotelian philosophy, this book differs from them and has a method peculiar to itself. All of its material has not been assembled by thought and reasoning; rather, intellectual intuition, contemplation and ascetic practices have played a large role in it. Since our sayings have not come by means of rational demonstration but by inner vision and contemplation, they cannot be destroyed by the doubts and temptations of the sceptics. Whoever is a traveller on the road to Truth is my companion and aid on this path. The procedure of the master of philosophy and wisdom, the Divine Plato, and the sages who preceded Plato in time like Hermes, the father of philosophy... And the Ishrāqi wisdom, whose foundation and basis are the two principles of light and darkness as established by the Persian sages. . . .⁴

Now we come to our most important question: Is Suhrawardi a philosopher, a mystic or both? To resolve this complicated problem, we use again synthetical method to chart a golden triangle and come up with a central answer. Seriously studying his works, we obtain from the first step that he is a philosopher in full understanding, different from the Greek and Iranian philosophers; it means that he attains the knowledge from another source, Noor al-Anvār, and through another way of contemplating and meditating. Contrary to Peripatetic philosophers from Aristotle to Iranian Peripatetic philosophers, who achieve knowledge through reason and assume a rational method in philosophical and logical proofs, he, on the opposite, relying on Aristotelian methodology and epistemology, constructs his philosophy on the basis of intuition. Therefore, he perceives knowledge by presence in a visionary realm under the guidance of Master of Philosophers, Aristotle. In one of his major works, *Kitāb al-Mashari'awāl motarihat*, Suhrawardi refers to his famous mystical trance and dialogue he had with Aristotle in these remarks.

(280) This was due to what happened between myself and the philosopher, the master of thinkers, Aristotle, in a mystical stage called (*Jaburs*).

On this occasion in a vision he started talking to me about the idea that man is entitled in the first place to make his inquiry into the problem of the knowledge of the reality of himself (*elmihi bi dhātih*), and in the second, to make inquiry into the knowledge of the others which are beyond the reality of himself.⁵


However, being a philosopher, Suhrawardi also philosophizes on truth and problems of this universe and even he uses philosophical theorems and logical demonstrations. But although he even applies the Aristotelian proofs in some methodological approaches and in philosophical inquiries he relies on Aristotle's and not Plato's position, still he goes further to change the Peripatetic methods. As he states:

I have not paid attention to the well-known doctrine of the Peripatetics, but rather I am reviewing and revising them as far as I can and mention only the core of the theorems (*qawā'id*) of the First Teacher.⁶

Further, in his "Introduction to the *Philosophy of Illumination* he attempts at setting up some critical considerations:

I have provided in this book what enables one to dispense with (Peripatetic methods), plus amazing and unique matters. It includes carefully laid-down rules of science. In it there are not discrepancies nor scattered thought. I advise you not to follow me blindly, nor any one else. For the true measure of things is demonstration. . . . Turn to "experiential sciences"⁷ in order that you may become one of the philosophers.⁸

His words prove our idea that he has a new attitude in philosophy different from Peripatetics view and he hints at experience as a real measure for philosophical understandings other than mere theoretical demonstrations. So, we come to a new triangle again:




For him, experience is sensuous knowledge, but not the same as the empirical sensuous knowledge of the external world, which is only a part of his constellation. Philosophy for him is not only a speculative contemplation, an intuitive one as well. In fact, in his ontological methodology for evaluating knowledge about this universe, he uses a method combining discursive and intuitive approaches. Arguing in a different way, we find out the wisdom at the top of triangle representative of Active Intellect,⁹ the first thing Absolute created, due to Suhrawardi's interpretation, and reason and intuition on two angles.

Furthermore, although he is a logician as well and he uses logic as an organon in accompany with philosophy in his theoretical system, but again he criticizes Peripatetic logic. In his book *Hikmat al-ishrāq*, he devotes the first section to the study of logic as formulated by Aristotle and Phorphyry, without accepting it totally; In fact, he devoted the second part of the first section to a general analysis of some of the aspects of Aristotelian Philosophy including logic. Here Suhrawardi criticizes the Aristotelian definition which he considers to be no more than a tautology and reduces the nine accidents to four, these being relation, quality, quantity and motion.

In analyzing and evaluating Aristotle and Muslim Peripatetics he attacks some of the basic tenets of their philosophy in order to prepare the ground for the formulation of his own special philosophy, *Ishrāqi* doctrines. He does not accept the view of Avicenna and other Aristotelians that in each existing thing, the "existence" is principal and the "essence" is dependent for its reality upon "being". Thus, in this case "existence" for him is subjective existence. But, it is the "essence" of a thing that possesses reality and is principal, "being" playing the subordinate role of an accident added to the "essence". . . .

To shed light on this complicated view, we should interpret his creative analysis more clearly. As we apprehend from Islamic-Iranian Philosophy, we have two schools called principality of essence (*isalat al-mahiyant*) and principality of being (*isalat al-wujud*). At first glance, it seems that Suhrawardi belongs to the first school, and some philosophers even have agreed to it. Contrary to this, in my opinion, he belongs to none of these schools, because "being" in this sense, is subjective concept for him, and "essence" is


substantial quiddity in direct relation to Absolute Substance like real being or better to say, “existence”. So, in other words, he belongs to both of these schools and what is more important for him consequently, is that “existence” assumes as an universal truth. We can show this unique analysis in a new triangle:




Moreover, “existence” is nothing other than Absolute Light or Noor al-Anvār which flows in all beings and essences directly or indirectly. Here, from ontological point of view, he is very close to Ibn Arabi, who also believes that “existence” flows in everything permanently. The only difference is that, Suhrawardi considers light equal to existence flow in all existents. He says himself:

The Essence of the First Absolute Light, Beauty, gives constant illumination, whereby it is manifested and it brings all things into existence, giving life to them by its rays. Everything in the world is derived from the Light of His Essence and all beauty and perfection are the gift of His bounty, and to attain fully to this illumination is salvation.¹⁰

In this respect, to specify his cosmographic features of his epistemology, besides allegorization, using metaphor, meta-language and symbolic language, Suhrawardi employs a synthetical language in harmony with his whole worldview, which can be illustrated in Golden Triangles from esthetical standpoint. As he mentioned himself, Beauty for him is identical with Existence, which is the manifestation of Absolute or Absolute Beauty in this world.




Therefore, to understand his attitude toward wisdom and his interpretation of it in an illuminated way, we can claim that he is a Philosopher and Mystic at the same time and light or Absolute existence is the origin of his knowledge. As Suhrawardi says himself about his root of knowledge this is what distinguishes him from others as a special mystic other than being merely a philosopher. Being differentiated from other mystics, makes him a philosopher (who is) close to the existentialist philosophers (Germans), for whom also “existence” is not mere being in the world, but more than that, implies presence of beings in phenomenal universe. To show the similarities of his perception of “existence” and its difference with “being”, in comparison with Existencialist School, we will deal with descriptively in a separate article. Now we can use triangles to show Suhrawardi’s position from ontological point of view:



The more we study his outlook, the more we become closer to this fact that light (Noor) and (Noor al-Anvār) “Light of Lights” plays a crucial and influential role in his wisdom. But we should also recognize this point that where he speaks of light in this world as the symbol of Absolute Light, he aims at a new mode of interpretation basically different from that of dualists and Manicheans. So, although he uses dual concepts of darkness and light, he does not fall into dualism, because these two are two dimensions of one, and through

them, he comes on a synthesis and reaches a new triangle:


It is proper to glorify the self-subsistent Presence and no other. It is right to laud and magnify the Lord of Divine Might exceedingly. Praise be to the Holy One from whose identity¹¹ proceeds the identity of all that can be named, and from whose being comes the being of all that will ever be. Homage and benedictions upon the soul of our Lord, the ray of whose Light of purity shone upon the world and whose beams of revelation lit the horizons of the orient and occident, and upon his companions and Helpers.




Looking in a general manner to his philosophical outlook, we apprehend that he criticizes Aristotle severely for refusing to believe in the world of archetypes, or “Platonic ideas”, as his Master has done, and for having thereby deprived things of any reality in higher orders of being. Likewise, he rejects the Aristotelian definition of place and prefers a concept of place closer to that of Plato. Although Suhrawardi refers to Plato as a Master and although he has many similarities with him, he possesses a different worldview from that of Plato. As we understand from his words and works, the first thing appeared was Absolute Intellect:

Know that the first thing God created was a glowing pearl He named Intellect, 'aql. . . This pearl He endowed with three qualities, the ability to know God, the ability to know itself and the ability to know that which had not existed and then did exist. From the ability to know God there appeared *husn*, who is called Beauty; and from the ability to know itself there appeared '*ishiq*' who is called Love. From the ability to know that which did not exist and then did exist there appeared *huzn*, who is called Sorrow. . . . (Treatise, VI).


So, having in mind that he refers to Plato as his Master, we can then compare these two philosophers and reach the conclusion that they are very similar, and at the same time, there is a basic difference between them. Concerning the homonymous line, they correspond in methodological ontology, and dissimilarity rise up from their initial interpretations presenting the origin of creation of this world. Idea for Plato is consistent to itself and this world is the shadow of Idea. But on the behalf of Suhrawardi, He is the God, who is assumed as the Creator of Absolute Intellect, being identical to Plato's Idea:



To indicate more clearly his unique Philosophy of Illumination (*Hikmat al-ishrāq*) and his special spiritual development (pilgrimage) to obtain the knowledge, we look at two of his most important and influential books, *Paths and Havens* and *Philosophy of Illumination* in which we can find out specific statements concerning methodology of the Philosophy of Illumination. In the "Introduction" of *Paths and Havens*, Suhrawardi points out that the book consists of the results of his personal experiences and intuition. To attain knowledge, he admits that he has got some principles as a result of passages of contemplation which consists of three stages. The first stage is an activity through which the philosopher prepares himself for illuminationist's knowledge. The second stage is the stage of building up a true science. Only in this stage of building, the philosopher goes on to use discursive analysis and after that what is constructed will be written down. Obviously, we are facing a trinal spiritual development which can be shown in a new triangle:



Looking more deeply at his unparalleled interpretation of pilgrimage of the soul, we find out that one who has the ability to travel this spiritual development, will be able to pass fire, water and mountains. Put it in another way, this means that with rise of the sun of illumination in him, an intuitive and experiential awareness to the gravitational pull back toward his origin on the vertical orientation, appears, through which, the soul can pass easily out of limitations of time, space and matter; here we can perceive the real freedom of the Perfect Man through flight of soul from west to east, stretching out of this cage to enter Unlimited Time, his source which he has lost, to match the eternity and hear the sound of Gabriel's wing. In fact, the Journey of the soul reaches its ultimate point, passing away and releasing from the cage, or triangle of matter, time and space and entering the real universe of Golden Triangle of immaterial, eternal Time and unlimited Space:



Summarizing this short study of Suhrawardi's worldview, we will realize that looking from every dimension to prism of his coloured lights, there appears a new triangle. So, from philosophical, mystical, esthetic, cosmological, logical and eschatological points of view, his ideas are systematized in a synthetical—dialectical or triunal pattern. Therefore, being philosopher and mystic at the same time, he is typified by creativity of knowledge and personality.

Notes

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2. *The Mystical & Visionary Treatises of Suhrawardi*, Treatise VI, trans. by W. M. Thackston, London, 1982.
3. One of the basic and important treatises of Suhrawardi, in which, he expresses his special perception of Intellect. See: *Suhrawardi's Treatises*, trans. by W. M. Thackston.
4. *Hikmat al-ishrāq* (Philosophy of Illumination), trans. by H. Ziai.
5. *Kitāb al-Masharia, wal-motarihat*, ed. H. Corbin (Istanbul, 1945), p. 484, English trans. by M. Y. Hairi.
6. Suhrawardi, *Opera* I, p. 2, trans. to English by H. Ziai.
7. *al-ilm "al-tajarrudi" al-ittisali al-shuhudi*. Cf. R. Arnaldez, El, s.v. "Ishraq"
8. Suhrawardi, *Opera* I, pp. 120, 121, English trans. by H. Ziai.
9. For more explanations See *The Mystical & Visionary Treatises of Suhrawardi*, Treatise VI, trans. by W. M. Thackston, London, 1982.
10. Suhrawardi, *Hikmat al-ishrāq*, trans. to English by M. Smith, in the Readings from the *Mystics of Islam* (London, 1950), p. 79.
11. The word used is *ui* ('he-ness'), the Persian equivalent of the Arabic *huwiyya*, a philosophical term usually translated to 'ipseity' what 'is' essentially. For its use as the third person objective identity, see *The Mystical & Visionary Treatises of Suhrawardi*, VIII. 10 (3).

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 ———. *Zakhaer-al-Aalagh*
 ———. *Fusus al-Hikam (Bezels of Wisdom)*
 ———. *Rasael Ibn Arabi (Farsi)*
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(Compiled by Takashi Iwami)

Appendix
Catalogue of
Lithographed Books of Iran
in the Library of Toshihiko Izutsu
Compiled by Takashi Iwami

١ الاشتياني ، محمد حسن .

بحر الفوائد في شرح الفرائد / [للحاج ميرزا حسن بن جعفر الاشتياني] . —
طهران : دار الطباعة استاد آقا سيد مرتضى بمباشرة استاد آقا ميرزا حسن بسعي
واهتمام السيد محمد علي الشيرازي به خط احمد التفريشي ، شعبان سنة ١٣٠٧-
شعبان سنة ١٣١٥ ق .
٤ جلد در ١ مجلد (٢٩٩ ، ٢٣٣ ، ٢٣٢ ، ٦٩ ص) ، ٣٥ س .

٢ آل طباطبا ، سيد محمد باقر بن مرتضى حسن العلوي الفاطمي .

كتاب وسيلة الوسائل في شرح الرسائل / من تصنيفات الحاج سيد محمد باقر . —
تبريز : دار الطباعة المخصوصة للحاج ملا عباسعلي التبريزي ، ١٢٩١ ق .
بي شماره صفحه ٥٦ ، [٣] ص ، ٣٦ س .
في الذيل : رسالة في المباحث المتعلقة بالكتاب الكريم .

٣ ابن أبي جمهور الأحساني .

الكتاب المعروف بالمجلي الموسوم بمسلك الإفهام والنور المنجي من الظلام / المنسوب
إلى ابن أبي جمهور الأحساني . — طهران : تصدى للطبع الحاج الشيخ احمد
الشيرازي به خط حسين بن محمد الخوانساري ، ربيع الثاني ١٣٢٩ ق .
٥٨٥ ص ، ٢٦ س .
بانضمام : أسرار الحج .

٤ ابن الشهيد الثاني ، الحسن بن زين الدين .

معالم الأصول . — بدون مشخصات طبع ، باهتمام وتصحيح محمد علي .
بي شماره صفحه ٢٧ ، ٢٧ س .
سه صفحه اول افتاده .

٥ ابن الشهيد الثاني ، الحسن بن زين الدين .

[معالم الدين / الشيخ حسن بن زين الدين الشهيد الثاني] . - [إيران] : كارخانه آقا ميرزا محمد به خط حاجي آقا بن عبد الله التبريزي ، ربيع الاول ١٢٧٣ ق .
٢٢٧ ص ، ٢٣ س .

٦ ابن الناظم ، محمد بن محمد .

كتاب ابن الناظم في شرح ألفية ابن مالك . — [طهران] : بي نا به خط ابن محمد هادي على اكبر الخوانساري ، ١٢٧٦ ق .
بي شمارہ صفحہ ، ٢٧ س .

٧ ابن بابويه القمي ، محمد بن علي .

علل الشريعة / محمد بن علي بن بابويه . — [ایران] : بي نا به خط ابن آقا مير محمد علي حسين الحسيني الخوانساري (علل الشريعة) و ابن محمد مؤمن على الطالقاني المرجاني (معاني الأخبار) ، ربيع الاول ١٣١١ ق .
١٦٢، ٢٠٣ ص ، ٣٥ س .
بانضمام : كتاب معاني الأخبار / للمصنف .

٨ ابن سينا .

[الشفاء / للشيخ الرئيس ؛ تعليقات صدر المتألهين] . — طهران : مطبعة علميه خاصه مدرسه دار الفنون بدستيارى ميرزا حسين خلف آقا ميرزا عباس به خط عبدالكريم الشريف الشيرازي ، ١٣٠٣- [١٣٠٥] ق .
٢ جلد (٥٢٢ و ٦٥١ ص) ، ٣٤ س .
جلد اول : بدون مشخصات طبع .

٩ ابن سينا .

كتاب قانون / الشيخ الرئيس ؛ بتصحيح الشيخ محمد رضا الكندي . — [طهران] : دار الطباعة على قليخان (جزء ٢) ؛ دار الطباعة كربلائي محمد حسين طهراني (جزء ٣) باهتمام محمد رضى بن حسين الهاشمي العلوي الفاطمي الحسنى الحسينى الطباطبائي السعنانى الطهرانى به خط ابن ميرزا سيد محمد رضا احمد الطباطبائي الاردستاني (متن) و محمد على طهراني (اعلان مقدم) و محمد حسن الكلپايكاني (اعلان مؤخر) ، رمضان ١٢٩٦-١٢٩٧ ق .
٤ جلد در ١ مجلد (٢٤٧، ٣٢٣، ١٥٥، ٥٨ ص) ، ٣٤ س .

١٠. الاحسائي ، شيخ احمد بن زين الدين .

كتاب شرح الزيارة / للشيخ احمد بن زين الدين الاحسائي .— تبريز : دار الطباعة المتعلقة بالاستاد حاج مشهدي آقا بن آقا احمد تبريزي بدستيارى محمد تقى بن رضا النخجوانى به خط محمد على بن ميرزا محمد شفيع خوشنويس ، ربيع الثانى ١٢٧٦ق .
٤٥٨ ص ، ٣٥ س .

١١. الاحسائي ، شيخ احمد بن زين الدين .

[شرح المشاعر / الشيخ احمد بن زين الدين الاحسائي] .— [تبريز : بى نا ، بى تا (قبل از سال ١٢٨٥ق)] .
بى شماره صفحه ، ٢٦ س .
بدون مشخصات طبع .

١٢. الاسترآبادى ، رضى الدين محمد بن الحسن .

شرح رضى على الكافية لابن الحاجب فى علم النحو والاعراب .— تبريز : كارخانه ملا صالح بمباشرة ولد آن مشهدى مهدى ومشهدى اسمعيل به خط حاجى آقا بن عبد الله تبريزي ، ١٢٧٤ق .
٣٢٧ ص ، ٣٦ س .

١٣. اصفهاني ، على اكبر .

زبدة المعارف / من تأليفات أخوند ملا على اكبر اصفهاني .— [طهران] : چاپخانه حاجى عبد المحمد باعث وبانى اين مطبوع محمد حسين تاجر طهرانى به خط على اصغر التفرشى ، رجب ١٢٦٧ق .
بى شماره صفحه ، ٣٥ س .

١٤. الاصفهاني ، محمد حسين بن عبد الرحيم الطهرانى الحائرى .

كتاب الفصول فى علم الاصول / [من تأليفات محمد حسين الاصفهاني الطهرانى الحائرى] .— [طهران] : كارخانه كربلايى محمد قلى وكربلايى محمد حسين بسعى واهتمام آقا ابو الحسن ، ١٢٨٦ق .
بى شماره صفحه ، ٣٥ س .

١٥. الانصارى ، مرتضى بن محمد امين .

الرسائل الاربعة / للشيخ المرتضى الانصارى .— [تبريز] : المطبعة المخصوصة للحاج

كريم بن الحاج ابراهيم التبريزي به خط محمد على التبريزي ، ربيع الاول ١٣١٤ ق .
٧٣٧ ص ، ٣٦ س .

١٦ الانصاري ، مرتضى بن محمد امين .

كتاب المتاجر / من مصنفات شيخ مرتضى الانصاري ؛ تصحيح الحاج ميرزا محمد رضا الرضوي الخوانساري . — [طهران] : بي نا به خط محمد باقر (جلد ١) و عبد الكريم الجزى الاصفهاني (جلد ٢) ، شعبان ١٣٢٥-١٣٢٦ ق .
جلد ٢ در ١ مجلد (٣٦٠ ، ٣٨٥ ص) ، ٣٥ س .

١٧ الانصاري ، مرتضى بن محمد امين .

مطارح الانظار / من تقريرات الشيخ مرتضى الانصاري . — طهران : مطبعه مرتضويه بدستيارى استاد آقا سيد مرتضى بسعى واهتمام آقا مشهدي نوروز على كتابفروش طهراني به خط محمود بن غلام حسين ، محرم ١٣١٤ ق .
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 (كذا) العقائد لنصير الدين خواجه نصير الطوسي ، ٢-حقايق الايمان / من
 تصنيفات المحقق الشهيد الثاني ، ٣-اسرار الصلوة / ايضا من تصنيفات الشهيد
 الثاني ، ٤-كشف الرتبة في احكام الغيبة والنميمة / له ايضا ، ٥-تفسير سورة
 الاعلى / من تصنيفات صدر الدين الشيرازي ، ٦-معانى بعض الاخبار / من تأليفات
 الشيخ محمد بن بابويه الصدوق .
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 طرح الكونين ورفض العالمين] / صدر الدين الشيرازي ، ٣-رسالة في تحقيق خلق
 الاعمال / ايضا لصدر الدين الشيرازي ، ٤-حاشية كشف الرتبة / لمحمد الحسينى ،
 ٥-حاشية اسرار الصلوة / من تحقيقات ملا عبد الرسول المازندراني ، ٦-رسالة
 اجوبة السؤالات المتعلقة بالمعارف / للملا على النورى .

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 فهرست ما فى هذا المجلد : ١-كشف الفوائد للعلامة الحلّي ، ٢-حقايق الايمان / من

تصنيفات المحقق الشهيد الثاني ، ٣- اسرار الصلوة / ايضا له ، ٤- كشف الريبة في احكام الغيبة والنميمة / ايضا له ، ٥- تفسير سورة الاعلى / من تصنيفات صدر الدين الشيرازي ، ٦- معاني بعض الاخبار / من تأليفات الشيخ محمد بن بابويه الملقب بالصدوق .

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بي شمارہ صفحہ ٢٦ ، س .

٩٠ مجهول .

شرح الفصوص للمعلم الثاني الفارابي . — طهران : بي نا ، شوال ١٣١٨ق .
١٤٦ ص ، ٢١ س .

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